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Preface
The troublesome state of affairs concerning freedom of expression in a world 
of religiously motivated terrorism (“theoterrorism”) is what prompted us to 
edit The Fall and Rise of Blasphemy Law.
In today’s world, we are witnessing two conflicting developments taking 
place with regard to freedom of expression and religion. On the one hand, 
we are seeing the continuation of the modernisation project. Influenced by 
the Enlightenment and critical thinking, laws combatting the defamation 
of religion (blasphemy laws) are in many parts of the Western world either 
abolished, or enforced to a far weaker extent in comparison with their 
historical counterparts. On the other hand, we are seeing a resurgence of 
religious fundamentalism in extreme forms. The most extreme form is the 
conviction that the blasphemer, heretic or apostate has to be killed.
This perplexing development gives a whole new dimension to the 
discussion on freedom of expression. Legal limits on freedom of expression, 
established by legislators and judges, are now only one part of the picture. 
Terrorist attacks, which cause fear and, subsequently, self-censorship, have 
become another part of the picture. The protection of freedom of expression 
now also depends on the ability of governments successfully to combat 
theoterrorism.
We thank the contributors to this book. We are also grateful for the two 
peer reviews that we have received, which have helped us improve this 
book. We thank the pre-eminent scholars Eric Barendt, Alan Dershowitz, 
Menachem Mauthner and Bassam Tibi for gracious quotations they allowed 
us to use as endorsements. And last but not least: we are very happy that 
Leiden University Press has shown great enthusiasm throughout every stage 
of this project. It was a privilege to work with such an excellent publisher.
Paul Cliteur and Tom Herrenberg
Leiden University, September 2016
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Foreword
Blasphemy: A Victimless Crime or a Crime in Search 
of a Victim?
Flemming Rose
In the spring of 2015 the Danish centre-left government, with the backing 
of some opposition parties, decided to keep the country’s 150-year-old 
blasphemy law on the books. It did it in spite of the fact that there had not 
been a single conviction for blasphemy since 1946, and against the advice 
of several NGOs and other civil society organisations. A proposal to abolish 
the blasphemy law had been put forward in 2004 when a group of Muslims 
wanted to take the Danish Broadcasting Corporation to court for having 
shown Theo van Gogh’s documentary Submission in the aftermath of his 
killing. Why did the government opt for this solution?
Making the government’s case, Mette Frederiksen, then the Minister 
of Justice and current head of the social democratic party, claimed it was 
a preventive measure to secure public order in the event of blasphemous 
outbursts. She specifically singled out burning the Bible and the Koran as 
blasphemous acts that keeping the law would make it possible to punish. “I 
cannot see how it will strengthen our society or how the public debate would 
be enriched by legalizing the burning of holy books,” she said. 
Well, I can think of a lot of speech and other things that to my mind will 
not benefit or enrich the public space, but does that justify criminalising 
them?
It is true that book burning provokes the most unpleasant associations and 
brings to mind terrible episodes in our history, and it is quite rightly seen as 
an antidote to civilisation. But say your loved ones were killed in a terrorist 
attack and the terrorists justified their bloody actions with quotations from a 
holy book, would the burning of such a book not be a quite understandable 
reaction to express your sense of grief and contempt? 
Leaving this point aside, the Danish government was not entirely honest 
about the state of affairs. Of course, it did not fear violent reactions to copies 
of the Bible being burned in public. In fact, in 1997 the Danish evening 
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news, a Danish Broadcasting Corporation programme, showed a Danish 
artist burning a copy of the Bible while speaking about his coming exhibition 
at an art gallery in Aarhus, Denmark’s second largest city. No death threats 
followed; there were just a few complaints and a call for the prosecutor to 
initiate a blasphemy charge. The case was dropped three months later, largely 
on the basis of the artist’s explanation that it was a symbolic act intended 
to raise public debate about Christianity. In 2006 the Norwegian comedian 
Otto Jespersen also burned a copy of the Bible in the Christian-dominated 
town of Aalesund in front of rolling TV cameras. When asked to repeat his 
stunt with a copy of the Koran, Jespersen refused, saying that he wanted to 
live longer than another week.
As noted above, in 1997 Danish public broadcasting had no qualms about 
an artist burning a copy of the Bible on the news. In 2015 the situation 
was quite different when it came to showing a few cartoons of the prophet 
Muhammad on a late night news show on the same TV station. I was on 
the news show Deadline after the “Je Suis Charlie” day in France, Sunday, 
11 January 2015, following the killing of 12 people at the satirical magazine’s 
offices a few days earlier, to talk about the state of free speech in Europe. 
The magazine Charlie Hebdo’s encounter with the Muslim prophet and 
his adherents started in February 2006 with the republication of Jyllands-
Posten’s cartoons of Muhammed, and so for a few seconds the anchorman 
showed a page containing the 12 original Muhammed cartoons from my 
book The Tyranny of Silence.
It seemed relevant to the topic at hand. Nevertheless, immediately after the 
show the host received a reprimand from his boss and was later temporarily 
removed from the show. He was also criticised by some colleagues for putting 
them in danger, though they did not say as much in public.
So the issue driving the government’s motivation to keep the blasphemy 
law was the holy book of a specific religion and its prophet, not holy 
books and prophets in general. Interestingly, the Danish government also 
reasoned its decision to keep the blasphemy law with a reference to possible 
international reactions to blasphemous speech in Denmark. The result was 
that religious fanatics in the Muslim world now have the power to trigger 
blasphemy charges in Denmark in order to demonstrate to the outside 
world that the government accepts their threats and violence as the most 
serious argument for upholding the rule of law. To me this sounds like a very 
paradoxical understanding of the rule of law in one of the most stable and 
peaceful liberal democracies in the world.
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Two of the essays in this enlightening and thought-provoking anthology 
describe a similar line of reasoning. In November 2004, a couple of weeks 
after the killing of the Dutch filmmaker and provocateur Theo van Gogh, 
the Dutch Minister of Justice, Piet Hein Donner, proposed a revival of the 
blasphemy law. The logic seemed to be that if the Netherlands had had laws 
criminalising van Gogh’s speech about Islam and Muslims then he would still 
be alive. In short, blame the victim and make concessions to the perpetrators 
of violence, then everything will be just fine.
This is one approach to the fact that “God is back,” as two former editors 
and writers for The Economist put it in a book title a few years ago. It is 
popular, especially among Western governments and people who are willing 
to sacrifice freedom on the altar of diversity, to defend their stand with short-
term utilitarian arguments. This highly problematic point of view is analysed 
and dissected in several of the essays. Another approach was proposed by 
the Norwegian government when, in the aftermath of the attack on Charlie 
Hebdo, it decided to repeal its blasphemy law. In promoting the abolition of 
the law, two members of parliament said:
The attack on the French satirical magazine Charlie Hebdo in January 
2015 was an attack on freedom of the press and freedom of expression. 
Even though the blasphemy law in and of itself does not legitimise 
violence, it provides support for the point of view that religious speech 
and symbols have a right to special protection against other kinds 
of speech. This embodies an unfortunate message, and it is about 
time that society stood up for free speech in a clear and unequivocal 
manner, also when it comes to religious issues.
In fact, several observers have made the point that the severe blasphemy laws 
in Pakistan serve as an incitement to violence against blasphemers, not as a 
legal instrument to secure the social peace. In Pakistan, as in several other 
Muslim-majority countries, blasphemy is a capital offence on a par with a 
terrorist attack killing hundreds of people. That is part of the reason why 
there are so many extrajudicial killings of blasphemers in Pakistan. When the 
government communicates to the public that blasphemy is more or less as 
evil as killing hundreds of innocent people, it should not come as a surprise 
that a lot of people are willing to take the law into their own hands. In 2011, 
Mumtaz Qadri, who worked as a bodyguard for Salman Taseer, the governor 
of Punjab province, killed the man he was assigned to protect because Taseer 
had spoken out against the blasphemy laws and defended a Christian woman 
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who was standing trial on blasphemy charges. Qadri was praised as a hero, 
even by Pakistani lawyers. He was executed in February 2016.
With this in mind, one may feel tempted to ask: might getting rid of 
blasphemy laws in the long run pave the way for non-violent reactions to 
blasphemy?
The Danish and Norwegian reactions to the attacks in Paris and 
Copenhagen at the beginning of 2015 represent two different approaches 
to free speech and its limits in a globalised world dominated by digital 
technology and an increasing diversity of religions and cultures. The debate 
about free speech and its limits can no longer be confined to homogeneous 
national spaces. The Danish government’s decision to keep the blasphemy 
law due to threats and violence in countries several thousand kilometres 
away is a manifestation of this new world. In an important and principled 
essay about the Terry Jones affair—an American pastor’s intention to burn 
a copy of the Koran and the U.S. government’s reaction—Paul Cliteur, Tom 
Herrenberg and Bastiaan Rijpkema make the point that it may have grave, 
long-term consequences if liberal democracies are willing to compromise 
fundamental liberties like freedom of speech in order to manage the forces 
of globalisation. They write: “In an interconnected world, free speech cannot 
be studied in the isolation of a single legal order. Terrorists and extremists 
on the other side of the globe force restrictions on the use of free speech by 
a U.S. citizen, and coerce the U.S. government to intervene.”
We need a serious debate about free speech in a globalised world in order 
to avoid ad hoc, short-term decisions to calm emotions.
I find it logical and natural that the more diverse a society becomes in 
terms of culture and religion the more diverse the ways in which people 
express themselves will be. Public confrontations regarding deeply held 
beliefs are inevitable if society wants to provide equal space for differing 
world views in a multicultural society. One has to be honest about the fact 
that diversity is difficult and painful if people are serious about their cultural 
and religious affiliations. Unfortunately, the majority of European politicians 
believe that cultural and religious diversity should be accompanied by less 
diversity when it comes to speech. They are convinced that the only way to 
safeguard the social peace is to accept new limitations on speech. I suspect 
that the pressure on free speech in Europe and beyond will grow in the 
coming years, and in order to understand what is going on we need historical 
analysis, perspective and deconstruction of the arguments favouring further 
limitations on speech. The volume at hand provides the reader with valuable 
insights.
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What is blasphemy? Blasphemy is basically about transgression, about 
crossing the line between the sacred and the profane in ways that are seen 
as improper in a specific context. Blasphemy has no consistent and objective 
meaning independent of time and space. Definitions cover a wide range of 
speech depending on religious content, social norms and power relations.
Austin Dacey has identified three broad concepts in the history of legal 
regulation of blasphemy in the West. They have been prevalent at different 
times throughout history.1 First, there is an ancient concept of blasphemy 
as a direct verbal affront to the divine; second, a medieval concept of 
blasphemy arises as a seditious challenge to the sanctity of law, public order 
or the common good; and, third, there is a modern notion of blasphemy as 
an offence against the sensibilities, rights or dignity of individual believers. 
The last definition is informing current debates about blasphemy and 
can be difficult to separate from incitement to religious hatred. Recently, 
this was demonstrated in a court case in Denmark. In 2016, the city court 
of Elsinore convicted a man of incitement to religious hatred. He had 
written on his Facebook page: “The ideology of Islam is as despicable and 
deplorable, oppressive and anti-human as Nazism. The massive immigration 
of Islamists to Denmark is the most destructive thing that has happened to 
Danish society in recent memory. Islam wants to abuse democracy in order 
to destroy democracy.”
The court deemed these statements to be insulting and degrading to 
the adherents of Islam, though to some this was not seen as an attack on 
individuals or a group of people but as criticism of an ideology. The man 
was acquitted by an appeals court, but the incident shows that it may be 
difficult even for professional judges to draw clear lines between blasphemy 
and incitement to religious hatred. This point was reinforced by another 
case that was unfolding at the same time, in which Denmark’s prosecutor 
general refused to charge an imam with incitement to hatred. The day before 
the deadly attacks in Copenhagen in February 2015, in which a film director 
attending an event centred on blasphemy, art and free speech and a young 
Jew guarding the synagogue were killed, the imam said:
Our Prophet had Jewish neighbours in Al Medina. Did he want closer 
relations, harmony and dialogue in the manner of the UN and those 
who want to unite truth and lies? Or did he preach that they had to 
1 Austin Dacey, The Future of Blasphemy: Speaking of the Sacred in an Age of Human Rights (New York: 
Bloomsbury Academic, 2012).
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commit themselves to Allah? When they broke their promises and did 
not accept his call, then you know what he did to them. It says in the 
Sira that he went to war against the Jews. They were driven into an 
abyss of resignation and corruption that led them from the level of 
humans to the level of animals.
To make the situation even more confusing, a Danish citizen was charged 
with incitement to religious hatred after having burned a copy of the Koran 
in his backyard. He filmed the episode and posted it on Facebook with the 
words: “Think about your neighbour; it stinks when it burns.”
I suspect that the lack of consistency and difficulties in classifying speech 
crimes are not confined to Denmark. They are part of a general European 
trend. In a chapter dealing with the history of Dutch blasphemy law, Paul 
Cliteur and Tom Herrenberg analyse the situation and identify a dilemma 
confronting Europe’s liberal democracies: “What the jihadists of the twenty-
first century re-introduced was the implementation of blasphemy laws by 
extrajudicial execution. Europe is still struggling with how to respond.”
According to Cliteur and Herrenberg there are basically two ways in 
which multicultural democracies can react to this new situation. Either they 
can, as a sign of “multicultural etiquette,” outlaw blasphemy and incitement 
to religious hatred in order to prevent intercommunal strife, and maybe even 
terrorist attacks. Cliteur and Herrenberg rightly see this as a futile exercise. 
Or they can—as the Netherlands and Norway did—revoke provisions that 
protect religion and religious symbols.
Nevertheless, laws against blasphemy or religious insult are still on the 
books in several European countries. This is of course an act of discrimination 
against non-believers. It seems to me that blasphemy needs legal protection 
as a matter of equality before the law and as a precondition for citizens’ right 
to exercise their freedom of expression and freedom of conscience. At the 
height of the cartoon crisis, back in 2006, many observers, including people 
of a liberal persuasion, made the claim that ridiculing Islam’s prophet violated 
Muslims’ right to freedom of religion. Blasphemy was seen as giving offence 
to religious sensibilities, and in a time of “grievance fundamentalism” it had 
to be identified as a criminal offence. Or they interpreted John Stuart Mill’s 
harm principle as holding that an individual’s freedom of speech stops when it 
is used to hurt other people’s feelings. This nonsense was repeated by serious 
people who should have known better. To me it indicated a frightening lack 
of understanding of the basic principles of a free society. 
FOREWORD 15
A few countries have changed their laws in order to make it clear that 
they cover both religious and secular sensibilities so that they provide legal 
recourse to those of secular persuasions as well. That is an improvement, 
but the danger is that it will trigger further limitations on speech along the 
lines of “if you respect my taboo, I will respect yours.” If it is illegal to mock 
the Christian faith it should also be illegal to mock secular ideologies like 
Marxism and liberalism. This has been the case with memory laws. Laws 
criminalising Holocaust denial have been followed by laws criminalising the 
denial of the crimes of communism.
The volume at hand makes a convincing case against the West’s concessions 
to religious fundamentalism over the course of almost four decades. They 
started in 1980 with an almost forgotten documentary about the execution 
of a young Saudi princess and her lover for adultery. Back then the Saudi 
government, with the help of Western governments and oil companies, 
succeeded in convincing a lot of people that broadcasting the documentary 
would be an affront to Muslims. My own government and the Danish 
Broadcasting Corporation caved in to the intimidation and cancelled the 
broadcast of Death of a Princess. The arguments and intimidation employed 
then were very similar to those used during later confrontations: Yes, we 
have free speech, but speech has to be responsible, and this is irresponsible. 
Why insult other people’s religious feelings? Yes, we have our values, but they 
have theirs, and it is not up to us to pass any judgement on them. Violence 
has nothing to do with Islam, and so on and so forth. The arguments were 
repeated after the fatwa against Salman Rushdie in 1989, after the killing of 
Theo van Gogh in 2004, during the cartoon crisis in 2006, after the killings 
at Charlie Hebdo, and in Copenhagen in 2015. The list goes on and on.
Paul Cliteur, Laetitia Houben and Michelle Slimmen sum it up this way:
Instead of upholding and defending the values European governments 
have enshrined in their human rights treaties and constitutions, they 
give in to the unreasonable demands of dictatorships. In the long run 
this attitude may prove suicidal, and democratic governments should 
perhaps do some soul searching on how to uphold democratic values 
in the future.
Indeed.
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1 General Introduction
 Paul Cliteur & Tom Herrenberg
This volume centres around two trends that are currently influencing 
freedom of expression. The first trend is the fact that many Western countries 
have become, over a long period of time, less strict about sacrilegious 
expression—many repealed their blasphemy laws or became less harsh in 
their punishment of blasphemy. Hence “the fall of blasphemy law.” The 
second trend goes in the opposite direction. Over recent decades, Western 
societies have witnessed multiple attempts to suppress speech that defames 
religion. Hence “the rise of blasphemy law.” A particularly vicious way of re-
energising the suppression of blasphemy came from radical believers seeking 
to remove blasphemy from the public domain by violent means. Examples 
include Ayatollah Khomeini calling for the death of British novelist Salman 
Rushdie in 1989, the murder of Dutch filmmaker and polemicist Theo van 
Gogh in 2004, and the murders of Charlie Hebdo staff members in Paris in 
2015.
In all these cases, Islamists took the law into their own hands to deliver 
harsh worldly punishments for blasphemous speech in the West, or 
encouraged others to do so (Khomeini). According to Khomeini, Rushdie 
had written a blasphemous novel for which he and others involved in the 
publication had to be executed. The reason for the murder of Theo van Gogh 
was, in the words of his killer Mohammed Bouyeri, that Van Gogh “had 
offended the Prophet. According to the law he deserved the death penalty, 
and I have executed it. ... Theo van Gogh considered himself a soldier. He 
fought against Islam. On 2 November 2004, Allah sent a soldier who slit 
his throat.”1 The two brothers who attacked the offices of Charlie Hebdo —the 
magazine that had featured caricatures of the prophet Muhammad a number 
of times—wanted to “avenge the prophet.”2
1 Gerechtshof Den Haag (The Hague Court of Appeal), 23 January 2008.
2 http://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-30710883.
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Besides terrorism, there have been non-violent attempts to suppress free 
speech. These include the resolutions tabled at the United Nations aimed at 
banning “defamation of religion,” and pressure from Saudi Arabia to censor 
the airing of the documentary Death of a Princess on Western media outlets 
in the early 1980s.
Whilst this “rise of blasphemy law” is a relatively modern trend in Western 
societies, so is the “fall of blasphemy law.” For many centuries, speaking 
ill of objects of religious veneration got people into serious trouble, even 
before the advent of monotheism. One of the best-known trials in history 
occurred centuries before the birth of Christianity, when Greek philosopher 
Socrates (c. 470–399 BC) stood trial—which resulted in him being forced to 
drink hemlock—for questioning the accepted gods of Athens. The charge of 
“impiety” levelled against Socrates, which “signified shocking and abhorrent 
ideas about religion”3 to the Greeks, had been made earlier against Socrates’ 
brother-in-arms, the Greek military commander Alcibiades (c. 450–404 
BC). His run-in with the authorities is recounted as follows by the historian 
Leonard W. Levy:
In 415 BC, when Athenians were preparing an expeditionary force 
against Sparta, the city awoke one morning to an appalling discovery: 
nearly every statue celebrating Hermes, son of Zeus, the king of gods 
and men, had been desecrated during the night. Impiety on so vast a 
scale seemed the work of a conspiracy. The event was taken as a bad 
omen for the expedition and for the survival of Athenian democracy. 
Informers, responding to offers of rewards, implicated Alcibiades, 
and further investigation uncovered a second crime of impiety. If 
the first was comparable to smashing statues of the Madonna in all 
the religious shrines in a Catholic town during the Middle Ages, the 
second was comparable to a Black Mass. One night when the spirits 
had been high and the flagons low, according to informers, Alcibiades 
had led a blasphemous parody of the sacred Eleusinian Mysteries, 
which honoured Demeter, the earth goddess. Impersonating the high 
priest, Alcibiades had revealed and mocked the secret rites.4
3 Leonard W. Levy, Blasphemy: Verbal Offenses Against the Sacred, from Moses to Salman Rushdie (Chapel 
Hill & London: The University of North Carolina Press 1993), 31.
4 Ibid., 5.
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Alcibiades was sentenced to death in absentia but went to Sparta before the 
sentence could be delivered.
While crassly insulting religion is still prohibited in Greece 2.500 years 
later, the penalties are far less severe.5 Many other Western countries have 
also softened their approach to combatting blasphemy. Some countries 
even went all the way and decriminalised blasphemy altogether. Examples 
include England, which abolished the common law offences of blasphemy 
and blasphemous libel in 2008, and the Netherlands, which repealed the 
three provisions prohibiting blasphemy in the Criminal Code in 2014.6 This 
is in line with recommendations of the Venice Commission—the Council of 
Europe’s advisory body on constitutional matters—made on the subject of 
blasphemy laws in 2008: “the offence of blasphemy should be abolished ... 
and should not be reintroduced.”7
On the global level, human rights protecting freedom of expression also 
push in the direction of the decriminalisation of blasphemy simpliciter. The 
current United Nations Special Rapporteur on freedom of religion or belief, 
Heiner Bielefeldt (b. 1958), stated that “In the human rights framework, 
respect always relates to human beings ... The idea of protecting the honour 
of religions themselves would clearly be at variance with the human rights 
approach.”8 A workgroup comprised of international experts brought together 
by the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights 
argued that “States that have blasphemy laws should repeal these as such 
laws have a stifling impact on the enjoyment of freedom of religion or belief 
and healthy dialogue and debate about religion.”9 Lastly, the Human Rights 
Committee—the body that monitors implementation of the International 
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights—holds that “Prohibitions of displays 
5 See arts 198 and 199 of the Greek Criminal Code. A recent blasphemy trial took place in 2014, 
when a Greek man named Filippos Loizos created a page on social networking website Facebook in 
which he satirised a deceased Orthodox monk. He was sentenced to 10 months in prison. See “Man 
sentenced to jail in Greece for mocking monk,” Reuters News, 17 January 2014.
6 See also (partially outdated) Blasphemy, Insult and Hatred: finding answers in a democratic society 
(report) (Luxembourg: Council of Europe Publishing, 2008), 19.
7 Ibid., 32.
8 Report of the Special Rapporteur on freedom of religion or belief, 2013, U.N. Doc. A/HRC/25/58, para. 33.
9 Rabat Plan of Action on the prohibition of advocacy of national, racial or religious hatred that 
constitutes incitement to discrimination, hostility or violence, 2012, 5.
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of lack of respect for a religion or other belief system, including blasphemy 
laws, are incompatible with the Covenant ...”10
IndIrect Blasphemy laws
Thus far we have mentioned two trends regarding blasphemy. The first is the 
decline of blasphemy laws in the West. The second is the de facto revival of 
bans on blasphemy by radical believers, and political pressure on Western 
states and international fora to censor blasphemy. Yet there is another way in 
which the suppression of blasphemy can be revived, namely via an extensive 
interpretation of laws against “group defamation” or “inciting hatred.” Such 
laws are a common feature of the regulation of public discourse in most 
advanced democracies—the United States being a notable exception. Laws 
of this type are different from straightforward blasphemy laws, which are 
generally speaking directed at protecting religion and religious symbols as 
such instead of a group of people. Nonetheless, they may, when extensively 
applied, have the effect of stifling criticism of religion and thus function as 
“indirect” blasphemy laws.
In 2002, French novelist Michel Houellebecq (b. 1956) was prosecuted 
for stating that Islam is “the most stupid religion” and that the Qur’an is 
“badly written.” Houellebecq was charged with “inciting religious and racial 
hatred” but acquitted.11 In the Netherlands a defamation trial took place for 
the displaying of a poster that read, inter alia, “Stop the tumour called Islam.” 
After the defendant was convicted by both the trial court and the appellate 
court of “defamation of a group of people on the basis of their religion,” the 
Dutch Supreme Court eventually acquitted him in 2009.12
A recent example of these types of cases is that about the German-
Egyptian political scientist Hamed Abdel-Samad (b. 1972). Abdel-Samad 
has published a number of works, partly autobiographical, about Islam 
and Islam-related topics.13 Some of what he has said and written has led 
10 Human Rights Committee, General comment no.  34, U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/GC/34, para. 48.
11 “Calling Islam stupid lands author in court,” The Guardian, 18 September 2002; “Author Charged for 
Islam Remark Is Acquitted,” The New York Times, 23 October 2002.
12 Hoge Raad (The Dutch Supreme Court), 10 March 2009.
13 Abdel-Samad, Hamed, Der Islamische Faschismus: Eine Analyse (Munich: Droemer Verlag, 2014); 
Abdel-Samad, Hamed, Islamic Fascism (Amherst, NY: Prometheus Books, 2016); Abdel-Samad, 
Hamed, Der Untergang der islamischen Welt: Eine Prognose (Munich: Droemer Verlag, 2010); Abdel-
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to considerable controversy. In 2013 he went into hiding after receiving 
death threats over a speech he had given in Egypt. In the speech Abdel-
Samad had criticised radical Islam and Egypt’s Muslim Brotherhood, and 
accused them of spreading “religious fascism.”14 His book “Mohamed. A 
settlement”—Mohamed. Eine Abrechnung—also sparked controversy. In the 
book, published in 2015, Abdel-Samad not only writes that Islamism is a 
“fascist ideology,” he also calls the prophet Muhammad a “mass murderer 
and a sick tyrant.”15 In an interview with German television channel Das 
Erste, Abdel-Samad argued that “Muhammad is not questioned by Muslims, 
he is mystified and elevated. And I believe that it is time for a settlement.”16 
He wanted to “create more commotion,” Abdel-Samad explained. “It’s time 
that Muhammad is discussed as a person. Muhammad died 1.400 years ago, 
but he isn’t really buried. He lies in his coffin and rules from his coffin. He 
holds power over our present world.”17 Abdel-Samad argued that he wanted 
to normalise criticism of Islam and Muhammad, and he hoped that no author 
would have to fear for his life for such criticism.18 
Abdel-Samad faced a legal backlash over the book. A complaint was filed 
for Volksverhetzung, which is prohibited under section 130 of the German 
Criminal Code, and Abdel-Samad was interrogated by the Berlin public 
prosecutor.19 The crime of Volksverhetzung—“incitement to hatred”—can be 
Samad, Hamed, Krieg oder Frieden: die Arabische Revolution und die Zukunft des Westens (Munich: 
Droemer Verlag, 2011); Abdel-Samad, Hamed, Mein Abschied vom Himmel: Aus dem Leben eines 
Muslims in Deutschland (Munich: Knaur Taschenbuch Verlag, 2009).
14 “German author in hiding after receiving Islamist death threats,” Deutsche Welle, 11 June 2013.
15 See Michael Wolffsohn, “Der Islamkritiker als Volksverhetzer?,” Die Welt, 16 March 2016, available 
at: http://www.welt.de/debatte/kommentare/article153357890/Der-Islamkritiker-als-Volksverhetzer.
html.
16 “Der Prophet Mohammed – eine Abrechnung von Hamed Abdel-Samad,” available at: http://www.
daserste.de/information/wissen-kultur/ttt/sendung/sendung-vom-20092015-120.html. 
17 Ibid.
18 Ibid. In 2012, during the violent aftermath of the Innocence of Muslims video in which the prophet 
Muhammad is depicted in a derogatory way, Abdel-Samad said that “Muslims have to learn over 
time that the Prophet Muhammad does not just belong to them, but he’s part of the history of 
humanity. Not everyone sees the prophet the way a faithful Muslim sees him”: see “Violence in the 
name of Allah,” Deutsche Welle, 13 September 2012.
19 Michael Wolffsohn, “Der Islamkritiker als Volksverhetzer?,” Die Welt, 16 March 2016, available at: 
http://www.welt.de/debatte/kommentare/article153357890/Der-Islamkritiker-als-Volksverhetzer.
html; “Anzeige gegen Hamed Abdel-Samad. Islamkritik = Volksverhetzung?,” available at: http://
hpd.de/artikel/islamkritik-volksverhetzung-12840. 
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found in the “Offences against public order” chapter of the German Criminal 
Code. The first subsection of the article reads as follows:
Whosoever, in a manner capable of disturbing the public peace (1) 
incites hatred against a national, racial, religious group or a group 
defined by their ethnic origins, against segments of the population or 
individuals because of their belonging to one of the aforementioned 
groups or segments of the population or calls for violent or arbitrary 
measures against them; or (2) assaults the human dignity of others by 
insulting, maliciously maligning an aforementioned group, segments 
of the population or individuals because of their belonging to one 
of the aforementioned groups or segments of the population, or 
defaming segments of the population, shall be liable to imprisonment 
from three months to five years.20
In March 2016, German historian Michael Wolffsohn (b. 1947) wrote an article 
in the magazine Die Zeit about Abdel-Samad. In his article, Wolffsohn defends 
Abdel-Samad against the Volksverhetzung allegation. Wolffsohn points to article 
5 of the German Constitution, which prescribes that everyone has “the right 
freely to express and disseminate his opinions in speech, writing and picture” 
and that “arts and sciences, research and teaching shall be free.” Will the Berlin 
prosecutor, of all people, violate the constitution? Wolffsohn asks.
Unsurprisingly, the allegation also frustrated Abdel-Samad. He posted 
some of his grievances on his Facebook page.
How is it possible to measure Volksverhetzung? If one counts the 
number of heads that will be cut off because of my book, the number 
will be zero. Nobody will be expelled nor will anyone lose his job as a 
result of my book. … In the Islamic world, critics of Islam have to take 
the death penalty, imprisonment, and lashing into account. In Europe 
they have to fear radical Islamists. They are unwanted by politicians, 
or at least ‘not helpful.’ They are bullied, defamed, and criticised by 
the left-wing and dialogue professionals. The fact that the German 
justice system also takes part in these sanctions, is, to me, a scandal!21
20 See https://www.gesetze-im-internet.de/englisch_stgb/englisch_stgb.html. 
21 Quoted in: Michael Wolffsohn, “Der Islamkritiker als Volksverhetzer?,” Die Welt, 16 March 2016, 
available at: http://www.welt.de/debatte/kommentare/article153357890/Der-Islamkritiker-als-
Volksverhetzer.html.
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We believe cases such as those of Houellebecq and Abdel-Samad are 
problematic. Our evaluation of powerful historical symbols, whether 
economic, political or religious in nature, must be uninhibited. The fact 
that Abdel-Samad, if prosecuted, might be acquitted, as was the case with 
Houellebecq, does not alter this. Interrogations and prosecutions are, 
regardless of their outcomes, burdensome and can potentially have serious 
“chilling effects” on public expression about religion. In a truly inclusive 
society that values plurality of opinion, the state has to treat those who 
praise religious symbols the same as those who despise them. Suppression 
of blasphemy, whether directly via blasphemy laws or indirectly via the 
application of laws against “group defamation” or “incitement to hatred,” 
erodes that inclusiveness and plurality.
OutlIne Of thIs VOlume
With contributions from scholars in a range of disciplines, this volume seeks 
to offer an examination of topical issues relating to freedom of expression, 
censorship and blasphemy in contemporary multicultural democracies.
Chapter 2 examines the history of blasphemy in the West from the 
medieval period. It finds blasphemy significantly overshadowed by the 
medieval church’s focus upon heresy. By the eighteenth century punishments 
for the crime had been relaxed and the whole offence was suddenly 
problematised by the ideological consequences of both the American and 
French revolutions. From here until well into the modern period high-profile 
court cases attracted the attention of both reformers and the media, leading to 
a significant questioning of the state’s right to, and justification for, legislating 
on matters that amounted to individual religious conscience. By the end of the 
third quarter of the twentieth century most blasphemy laws in the west were 
considered anachronisms that would inevitably pass away very soon. This 
view was starkly disturbed by demands from non-Christian religions within 
the West’s now plural societies—ones which increasingly had their legal 
autonomy curbed or removed by much larger legal frameworks. This chapter 
then argues that this new development systematically introduced a tension 
within Western social democracies between guaranteeing freedom of speech 
and protecting vulnerable minorities. From this tension blasphemy law 
became entwined with new legal thinking around the concept of hate crime 
and new pieces of legislation emerged which often conflated the two. The 
chapter concludes by discussing the history of this development alongside 
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calls for its revoke as offering an unenvisaged incentive and precedent for 
other nations to reimagine and potentially reconstruct blasphemy laws of 
their own.
Chapter 3 describes the history of blasphemy under the English common 
law from its development by the courts in the seventeenth century, through 
its apparent liberalisation in the nineteenth century to its eventual abolition 
by Parliament in 2008. However, as Ivan Hare points out, that seemingly 
linear progress towards greater protection for freedom of expression on 
religious matters masks a much more complex story: a story in which the 
breadth and flexibility of the definition of blasphemy were used to bring 
prosecutions against disfavoured groups and against important works of 
literature and political philosophy. Hare argues that much of this complexity 
derives from the failure for 300 years to question the original normative 
foundation of the law. The chapter concludes with a discussion of whether 
it is possible to regard the recently enacted offences of stirring up religious 
hatred as a modern successor to the law of blasphemy.
Chapter 4 discusses the Dutch blasphemy law that was in the Criminal 
Code from 1932 until 2014. The minister of justice who drafted the 
blasphemy law was incredibly upset by attacks on the Christian God and 
Jesus by communists. The law drafted to combat these attacks criminalised 
“scornful blasphemy in a manner offensive to religious feelings.” The 
first decades of the law’s existence saw prosecutions and convictions for 
blasphemous utterances, yet in the 1960s Dutch novelist Gerard Reve’s trial, 
over two passages in which he described sexual acts between God and a 
donkey, reduced the law’s power. Later “blasphemers,” most notably Theo 
van Gogh, did not have much to fear from the Dutch Prosecution Service, 
but rather from radical Islam. The chapter also discusses events surrounding 
Van Gogh’s death.
Chapter 5 looks at the pressure exerted by Saudi Arabia to censor the 
airing of the documentary Death of a Princess on Western television in the 
early 1980s. This documentary was based on the true story of Princess 
Masha’il Bint Fahd Al Saud, a 19-year-old Saudi Princess who was, together 
with her lover, publicly executed for adultery. After a description of the film’s 
content, the chapter elaborates on the attitude Western political leaders 
adopted in dealing with the diplomatically sensitive issue of (not) airing the 
film.
Chapter 6 deals with what might be considered the locus classicus of 
the modern era of Westerners being threatened by radical believers for 
blasphemous expression: the publication of Salman Rushdie’s novel The 
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Satanic Verses in 1988 and Khomeini’s death threat that followed in 1989. 
This chapter discusses some of the criticism that has been levelled against 
Salman Rushdie for writing his book.
Chapter 7 discusses the burning of the Quran by American pastor Terry 
Jones in light of one of the best-known quotations about free speech: “If 
all mankind minus one, were of one opinion, and only one person were of 
the contrary opinion, mankind would be no more justified in silencing that 
one person, than he, if he had the power, would be justified in silencing 
mankind” (John Stuart Mill). With Jones, we have such an extremely 
unpopular opinion that virtually “all mankind minus one” objected to it. The 
chapter explores the free speech controversies and dilemmas this real-life 
“mankind minus one” situation gives rise to.
Chapter 8 is about the international dimension of blasphemy, in 
particular the so-called United Nations “defamation of religion resolutions.” 
The adoption of these resolutions was pushed for by the Organisation of 
Islamic Cooperation. Contrary to human rights standards, these resolutions 
were aimed at protecting religion and religious symbols as such. The chapter 
discusses the background of these resolutions and their relationship to 
international standards of freedom of expression.
Chapter 9 focuses on a number of social developments concerning 
multiculturalism and blasphemy in England. The chapter discusses, inter 
alia, the difference between social responses to blasphemy directed at the 
Christian religion and those directed at other religions. While responses to 
the 1979 religious satire comedy film Life of Brian were largely supportive 
of artistic expression, in cases of non-Christian blasphemy freedom of 
expression was trumped, due to the ideology of “multiculturalism,” by 
the importance of protecting ethnic minority sensibilities. The chapter 
concludes by arguing that the threat of censorship on the grounds of 
blasphemy remains imminent in England, not for legal reasons—the English 
law of blasphemy having been repealed in 2008—but because of academia 
and popular media engaging in self-censorship, out of either fear of violence 
or the fear of offending minority sensibilities.
We would like to emphasise that the chapters differ in both content and 
style. Generally speaking, chapters 2, 3 and 4 present legal and historical 
analysis of blasphemy laws, while other chapters look at blasphemy and 
censorship from a cultural or international perspective, or discuss moral 
and political dilemmas that blasphemous expression can give rise to. We 
believe that this multi-level approach is a strength rather than a weakness. 
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Nonetheless, all contributions are concerned with the issues of freedom of 
expression and blasphemy.
The chapters on the development of blasphemy law in modern times 
indicate that, contrary to what is commonly assumed, suppression of 
blasphemy is not in decline but on the rise, albeit not always under the 
explicit name of “blasphemy law.” Common epithets are “incitement to 
religious hatred,” “defamation of religion,” and other new concepts that are 
being used to stifle freedom of speech, especially the freedom to criticise 
religion. These chapters also try to demonstrate that the contemporary 
decline (or “fall”) of free speech (and concomitant “rise” of blasphemy law) 
is intimately connected with terrorist attacks on those who exercise their 
right to free speech. The Rushdie affair, the Danish cartoon controversy and 
the murders of the Charlie Hebdo staff are the best-known examples of this 
phenomenon, but, as this book makes clear, some other incidents are also an 
important part of the context of this development.
We are fully aware that some readers might find some chapters in the 
book (i) a little polemical or (ii) supportive of a “radical” conception of free 
speech. Let us comment on both of these interpretations.
First, we have tried not to be polemical in the sense that nowhere do 
we polemicise against other authors. Instead, we want to present historical 
material that is largely unknown, and the relevance of which has not been 
fully grasped. For example, no one could have missed the attack on Charlie 
Hebdo, but the fact that as early as 1980 Western governments were under 
severe pressure not to broadcast a film about the Saudi royal family is largely 
forgotten (see chapter 5 on Death of a Princess).
Second, these chapters may be interpreted as taking a more “radical” 
stance on free speech than most authors do. As editors we do not subscribe 
to this view. We do not advocate a more “radical” conception of free speech, 
but the maintenance of a conception that was common in the seventies and 
eighties of the twentieth century (see for example the Handyside case of 
1976, in which the European Court of Human Rights stated that free speech 
was also applicable to expression that “offends, shocks and disturbs”). There 
is nothing “radical” in the idea that a novelist can publish a novel that some 
religious believers might consider blasphemous, insulting or offensive. What 
might be considered “radical” is the slow and hardly noticed erosion of these 
civil liberties in our time.
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2  Blasphemy and the Law:  
The Fall and Rise of a Legal Non Sequitur
 David Nash
OrIgIns Of a cOncept
Blasphemy as an offence originates most readily and successfully within 
cultures where the prevailing faith can be described as a religion of the 
book. Judaism, Christianity and Islam all possess very strong conceptions of 
blasphemy and the specifics of how their monotheistic worlds conceive the 
offence. The success of the concept may well rely upon the fact that religions 
of the book are religions that codify, prescribe, proscribe and enact. In other 
words, the fundamental basis of their faith rests on a series of laws motivated 
by a mixture of sacred pronouncement, or the development of custom based 
upon such pronouncement. Cursing or reviling the Gods was outlawed 
because it offended both the deity concerned and the social and cultural 
peace of communities within the ancient world. In many instances this was 
also linked to a sense of immanent providence whereby the community and 
its laws were under pressure to act or forms of harm were in danger of being 
visited upon the community.1
The footprint of these laws is easily traceable within such religions of the 
book, and their impact is well known and reasonably well researched.2 Thus 
it is not the function of this chapter to revisit this early development of such 
laws. Suffice it to say that many aspects of this early conception survived 
well into the early modern period and in many cases beyond. This chapter 
is primarily concerned with tracing the development of the laws against 
blasphemy into modern times—in short, to chart its progressive fall up to 
1 Leonard Levy, Blasphemy and Verbal Offense Against the Sacred: From Moses to Salman Rushdie (New 
York: Knopf, 1995), 3–8.
2 See, e.g., Leonard Levy, Treason Against God: A History of the Offense of Blasphemy (New York: 
Schocken Books, 1981), 3–102 traces the origin of the law up to the heyday of medieval heresy.
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the end of the twentieth century and then investigate its rapid rise after this 
date.
The precise history of blasphemy within the world of Christendom in the 
medieval period can appear opaque because it was, in this period, something 
of a subordinate concept. Although laws against blasphemy and heresy were 
both enforcing forms of discipline, it was the latter’s focus upon religious 
orthodoxy which became more important than the former’s prescription of 
mocking God and his powers. Thus through the medieval period the Papal 
Inquisition and often the secular arm of primitive states were engaged 
upon the pursuit of heretics and their webs of association and belief. Many 
historians note their proliferation and their self-sustaining power, which 
was often based on the growing literacy of certain groups within society.3 
Campaigns against heresy also intensified and grew more serious as 
perceptions of new heretical groups as more deeply organised and committed 
began to circulate. This also stood in contrast to the blasphemer, who was 
almost exclusively conceived of as an isolated individual, and the focus upon 
organised groups of religious dissidents further downgraded the importance 
of the blasphemer. Most obvious in Europe were the concerted campaigns 
against heretical groups such as the Albigensians, Bogomils, Waldensians 
and Cathars that ranged across regions and borders of western Europe. The 
Inquisitions that pursued them were largely composed of individuals from 
the Dominican Order, which stressed the importance of theology as arguably 
more important than the interpretation and application of the law.4 Likewise 
such actions were replicated in England in pursuit of close-knit heretical 
groups such as the Lollards. All served to push blasphemy as an offence 
further into the shadows.
Nonetheless we do encounter blasphemy in some accusations and charges 
laid against individuals in the medieval period. Very often these appear as 
additional or adjunct charges in amongst a number of other accusations. 
Thus they were significant only as afterthoughts or as part of what we might 
describe as a basket of offences that instead place focus upon the general 
offensiveness of the individual rather than a deep realisation of blasphemy 
as a pernicious evil. The influence of Aquinas was quite important in 
3 Malcolm Lambert, Medieval Heresy: Popular Movements from the Gregorian Reform to the Reformation 
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1992), 26–30.
4 Henry Asgar Kelly, “Inquisition and the Prosecution of Heresy: Misconceptions and Abuses,” in 
Henry Asgar Kelly, Inquisitions and Other Trials in the Medieval West (Aldershot: Ashgate, 2001), 
439–451, 451.
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bringing blasphemy further forward into the picture, and his work was 
instrumental in theorising it as an errant faith-based position that sought to 
undermine the honour of God.5 This conception of the honour of God also 
had a distinctive social use that persuaded municipalities to enact sanctions 
against blasphemy. The power of religious oaths began to be of increasing 
importance as commerce developed in the city states of Northern Europe. 
As such, blasphemy served to cheapen these guarantees of trust and thus 
undermined their power, currency and validity.6 These really commenced 
with the Town Ordinances and Privileges of Vienna of 1221 but were then 
followed by the laws of Frederick II in 1231.7
This growing aspect of state involvement meant that the partnership 
between church and state that had commenced with heresy was continued 
into the greater seriousness with which blasphemy was coming to be treated. 
This became evident in a number of statutes that began to appear in the 
middle of the thirteenth century. In France, the monarchy’s comparatively 
long involvement in curtailing blasphemy commenced with Louis IX’s 
statute of 1263. This initiative gathered pace with subsequent action against 
blasphemers in the Low Countries, Spain and parts of Germany.8 It was 
almost ubiquitous that the punishments for such crimes were various species 
of physical mutilation or humiliation and sometimes both. This further 
served to highlight the individuality of the culprit and the comparative rarity 
of the offence, alongside an emphasis which placed this miscreant individual 
outside of society, however briefly. 
Another feature of this time which unwittingly brought blasphemy more 
readily to the attention of the Church and local governing agencies was the 
late medieval fashion for lay confraternities. These were organised groups in 
regions and localities who were tasked with scrutinising and overseeing the 
practices of piety and orthodoxy in their community.9 The evidence that they 
5 Leonard Levy, Blasphemy and Verbal Offense Against the Sacred: From Moses to Salman Rushdie (New 
York: Knopf, 1995), 51–53.
6 Carol Lansing, Power and Purity: Cathar Heresy in Medieval Italy (Oxford: Oxford University 
Press, 1998), 166–167 and John Marshall, John Locke Toleration and Early Enlightenment Culture 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2006), 231–232.
7 Gerd Schwerhoff, Zungen wie Schwerter: Blasphemie in alteuropäischen Gesellschafen (Konstanz, 
2005), 300.
8 David Nash, Blasphemy in the Christian World: A History (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007), 151.
9 Gerd Schwerhoff, Zungen wie Schwerter: Blasphemie in alteuropäischen Gesellschafen (Konstanz, 
2005), 300.
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came back with was potentially shocking and convinced many that bringing 
orthodoxy deeper into the lives of their local fellow Christians was almost 
tantamount to a new crusading impulse. The watchword of this impulse and 
its explicit intention was the restoration and maintenance of discipline. This 
remained a paramount consideration until well into the eighteenth century, 
although interpretation of it could be protean in both its conception and 
interpretation. With a premium on this sense of discipline and conformity, 
blasphemy was conceived of as a species of indiscipline, and this was arguably 
enhanced by several of the fissures which sprang out from the Reformation. 
Many of the instances of indisciplined blasphemy that the Reformation 
world uncovered, when not outbursts of simple anger and frustration, were 
frequently associated with either drink or gambling. Individuals whose reason 
had been impaired by alcohol frequently despoiled religious relics or statues 
or sought to command the almighty to do their bidding; this simultaneously 
broke the peace of the community and introduced the concern associated 
with providential judgement upon the community as a result. Gambling 
was also a common area where accusation of blasphemy originated, with 
individuals either commanding the almighty to provide them with luck or 
cursing him remorselessly for withholding apparently much needed good 
fortune.10
the refOrmatIOn and relIgIOus law
Leonard Levy has noted in particular that the Reformation was a catalyst 
for changing perceptions of blasphemy. Luther in particular lighted on 
blasphemy as a concept and accusation that he could use in his dialogues and 
disputations with the orthodox Catholic position, which appeared idolatrous. 
Rejuvenating the conception of this offence was also a method of avoiding 
the use of the more ideologically problematic term of heresy—an accusation 
and conception that Catholicism was itself dangerously cognizant of and 
10 For instances of blasphemy whilst under the influence of alcohol see Francisca Loetz, Dealings 
with God: From Blasphemers in Early Modern Zurich to a Cultural History of Religiousness (Farnham: 
Ashgate, 2009); M.R. Baelde, Studiën over Godsdienstdelicten (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1935), 
137; Thomas Brennan, Public Drinking and Popular Culture in Eighteenth-Century Paris (Princeton, 
NJ: Princeton University Press, 1988), 74. For gambling see Javier Villa-Flores, Dangerous Speech: 
A Social History of Blasphemy in Colonial Mexico (University of Arizona Press).
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experienced in implementing.11 Certainly Francisca Loetz and others have 
also detected a renewed interest in blasphemy in other “reformed” religious 
societies. What often emerges from this work is that authorities in cities like 
Geneva and Zurich displayed a fairly stringent attitude to the offence, even if 
their attitude to punishing those accused and convicted could vary according 
to individual circumstances, location, and over time.12
Meanwhile the Catholic world of the Counter-Reformation, particularly 
after the Council of Trent, made the individual the growing focus of 
attention, and this, likewise, went along with a revitalisation of the Church’s 
approach to blasphemy and laws against it.13 This might be seen as a perhaps 
logical reaction to the Catholic Church’s belief that the sacred was in danger 
of being profaned precisely at the time when it seemed to require the most 
veneration. One method of disseminating this view was to reiterate that 
orthodoxy and correct observance should be ingrained in institutions and 
family structures.14 This further associated dissenting and undisciplined 
behaviour with the errant personalities of individuals.
dIscIplIne and punIsh?
The quest for a disciplinary ethos also crept further up the priorities of 
authority and governance which showed a renewed interest in curbing 
blasphemy that, thereafter, preoccupied the increasingly sophisticated 
early modern state. As the sixteenth century wore on the pace of legislation 
quickened. France enacted no fewer than fifteen separate statutes in the 
sixteenth century, with analogous developments also occurring in Spain. It 
is interesting that Venice constructed its own legal tribunal specifically to 
hear blasphemy cases.15 Perhaps this particular innovation recognised this 
city’s foreboding sense of providential menace brought on by a range of 
factors, including its potential political weakness and location, which left it 
11 Leonard Levy, Blasphemy and Verbal Offense Against the Sacred: From Moses to Salman Rushdie (New 
York: Knopf, 1995), 60–61.
12 Francisca Loetz, Dealings with God: From Blasphemers in Early Modern Zurich to a Cultural History of 
Religiousness (Farnham: Ashgate, 2009), especially Parts II and III.
13 David Nash, Blasphemy in the Christian World: A History (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007), 151.
14 John Bossy Christianity in the West (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1985),155-156.
15 Elizabeth Horodowich, “Civic Identity and the Control of Blasphemy in Sixteenth Century Venice”, 
Past and Present, 181 (2003) 3.
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vulnerable to everything from plague to potentially disastrous invasion and 
conquest.
The interest of government, authority and individual courts further draws 
our attention to a fundamentally important public order dimension which 
became an adjunct to the Church’s search for orthodoxy and disciplined 
religious observance. The state’s interest in providing communal punishments 
which were shared, either by passive observance of their instigation or their 
aftermath, became a part of this process. Thus shaming punishments, many 
involving public penance dressed in specific shame-ridden garments or 
devices (such as wooden barrels), showed the consequences of indiscipline 
to the whole community. The often used disfiguring punishments, which 
maimed the tongue, cheek, ears or lips, provided a constant reminder to the 
community of the past lapses of its errant individuals.16
Both public order concerns and a lingering sense of the providential also 
saw states enact military and naval ordinances which specifically aimed at 
preventing blasphemous utterances within such institutions.17 Again public 
order and discipline were paramount in creating a functioning institution. 
Yet the providential dimension was present in the recognition that soldiers 
and sailors were placed in perilous and unforgiving situations where they 
conceivably felt themselves to be at the mercy of divine judgement.18 Looking 
at this whole movement towards greater cultures of disciplined orthodoxy has 
led some historians, such as Alain Cabantous, to suggest that this constituted 
an attack upon a more coherent vibrant culture of plebeian blasphemy. The 
attitudes of authority were aimed at belittling and minimising the coherence 
of this culture whilst also obviously seeking to marginalise it.19 
The English reformation, with its sudden, much closer connection 
between religious orthodoxy and the state, further enhanced the importance 
of enforcing forms of discipline.20 Older heresy laws were strengthened by 
an Act of 1533 and a subsequent statute in 1547 which sought to protect the 
sacrament from abuse. A defining moment came towards the end of the 
16 David Nash, Blasphemy in the Christian World: A History (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007), 
153–154. See also Richard Van Dulmen, Theatre of Horror: Crime and Punishment in Early Modern 
Germany (trans. Elisabeth Neu, Cambridge, 1990), 155.
17 David Nash, Blasphemy in the Christian World: A History (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007), 115.
18 Ibid., 115–116.
19 Alain Cabantous, Blasphemy: Impious Speech in the West form the Seventeenth to the Nineteenth 
Century (New York: Columbia University Press, 1998), passim.
20 David Nash, Blasphemy in the Christian World: A History (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007), 157.
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subsequent century for both blasphemy and the state’s role as a regulatory 
authority charged with ensuring conformity and discipline. Whilst the 
Commonwealth period had seen a systematic extension of religious 
toleration, it had nonetheless witnessed religious dissidents that had pushed 
the boundaries too far.21 The political and ideological ferment of these times 
meant that decisions about what to do with such people were manifestly less 
than clear-cut, and individuals like Best and Biddle languished in gaol whilst 
their potential fates were debated at length in Parliament.22 The resolution 
of both these cases did not indicate a clear policy or direction of thought. 
This only really came in 1675 with a groundbreaking judgement in the 
case against James Nayler. The judge, Sir Matthew Hale, pronounced that 
Nayler’s blasphemies should be dealt with relatively harshly because attacks 
upon religion were attacks upon the law and the state.23 His famous phrase 
argued that religion was “part and parcel of the laws of England,” and that to 
attack one of these facets was implicitly to attack the other. Again such ideas 
also contain a submerged public order dimension. This series of sentiments 
became enshrined in the English blasphemy statute of 1698 (9 & 10 William 
c. 32) which made provision for progressive punishments, finally prescribing 
capital punishment for a third offence.24 
This law and its provisions were also a manifestation of anxieties about 
the security of the kingdom and good order alongside a still lingering strand 
of providentialism. This heady mixture of concerns and feelings had also 
been evident in the trial and execution of Thomas Aikenhead in Scotland 
in 1697.25 Although this statute was not used successfully, it was readily 
invoked, and its provisions served to threaten both individuals and religious 
groups whose doctrines (such as those of anti-trinitarian groups) were now 
perceived to exist in opposition to the Church as it had been established 
by law. This last aspect was important because the statute gave primacy of 
place to the established church and its doctrines and, in the mind, arguably 
made other religious doctrines capable of being regarded as blasphemous. 
21 David Nash, Blasphemy in Britain 1789 to the Present (Aldershot: Ashgate, 1999), 27–28.
22 Ibid., 28–29.
23 Ibid., 29–30.
24 Courtney Kenny, “The Evolution of the Law of Blasphemy,” in Cambridge Law Journal 1 (1922) 127 at 
132.
25 M.F. Graham, The Blasphemies of Thomas Aikenhead: Boundaries of Belief on the Eve of the 
Enlightenment (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 2013 edn.).
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Although the injustice of this would be cited by some defendants, no 
successful prosecutions were brought under this statute.26
What functioned in its place was the Common Law offence of blasphemous 
libel. This particular provision eventually had considerable influence, and 
this can be readily seen in the history of both American and Australian 
jurisprudence which ensured that the reactions of these societies defined 
themselves in relation to this legal precedent.27 What was fundamental to 
this state of affairs was the capacity for the judge presiding over a particular 
case to pronounce on the state of the law within any given context. Whilst 
precedent could be drawn upon within reason, the opportunity to innovate 
was intrinsic to this system, which often led to the law being disparagingly 
referred to as “judge-made law.” Yet this approach had many devotees who 
regularly suggested that it enabled each age to assess what was acceptable 
and what was not before the ultimate jury of public opinion at large. If 
material offended sensibilities and was likely to provoke outraged breaches 
of the peace, then either individuals or policing authorities would be able to 
bring a prosecution. A trial was a further legitimate check and balance that 
ensured freedom and fairness between rights of free speech and the right to 
remain unoffended by the actions and expressions of others. Even into the 
twentieth century the United Kingdom Home Office expressed itself to be 
manifestly in favour of the law’s retention precisely because it offered these 
regulatory checks and balances.28 Despite the Common Law of blasphemous 
libel functioning as an inherited precedent which eventually informed the 
attitudes of American Federal law, the development of attitudes to blasphemy 
within the American colonies, and eventually states, was considerably 
more piecemeal. In their different forms of legislation around blasphemy 
these different colonies and states represented everything from draconian 
and strict persecution right through to what appeared to be full religious 
toleration.29 
26 This fact was noted when the Act was repealed in 1967.
27 See David Nash, Blasphemy in the Christian World: A History (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007); 
for the situation in America see 78–79, 166–168, 173–175 and 179. For Australia see 22–23, 98, 
178–179.
28 See the various Home Office Papers in file HO 4524619. An account of their significance is in David 
Nash, Blasphemy in the Christian World: A History (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007), Ch. 6.
29 See David Nash, Blasphemy in the Christian World: A History (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007), 
163–167.
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By the eighteenth century most blasphemy sentences passed against those 
convicted were commuted to lesser forms of imprisonment or banishment. 
This may have occurred as an unprompted relaxation of concerns about 
discipline, but equally it might be argued that this was a growing recognition 
that upholding the privilege of a single religious orthodoxy within states 
was problematic and of diminishing importance. However, what split this 
view, arguably, wide open was the impact of the American Constitution’s 
construction and the subsequent impact of the French Revolution. In their 
separate ways both displayed models for how the church-state relationship 
might be rethought or, instead, actively unravelled. 
The American constitution, in pursuit of some contemporary ideals of 
freedom, shelved the whole conception of an established and even a state 
church. Instead Christianity would eventually become an official religion, 
even if the idea of support through state subscription would remain 
anathema. Thus an area of American law came to be a battleground between 
local conceptions of morality upheld by local sanctions and the federal legal 
system’s rejection of many such actions as unconstitutional.30 One legacy 
of America’s innovative disestablishment is that dissolving, breaking or 
unravelling the link between church and state would hereafter become the 
preoccupation and enthusiasm of secular-inspired liberalism everywhere.
Quite obviously the French Revolution’s destruction of the church 
and state link was more far reaching. The construction of these two more 
obviously secular states foregrounded individual rights whilst emphasising 
that species of religio-state compulsion were intolerable. For many, such 
freedoms would almost never go far enough, as their various critiques of 
religion would periodically trouble the courts in many Western countries up 
to the last quarter of the nineteenth century.31 However, what this does really 
highlight is that the blasphemer, during the age of reason, was an ideological 
dissident with firm views about the place of religion within the universe as 
either wholly a private concern or, indeed, entirely irrelevant. This was a 
marked change from the earlier archetype of the blasphemer as merely an 
indisciplined individual who, for various reasons, had merely lapsed from 
the orthodox straight and narrow—with the task of the state and church 
merely to restore them to this correct pathway.
The legacy of blasphemy laws in nineteenth century Europe thus really 
became exercises in upholding the church-state link, in various degrees of 
30 Ibid., 205 and 343.
31 Ibid., 117.
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rigidity, as a means of preserving national self-images as god-fearing states 
rather than maintaining strict religious orthodoxy. Thus one offshoot of this 
was a religio-national providentialism.32
reVOlutIOns and upheaVals
This maintenance of morality characterised early nineteenth century 
society’s approach to the control and regulation of blasphemy. Certainly 
there is evidence of its success in suppressing the virulent Jacobin-inspired 
ideas of Richard Carlile in England.33 The 1820s and 1830s witnessed a 
succession of court cases where ideas associated with free expression were 
effectively trumped by the necessity of protecting society from the social 
implications of such freedoms.34 This situation had its counterpart in the 
United States in the case against Ruggles, who represented an American 
expression of similar ideologies and sentiments.35 As the century wore on, 
both countries also witnessed cases that produced embarrassment for high-
handed authority that could no longer rely upon the wholehearted support 
of the population at large or even of some of its own government officials.36 
Such authority increasingly found its justification for action critiqued by 
the rise of social democratic societies founded on forms of liberalism. In 
32 See David Nash, “‘To Prostitute Morality, Libel Religion, and Undermine Government’ Blasphemy 
and the Strange Persistence of Providence in Britain since the Seventeenth Century,” in Journal of 
Religious History 32(4) 439.
33 See Joel Wiener, Radicalism and Freethought in Nineteenth Century Britain: The Life of Richard Carlile 
(Westport, CT: Praeger, 1983); M.J.D. Roberts, “Making Victorian Morals? The Society for the 
Suppression of Vice and its Critics 1802–1886”, Historical Studies xxi (1984) 157; and M.J.D. Roberts, 
‘Blasphemy, Obscenity and the Courts: Contours of Tolerance in Nineteenth Century England’, in 
Paul Hyland and Neil Sammells (eds.), Writing and Censorship in Britain (London: Routledge, 1992).
34 Joel Wiener, Radicalism and Freethought in Nineteenth Century Britain: The Life of Richard Carlile 
(Westport, CT: Praeger, 1983), passim.
35 See Theodore Schroeder, Constitutional Free Speech Defined and Defended in an Unfinished argument in 
a case of blasphemy (New York: Free Speech League, 1919, De Capo Press Edn, 1970), 69–71. See also 
David Nash, Blasphemy in the Christian World: A History (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007), 
78–79.
36 See the reactions to the trial of Thomas Pooley, where a manifestly insane man’s treatment became 
an indictment of the law and its proceedings in such matters. See Timothy J. Toohey, “Blasphemy 
in Nineteenth-Century England: The Pooley Case and Its Background”, Victorian Studies 30, no.  3 
(Spring, 1987) 315.
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England this is evidenced by the Foote case of 1883–1884 and in America in 
the case against Moore.37 Australia would also follow suit in the outcome of 
the case against Lorando Jones.38
The verdict in the Foote case was monumental because it finally 
unravelled the psychologically important link between religion and the law. 
The presiding judge, Justice Coleridge, set aside the letter and spirit of the 
Hale judgement and emphatically stated that religion was no longer “Part 
and Parcel of the Law of the land.”39 But Coleridge went further, establishing 
an important species of test of offence that also proved influential. The true 
test of blasphemy in court was now no longer the matter uttered (such logic 
naturally proceeded from the demise of the “part and parcel” argument) but 
instead the manner uttered.40 Thus the test came to associate the crime with 
wounding the feelings of individuals. 
When policing authorities were ever involved in discussions of the offence 
of blasphemy they would often express satisfaction at such an outcome. 
No longer did they have to run the gamut of defence cases which focussed 
upon the purchase of material which sometimes embarrassed such policing 
authorities who could not identify vendors in court or whose members gave 
woolly and unsatisfactory answers when questioned about their individual 
responses to the material they had purchased whilst trying to establish 
grounds for prosecution.41 Likewise, such authorities were also spared the 
problems of law enforcement officers tasked with deciding whether material 
or speech actually contained blasphemous content. Henceforth this decision 
was taken out of their hands so that they became concerned with issues that 
they were more readily equipped to deal with. This conception of “manner,” 
once again, had an important public order dimension, so that the material 
itself now underwent a test of whether it was liable to provoke violence or 
some other species of breach of the peace. 
Paradoxically this preoccupation with breaches of the peace coincided with 
a shift in the character of those who were indicted and tried for blasphemy. 
37 David Nash, Blasphemy in the Christian World: A History (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007), 
175.
38 Ibid., 178–179.
39 Ernest Hartley Coleridge, Life and Correspondence of John Duke, Lord Coleridge (London, 1904), 291.
40 David Nash, Blasphemy in the Christian World: A History (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007), 
155–162.
41 This had been a feature of many early nineteenth century cases. See David Nash, Blasphemy in the 
Christian World: A History (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007), Ch. 3.
38 THE FALL AND RISE OF BLASPHEMY LAW
From the middle of the nineteenth century there was a growing tendency 
for such individuals to be artists and writers rather than revolutionaries and 
political radicals. This, in itself, may represent some wider philosophical 
changes in which political sub- and countercultures themselves had become 
more individualistic and had also acquired some degree of acceptance 
within late nineteenth century liberal cultures. Thus boundaries had been 
pulled back, but moral and regulating authorities always saw blasphemy as 
perhaps a touchstone of how far critics of conventional morality and social 
arrangements should really be allowed to go. 
Thus public order concerns became fused with new ways of thinking 
about the offensiveness of new types of writing and precisely where these 
might be consumed. Whether the reading of blasphemous material in a 
public place, or the encounter with it in a public place, would provoke a 
reaction became a bona fide test of offensiveness. Policing authorities, rather 
than being charged with hunting down offensive material (in truth, most 
were weary of this responsibility now), had public order-style tests that 
would be discussed in court concerning whether an item or facet of speech 
was liable to offend or endanger the peace.
eVOlutIOn Or mOdernIsatIOn
One dimension of this was the invention of a style of “casual encounter 
with blasphemy.” In other words, the law had shifted from whether the 
blasphemous material was, under a state-regulated definition, blasphemous, 
but instead to whether it could be proven to offend—resulting in a possible 
public order related consequence. Thus blasphemy became an offence in 
which the casual encounter with such material was the issue to be avoided. 
One method of policing blasphemy was to persuade its potential perpetrators 
to police themselves and restrict access as far as possible to those who were 
unlikely to be offended by material. This perhaps also reflected aspects of 
post-war individual conceptions of human rights, which were also persuading 
centralised authority to retreat from actions it might previously have been 
prepared to take.42 
Procedures designed to warn consumers of the nature of material were 
considered a part of modern democratic systems, which themselves urged 
plurality and choice which could supposedly be ensured by expecting 
42 Ibid., 182.
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audiences to be self-regulating. This philosophy was adopted for a time in 
some European countries, notably France and Germany, but was somewhat 
less successful in Britain. In the latter the arguments which were brought 
forward in the Gay News Case of 1978 indicated that suggestions that 
material was intended only for a restricted audience would be trumped by 
their apparent offensiveness. This was true even if they were seen, perhaps 
unwittingly, by subsequently shocked individuals—some with an agenda of 
their own.43
Nonetheless the focus upon “manner” as the test of offence in countries 
accepting English legal precedent and jurisprudence and even beyond did 
serve to remove the state’s role as censor and arbiter of religiously motivated 
debate. So, for most of the twentieth century the laws of blasphemy were 
slumbering. Although debates were occasionally held about their apparent 
anachronism they were generally regarded as insignificant and as a gentle 
reminder of Christian heritages in the West. As such these laws, during 
this period, encouraged populations to look firmly back to their past and 
not forward to any conception of an altered religious future. Indeed, it is 
relatively noteworthy that few political parties were prepared to consider 
the repeal of blasphemy laws as in any way important in their own potential 
legislative programmes. Petitions for their removal would often meet with 
considerable sympathy, but also with inertia, often in equal measure. Such 
laws slumbered and apparently did no harm—so what reason could be given 
for their removal? Especially when other pressing considerations could 
always be found to occupy the mind of government.
However, by the century’s end such laws were, unknowingly, on borrowed 
time. The slow progress of supranational agencies and their growing quest 
to enforce religious equality began an argument that saw the concept of 
religious privilege enshrined in law as untenable. Although this was taken 
seriously, its logic became dwarfed by the counter-claims of religious groups 
demanding such equality. This liberal claim for the religious equality of the 
individual ironically became undermined by other agendas that saw such 
individual equality as somehow threatening. Liberating and empowering the 
individual began to be seen solely as a project intended to enhance and extend 
Western liberalism and its own projects. This was frequently contrasted with 
the sense of collective revelation that entered the language and arguments 
emanating from Islamic communities.
43 For an account of the events leading to the Gay News Case see David Nash, Blasphemy in the 
Christian World: A History (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007), Ch. 8.
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The complacency of Western thinking about blasphemy laws was 
rudely shattered and derailed from a course of gradual liberalisation by the 
explosion of feelings around Salman Rushdie’s The Satanic Verses.44 This 
event in particular motivated Muslims to connect politics and religion in a 
dangerous mixture which, when focussed, argued explicitly for the extension 
of religious protection. Such demands were offered not so readily on the 
grounds of equality and justice, but in order to seek protection from the 
religious bias evident still in the legal apparatus of many Western countries. 
In Britain this was an incident which provoked probably the last defence of 
the cosy status quo of slumbering anachronism. When a legal challenge was 
mounted to the partial protection for Christianity enshrined in British law, 
this was rebuffed by the reassertion of the legitimacy of protection for the 
state church.45
western states respOnd
One element in the revival of blasphemy that was to a great extent 
unforeseen was the revival of blasphemy legislation in the West. The pressure 
produced by the agendas of multiculturalism and of hate crime made the 
balancing act that Western social democracies had to indulge in still more 
precarious. Their populations reflected the legacy of a colonial past that in 
many respects had seen such countries promote cultures of tolerant and 
enforceable liberalism (as evidenced by the British government’s installation 
and subsequent redrafting of the Indian Criminal Code of 1858).46 It was 
scarcely surprising that a thirst for tolerance and equality was now a part of 
some views expressed, demanding equality before the law. 
European countries also found themselves under pressure to finally 
expunge the inequalities which remaining blasphemy laws represented. As 
we have seen these were products of very different historical and religious 
44 There are various different accounts of the Salman Rushdie case which probably by now deserves its 
own carefully annotated bibliography. Places to start include Kenan Malik, From Fatwa to Jihad: The 
Rushdie Affair and its Legacy (London, Atlantic Books, 2009) and Malise Ruthven, A Satanic Affair: 
Salman Rushdie and the Rage of Islam (London: Chatto and Windus, 1990).
45 Ex parte Choudhury 1 All ER 306. See also Marcus Tregilgas-Davey, “Ex Parte Choudhury: An 
Opportunity Missed”, The Modern Law Review 54, no.  2 (1991) 294.
46 This was suggested during discussions around the House of Lords Select Committee on Religious 
Offences in England and Wales (2003), Ch. 4: Blasphemy: the Options, paras 52 and 53.
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circumstances. Anachronism provided civil servants with a kind of comfort 
that they protected religion without seriously contemplating the use of such 
laws. But the pressure of the European Union’s treaty obligations and the 
resultant quest to harmonise legal codes created considerable tensions in 
this area. Not least of these was a dialogue about whether individual states 
had a right to maintain such laws as a discretionary part of the “margin of 
appreciation” or simply had to cave in under the pressure from the whole 
European community to establish a supranational single standard of law. 
At first sight the decision to resist such changes seems strange, especially 
since the logic of harmonisation appeared rational and inescapable. Even 
harder to understand was the reassertion of ideas associated with the 
“margin of appreciation,” as the United Kingdom sought to plead around the 
Wingrove case in 1996.47 All these laws associated with blasphemy had fallen 
into disuse, so how precisely could a reasonable and rational argument be 
constructed for their retention? However, it might be argued that the quest 
to remove these laws genuinely exposed a raw nerve in Western societies 
and their views of themselves. Removal of blasphemy laws—laws which, 
as we have seen, protected the state-sanctioned version of Christianity, or 
a wider generic conception of this same belief system—seemed somehow 
really final as these societies approached the millennium. Removing 
protection, and by definition privilege, from previously state-protected 
religion was an admission that such countries were no longer nominally or 
realistically Christian. Moreover, the multicultural future that awaited them 
cut an umbilical cord with a Christian and imperial past. Admitting to the 
necessary depth of this sea change also brought forth concerns about the 
apparent reality of secularisation which had clearly affected the Christian 
religion most obviously in every Western country. It was no coincidence that 
the House of Lords Select Committee on Religious Offences in England and 
Wales (2003) felt itself duty-bound to open its final report with a declaration 
that Britain was “still a Christian country.”48
Sensibilities were sharpened and heightened by a series of high-profile 
international incidents that indicated religion had once more become 
central to ideology and identity. The logic of this seemed to suggest that wider 
protection should be offered to religions that perceived themselves to be 
47 See David Nash, Blasphemy in the Christian World: A History (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007), 
265–266.
48 House of Lords Select Committee on Religious Offences in England and Wales (2003), Introduction 
and conclusion.
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minorities in Western countries. Generally speaking, the solution proffered 
for this situation stemmed from the agenda associated with multiculturalism. 
This removed the sense of privilege from host communities to actively share 
it around with minorities that had previously been excluded. It offered 
disaffected minorities a degree of citizenship, solved any remaining concerns 
lingering around the retention of blasphemy laws in Western countries, and 
also provided a viable public order solution through equalising treatment and 
seeking to set a series of boundaries within which intervention was actively 
required. This really manifested itself in the development of the concept 
of hate crime.49 This readily came to see species of interpersonal conflict 
as motivated by and containing factors which the law came to describe as 
aggravating. Whilst the language and legal mechanisms for investigating 
hate crime had been developed, at least in embryo, it was certainly the case 
that conceptions of incitement to religious hatred came later. This was part 
of the wider history of hate crime in which categories actually expanded 
as awareness and agendas of inclusion widened in response to society’s 
demands, expressed through the multicultural ethos. 
Thus societies in the West began to think actively about how incitement 
to religious hatred laws were the magic bullet, one which would provide 
robust solutions to the targeting of immigrant communities whose 
religion had become a high-profile signifier of their identity as a result of 
developments in the contemporary political context. So it was believed, 
incitement to religious hatred laws could actively replace blasphemy laws. 
The logic seemed both simple and impeccable. The removal of blasphemy 
laws and their replacement with incitement to religious hatred would, at a 
stroke, equalise the status of all religious groups and denominations before 
the law. These would henceforth all have protection from unprovoked, and 
even provoked, attacks upon their beliefs and status. The problem was how 
precisely to define what should be protected. In England the House of Lords 
Select Committee on Religious Offences discussed the lessons that might 
be learned from the twentieth century reframing of the Indian Criminal 
Code. However, this potential solution still contained the remnants of neo-
colonial attitudes, and likewise it focussed upon artefacts and buildings and 
was manifestly less well-suited to a world where the exchange of views and 
attitudes was now happening in real time on the internet and beyond.
49 This concept was implicit in the deliberations of the House of Lords Select Committee on Religious 
Offences. See ibid., verbal evidence given 18 July 2002, questions 220–238.
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These were scarcely the only objections. Why, many from the secular 
camp asked, was religion singled out to be protected as a category of identity 
and belief status whereas other belief systems were excluded? It was also 
the case that many of the issues that had hampered attempts to extend the 
blasphemy laws to encompass all religions also resurfaced in the construction 
of adequate incitement laws. In particular how religion was to be defined, 
alongside how to regulate and police the content of such a definition, 
remained a perplexing problem that was never going to be resolved.
In theory most countries would have thought the ideal route forward 
would have been to repeal what blasphemy laws remained and immediately 
replace these with incitement to religious hatred laws. This indeed had 
been one intention behind the questioning of the 2003 House of Lords 
Select Committee on Religious Offences in England and Wales. This saw 
the repeal of the laws against blasphemous libel in England as a clear and 
obvious quid pro quo for installing a replacement Incitement to Religious 
Hatred Law. Apparently unworkable and anachronistic laws that maintained 
privilege were to be removed in favour of laws which seemingly reached for 
equality amongst believers and non-believers. Nonetheless it was significant 
that the Select Committee’s final report stopped short of an unequivocal 
recommendation.50 However, in many instances the seemingly simple 
process of enacting these ideas fell foul of procedural difficulties and political 
inertia. Certainly in Britain embracing repeal of such laws has never been 
popular with individual political parties. 
In Britain political pressure, mostly from outside Parliament, saw 
incitement laws appear on the statute book wholly independently of any move 
to remove the law of blasphemous libel. The Common Law of blasphemous 
libel was finally repealed as a result of a private member’s amendment to 
the Criminal Justice and Immigration Bill of 2008. This further emphasised 
that government would actively distance itself at every opportunity from 
the issue of blasphemy repeal. Religious hatred itself was finally dealt with 
under the Racial and Religious Hatred Act of 2008, which amended the 1986 
Public Order Act to create the offence of stirring up hatred against persons 
on religious grounds.
Whilst this may have appeared to be the end of conventional blasphemy 
laws in Western countries (New Zealand and Australia had departed 
from the logic of English common law sometime earlier) some anomalies 
remained. Of considerably more interest for our purposes were situations 
50 Ibid., conclusion.
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where the logic of older legal precedent and requirement collided with the 
new agendas bequeathed to Western legal systems by the rise of laws seeking 
to prevent religious hatred.
In Ireland there was just such a collision which produced a further 
departure from the apparently smooth transition from blasphemy to 
incitement to religious hatred that caught almost everybody by surprise. 
In the same year as repeal was enacted in England, the Republic of Ireland 
chose to revisit its blasphemy laws. Certainly there is evidence that the 
judiciary and the ruling Fianna Fáil party felt constrained by the situation 
they both found themselves in. The Irish Constitution of 1937 contains a 
statutory requirement that there be a clause concerning blasphemy. Whilst 
Ireland was scarcely a theocratic state, large sections of its constitution did 
privilege the holding and practising of the Christian religion, and especially 
the state-recognised religion of Catholicism. 
Within the new world of equality and under the pressures of harmonisation 
with European law, the Irish government felt a pressing imperative to 
revise the law of blasphemy. Up to this point in Ireland this had more or 
less followed the evolution of English Common Law precedent, and this had 
evolved along this same path until incorporation in the Irish Constitution. 
Indeed, in the few blasphemy cases that emerged before the millennium the 
tendency had been to cite the same English Common Law precedents that 
governed the application of the law of blasphemous libel in England.51 
However, new thinking and a departure from English Common Law 
precedent was confirmed by the resolution of the Corway case of 1999. In 
this instance the Supreme Court declared that blasphemy could no longer 
be interpreted in a “narrow sense” and had thereafter to embrace the logic 
of modern multicultural and multifaith states.52 Faced with the twin issues 
of satisfying the needs of the Constitution and the imperatives for wider 
religious equality and inclusion, the Irish Justice Minister, Dermot Ahern, 
brought a bill before Parliament which sought to change the laws against 
blasphemy in the context of articles 36 and 37 of the 2009 Defamation Act. 
Rumours suggested that even his own political party was taken aback by this 
development, and considerable anxiety attended its progress through the 
Dáil. Owing almost nothing to previous precedents around the construction 
51 This is discussed in Law Reform Commission, Consultation Paper on the Crime of Libel (Law 
Reform Commission, 1991) Chapter One—Historical Development of the Crime of Libel. See also 
Constitution of Ireland, Article 40.6.i (Dublin: Stationery Office), 158.
52 Aodhán Ó Ríordáin, Dáil debates, Thursday, 2 October 2014.
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of blasphemy laws, the new provisions were very obviously shaped with 
combatting “hate crime” as a priority.
The provisions of articles 36 and 37 made the “publishing or uttering” of 
“blasphemous matter” an offence liable to a fine of 25,000 Euros. Blasphemy 
was here defined as matter which was “grossly abusive or insulting in relation to 
matters held sacred by any religion.” Likewise, article 36 subsection b required 
“intention” to cause “outrage.” There were also provisions for the seizure of 
blasphemous material by the police (article 37, section 1 subsections a, b and 
c, and article 3). Aware that this all looked rather draconian and reminiscent 
of nineteenth century actions against atheist material in Britain, article 36 
proposed a number of defences. Very clearly the public order dimension 
was uppermost in the presumption that the material in question had to be 
capable of offending a “reasonable person.” Likewise, creative, academic and 
intellectually motivated people could seek protection under the law through 
its category of legitimate defences. It became a defence if material could 
demonstrate “genuine literary, artistic, political, scientific or academic value 
in the matter to which the offence relates.” Realising also that this potentially 
gave significant advantages to the category of the offended, the law tried to 
deny this potential status from religions for which “the principal object ... 
is the making of profit,” or those which employed “oppressive psychological 
manipulation” (Article 36, section 4, subsections a and b).
The sheer haste involved in the construction of this law meant that a 
very significant number of legal hostages to fortune lay in its framing. The 
blasphemous matter needed to be “grossly” abusive and there seemed no 
clear definition of when this level of abuse, as opposed to “mild” or “minimal” 
abuse, had been reached. Likewise, “outrage” again was not clearly defined. 
The range of possible defences also appeared likely to be problematic. Given 
the possible defences offered, many convicted of blasphemy in the past 
would have noted how much this looked like a class discriminatory law akin 
to those of the nineteenth century. As such it created provisions whereby a 
skilled and educated debater stood far less chance of prosecution than a less 
educated individual in a non-academic context. A closer examination also 
made many wonder quite how the courts would define “… genuine literary, 
artistic, political, scientific or academic value.” Speculating about the legal 
differences between “genuine” manifestations and “false” manifestations of 
these could potentially prove spectacularly embarrassing in court—as could 
defining the concept of a “reasonable person,” or “substantial number of 
adherents” in the context of religious debate.
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Beyond this the attempts to define “religion” were clumsy at best, and the 
attempts to prevent religious “cults” (something again not positively defined) 
from seeking protection under the law failed to envisage where this might 
lead. Debates about the propriety and status of mainstream religions in the 
Irish courts would potentially have been spectacularly embarrassing for all 
concerned. Speaking in the Irish Senate (Upper House of Government) in 
February 2012, Senator Ivana Bacik noted that this law had “gone against 
the EU norm in adopting a new statutory definition of blasphemy based on 
a definition of offence.”
Such misgivings became more widely manifest amongst members of the 
Fine Gael/Labour coalition government after Senator Bacik’s pronouncement. 
This growing scepticism and willingness to investigate the law’s value led to 
the decision to submit it to the consideration of a Constitutional Convention, 
which took place outside Dublin in November 2013. The Convention heard 
a number of speakers and was eventually asked to vote on two questions. 
The first was asking if the removal of a blasphemy provision from the Irish 
Constitution was desirable. This elicited a considerable majority in favour 
of its removal, which gave some heart to the abolitionists’ cause. However, 
it was something of a surprise when a few hours later the Convention was 
asked whether it still wanted to retain a blasphemy law that would not 
be considered to be part of the Constitution. When the vote on this latter 
measure was counted it revealed only a very narrow majority wanting to 
avoid this law’s retention. 
Taken together these two votes were revealing about how one Western 
nation with a still considerable religious tradition wanted to think about the 
phenomenon of blasphemy and legislate for its existence. The vote against 
retaining it in the Constitution was a major move towards recognising that 
the age of confessional states was over and the plural nature of the country’s 
religious life should be acknowledged by the Constitution. However, the 
much narrower outcome to the vote about retaining blasphemy somewhere 
perhaps told a different story. It spoke of fears of abolishing such a law and 
how this might be a final admission of the state religion relinquishing power 
unnecessarily. After all, as many nations before had discovered, the law here 
was an almost silent, almost moribund gatekeeper that actively reassured 
those fearful of religious change. In this instance it genuinely appeared that 
a blasphemy law, even conceptions of a newly created but flawed one, could 
provide sources of reassurance and comfort to a population at large. Others 
may well have seen the retention of such a law as shorthand for offering 
protection to religious status and identities. Whatever else this did, it also 
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suggested that governments genuinely needed to take into account this 
groundswell of opinions before taking anything that appeared to be decisive 
action. In the written evidence offered to the Convention’s website, before it 
met in session, some interesting trends could be discerned. One submission 
from the Catholic Church itself argued for repeal of the law, whilst that from 
a Catholic lay organisation (the Order of the Knights of St. Columbanus) 
argued for retention.53 This replicated several earlier historical instances 
where the laity of a Christian church appeared much more conservative than 
that same church’s hierarchy. Indeed, the former’s suspicion of the latter and 
their conceivably more ambivalent (or alternatively pragmatic) relationship 
to the faith would be a constant theme in such discussions.
Whether the inconclusive outcome from the Convention’s two votes had 
any influence or not on subsequent events and government opinion is an 
interesting question. However, the Fine Gael/Labour Coalition government 
reversed course and eventually decided to postpone action in the matter, 
even though interest in the issue was reopened by the Charlie Hebdo affair 
in Paris.54 Whilst recognising that the law was an anomaly and a problem, a 
failure to act risked making matters considerably worse by declaring that a 
referendum would not occur in the lifetime of the current government.
So why was the Irish government increasingly persuaded that a 
referendum (which was always couched as a referendum to remove the 
law) would eventually be necessary and should be both publicised and 
timetabled? Chief amongst the misgivings of both politicians and civil 
servants was a realisation that Ireland’s parochial decision in relation to 
its own Constitution had ignored the wider global context. As opposition 
opinion reminded the Irish government and its civil servants alike, the 
country could no longer behave as though it operated in a vacuum. Ireland 
had unwittingly sailed against the tide in producing a new and viable law 
which altered the entire legal landscape of the offence in the West. An almost 
uniform status of legal anachronism was challenged by the impetus of a new 
law made viable. This was noticed by other countries and would very soon 
lead to acute embarrassment in Irish government circles as well as pressure 
from other interest groups seeking repeal. 
53 See https://www.constitution.ie/SubmissionDetails.aspx?sid=d21e4103-e542-e311-8571-
005056a32ee4 (accessed 6 March 2016).
54 See http://www.irishexaminer.com/ireland/blasphemy-offence-may-be-removed-next-year-306162.
html (accessed 5 February 2016).
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The impetus behind this was the actions of other countries who had taken 
note of Ireland’s new stance on blasphemy. The Organisation of Islamic 
Cooperation (OIC) had been gaining more universal acceptance of its desire 
to extend the concept of defamation since 2009. Such requests had been 
offered at the Human Rights Council and also at the United Nations General 
Assembly.55 
However, the developments in Ireland represented something of a sea 
change. Pakistan, speaking as the lead voice in the Organisation of Islamic 
Cooperation (OIC), cited part of the wording of the Irish blasphemy law 
when proposing a resolution on defamation of religion.56 This proved beyond 
reasonable doubt that while moribund blasphemy laws were bad enough, 
still worse new laws created a dangerous culture of viability for such laws. 
Thus, criticism of Islamic countries that sought to reinvigorate such laws 
looked now like the worst kind of hypocritical orientalism. Nonetheless 
whilst the law in Ireland remains it is a provocation to all involved in the 
debate and seems to incite opinions in almost every direction.
Thus blasphemy laws have risen to address the needs of societies that 
sought to protect the sanctity of religious belief whilst also the peace of 
mind of individuals fearful of the providential consequences of denying 
God. Although overshadowed by heresy laws, initially blasphemy laws 
evolved to police and punish indiscipline. By the late eighteenth century 
they were enacted against religious radicals and political activists who were 
largely replaced by artists and writers as the twentieth century dawned. 
Within liberal societies, supposedly in favour of religious toleration, such 
laws increasingly seemed anachronistic, and many withered away or were 
repealed. However, their widespread demise was prevented by a new 
premium placed upon the status of the religiously oppressed. This saw 
blasphemy as a weapon to re-establish and reconfirm identity for individuals 
and nation states. The chance and opportunity to do this was readily afforded 
by Western states adopting hate crime laws and the extension of such laws 
to cover all religions without due care and attention. This has created an 
international deadlock that gives such laws a modern credibility that would 
have seemed almost incredible only fifteen years earlier.
55 Austen Dacey, The Future of Blasphemy (London: Continuum, 2012), 2.
56 Clare Daly, Dáil debates, Thursday, 2 October 2014.
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3  The English Law of Blasphemy:  
The “Melancholy, Long, Withdrawing Roar”
 Ivan Hare
This chapter is about the history of the English law of blasphemy. The 
definition of blasphemy has altered over time, but its essence was expression 
which undermined, insulted or revealed contempt for the Christian God or 
the formularies of the Church of England.1 On first encounter, the story 
appears to be relatively straightforward—and one which advances to the same 
tune as other major developments in legal, social and intellectual history. As 
far as the ordinary (as opposed to ecclesiastical) courts are concerned, the 
common law of blasphemy was born in the seventeenth century of an absolute 
identification between the doctrine of the established Church of England 
and the authority of the state. This identification was maintained (almost as 
an article of faith itself) until the offence was substantially narrowed towards 
the end of the nineteenth century to permit the questioning of elements of 
Christianity, so long as it was conducted in a “temperate” manner in which 
the “decencies of controversy are maintained.”2 Indeed, by the beginning 
of the twentieth century, the definition of blasphemy appeared to be so 
etiolated and prosecutions were so rare that many believed it to be a dead 
1 Richard H. Helmholz, The Oxford History of the Laws of England, Volume I: The Canon Law and 
Ecclesiastical Jurisdiction from 597 to the 1640s (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2004), 636–637 
defines blasphemy “technically” as “the attribution to God of a property inconsistent with his 
divinity.” See for Blackstone’s definition: William Blackstone, Commentaries on the Laws of England 
(8th edn. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1778), Book IV, 59. The Blasphemy Act 1697 made it an offence 
for any person educated in, or who had made profession of, the Christian religion to “deny any 
One of the Persons in the Holy Trinity to be God, or … assert or maintain there are more Gods 
than One, or … deny the Christian Religion to be true, or the Holy Scriptures of the Old and New 
Testament to be of Divine Authority.” In this chapter, I only address the law of England and Wales. 
The laws of Scotland and Northern Ireland are materially different in a number of respects as, of 
course, is the history of religion in those nations.
2 Bowman v. Secular Society Ltd [1917] A.C. 406, 423, per Lord Finlay L.C.
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letter. In due course, after it had made incitement to hatred on the grounds 
of any religious belief a criminal offence, Parliament abolished the crime of 
blasphemy altogether. 
The history of blasphemy therefore appears to conform to our common 
preconceptions of progress: with secularisation and Enlightenment 
rationalism leading inexorably to greater freedom and pluralism.3 The 
aim of this essay is not just to establish that this account is misleading and 
unsatisfactory, but also to examine a number of puzzling elements of the 
English law of blasphemy. These include: the origin and persistence of the 
identification between Church doctrine and the state beyond the early 
modern period; the resurrection of blasphemy in the late twentieth century 
(which threatened much greater restrictions on free speech than had been 
thought possible during most of the previous hundred years); the depiction of 
the new offence of incitement to religious hatred as somehow a modern and 
pluralistic version of blasphemy; and the ultimate abolition of blasphemy, 
not as a result of principled legislative debate, but by an adventitious side 
wind. This far from linear progression towards liberalisation explains the 
titular quotation from Mathew Arnold’s Dover Beach which the poet applied 
to the receding “sea of faith.”
I shall examine these puzzling aspects of the law of blasphemy by describing 
chronologically: the emergence of blasphemy as an offence at common law, 
its apparent immunity to fundamental reform from the seventeenth to the 
late twentieth centuries, and its eventual abolition at the start of the twenty-
first century. Finally, I shall say something about the relationship between 
blasphemy and incitement to religious hatred.
Before embarking on that account, however, some caveats are necessary. 
First, the distinction between blasphemy and other forms of religious crime 
has not always been either clearly stated or universally respected. English 
law once contained a substantial number of religious offences. Along with 
blasphemy, Sir William Blackstone, in his Commentaries on the Laws of 
England (published from 1766 onwards), described the crimes of apostasy, 
heresy, “profane and common swearing and cursing” and, finally, “witchcraft, 
conjuration, inchantment, or sorcery.”4 Although some maintained the 
3 Herbert Butterfield, The Whig Interpretation of History (London: G Bell and Sons, 1931).
4 William Blackstone, Commentaries on the Laws of England (8th edn. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1778), 
Book IV, ch 4. 
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distinction between blasphemy and other offences,5 there was a tendency in 
the early cases and writings to treat all questioning or criticism of religious 
orthodoxy as forms of heresy or atheism.6 
This leads to the second caveat, which is that prosecutions in the early 
modern period did not always distinguish blasphemy from the other forms 
which criminal libel could take as a matter of common law.7 Those other 
forms were seditious libel, obscene libel, and defamatory libel. Given the 
facts of some cases, this is not surprising. For example, Sir Charles Sedley’s 
drunken behaviour on the balcony of a Covent Garden tavern in 1663 
sounds as if it could have been designed to fall foul of more than one form of 
criminal libel. Once he had defecated on the crowd below and removed all 
of his clothing, Sedley acted “all the postures of lust and buggery that could 
be imagined, as abusing of the scripture, as it were, from thence preaching a 
Montebank sermon from that pulpitt.” As if that were not sufficient, Sedley 
then took a glass of wine “and washed his prick in it and then drank it off”; 
his glass refreshed, he then toasted the King for good measure.8 Whether the 
crowd objected most to being defecated upon or preached at is not recorded, 
but a “riot almost ensued, and some windows were broken—evidence of a 
breach of the King’s Peace.”9 This was an unusual case. However, even in 
less extreme circumstances, John Spencer has suggested that the decision to 
charge blasphemous or seditious libel “seems to have depended largely on 
the taste in vituperative epithet of the man who drafted the indictment or 
5 For example, in Naylor’s case (1656) 5 St. Tr. 825, Lord Commissioner Whitelock stated that “heresy 
is Crimen Judicii, an erroneous opinion; blasphemy is Crimen Malitae, a reviling of the name and 
honour of God.”
6 Diarmaid MacCulloch describes the tendency to treat all expressions of religious doubt as atheism 
as being as common as that of describing all disapproved sexual practices as sodomy (Reformation: 
Europe’s House Divided 1490-1700 (London: Penguin Books, 2004), 693). See, further, David Nash, 
Blasphemy in the Christian World (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007), 48.
7 William Holdsworth, “Defamation in the Sixteenth and Seventeenth Centuries”, 40 L.Q.R. (1924) 
302, 397; 41 L.Q.R. (1925) 13.
8 Sir Charles Sydlyes Case (1662) 1 Keb. 620; 83 E.R. 1146. The reports are decorously short, but 
Samuel Pepys is, characteristically, less squeamish and the above quotations come from The Diary of 
Samuel Pepys (ed. Robert Latham and William Matthews, London: Bell & Hyman, 1990), vol. IV, 269 
(entry for 1 July 1663). Sedley’s case is discussed in David Lawton, Blasphemy (Hemel Hempstead: 
Harvester Wheatsheaf, 1993), 23–26.
9 Geoffrey Robertson, Obscenity: An Account of the Censorship Laws and their Enforcement in England 
and Wales (London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1979), 21.
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information,” rather than upon distinctions of substance.10 Blasphemy and 
obscenity have remained close companions (if not exactly bedfellows) up to 
the present day, especially in the field of artistic expression.11
Thirdly, an account of the history of blasphemy cannot be entirely 
divorced from the legal regulation of religion as a whole in English law. Such 
regulation was broad and extensive: a collection of ecclesiastical statutes 
from 1847 ran to five volumes, and in its more than two thousand pages 
covered subjects from “Abbeys,” “Abjuration,” and “Advowsons” to “Usury,” 
“Witchcraft” and “Writs.”12 Although the criminal penalties for blasphemy 
10 John Spencer, “Criminal Libel-A Skeleton in the Cupboard” [1977] Crim. L.R. 383. John Spencer 
gives the example of Reg. v. Keach (1665) 6 St. Tr. 701 in which a book contrary to the teachings of 
the Church of England was prosecuted as seditious (rather than blasphemous) libel. This confusion 
between sedition and blasphemy also appears to have been a characteristic of the exercise of 
ecclesiastical jurisdiction (Richard H. Helmholz, The Oxford History of the Laws of England, Volume I: 
The Canon Law and Ecclesiastical Jurisdiction from 597 to the 1640s (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 
2004), 636).
11 The indictment in Whitehouse v. Lemon [1979] A.C. 617 (discussed further below) particularised the 
offence as “an obscene poem and illustration vilifying Christ and His life and His crucifixion,” cited 
by Viscount Dilhorne at 639. In the Court of Appeal, the inclusion of “obscene” was stated to be a 
matter of regret by Counsel for the Crown (R. v. Lemon (Denis) [1979] Q.B. 10, 15B). Other examples 
are given in David Nash, “Last Temptation and Visions of Ecstasy: Blasphemy and Film”, Ch. 7 of 
David Nash, Blasphemy in the Christian World (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007). Outside film, 
Andre Serrano’s ‘Piss Christ’ and Chris Offili’s ‘The Holy Virgin Mary’ provided further examples 
from the 1990s.
12 The Ecclesiastical Statutes at Large extracted from the great body of the statute law, and arranged 
under separate heads by James Thomas Law (London: William Penning and Co, 1847). St John A. 
Robillard’s Religion and the law (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1984) devotes only 20 
of his 200 pages to blasphemy. Some statutes went so far as to prescribe religious orthodoxy with 
some precision. For example, the “Act for abolishing of diversitie of opinions in certaine Articles 
concerning Christian religion” (sometimes referred to as the Act of the Six Articles) asserted the 
orthodoxy of transubstantiation, clerical celibacy, vows of chastity, private masses and auricular 
confession (31 Hen. VIII, c. XIV). This Act was described by Eamon Duffy as marking “a decisive 
turning-point for the progress of radical Protestantism under Henry” in The Stripping of the Altars: 
Traditional Religion in England c.1400-c.1580 (2nd edn., (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 
2005), 424. Later Reformation statutes went much further in distancing the Church of England 
from that of Rome and were supplemented by a range of non-parliamentary measures, including 
Convocation’s Ten Articles (“the first official doctrinal formulary of the Church of England” (ibid., 
392)) and Thomas Cromwell’s Injunctions of 1536 (attacking pilgrimages and the cult of images 
and relics) and 1538. However, my focus is almost entirely on the common law of blasphemy. There 
is some justification for this as, for example, there was never a prosecution under the Blasphemy 
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were among the most violent and brutal, many more individuals suffered 
from the legal disqualifications which for centuries affected the ability of 
non-adherents of the Church of England to own land, sue in a court of law, 
bequeath their property on death, or hold many forms of public office.13 The 
extent of the reach of the law of blasphemy is further illustrated by the legal 
treatment of two of the Romantic era’s greatest poets: Shelley was denied 
custody of his children because of his “impiety and irreligion” (which was 
manifested in his blasphemous writings in Queen Mab and elsewhere) and 
an injunction was refused to restrain publication of an unauthorised copy of 
Byron’s Cain because of its blasphemous content.14 An account of blasphemy 
cannot therefore give a fully representative picture of the extent to which 
the doctrine and practices of the Christian Church were for centuries woven 
into the fabric of English society.15 Subject to those caveats, I now return to 
the chronology outlined above.
the emergence and endurance Of Blasphemy at cOmmOn law
The story of the development of the offence of blasphemy at common law is 
well known.16 Originally, jurisdiction over religious offences lay exclusively 
Act 1697. For an account of the statutory provisions see Eamon Duffy, The Stripping of the Altars: 
Traditional Religion in England c.1400-c.1580 (2nd edn., (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 
2005), 379–477 and Frederic William Maitland, The Constitutional History of England (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 1911), 506–526.
13 St John A. Robillard, Religion and the law (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1984), contains 
an Appendix which sets out the principal “moves towards religious toleration in the nineteenth 
century.”
14 Shelley v. Westbrooke (1821) Jac. 266; 37 E.R. 850 (the quotation comes from Warde v. Warde (1849) 2 
Phillips 786, 791) and Murray v. Benbow (1822) Jac. 474; 6 Petersdorff Abr 558n (see further Isabella 
Alexander, Copyright Law and the Public Interest in the Nineteenth Century (Oxford: Hart Publishing, 
2010), at 72–3 for a discussion of this and Don Juan). A bookseller was successfully prosecuted for 
selling Queen Mab in R v. Moxon (1841) 4 St. Tr. NS 693.
15 The outstanding account of pre-Reformation religious practice remains Eamon Duffy in The 
Stripping of the Altars: Traditional Religion in England c.1400-c.1580 (2nd edn., (New Haven, CT: Yale 
University Press, 2005) and (on a smaller scale) The Voices of Morebath: Reformation and Rebellion 
in an English Village (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 2003). For the later period see D. 
MacCulloch, The Later Reformation in England 1547-1603 (London: MacMillan Education, 1990).
16 David Nash, Blasphemy in the Christian World (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007), Ch. 2; 
Leonard Levy, Blasphemy: Verbal Offense against the Sacred from Moses to Salman Rushdie (Chapel 
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in the Ecclesiastical Courts17 and the ordinary courts would refuse to permit 
actions concerning purely spiritual matters to proceed before them.18 
Atwood’s case confirmed that justices of the peace had no jurisdiction over 
the uttering of scandalous words, such as that “the religion now professed 
was a new religion…preaching was but prating” [empty or pointless talk].19 
As we have seen, Sedley’s case involved conduct in which the profane could 
properly be said to outweigh the divine (with elements of obscenity, sedition, 
blasphemy and a threatened breach of the peace). As such, the temporal 
court of King’s Bench felt well able to deal with him. However, it was not 
until Taylor’s case in 1676 that the Court of King’s Bench addressed itself to 
purely religious expression.20 Taylor’s statements included that “Christ is a 
whoremaster, and religion is a Cheat…I am Christ’s younger brother and 
that Christ is a bastard.” Chief Justice Hale justified the jurisdiction of the 
Court of King’s Bench over such matters in the following terms:
These words, though of ecclesiastical cognisance, yet that religion 
is a cheat, tends to the dissolution of all government, and therefore 
punishable here, and so of contumelious reproaches to God, or the 
Hill, NC: University of North Carolina Press, 1993), ch. 10; and Hypatia Bradlaugh Bonner, Penalties 
Upon Opinion (London: Watts & Co, 1934), 1–34.
17 Richard H. Helmholz explains that the ecclesiastical jurisdiction survived the passing of statutes 
on blasphemy (such as 3 Jac 1, c. 21 (1605))—which would normally have the effect that the 
ordinary courts would take over decision-making—by express provisions preserving the position 
of the ecclesiastical courts (The Oxford History of the Laws of England, Volume I: The Canon Law and 
Ecclesiastical Jurisdiction from 597 to the 1640s (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2004), 276).
18 John Baker, The Oxford History of the Laws of England, Volume VI: 1483-1558 (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 2003), 791–792. Professor Baker notes that by the 1540s the Court of Common 
Pleas would countenance some spiritual element in proceedings before it, for example, where an 
individual was accused of being a heretic. In such cases, the secular element of defamatory libel 
provided a basis for the common law courts to exercise jurisdiction even though the subject-matter 
of the libel was religious.
19 (1618) 1 Vent. 293. In Traske’s case (1618) Hob. 236, the defendant’s views “that the Jewish Sabbath 
ought to be observed, and not ours, and that we ought to abstain from all manner of swines’ flesh” 
were punishable only in the Ecclesiastical Courts, but his criticisms of the King and Bishops tended 
to sedition and were properly a matter for the Star Chamber: William S. Holdsworth, History of 
English Law, Vol. VIII (London: Methuen, 1903–1926), 406–407. On the history of blasphemy before 
1660 see Gerald D. Nokes, A History of the Crime of Blasphemy (London: Sweet and Maxwell, 1928), 
1–42.
20 (1676) 3 Keb 607; 84 ER 906. 
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religion established. An indictment lay for saying the Protestant 
religion was a fiction for taking away religion, all obligations to 
government by oaths etc ceaseth, and Christian religion is a part of 
the law itself, therefore injuries to God are punishable as to the King, 
or any common person.21
Before analysing this reasoning, a number of points should be made about the 
historical context in which the decision was delivered. Seventeenth century 
England had seen unprecedented political turmoil in the form of the English 
Civil War (which led to the execution of King Charles I) and the Interregnum. 
It was also a period of great controversy about the philosophical basis of 
government with seminal contributions from Thomas Hobbes, Robert 
Filmer and John Locke.22 Hale was familiar with Hobbes’ work and wrote his 
own Reflections on Hobbes’ Dialogue of the Law.23 Moreover, England’s break 
with Roman Catholicism had, for the first time, unified secular and religious 
authority in the King who was not only head of state, but also Defender of the 
Faith. There were also institutional reasons for the King’s Bench to expand 
its role. The Star Chamber (which had previously prosecuted blasphemy) 
21 The other report of Taylor’s case (1 Vent 293; 86 ER 189) states: “Christianity is parcel of the laws of 
England; and therefore to reproach the Christian religion is to speak in subversion of the law”. Alan 
Cromartie, Sir Matthew Hale 1609-1676: Law, Religion and Natural Philosophy (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 1995), 177 quotes Hale from the Fairhurst Papers in Lambeth Palace Library on 
the power to suppress religious dissent: “the reasonableness and indeed necessity of this coercion 
in matter of religion is apparent for the concerns of religion and the civil state are so twisted one 
with another that confusion and disorder an[d] anarchy in the former must of necessity introduce 
confusion and dissolution of the latter.” See further William Hawkins, A Treatise of the Pleas of the 
Crown (8th edn., (London: S. Sweet, 1824), Bk. 1, 358.
22 John Locke, The Second Treatise of Civil Government and a Letter Concerning Toleration (Oxford: 
Basil Blackwell, 1946) (originally published in 1689); Thomas Hobbes, Leviathan (Oxford: Basil 
Blackwell, 1955) (originally published in 1651); Robert Filmer, Patriarcha (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 
1949) (originally published in 1680 (after Hale’s death), but much of this work was published in 
other forms during Hale’s lifetime).
23 The Reflections were not published until the early nineteenth century. Thomas Hobbes’ A Dialogue 
between a Philosopher and a Student of the Common Laws of England (Chicago, Ill.: University of 
Chicago Press, 1971) (originally published in 1681) contains a chapter ‘Of Heresie’ which also 
addresses blasphemy. Alan Cromartie, Sir Matthew Hale 1609-1676: Law, Religion and Natural 
Philosophy (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1995) includes in Chapter 7 an account of 
“Restoration: constitutional theory,” with an understandable emphasis on the work of Coke and 
Selden. Cromartie concludes that there was no evidence that Hale read Filmer: ibid., 116 fn 105.
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was abolished on the death of Charles I, and the King’s Bench inherited 
its criminal jurisdiction. Moreover, the Ecclesiastical Courts “had suffered 
under Cromwell a paralysis from which they had not fully recovered.”24 More 
personally, Hale was a Royalist and a devout Christian.25
These circumstances might provide some justification for why Taylor’s 
case was decided as it was in 1676, but they do not explain how it came 
to provide the philosophical and doctrinal basis for the common law of 
blasphemy for more than two hundred and fifty years.26 The influence of 
Hale’s judgment is all the more surprising when its reasoning is examined. 
In common with most of that age, the reports of the judgment are very 
short. They do not include any reference to previously decided cases. Some 
commentators have suggested that Hale may, in fact, have relied on an 
inaccurate translation in one of the authorities.27 Whether or not that is so 
is less important than the quality of the reasoning itself. Hale’s reasoning is 
entirely circular: Taylor is guilty of an offence punishable before the Court 
of King’s Bench not because he has breached any particular law or statute, 
but because his criticism of religion undermines or subverts the obligation 
to obey the law in general. This assertion is unjustified as a matter of fact 
on at least two bases. First, the law of England plainly was not the same 
as the moral teachings of the established Church.28 Secondly, there was no 
24 Courtney S. Kenny, “The Evolution of the Law of Blasphemy’”, 1 Camb. L. J. (1922) 127, 129. 
However, the mere fact that the spiritual courts would not provide a remedy did not require that the 
secular courts should—as the Court of King’s Bench very properly held in declining jurisdiction over 
the “printing of bawdy stuff” in R v. Read (1708) 11 Mod. Rep. 142. The Court soon changed its mind 
and invented the common law offence of obscene libel in R v. Curl (1727) 2 Str. 788; 1 Barn K.B. 29; 
93 E.R. 849. A full account is given in Geoffrey Robertson, Obscenity: An Account of the Censorship 
Laws and their Enforcement in England and Wales (London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1979), Ch. 2.
25 Hale presided over the well-known trial of Amy Duny and Rose Cullender for witchcraft in March 
1662 at the Assizes in Bury St Edmunds. Both were hanged. Alan Cromartie, Sir Matthew Hale 1609-
1676: Law, Religion and Natural Philosophy (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1995), 237–239 
includes an appendix on “Hale and witchcraft”.
26 Leonard Levy describes it as “the most important [case] … that had ever been or ever would be 
decided in England on the subject” in Blasphemy: Verbal Offense against the Sacred from Moses to 
Salman Rushdie (Chapel Hill, NC: University of North Carolina Press, 1993), 220. 
27 Courtney S. Kenny, “The Evolution of the Law of Blasphemy’”, 1 Camb. L. J. (1922), 130–131 
accepts the view that the work usually called Finch’s Common Law (1627) contained a material 
mistranslation which may have misled Hale. 
28 As Lord Cranworth famously pointed out, “none of us have ever seen a man indicted in a Court of 
Law for not loving his neighbour as himself”, quoted by Kenny, in ibid., 130. Lord Atkin in Donoghue 
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evidence to suggest that Taylor’s words had any effect in reducing obedience 
to the law—still less that they tended “to the dissolution of all government.” 
The real criticism of Hale’s reasoning, though, is that it is based on a 
contradiction. In order to punish Taylor for his statements on matters of 
religion, Hale was forced to identify a secular basis for the jurisdiction of the 
ordinary (as opposed to ecclesiastical) courts. However, once he identified 
that basis as the undermining of the authority of the state and of respect for 
the law, there was no reason for common law courts to punish blasphemy 
as a distinct offence because the law of sedition already provided an ample 
basis for dealing with such conduct. The law of sedition was well-established 
by this time and might be thought to be a more appropriate basis upon which 
a secular court could restrain expression which threatened the authority of 
the state or incited hostility between different members of society.29 
Despite this fundamental difficulty, Taylor’s case and its rationale 
continued to be cited with approval well into the nineteenth century.30 It 
was explicitly adopted by Blackstone.31 This point should not be overstated: 
Hale’s justification for the common law of blasphemy was, of course, 
v. Stevenson [1932] A.C. 562, 580 induced from the mass of single instances in which liability had 
previously been imposed the classic statement of the tort of negligence in these terms: “The rule 
that you are to love your neighbour becomes in law, you must not injure your neighbour; and the 
lawyer’s question, who is my neighbour? receives a restricted reply.” In the context of the common 
law right to a fair hearing, Fortescue J. stated in R. v. Chancellor, Master and Scholars of the University 
of Cambridge (1723) 1 Str. 557, 567 that “even God himself did not pass sentence on Adam before he 
was called upon to make his defence”. As Lord Hoffmann pointed out subsequently, this cannot have 
been to improve the quality of God’s subsequent decision given His Omniscience (Secretary of State 
for the Home Department v. AF (No 3) [2010] 2 A.C. 269, [72]).
29 Sir James Fitzjames Stephen, A History of the Criminal Law of England (London: MacMillan and Co, 
1883), 298–316 traces the history of sedition back to the Plantagenets, but states that it was “highly 
important and prominent” by the time of the Tudors. See further Stephen’s Digest of the Criminal Law 
(9th edn, London: Sweet and Maxwell, 1950), art. 114.
30 Examples of cases in which later courts (including several Chief Justices) relied not just on the 
authority of Taylor’s case, but expressly adopted Hale’s rationale include Dominus Rex v. Woolston 
(1728) Fitz. 64; 94 E.R. 655 (for suggesting that Christ’s miracles should be read allegorically and not 
literally); R. v. Williams (1797) 26 St. Tr. 653 and R. v. Carlisle (Richard) (1819) 3 B. & Ald. 161 and R. v. 
Carlisle (Mary) (1821) 1 Str. Tr. N.S. 1033 (for publishing Thomas Paine’s The Age of Reason (1794)).
31 William Blackstone, Commentaries on the Laws of England (8th edn. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 
1778), Book IV, 59 defined blasphemy as: “denying [the Almighty’s] being or providence; or by 
contumelious reproaches to our saviour Christ. Whither also may be referred all profane scoffing 
at the Holy Scripture, or exposing it to contempt or ridicule. These are offences at common law 
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elaborated by later judges. In some cases, a further paternalistic motive of 
protecting the young or uneducated from attacks on Christianity was relied 
upon, particularly where the “tone and spirit [of the attack] is that of offence 
and insult and ridicule, which leaves the judgment really not free to act.”32 
However, these refinements did not call into question the fundamental 
rationale of Taylor’s case. 
the apparent narrOwIng Of Blasphemy
In the late nineteenth century, as sober and temperate criticism of religion 
became a respectable part of public discourse, the law appeared to tolerate 
the reasoned denial of the truth of Christianity.33 By the early twentieth 
century, it appeared that Hale’s reasoning was finally displaced as the basis 
for the law of blasphemy in favour of a rationale based on preserving public 
order. In 1917, Lord Parker stated that:
punishable by fine and imprisonment, or other infamous corporal punishment: for Christianity is 
part of the laws of England.”
32 R. v. Carlisle (Mary) (1821) 1 Str. Tr. N.S. 1056 (the sentencing decision) and R. v. Heatherington 
(1841) 4 St. Tr. NS 563, 591 (the source of the quotation). Heatherington also marks a change of 
focus in examining the tone of the expression, rather than whether it seeks to undermine aspects of 
doctrine.
33 Such a modification was necessary to avoid exposing to prosecution Charles Darwin and Thomas 
Huxley (as Roskill L.J. pointed out in R. v. Lemon (Denis) [1979] Q.B. 10, 17). In R. v. Ramsay and 
Foote (1883) 15 Cox CC 231, 236, Lord Coleridge C.J. directed the jury in the following terms: “A 
wilful intention to pervert, insult, and mislead others, by means of licentious and contumelious 
abuse applied to sacred subjects, or by wilful misrepresentations or wilful sophistry, calculated 
to mislead the ignorant and the unwary, is the criterion and test of guilt.” This passage was also 
thought to have established (or affirmed) the requirement that the defendant must have intended 
to insult or vilify religious subjects. When read in context, this view is not justified as a requirement 
of intention would have been incompatible with the numerous convictions of booksellers for 
blasphemous material who might well have been unaware of the precise content of what they or 
their servants sold (John Spencer, “Blasphemous Libel Resurrected—Gay News and Grim Tidings”, 
Camb. L.J. 38 (1979) 245). The earlier formulations of the law had been most influentially criticised 
by John Stuart Mill in On Liberty (2nd edn, (London: John W. Parker and Son, 1859), 54, which refers 
to the “stain … of legal persecution: in relation to penalties for expression” and relies on the then 
recent example of Thomas Pooley, “an unfortunate man, said to be of unexceptional conduct in all 
relations of life,” who was sentenced at Bodmin Assizes in July 1857 to 21 months’ imprisonment for 
blasphemy (although ultimately receiving a free pardon from the Crown).
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To constitute blasphemy at common law there must be such an 
element of vilification, ridicule or irreverence as would be likely to 
exasperate the feelings of others and so lead to a breach of the peace.34 
More importantly for our purposes, Lord Parker appeared (250 years after it 
was decided) to bury Taylor’s case, which he summarised as follows: 
to the effect that Christianity is part of the law of the land, the suggested 
inference [is] that to attack or deny any of its fundamental doctrines 
must therefore be unlawful. The inference of course depends on some 
implied major premise. If the implied major premise be that it is an 
offence to speak with contumely or even to express disapproval of 
existing law, it is clearly erroneous. If, on the other hand, the implied 
major premise is that it is an offence to induce people to disobey the 
law, the premise may be accepted, but to avoid a non sequitur it would 
be necessary to modify the minor premise by asserting that it is part of 
the law of the land that all must believe in the fundamental doctrines 
of Christianity, and this again is inadmissible. Christianity is clearly 
not part of the law of the land in the sense that every offence against 
Christianity is cognizable in the Courts.35
Lord Sumner was more succinct:
My Lords, with all respect for the great names of the lawyers who have 
used it, the phrase ‘Christianity is part of the law of England’ is really 
not law; it is rhetoric…36 
34 Bowman v. Secular Society Ltd [1917] A.C. 406, 446, per Lord Parker. Lord Sumner, in ibid., 466–467, 
stated that the limits of lawful expression were exceeded where criticism of Christianity or the 
Church of England tended to “endanger the peace then and there, to deprave public morality 
generally, to shake the fabric of society, and to be a cause of civil strife.” Bowman was not a 
prosecution for blasphemy, but addressed the question of whether a bequest to the Secular Society 
(whose aim was to promote the philosophy that human conduct should be based upon natural 
knowledge, and not upon supernatural belief) was valid. The House of Lords held that it was (Lord 
Finlay L.C., 423; Lord Dunedin, 433; Lord Parker of Waddington, 445–446; and Lord Buckmaster, 
470). 
35 Ibid., 446.
36 Ibid., 464.
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Neither judge pursued these views to their logical conclusion: if the 
law of blasphemy was henceforth to be based on the secular justification 
of preserving the public peace, there was no reason for it to exist as a 
crime distinct from the established common law offences relating to the 
maintenance of public order.37 However, the decision in Bowman did appear 
to confirm that the scope of blasphemy had narrowed to an extent more 
consistent with the exercise of free speech in a modern democracy.38 Indeed, 
it led many informed commentators to suggest that the law of blasphemy 
was moribund.39 Save for the case of Gott,40 there was no prosecution for 
blasphemy after Bowman until 1977. 
resurrectIOn?
However, in that year, the moral campaigner Mary Whitehouse instituted 
a successful private prosecution for blasphemy against the editor and 
publishers of Gay News.41 Mrs Whitehouse objected to the publication of the 
poem, ‘The Love that Dares to Speak its Name’ by Professor James Kirkup, 
which was accompanied by a drawing of Christ. The poem was described 
in court as ascribing to Christ promiscuous homosexual practices with the 
37 Anthony T.H. Smith, The Offences Against Public Order (London: Sweet and Maxwell, 1987).
38 Lord Sumner also stated in Bowman v. Secular Society Ltd [1917] A.C. 406, 466–467: “The words, as 
well as the acts, which tend to endanger society differ from time to time in proportion as society is 
stable or insecure in fact, or is believed by its reasonable members to be open to assault … In the 
present day reasonable men do not apprehend the dissolution or the downfall of society because 
religion is publicly assailed by methods not scandalous.” He also stated that he would not want 
to limit the power of a future society to expand the scope of blasphemy again to deal with “future 
irreligious attacks, designed to undermine fundamental institutions of our society.”
39 Lord Denning, Freedom under the Law (London: Stevens & Co, 1949), 46. Sir James Fitzjames 
Stephen had said as much in 1883 in A History of the Criminal Law of England (London: MacMillan 
and Co, 1883), Vol. II, 396, describing the offences against religion as “all but entirely obsolete.” Lord 
Goddard C.J. referred to the “somewhat obsolete offence of blasphemy” in a different context in R. v. 
Morris [1951] 1 K.B. 394, 397.
40 R. v. Gott (1922) 16 Cr. App. R. 87. Gott had described Christ as entering Jerusalem “like a circus 
clown on the back of two donkeys” and the Court of Appeal upheld his conviction for distributing 
such pamphlets in a manner which might provoke a breach of the peace in “anyone in sympathy 
with the Christian religion, whether he be a strong Christian, or a lukewarm Christian, or merely a 
person sympathizing with their ideals”: 89–90.
41 Whitehouse v. Lemon [1979] A.C. 617.
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Apostles and other men during his lifetime and depicting in graphic detail 
acts of sodomy and fellatio with the body of Christ immediately after his 
death (perhaps to demonstrate that there is no rest for the virtuous either).42 
In Whitehouse v Lemon, the House of Lords confirmed the continued 
existence of the offence of blasphemy at common law. However, the main 
issue in the appeal was whether or not the prosecution had to prove an 
intention to shock or arouse resentment or whether it was sufficient that the 
defendant intended to publish material which was in fact blasphemous. The 
majority held that the latter was all that the law required.43 Although not in 
issue in the appeal, two members of the House of Lords expressed the clear 
view that there was no requirement to demonstrate a tendency to cause a 
breach of the peace.44 Lemon therefore appears to reverse two of the most 
important elements of the progress which was thought to have been made 
in narrowing the definition of blasphemy over the previous century: by 
requiring an intention to insult or cause offence and by confining it to cases 
where a breach of the peace was likely. Viscount Dilhorne went further and 
held that the elements of the offence of publishing a blasphemous libel had 
not altered since 1792.45 Finally, Lemon affirmed the fundamental shift in the 
common law: from punishing attempts to undermine elements of Church 
of England doctrine to protecting the “feelings of the general body of the 
community.”46 The House of Lords did not explain how this new rationale 
justified criminal restrictions on free speech, especially where the feelings 
42 The phrase “no rest for the wicked” appears to derive from the Book of Isaiah, verses 48:22.
43 Whitehouse v. Lemon [1979] A.C. 617, Viscount Dilhorne, 645F–656C; Lord Russell of Killowen, 
657G–658A; and Lord Scarman, 665F–G. The editor of Gay News, Denis Lemon, was originally 
sentenced to nine months’ imprisonment (suspended for 18 months) and fined £500; the publishers 
were fined £1,000. The Court of Appeal quashed the custodial elements of Lemon’s sentence and 
left the fines in place. The other members of the House held that an intention to shock or cause 
resentment was required (Lord Diplock, 635H–636B; and Lord Edmund-Davies, 656B–E).
44 Ibid., Lord Edmund-Davies, 656G and Lord Scarman, 662D–E.
45 1792 was the date of Fox’s Libel Act which made all questions of fact in a libel case a matter for the 
jury, rather than the judge.
46 Whitehouse v. Lemon [1979] A.C., 662C–D, per Lord Scarman. This is also clear from the majority’s 
approval of the trial judge’s direction to the jury which included the following: “Did it shock you 
when you first read it? ... Could you read it aloud to an audience of fellow-Christians without 
blushing? ... Could it hurt, shock, offend or appal anyone who read it?”
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of the community which are entitled to protection are confined to those of 
members of the Church of England.47
Lemon marked the final stage in the development of the common law 
of blasphemy. There are, however, two more cases to deal with in this 
history. In the first, a Mr Choudhury sought unsuccessfully to bring a private 
prosecution against Salman Rushdie and the publisher of The Satanic Verses 
for blasphemous libel.48 In Choudhury, the Divisional Court decided that it 
had no power to extend the common law of blasphemy to other religions.49 
The second is the decision of the Divisional Court which ultimately ended 
340 years of blasphemy prosecutions. 
aBOlItIOn
Jerry Springer: The Opera, a stage show which ran in London and elsewhere 
between 2003 and 2006, was a parody of the television chat show which 
pioneered a confessional and confrontational format for addressing personal 
problems. The stage show was produced by Jonathan Thoday, who was one 
of two named defendants in the prosecution; the other was Mark Thompson, 
the Director General of the BBC, which broadcast the production in January 
2005. In January 2007, the national director of an organisation called 
Christian Voice (Stephen Green) sought to bring a private prosecution for 
blasphemous libel in the City of Westminster Magistrates’ Court. The BBC 
received a substantial number of complaints about the broadcast. It appeared 
that Mr Green objected particularly to Act Two, in which the character of 
47 Robert C. Post in Constitutional Domains: Democracy, Community, Management (Cambridge, Mass.: 
Harvard University Press, 1995), 97–100, regards Lord Scarman’s judgment and his call for the law 
to be extended to other religions as “an instrument of pluralism.”
48 R. v. Chief Metropolitan Stipendiary Magistrate, ex parte Choudhury [1991] 1 Q.B. 429. In R. v. 
Gathercole (1838) 2 Lew 237, 254; 168 ER 1140, 1145, Alderson B stated: “A person may, without 
being liable to prosecution for it, attack Judaism or Mahomedanism, or even any sect of the 
Christian religion, save the established religion of the country; and the only reason why the latter is 
in a different situation from the other is, because it is the form established by law, and is therefore 
part of the constitution of the country.” See Jeremy Waldron, “Rushdie and Religion”, in Liberal 
Rights-Collected Papers 1981–1991 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1993) and Colin Munro, 
“Prophets, Presbyters and Profanity” [1989] Pub. L. 369. 
49 R. v. Chief Metropolitan Stipendiary Magistrate, ex parte Choudhury [1991] 1 Q.B., 447B–448E, per 
Watkins L.J.
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Mr Springer descends into hell and there meets various characters from the 
earlier parts of the play who now represent religious figures. For example, 
in the course of Act Two, there is an argument between Satan and Christ 
(who is dressed in a large baby’s nappy and accepts that he has coprophiliac 
tendencies) in which the latter admits to being “a little bit gay” and, holding 
up his hand, tells Satan to “Talk to the stigmata”; the figure of God is portrayed 
as inadequate and in need of therapy; and the chorus chants Jerry Eleison (a 
parody of the Kyrie Eleison, which features in many Christian services). Jerry 
Springer was unlikely to be everyone’s cup of tea, but the question for the 
District Judge was whether a summons for blasphemy should be issued. 
The Judge decided not, and the Divisional Court rejected Mr Green’s 
attempt to overturn that decision by way of judicial review.50 The Divisional 
Court upheld the decision that, on the facts, there was no prima facie case of 
blasphemous libel and, as a matter of law, the prosecution was barred by the 
Theatres Act 1968 and the Broadcasting Act 1990. 
The Divisional Court upheld the finding that the play could not be 
regarded as an attack on Christianity, but was really aimed at the exploitative 
television chat show. On the facts, this finding was plainly open to the 
Court.51 However, it is surprising in the light of Lemon, which can only 
be understood as having shifted the focus of the inquiry from whether the 
expression undermined Christianity to whether it was offensive. Whatever 
view one takes of Jerry Springer, it cannot be disputed that many Christians 
would find it deeply upsetting.52 The Court also relied on the fact that 
the play had been performed regularly for two years without any evidence 
that it undermined society or occasioned civil strife or unrest to support 
the conclusion that there was no prima facie case of blasphemous libel.53 
Again, this is an admirable finding as a matter of principle, but it sits very 
50 R. (on the application of Stephen Green) v. The City of Westminster Magistrates Court & Ors [2007] 
EWHC 2785 (Admin); [2008] E.M.L.R. 15 (the ‘Jerry Springer’ case).
51 The Court had regard to the play “as a whole” (ibid., [32] per Hughes L.J.) which is a further 
departure from many of the earlier cases where the judgments focus on particular phrases of 
passages.
52 A point the Court concedes, ibid., [32], per Hughes L.J.
53 Ibid., [32]–[33], per Hughes L.J. The Court did refer to the fact that there were demonstrations 
outside BBC Television Centre on the day before and the day of the broadcast (the latter attended by 
500 people). There was some disorder at the first demonstration and at least one arrest.
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uncomfortably with the clear decision in Lemon that demonstrating a 
likelihood of unrest was no part of the prosecution’s burden.54
As to the Theatres Act, s. 2(4) provides (as relevant):
No person shall be proceeded against in respect of performance of a 
play or anything said or done in the course of such a performance—
(a) for an offence at common law where it is of the essence of 
the offence that the performance or, as the case may be, what 
was said or done was obscene, indecent, offensive, disgusting 
or injurious to morality …
That was held to work for Mr Thoday. Mr Thompson was entitled to the 
protection of an identical provision in paragraph 6 of Schedule 15 to the 
Broadcasting Act 1990. There can be no dispute that blasphemy is a common 
law offence. It is also arguable that, after Lemon, the essence of the crime 
is offensiveness.55 However, this definition of the gravamen of blasphemy 
sits ill with the Court requiring an attack on Christianity and relying on the 
absence of evidence of unrest to deny that a prima facie case of blasphemy 
had been made out. If offensiveness is the essence of blasphemy, surely Mr 
Green had a prima facie case. What is most surprising about Jerry Springer 
is that the Theatre and Broadcasting Acts were found to be applicable to 
blasphemy at all. When their language, statutory context and legislative 
54 The Court in Jerry Springer makes the valid point that the issue in Lemon was the mental element of 
the offence and so the House of Lords did not have to address the actus reus in great detail. However, 
several members of the House of Lords were clear that the only consequence of the vilification of 
religion that the offence requires is that it should “be likely to arouse a sense of outrage” among 
believers (for example, Lord Diplock in Whitehouse v. Lemon [1979] A.C., 632D and 638C, Lord 
Edmund-Davies, 646H–647B and 654H and Lord Russell, 657A). The Court in Jerry Springer also 
accepts that two of the judges in Lemon stated that there was no requirement of an “imminent” 
breach of the peace. As we have seen above, those judges went further and stated that there was 
no need to show that the expression tended to lead to a breach of the peace (whether imminent 
or not). Lord Scarman’s reference to safeguarding “the internal tranquillity of the kingdom” goes 
much further than preventing an imminent breach of the peace as he makes clear by referring 
to protecting religious beliefs from “scurrility, vilification, ridicule and contempt” (Whitehouse v. 
Lemon, 658B–C). In fact, the Court’s requirement that the act “must be such as tends to endanger 
society as a whole, by endangering the peace, depraving public morality, shaking the fabric of society 
or tending to cause civil strife” was based on a concession (Jerry Springer, [10]).
55 Ibid., [19]–[20], per Hughes L.J. 
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history are examined, it is clear that these provisions are about obscenity 
and that neither Act was intended to apply to blasphemy.56 
The Divisional Court reached what is undoubtedly the correct decision 
as a matter of principle, but only by failing to follow binding precedent 
and ignoring orthodox guides to legislative meaning. The ramifications of 
the decision were also likely to be extensive. If Parliament considers that 
protection from offensive religious expression is not necessary in relation 
to broadcasting, it is very difficult to argue that restrictions on the written 
word will be justified, as the broadcast media are invariably regarded as 
more intrusive and therefore subject to greater legitimate regulation.57 
Jerry Springer appeared therefore to have achieved what commentators had 
wrongly predicted in the previous century: that the law of blasphemy was a 
dead letter.
Within just over a month of the decision in Jerry Springer, the government 
proposed to abolish the offences of blasphemy and blasphemous libel after 
a short period of consultation.58 On 5 March 2008, Baroness Andrews 
introduced the relevant clauses to the House of Lords by way of amendment 
to the Criminal Justice and Immigration Bill.59 The new clauses came into 
effect in July 2008, thereby ending 350 years of legal history. I have described 
elsewhere the numerous unsuccessful attempts to amend, repeal or replace 
the law of blasphemy: all of which met with failure.60 The decision in Jerry 
Springer realised what these noble and concerted efforts over more than a 
century had failed to achieve, and within eight months.
IncItement tO relIgIOus hatred
One of the arguments relied on by those seeking to introduce a law of 
incitement to religious hatred was the apparent unfairness of confining the 
56 Ivan Hare, “Blasphemy and Incitement to Religious Hatred: Free Speech Dogma and Doctrine”, in 
Ivan Hare and James Weinstein, Extreme Speech and Democracy (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 
2009), 298-299.
57 E. Barendt, Freedom of Speech (2nd edn, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2005), 444–449.
58 HC Deb., 9 January 2008, Col. 454. 
59 Ibid., cols. 1118–121. 
60 Ivan Hare, “Blasphemy and Incitement to Religious Hatred: Free Speech Dogma and Doctrine”, in 
Ivan Hare and James Weinstein, Extreme Speech and Democracy (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 
2009), 296–297.
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protection of the law of blasphemy not just to Christianity, but to the Church 
of England. This difference of treatment was exacerbated by the fact that 
certain religious groups (notably Jews and Sikhs) were treated in English 
law as “ethnic groups” and hence protected by the law on incitement to 
racial hatred, whereas Christians, Muslims or Hindus were not.61 As early 
as 1936, the first suggestions were made that incitement to religious hatred 
should become a criminal offence in its own right. Initiatives re-emerged 
throughout the late twentieth and early years of the twenty-first century.62 
The Religious Hatred Act became law in 2006. It defines religious hatred 
as “hatred against a group of persons defined by reference to religious belief 
or lack of religious belief.”63 The offence is defined as follows in s. 29B(1):
A person who uses threatening words or behaviour, or displays any 
written material which is threatening, is guilty of an offence if he 
intends thereby to stir up religious hatred.
This is narrower than the equivalent offence of incitement to racial hatred 
(originally introduced in the Race Relations Act 1965): the religious offence 
is confined to threatening words or behaviour, whereas incitement to racial 
hatred may be committed using “threatening, abusive or insulting” words 
or behaviour; further, as is clear from the above definition, incitement 
to religious hatred requires a specific intent to stir up hatred and has no 
alternative that hatred is likely to be stirred up (unlike racial hatred). Finally, 
there is an express limitation clause in s. 29J:
61 Mandla (Sewa Singh) v. Dowell Lee [1983] 2 A.C. 548 (Sikhism) and R. (E) v. Governing Body of JFS 
[2009] UKSC 15; [2010] 2 A.C. 728 (Judaism).
62 Ivan Hare, “Crosses, Crescents and Sacred Cows: Criminalising Incitement to Religious Hatred” 
[2006] Pub. L. 521, 522–523. See further Karen Goodall, “Incitement to Religious Hatred: All 
Talk and No Substance?”, 70 Modern L. Rev. (2007) 89. Incitement to religious hatred has been 
prohibited in Northern Ireland since the Public Order (Northern Ireland) Order 1987 (see Brigid 
Hadfield, “The Prevention of Incitement to Religious Hatred - An Article of Faith?”, 35 N.I.L.Q. 
(1984) 231 and Therese Murphy, “Incitement to Hatred: Lessons from Northern Ireland”, in Sandra 
Coliver (ed.), Striking a Balance: Hate Speech, Freedom of Expression and Non-discrimination (London: 
Article 19, 1992).
63 The Religious Hatred Act has inserted amendments into the Public Order Act 1986. This definition 
is in s. 17A of the 1986 Act.
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Nothing in this Part shall be read or given effect in a way which 
prohibits or restricts discussion, criticism or expressions of antipathy, 
dislike, ridicule, insult or abuse of particular religions or the beliefs or 
practices of their adherents, or of any other belief system or the beliefs 
of its adherents, or proselytizing or urging adherents of a different 
religion or belief system to cease practising their religion or belief 
system.
The new offence is a serious one: the maximum penalty is seven years’ 
imprisonment. 
In the absence of any prosecutions in the ten years since it was passed, it 
is difficult to say much more about the offence in this context. However, it 
is misleading to regard the new offence as a modern form of blasphemy for a 
number of reasons. First, it applies equally to beliefs which are secular or even 
anti-religious (as long as they occupy a position of equivalent importance to 
the individual and do not conflict with the fundamental rights of others).64 
Secondly, it cannot sensibly be regarded as a secular equivalent of blasphemy 
as the limitation clause makes clear that the offence provides no protection 
for the tenets of any sacred belief or the practices of any religion: its focus is 
entirely on words or behaviour which threaten and are intended to stir up 
hatred against individuals or groups of individuals. Incitement to religious 
hatred is therefore more closely related to prohibitions on discrimination 
than to the old laws of blasphemy.65 In the field of discrimination law, English 
courts have set their faces firmly against providing legal protection for the 
content of a religious belief “in the name only of its religious credentials.”66 
64 Kokkinakis v. Greece, 17 E.H.R.R. (1993) 397, [31] acknowledges the importance secular beliefs may 
have for the individual. The test for the recognition of such beliefs is described in R. (Williamson) v. 
Secretary of State for Education and Employment [2005] 2 A.C. 246, [23] and Grainger Plc v. Nicholson 
[2010] I.C.R. 360; [2010] I.R.L.R. 4.
65 The incitement to hatred laws now cover race, religion and sexual orientation (the latter enacted by 
the Criminal Justice and Immigration Act 2008 which abolished blasphemy). The Law Commission 
of England and Wales has recently concluded against further extending the offences to cover the 
other prohibited grounds of disability and transgender identity in Hate Crimes: should the current law 
be extended? (May 2014), Law Com. no. 348, Cm.8865 (upon which see Ivan Hare, “Free Speech and 
Incitement to Hatred on Grounds of Disability and Transgender Identity: the Law Commission’s 
Proposals’ [2015] Pub. L. 385).
66 McFarlane v. Relate Avon Ltd [2010] EWCA Civ 880; [2010] I.R.L.R. 872, [25]. McFarlane was a 
refusal of permission to appeal against the decision of the Employment Appeal Tribunal rejecting 
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For example, in rejecting a claim by a Christian who had been sacked for 
failing to provide sex counselling services to same-sex couples on grounds of 
his beliefs, Laws L.J. stated:
The Judaeo-Christian tradition, stretching over many centuries, 
has no doubt exerted a profound influence upon the judgment of 
lawmakers as to the objective merits of this or that social policy…But 
the conferment of any legal protection or preference upon a particular 
substantive moral position on the ground only that it is espoused by 
the adherents of a particular faith, however long its tradition, however 
rich its culture, is deeply unprincipled.67
Finally, it is a notable feature of the debate that the introduction of the 
offence of incitement to religious hatred has not quieted calls for a new law 
of blasphemy which would provide protection for the beliefs of all religious 
groups.68
cOnclusIOn
The focus of this chapter has been the history of the English law of 
blasphemy. Given the volume and complexity of the material, there has not 
been the opportunity to address directly the difficulties the law presented for 
the protection of free speech or the elimination of religious discrimination. 
Nor have I had the space to analyse blasphemy against the background of 
his challenge to his dismissal. McFarlane was upheld by the European Court of Human Rights in 
Eweida v. United Kingdom, 57 E.H.R.R. (2013) 8. 
67 Mcfarlane, ibid., [23]. The case was unusual in that a witness statement from Lord Carey of Clifton, 
the former Archbishop of Canterbury, was submitted to the court by counsel for McFarlane. In the 
witness statement, Lord Carey requested that cases involving religious discrimination should be 
heard by an expanded bench of judges who have a “proven sensibility to religious issues” (quoted at 
McFarlane, ibid., [17]). Lord Carey has also intervened in the press, arguing that a de facto blasphemy 
law is operating in Britain as a result of a reluctance on the parts of the press to criticise Islam 
(Sunday Times, 11 January 2015, available at: http://www.thesundaytimes.co.uk/sto/news/uk_news/
National/article1505845.ece. (accessed 31 January 2016)).
68 “Muslims Call For Blasphemy Law In UK And UN To Prevent Repeat of Anti-Mohammed YouTube 
Film” on The Huffington Post for 25 September 2012, available at: http://www.huffingtonpost.
co.uk/2012/09/25/muslims-blasphemy-law-uk-un-mohammed-youtube_n_1912004.html (accessed 
28 January 2016).
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the European Convention on Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms or 
other international law provisions or to compare it to other legal systems 
which have had to grapple with many of the same problems. However, it is 
to be hoped that this account of blasphemy’s “long and at times inglorious 
history in the common law”69 has revealed something of the difficult 
relationship between religion and the English state and the sometimes 
stuttering progress towards making England a freer and more secular polity. 
69 Lord Diplock in Whitehouse v. Lemon [1979] A.C., 633B.
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4  On the Life and Times of the Dutch 
Blasphemy Law (1932–2014)
 Paul Cliteur & Tom Herrenberg
IntrOductIOn
When the Dutch Criminal Code entered into force in 1886 it did not 
contain a general provision against blasphemy. In 1880, during a debate in 
Parliament about the Criminal Code, the minister of justice at the time, Mr. 
Anthony Ewoud Jan Modderman (1838–1885), opined that “God is able to 
preserve His own rights by Himself; no human laws are required for this 
purpose.”1 Yet, five decades later things had changed. A legislative proposal 
of 25 April 1931 entitled “Amendment to the Criminal Code with provisions 
regarding certain utterances hurtful to religious feelings”2 sought to add 
two provisions relating to the defamation of religion to the Criminal Code. 
Article 147 no. 1 was intended to criminalise “he who verbally, in writing, 
or in image, publicly expresses himself by scornful blasphemy in a manner 
offensive to religious feelings.” In addition, Article 429bis made it illegal for 
people to “display, in a place visible from a public road, words or images that, 
as expressions of scornful blasphemy, are hurtful to religious feelings.”3 
In this chapter we will give an account of this blasphemy law. We will 
address the law’s evolution in chronological order and start by describing 
the parliamentary debate on the introduction of the law in the 1930s. 
Subsequently, we will focus on the reception of the blasphemy law in the 
courts, up to and including the trial of Dutch novelist Gerard Kornelis van 
1 Parl. Doc., House of Rep., 1880/81, Debate of 25 October 1880, 102. In Dutch: Ik meende dat het 
sedert lang vaststond, dat God zijn regten zelf wel weet te handhaven; daartoe zijn geen menschelijke 
wetten noodig; daartoe is de strafwetgever niet geroepen.
2 Parl. Doc., House of Rep., 1930/31, no. 348, 2 (Aanvulling Wetboek van Strafrecht met voorzieningen 
betreffende bepaalde voor godsdienstige gevoelens krenkende uitingen).
3 Parl. Doc., House of Rep., 1930/31, no. 348, 2. Article 147 no. 1 was placed within the section 
“Crimes against public order” of the Dutch Criminal Code.
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het Reve (1923–2006) in the 1960s. The outcome of Van het Reve’s trial—
concerning charges over a number of blasphemous writings—reduced the 
legal prohibition against blasphemy to a more or less hollow phrase in the 
Criminal Code. However, as we hope to illustrate next, blasphemy did not 
vanish from the Dutch scene. But the post-Van het Reve generation of Dutch 
freethinkers and “blasphemers” had to reckon with a more redoubtable 
adversary than the puritanical Christianity that had introduced blasphemy 
legislation in the Netherlands. Post-Van het Reve authors like Theodor 
Holman, Theo van Gogh, and others had to face the informal interpretation 
of holy law by jihadists. The murder of Theo van Gogh—particularly since it 
was revenge for a short film critical of the position of women in Islam that 
Van Gogh had co-created—by a home-grown Islamic extremist in November 
2004 came as a great shock to secularised Dutch society. The murder could 
be seen as the resurgence of blasphemy law in a new guise. In the last part 
of the chapter we will briefly discuss the law that ultimately removed the 
blasphemy provisions from the Dutch Criminal Code.
the prOpOsal Of the dutch Blasphemy law
O, he is a great pleasure, that good god! He is an exceptionally useful 
thing! He leads the way in the march to war, he lends his lustre to the 
smear campaign against the Soviet Union, he is the patron of every 
christian and unchristian exploiter, he symbolizes the stultification of 
the masses ... God means imperial warfare, Christ means starvation 
and exploitation of the working masses, the “Holy Spirit” means 
bloody suppression of the colonial peoples, the Holy Virgin Mother 
means stultifying the people in order to preserve all these blessings. 
For the working people, there is no Christmas. For them there is the 
song of the French revolution—A la lanterne!
Christ on the dunghill!
The Holy Virgin in the stable!
The Holy Fathers to the Devil!
Long live the voice of the canon!
The canon of the proletarian revolution! 
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These sentences are taken from an article entitled “Away with Christmas!” 
(Weg met het Kerstfeest!) that appeared in the Dutch communist daily De 
Tribune on 24 December 1930. This newspaper article was one example 
of blasphemous material Minister of Justice Jan Donner (1891–1981) 
“grudgingly” gave in the short explanatory note accompanying his proposal 
for the introduction of the blasphemy law.4 Donner, a Reformed Christian 
and eminent jurist who later in his career became president of the Dutch 
Supreme Court, cited two more examples that inspired him to draft the 
blasphemy law, both taken from the same communist newspaper—in Mr. 
Donner’s words “a Dutch daily of anti-religious orientation.”5 The first 
example was a “repulsive” cartoon entitled “Plans for intervention are 
crafted in heaven and carried out on earth” (Interventie-plannen worden in de 
hemel gesmeed, en op aarde uitgevoerd) that appeared on 19 January 1931. The 
cartoon depicts a naked God in heaven wearing a hat with the words “God 
himself” written on it. God is depicted as saying: “I have discovered a new 
poison gas with which we can destroy Soviet-Russia entirely, my son.” A gas-
masked Jesus is seen hanging on a crucifix, holding a large tank of “Pacifism” 
in his hands. Referring to the tank, Jesus says: “Before we start, let us first 
spread this powder across the earth.” The cartoon also pictures Petrus—also 
wearing a gas mask—holding a sign that reads: “This year, God can only be 
contacted for war affairs.” The other example Mr. Donner briefly mentioned 
in his explanatory note was a cartoon that appeared on 4 April 1931, the 
day before Easter. This cartoon accompanied an article entitled “Away with 
Easter!” (Weg met het Paasch-feest!). It pictures God blowing air at the sails of 
a heavily armed sailing boat on its way to the Soviet Union. The sailing boat 
is manned by people in top hats, suggesting that they belong to the upper 
class of society, who are also blowing air at the sails.6
4 Parl. Doc., House of Rep., 1930/31, no. 348, 3, 1 (footnote 1). Donner only cited the sentence “Christ 
on the dunghill!” in his note. He did not want to cite the other “far graver” blasphemous content 
from the newspaper article.
5 Ibid.
6 The so-called Centrale Vereeniging voor Openbare Leeszalen, a government body responsible for the 
supervision of subsidised public libraries and public reading rooms, objected to the placement of 
editions of De Tribune at public libraries and reading rooms on the ground of “moral harmfulness.” 
Subsequently, the communist daily was banned from those places. In defending this decision, 
the Dutch minister of Education, Arts, and Sciences, Jan Terpstra (1888–1952), pointed out that 
“an honest, reasonable defence of atheism or communism” would not be banned from the public 
reading rooms, yet the problem with De Tribune was the “disgusting manner” in which this daily had 
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In a rare insight Donner gave into his inner self, he revealed that the 
opinions expressed in De Tribune had deeply offended him and that it was 
“a question of conscience” whether he could make use of his powers as a 
minister to act against this “vomit from hell.”7 And indeed, he came to the 
conclusion that the state had a role to fulfil here.8
Expressions like those cartoons in De Tribune, in which “a scorning, 
abusive, or reviling manner is chosen,”9 were the target of the projected 
law. The proposal relied heavily on the distinction between substance and 
manner: “Contesting Theism as such, no matter how fiercely, is not at 
issue; as long as, in terms of manner, a certain line is not crossed, the law 
remains idle,” Mr. Donner argued.10 Although the minister was willing to 
“admit to a certain degree” that abusive remarks about the divine were rare 
in Dutch society, they were nonetheless intolerable.11 The Netherlands was 
a predominantly Christian nation at the time12 and in “a State in which God 
is acknowledged in multiple ways,” public expressions “that directly scorn 
God ... cannot be tolerated.” According to Mr. Donner, “The public sphere 
“repeatedly scorned and offended the religious feelings of a large number of our people.” See Parl. 
Doc. House of Rep., Debate of 12 June 1931, 2754–2755.
7 Parl. Doc., House of Rep., Debate of 31 May 1932, 2634.
8 Ibid.
9 Parl. Doc., House of Rep., 1930/31, no. 348, 3, 1.
10 Ibid. “Every form of expression that does not scorn or abuse God” was outside the scope of his 
legislative proposal. The same was the case for “thoughtless utterances” and “cursing.” Obviously, 
Donner was of the opinion that the boundaries had been crossed in the articles and cartoons 
that had appeared in De Tribune. See Parl. Doc., House of Rep., 1930/31, no. 348, 3, 2. Donner’s 
separation of substance and manner echoes the famous distinction made by Lord Coleridge, to 
whom Donner refers in his discussion of comparative law. In Regina v. Ramsay and Foote (1883) it 
was decided “that the mere denial of the truths of Christianity does not amount to blasphemy; but 
a wilful intention to pervert, insult, and mislead others by means of licentious and contumelious 
abuse applied to sacred subjects, or by wilful misrepresentations or artful sophistry calculated to 
mislead the ignorant and unwary, is the criterion and test of guilt; and supposing that the decencies 
of controversy were observed, even the fundamentals of religion might be attacked.” Donner cites 
this decision in Parl. Doc., Senate, 1931/1932, no. 34, Eindverslag der Commissie van Rapporteurs, 
6 October 1932, 4. The English blasphemy law is discussed in chapter 3 of this volume.
11 Parl. Doc., House of Rep., 1930/31, no. 348, 3, 1.
12 In 1930, roughly 80–90 per cent of the people were affiliated with a branch of Christianity. See 
Ronald van der Bie, “Kerkelijkheid en kerkelijke diversiteit, 1889–2008,” in: Centraal Bureau voor 
de Statistiek [central bureau of statistics], Religie aan het begin van de 21ste eeuw (report), 14. 
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must be kept pure from such forms of expression.”13 Not criminalising 
scornful blasphemy would limit freedom in Donner’s view:
Freedom of religion in the broad sense is a fruit of our historical 
development that we should be proud of. But in order to protect this 
freedom of thought as one of our highest national goods, action in 
this field is required. No good can continue to exist, whose abuse goes 
unpunished. When freedom of thought leads to debauchery, it will be, 
in the interest of freedom itself, forcefully opposed.14
The minister felt that somebody who “scornfully contests another’s religion, 
arrogates that person’s religious beliefs” and thus “utters his hurtful opinion 
in the other person’s sphere.”15
parlIamentary receptIOn
Despite the brevity of the legislative proposal and its accompanying 
explanatory note—together they comprised no more than two pages—it 
provoked a lively parliamentary reaction. A committee composed of members 
of the House of Representatives—the lower house of Parliament (Tweede 
Kamer)—issued a preliminary report roughly two and a half months after the 
law was proposed. This inventory of the parliamentarians’ attitudes revealed 
a number of objections to the criminalisation of scornful blasphemy. 
One objection was an empirical one. Not all representatives were 
convinced—as claimed by Mr. Donner—of the systematic nature of the 
“anti-religious propaganda,” nor was there consensus about the ability of 
society to counter the contested utterances without having to resort to the 
criminal law.16
A second type of objection raised the argument of equality. To outlaw 
“scornful blasphemy” was problematic because, it was argued, blaspheming 
the tenets of other religious groups might not be much more than vindicating 
one’s own religious principles.17 It was suggested that the non-religious 
13 Parl. Doc., House of Rep., 1930/31, no. 348, 3, 2. 
14 Ibid.
15 Ibid. See also Parl. Doc. House of Rep., 1931/32, no. 34, 1, 4.
16 Parl. Doc., House of Rep., 1930/31, no. 348, 4, 3.
17 Ibid., 3, 4.
76 THE FALL AND RISE OF BLASPHEMY LAW
were often the target of abusive speech. The issue was raised whether the 
frequent defamation of socialist principles or saying that “non-belief is a 
plague” should be punishable.18 Several members of Parliament adduced 
that it was a sign of “unbearable self-conceit”—after all, the proposer of 
the law was a Christian—to protect by law only the feelings of Christian 
believers while non-religious people could be freely exposed to grave 
vilification. These representatives were of the opinion that the blasphemy 
law contradicted the neutrality of the state and that all varieties of thought 
should be equally entitled to legal protection. Instead of legal suppression, 
these members viewed moral education as the appropriate response to the 
scorning of beliefs.19
The legal technicalities of the proposal gave ground for a third objection. 
“Because of a wide diversity of opinions” that existed in the Netherlands on 
what exactly did and did not constitute “blasphemy,” members of Parliament 
feared too much judicial subjectivity.20 The law would either be inapplicable 
to concrete cases at all, or it would lead to inconvenient trials. The publicity 
surrounding those trials would only broadcast the blasphemous utterance, 
which would add insult to injury.21 Moreover, there was a great consensus 
between both proponents and opponents about the bill’s ambiguity. The bill 
did not clearly identify the subject the blasphemy law sought to protect. Was 
it God? Or was it the religious feelings of people? And what about mocking 
Jesus? The explanatory note mentioned that “in a State in which God is 
acknowledged in multiple ways,” public expressions “that directly scorn 
God ... cannot be tolerated,” which seemed to imply the protection of 
God’s image and reputation. Yet the minister also spoke of “the severe insult 
to the feelings of the vast majority of our people” that had been done by 
utterances such as the blasphemous cartoons that had inspired him to draft 
the bill. It was this ambiguity that raised much uncertainty about the aim 
and scope of the blasphemy law.22 Some also argued that it was impossible to 
blaspheme God, because the notion of “God,” whether spiritual or personal, 
was metaphysical and existed outside worldly society. Others argued that 
it would be impossible to establish an objective standard for “blasphemy” 
18 Ibid., 3.
19 Ibid.
20 Ibid., 3, 5.
21 Ibid., 3.
22 Ibid., 4.
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and feared that scientific opinions could also be affected by the law.23 The 
minister’s argument that the blasphemer “utters his hurtful opinion in the 
believer’s sphere” was met with criticism from some members of Parliament; 
they considered it to be “highly artificial.”24
Notwithstanding these objections, there were also strong voices in favour 
of the proposal. This appraisal was largely due to the connection between 
God, state power and morality. For example, it was proclaimed that
In a State in which God is acknowledged, in which God is recognized 
also as the ultimate foundation of the Power of Government, … acts 
that this law seeks to punish violate public order, which Government 
has a duty to preserve. Public Blasphemy, insofar as it taunts or scorns 
God, breaches the moral order that, regarding our attitude towards 
the Highest Sovereign, ought to be maintained in a Christian nation. 
Prohibiting scornful blasphemy thus relates to the protection of the 
State’s foundations, but also extends to preserving the moral order in 
a Christian society, to keeping debauchery within reasonable bounds, 
to halting the worst degeneration, to countering the deepest decline.25
dOnner’s respOnse and further parlIamentary deBate
At the end of 1931 Donner replied to Parliament’s observations in his 
“Answering Note” (Memorie van Antwoord). He affirmed that, in his view, 
blasphemous utterances were indeed so systemically present in nature in 
Dutch society that a law against them was justified.26 As for the argument 
of equality, Donner “firmly denied” that his law was discriminatory in that it 
favoured religion over non-belief. He made clear that his legislative proposal 
23 Ibid., 5.
24 Ibid., 8.
25 Ibid., 6. Other representatives regarded “the relation between Government and God, who is the 
source of its Power and the necessary foundation of law and moral order … as the legal basis for 
the proposal. This legal basis anchors in nature and reason, which oblige the State to protect and 
secure religion with the force of law … This duty could justify in certain instances the State taking 
action against Blasphemy. In doing so, the State does not offer legal protection to God, but it fulfils a 
natural duty and enforces the foundation of its moral order.” See Parl. Doc., House of Rep., 1930/31, 
no. 348, 4, 6.
26 Parl. Doc., House of Rep., 1931/32, no. 34, 1, 1.
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sought not to combat statements offensive to religious feelings in general 
but only those that were uttered in a manner that “scorn the Person of 
God.”27 Therefore, questions about the defamation of socialist principles or 
of non-belief were irrelevant to Donner, since the bill did not seek to punish 
those who argued that “religion is the opium of the people” or statements 
of a similar nature.28 The very specific utterances Mr. Donner had in mind 
simply could not be compared with other types of expression: the utterances 
his law sought to ban were of a “unique character.”29 Donner also addressed 
the perceived “ambiguity” of his proposal. While “unable to hide his 
disappointment about this perception,” he stated that, as a matter of “factual 
phenomenon,” the blasphemous utterances were “scornful of God,” but that 
the legal basis of the proposal lay in “the insult to religious feelings.”30 As for 
the worries expressed by some parliamentarians that scientific views about 
God and religion could be affected by the blasphemy law, Mr. Donner made 
clear that not every statement dishonouring God fell within the scope of 
his law. Only those uttered in a “scorning manner” would be prohibited, 
and, as “scientific opinions and accounts of honest convictions never take 
such form,” the fear that scientific opinions could be punishable was deemed 
unrealistic.31 Moreover, he argued that defamation of “the Person of Christ” 
was covered by his blasphemy law, since “the Person of Christ is one of the 
Persons of the Holy Trinity.”32 
The proposal for the blasphemy law was discussed over the next year in 
multiple sessions in both the House of Representatives and the upper house 
of Parliament, the Senate (Eerste Kamer). As could be expected from the 
earlier responses, the bill received both praise and criticism. Mr. Visscher 
27 Ibid., 3.
28 Ibid., 1.
29 Ibid. See also: Parl. Doc., Senate, 1931/1932, no. 34, Eindverslag der Commissie van Rapporteurs, 
6 October 1932, 2.
30 Parl. Doc., House of Rep., 1931/32, no. 34, 1, 2, 3. Donner also made this explicit in: Parl. Doc., 
House of Rep., Debate of 31 May 1932, 2630 (Het ontwerp beoogt niet strafbaar te stellen de 
godslastering als zoodanig, maar de krenking van godsdienstige gevoelens door de smalende godslastering; 
het treft een bepaalden vorm van krenking van godsdienstige gevoelens. De zakelijke omschrijving daarvan 
is de smalende godslastering, maar de krenking van godsdienstige gevoelens is de rechtsgrond van de 
strafbepaling.).
31 Parl. Doc., House of Rep., 1931/32, no. 34, 1, 3.
32 Ibid., 4. A scorning image of the Mother of God, “although it would undoubtedly hurt religious 
feelings,” was not conceived to be covered by the proposal. 
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(1864–1947) argued in favour: “When Theism speaks so loud in our social 
conscience that it resounds in our laws in many ways, when thousands of 
people, however they may differ in philosophy of life, are moved by His 
Name, in whom we live and act, … then blaspheming that Name must be 
punishable.”33 Others disagreed for a variety of reasons. The elusive nature of 
“religion” and “God” were reasons for Mr. Eerdmans (1868–1948) to oppose 
the blasphemy law. “The conception of God is different for a theist, for a 
deist, or for a pantheist,” he argued.34 “Religion is a personal conviction. 
One only ever accepts one’s own religion as true. After all, if one did not 
recognise the truth of one’s own religion or favoured a different religion, one 
would either wish to practise no religion at all or adopt that other religion. 
This means that the religious expression of one person is liable to constitute 
offence to another’s religious feeling.”35 This view was endorsed by Mr. 
Eerdmans’ colleague, Henri Marchant (1869–1956), who was also against 
the proposal: “The orthodox has a different understanding of God from 
the non-orthodox. The Jew has a different understanding of God from the 
Christian. The conception of God is different for Catholics and Protestants.”36 
Furthermore, it was claimed that the blasphemy law would turn out to be 
counterproductive,37 that it was incomprehensible—“Is it desirable that 
our Criminal Code would allow God to be blasphemed, yet prohibit Him 
from being scornfully blasphemed—that it would create many problems 
of interpretation—“What are ‘religious feelings’? … Don’t we already have 
enough vague concepts like ‘compunctions,’ ‘conscientious objections,’ and 
‘grave conscientious objections’?”38—and that it would be difficult to explain 
why some anti-religious speech would be illegal while other types would not 
be covered by the blasphemy law—for example, defaming Mother God or 
the mass.39 It was even argued that the proposal should never have reached 
33 Parl. Doc., House of Rep., Debate of 26 May 1932, 2592.
34 Ibid., 2585.
35 Ibid.
36 Parl. Doc., House of Rep., Debate of 27 May 1932, 2608.
37 Parl. Doc., House of Rep., Debate of 26 May 1932, 2584, 2585. See also Parl. Doc., House of Rep., 
Debate of 27 May 1932, 2606. This was also underlined by the communist representative Mr. 
Wijnkoop, who argued that “the consequence of this law will be that we will become better known 
by the working classes.” See Parl. Doc., House of Rep., Debate of 26 May 1932, 2603.
38 Ibid., 2586.
39 Ibid., 2589.
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Parliament, since it created “a maze of theological imaginations” that could 
not be satisfactorily discussed during parliamentary proceedings.40
As one might expect, fierce opposition also came from the Dutch 
Communist Party. Mr. Wijnkoop (1876–1941), who frequently cited Lenin 
in his speeches, saw the blasphemy law primarily as a tool used by capitalists 
to blur the vision of the masses and to “knock down the communist 
movement.”41 The true reason why this law was proposed, according to 
Wijnkoop, was “to combat the communist daily De Tribune, the instrument 
of international communism that represents its ideas.”42 “We fight against 
all those obscurities, against superstition, and against enslavement to the 
Supreme Being to use the masses and to suppress the workers and peasants; 
that is what needs to be eliminated. This is the reality. We do it because it is 
more sacred to us than all the other sanctities discussed by these gentlemen 
here.”43 
Perhaps somewhat surprising, the orthodox Reformed Protestant Party—
Staatkundig Gereformeerde Partij (SGP)—also objected to the blasphemy 
law. The problem for this party was that the scope of the proposed law was 
too narrow, since it sought to criminalise only scornful blasphemy instead 
of blasphemy as such.44 “The Lord must be honoured and idolatry must be 
fought against,” according to Mr. Zandt (1880–1961).45 The blasphemy law 
as it was proposed was, in his eyes, “a toleration of the idolatry of Rome.”46
Eventually, the proposed blasphemy law was adopted by both Houses 
of Parliament. The House of Representatives adopted the bill by a small 
majority—49 votes to 4447—while the Senate did so with 28 members voting 
for and 18 against it.48 The blasphemy law entered into force on 1 December 
40 Ibid., 2584.
41 Ibid., 2597.
42 Ibid.
43 Ibid., 2600.
44 Parl. Doc., House of Rep., Debate of 27 May 1932, 2619. Also in: Parl. Doc. House of Rep., Debate of 
1 June 1932, 2653.
45 Parl. Doc., House of Rep., Debate of 31 May 1932, 2646.
46 Ibid.
47 Parl. Doc., House of Rep., Debate of 1 June 1932, 2654. The House of Representatives had 100 seats 
at the time (currently 150 seats).
48 Parl. Doc., Senate, Debate of 3 November 1932, 49. The Senate had 50 seats at the time (currently 
75 seats).
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1932. Mr. Donner described the adoption of his bill as “one of the greatest 
satisfactions” of his time as a minister of justice.49
the fIrst trIals Based On the Blasphemy law
The first trial under the blasphemy law took place on 30 May 1933.50 On that 
day, Mr. Hillenaar and Mr. Van den Heuvel, two members of the Sociaal–
Democratische Arbeiderspartij political party stood trial before the Almelo 
District Court. They were accused of being involved in the distribution of 
about 1,500 copies of a manifesto that, according to the public prosecutor, fell 
within the scope of Article 147 no. 1 of the Criminal Code.51 The manifesto 
called God, among other things, “an ineffective object of propaganda”—een 
ondoelmatig propaganda–object. The prosecutor requested that the court fine 
the accused the sum of 20 guilders.52 However, the court’s judgement of 
13 June 1933 was in favour of the accused. The court acquitted Mr. Hillenaar 
because it could not be proven that he had distributed or had arranged 
for the distribution—verspreiden of doen verspreiden—of the manifestos. 
While there was sufficient evidence that the other defendant, Mr. Van den 
Heuvel, had distributed the manifestos, he was “discharged”—ontslagen 
van rechtsvervolging53—and was not sentenced. According to the court, 
the blasphemy law did not apply to the mere spreading of opinions. After 
all, article 147 no. 1 criminalised him who “expresses himself by scornful 
blasphemy in a manner offensive to religious feelings.” The court reasoned 
49 See Parl. Doc., House of Rep., Debate of 31 May 1932, 2634.
50 “Smalende godslastering. Eerste vervolging volgens art. 147 W.v.S.,” in De Telegraaf, 20 May 1933, 3; 
“Eerste overtreding van het godslasteringswetje,” in Algemeen Handelsblad, 31 May 1933, 6; “Eerste 
vervolging op grond van het Godslasteringswetje,” in Het Volk, 31 May 1933, 2.
51 “Eerste vervolging op grond van het Godslasteringswetje. S.DA.P.–bestuurders uit Lonneker staan 
terecht,” in Het Volk, 31 May 1933, 2; “Eerste overtreding van het godslasteringswetje,” in Algemeen 
Handelsblad, 31 May 1933, 6.
52 “Eerste vervolging op grond van het Godslasteringswetje. S.DA.P.–bestuurders uit Lonneker staan 
terecht,” in Het Volk, 31 May 1933, 2.
53 See for an explanation of this legal term and how it differs from “acquittal” in Dutch criminal law: 
Peter J.P. Tak, The Dutch Criminal Justice System (Nijmegen: Wolf Legal Publishers, 2008), 102–103 
(“The accused is to be acquitted when the essential facts charged are not proven by the evidence 
presented. A discharge of the accused takes place when the facts charged are proven, but do not 
constitute a criminal offence, or when the offender is not liable due to a justification or exculpation 
defence.”). 
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that “where someone is not the author of a written work, it is necessary for 
that person to identify himself with the content of the work in some way, for 
example by signature” in order to fall within the scope of Article 147 no. 1.54 
The court did not address whether or not the statements in the manifesto 
constituted “scornful blasphemy.”55
On 15 June 1933, two days after the Almelo District Court’s decision, 
the Rotterdam District Court decided a case in which the prosecutor had 
requested the court to sentence the defendant to one month in prison.56 In 
this case a 34-year-old sailor had to appear in court for peddling a brochure 
entitled “The Netherlands, God, and Orange”—Nederland, God en Oranje. The 
accused was caught on 3 December 1932, only two days after the blasphemy 
law had become effective.57 The writer of the brochure—freethinker and 
public atheist Anton Levien Constandse (1899–1985)—could not be held 
accountable since the brochure had been written before the blasphemy law 
had entered into force.58 As Mr. Constandse59 recalled in an article he wrote 
in 1979, he had written the brochure “with remarkable anger and vicious 
aggression.”60 The passage that was the focus of the trial read:
And how is God doing? At least 20 per cent of the Dutch people are no 
longer affiliated with a church, and 10 per cent at most attend church 
54 “Smalende godslastering,” in Algemeen Handelsblad, 14 June 1933, 4. (Indien men niet zelf de auteur 
van het geschrift is, toch zeker noodig is dat op eenige wijze, bijv. door onderteekening blijkt, dat men zich 
met den inhoud van het geschrift vereenigt …).
55 “Beschuldigd van smalende godslastering. Vrijspraak en ontslag van rechtsvervolging,” in De 
Telegraaf, 14 June 1933, 4.
56 “Godslastering,” in: De Telegraaf, 16 June 1933, 6; “Een brochure met godslasterlijke inhoud. Tweede 
geval voor de rechtbank, thans te Rotterdam behandeld,” in De Telegraaf, 2 June 1933, 6; “Tweede 
Godslasteringsproces,” in Het Volk, 1 June, 3.
57 “Godslastering. Nog geen veroordeling,” in Leeuwarder Courant, 16 June 1933; “Een brochure met 
godslasterlijke inhoud. Tweede geval voor de rechtbank, thans te Rotterdam behandeld,” in De 
Telegraaf, 2 June 1933, 6.
58 “Een brochure met godslasterlijke inhoud. Tweede geval voor de rechtbank, thans te Rotterdam 
behandeld,” in De Telegraaf, 2 June 1933, 6.
59 Anton Constandse was one of the most important atheist authors in Dutch history. See on his work: 
“Constandse, Anton Lieven,” in Paul Cliteur and Dirk Verhofstadt, Het Atheïstisch Woordenboek 
(Antwerp: Houtekiet, (2015), 77–78. His most important works are A.L. Constandse, Grondslagen 
van het atheïsme (Rotterdam: N.H. Luguis & Zonen, 1926) and De zelfvernieting van het protestantisme 
(Rotterdam: N.H. Luigies & Zonen, 1926).
60 Anton Constandse, “Een geval van godslastering,” in De Gids. 142 (1979) 402.
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regularly. That is why they have decided to support the apparently 
weakened Old Lord by punishing anybody who speaks “scornfully” of 
him! Our Christian ministers are so convinced of God’s impotence 
(despite the millions in subsidies!) that they rushed to his aid, hoping 
that the old Dutch God will, both civilly and militarily, be able to exert 
himself again! His religious enterprise, however, is failing hopelessly.61
Despite the prosecutor’s request for a relatively harsh sentence, the sailor was 
discharged on the same grounds as in the first trial, namely that he had not 
expressed any blasphemous opinion; he had only distributed the brochure.62
On 16 August 1934 a new provision of the criminal law entered into 
force: Article 147a.63 In short, this provision made it illegal to distribute or 
publicly display blasphemous material.64
A conviction for blasphemy did take place on 15 June 1934, when a 
“radical socialist” was fined 30 Dutch guilders. The socialist had during a 
public appearance made statements about religion that were largely “beyond 
the reach of” Article 147 no 1. due to his “tactful choice of words”65—
largely, but not completely, since he also stated that “A God that created the 
tubercle bacillus is not a God, but a criminal.”66 On 20 September 1934, a 
member of the National Socialist Movement was convicted in Rotterdam for 
displaying one of the cartoons that had inspired the Minister of Justice to 
draft the blasphemy law—the one about God saying he had discovered a new 
poison gas.67 The accused, who was a devout Christian, had put the image, 
accompanied by a caption that read “Such a thing is allowed in Holland!”—
Zooiets mag in Holland!—behind a window because he had wanted to show 
how “God and His Son are abused nowadays in politics.”68 The judge 
convicted on the basis of Article 429bis of the Criminal Code and, taking the 
61 Ibid.; Robert Baelde, Studiën over Godsdienstdelicten (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1935), 228–229, 
also partially in “Godslastering. Nog geen veroordeling,” in Leeuwarder Courant, 16 June 1933.
62 Robert Baelde, Studiën over Godsdienstdelicten (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1935), 229.
63 See http://wetten.overheid.nl/BWBR0001854/TweedeBoek/TitelV/Artikel147a/
geldigheidsdatum_21-01-2016/informatie. 
64 Staatsblad 1934, no. 405 (Bulletin of Acts and Decrees).
65 Robert Baelde, Studiën over Godsdienstdelicten (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1935), 232.
66 Ibid., 234.
67 “Godslasterende afbeelding voor het raam,” in Het Vaderland, 21 September 1934, 2; “Godslastering. 
N.S.B.-er veroordeeld,” in De Tijd, 21 September 1934.
68 Ibid.
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good intentions of the accused into consideration, fined him 5 guilders.69 
On 23 June 1963 a columnist for the magazine Propria Cures was convicted 
and fined for writing, amongst other things, that Jesus was a “demagogue” 
and an “amateur ombudsman.”70
However, the trial that turned out to be the major turning point in the 
history of the Dutch blasphemy law was the case against Dutch novelist 
Gerard Kornelis van het Reve (1923–2006), who later in his life became 
known as Gerard Reve.
sex, gOd, and a dOnkey: the trIal Of gerard kOrnelIs Van 
het reVe
In 1966 Van het Reve was brought before the court of Amsterdam for 
breach of Article 147 no. 1 of the Dutch Criminal Code. Van het Reve, in the 
Netherlands generally considered to be one of the greatest Dutch novelists 
of the post-Second World War era,71 faced charges over two pieces of writing 
that the public prosecutor considered to be scornful blasphemy.
The first piece was a letter Van het Reve had written to his bank, which 
was published in the Dutch magazine “Dialogue”—Dialoog—in 1965.72 This 
letter, entitled “Letter to my Bank”—Brief aan mijn Bank—was in essence 
a request to his bank to transfer 400 Dutch guilders to him. In the letter, 
sent from the Spanish town of Algeciras, Van het Reve gave an account of 
some of his daily experiences in Spain, accompanied by a mixture of poetry, 
imagination and references to Jesus. In a part where Van het Reve wrote 
about his love for animals, the letter contained a passage that read:
If God again surrenders himself in Living Dust, he shall return 
as a donkey, at most capable of formulating a few syllables, under-
appreciated, maligned and beaten, but I shall understand Him and 
immediately go to bed with Him, but I shall tie bandages around His 
69 Ibid.
70 Amsterdam District Court, judgment of 23 June 1965, ECLI:NL:RBAMS:1965:AB5727 (in Dutch). 
71 The other two are Willem Frederik Hermans (1921–1995) and Harry Mulisch (1927–2010). 
Together they are typically referred to as De Grote Drie (“The Big Three”) of Dutch post-Second 
World War literature.
72 See Jan Fekkes, De God van je tante. Ofwel het Ezel-proces van Gerard Kornelis van het Reve 
(Amsterdam, De Arbeiderspers, 1968), 16.
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tiny hooves, so that I won’t get too scratched if He flounders when he 
comes.73
This letter prompted a priest and a reformed minister to write a joint letter 
to the magazine in which they complained about this passage. Although 
they praised Van het Reve’s work in general, they found it incomprehensible 
that the editors of Dialoog had published the “blasphemous and repulsive” 
passage.74 In response, Van het Reve explained that what he had written was 
simply his imagination of God:
Everyone is entitled to their own conception of God, and, if they are so 
inclined, to the freedom to share it. I, for example, imagine our Saviour 
the way I see and experience Him ... Many people wish to imagine 
Him with his hair way too long, parted in the middle and drenched in 
brilliantine, garbed in a white dress with an embroidered collar, and 
preferably without genitals, or, at least, without sexual activity ... Yet, 
for me the Son of God had quite well-proportioned genitals, which he 
decisively refused to let rust away; I imagine Him as being bisexual, 
although with a predominant homosexual tendency, slightly neurotic, 
but without hatred towards any creature, because God is the Love that 
cannot exclude any creature from Himself. This is my image of God’s 
Son. I do not want to force it upon anyone, but I am also unwilling to 
have another, no matter whom, take it away from me.75
Van het Reve also disparaged the accusation of “blasphemy.” Pondering 
about the Second Coming, Van het Reve admitted that the “chances of 
Him appearing as a Donkey, not to mention also wanting to have sex with 
me, are, of course, very small, but anything is possible with God. It seems 
blasphemous to me to exclude a priori any way in which God may incarnate 
and how he would behave.”76 He subsequently wrote that
73 The entire passage was longer, yet the public prosecutor considered only this part to fall within the 
definition of “scornful blasphemy.”
74 Jan Fekkes, De God van je tante. Ofwel het Ezel-proces van Gerard Kornelis van het Reve (Amsterdam, 
De Arbeiderspers, 1968), 24-25.
75 Ibid., 27.
76 Ibid., 26.
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The word “blasphemy,” as used by many Christians in this country, has 
about the same meaning as, for example, the word “provocation” has 
to communists. Just as communists employ the word “provocation” 
for every political action or expression that goes against their system 
of terror, so do self-described Christians utilise the word “blasphemy” 
for every conception of God that does not suit their system of terror or 
the one-way street of their so-called Christian tolerance.77 
Van het Reve’s initial article in Dialoog—the letter to his bank—together 
with his subsequent response to the priest and the reformed minister 
inspired representative Van Dis (1893–1973) to ask the government whether 
it intended to instigate criminal proceedings against Van het Reve. Van Dis 
considered Van het Reve’s remarks to be “of a blasphemous, immoral, and 
even satanic nature, and thus extremely offensive to the religious feelings of 
many of our people.”78 
The second piece of writing that got Van het Reve in trouble was a letter 
entitled “Letter from The House named The Grass”—Brief uit Het Huis, 
genaamd Het Gras—that appeared in his novel “Nearer to You”—Nader tot 
U—in 1966. In this particular passage, Van het Reve fantasised about kissing 
and having sex with God, who would appear to him as a “one-year-old mouse 
grey donkey.”79
Van het Reve was prosecuted, and he stood trial before the district court 
of Amsterdam on 20 October 1966.80 It was a highly anticipated, lengthy 
court day: theologians, writers and journalists watched Van het Reve explain 
his work,81 and four expert witnesses were heard during the day—a reformed 
professor specialising in Christian ethics, a professor of the exegesis of the 
77 Ibid., 26-27.
78 Parl. Doc., House of Rep., Question of 22 February 1966.
79 Jan Fekkes, De God van je tante. Ofwel het Ezel-proces van Gerard Kornelis van het Reve (Amsterdam, 
De Arbeiderspers, 1968), 33.
80 Van het Reve wanted the trial as well, since he wanted to clear himself of the accusations of 
blasphemy. See: Jan Jacobus Abspoel, Studenten, moordenaars en ander volk. Kritische kanttekeningen 
van een officier van justitie (Ede: L.J. Veen, 1979), 83; Jan Fekkes, De God van je tante. Ofwel het Ezel-
proces van Gerard Kornelis van het Reve (Amsterdam, De Arbeiderspers, 1968), 16, 34; “Merkwaardige 
rechtszitting over „godslastering”. f. 100,- boete geëist tegen Van het Reve,” in De Waarheid, 
21 October 1966, 3. 
81 Jan Fekkes, De God van je tante. Ofwel het Ezel-proces van Gerard Kornelis van het Reve (Amsterdam, 
De Arbeiderspers, 1968), 31.
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New Testament, a professor of literary studies, and a psychiatrist. During the 
trial Van het Reve defended his work largely along the lines of his response 
in the magazine Dialoog. When the judge asked him about his ideas, Van het 
Reve said that when he imagined God’s incarnation, he did so “in the shape 
of the most loveable creature that I know. That creature doesn’t need to be 
a human being. It could be a lamb, but donkeys are even more endearing to 
me.” Every human being desires an intimate relationship with the deity, Reve 
claimed. And he added that for him this relationship had a sexual component 
to it.82 Asked if he found the described acts perverse, Van het Reve said that 
there are “many opinions about what is perverse and what is not; suppose 
the animal appreciated the act, would it be immoral in that case?”83 Van het 
Reve also explained that for him sexuality is as holy as religion. The two are 
“indissolubly linked to each other. A sexless God is unthinkable for me. That 
would be blasphemy to me.”84
The public prosecutor, Mr. Jan Jacobus Abspoel (1935–1987), did not hide 
his lack of enthusiasm for the blasphemy law under which he prosecuted 
Van het Reve. During the trial he revealed that as a secondary school student 
he had protested against the blasphemy law, and he called the law “hideous.” 
But he also said that as a public prosecutor he had to enforce the law as 
it was—and that, in his opinion, it had been broken by Van het Reve.85 
This being the case, he requested the court to fine Van het Reve 100 Dutch 
guilders.
The Amsterdam District Court delivered its verdict on 3 November 1966. 
It turned out to be a decision that satisfied neither the prosecutor nor Van 
het Reve. The court discharged Van het Reve because, although it considered 
the passages to be blasphemous, they were not “scornful” (smalend). The 
court was not convinced that the passages were of a purely jeering nature, 
which the court considered necessary to convict Van het Reve of breach of 
Article 147 no. 1 of the Criminal Code.86
82 Ibid., 34.
83 Ibid., 35.
84 Ibid., 36.
85 Ibid., 85. In his memoires Mr. Abspoel wrote that he had had always regarded the blasphemy law 
as a political instrument from the 1930s. See Jan Jacobus Abspoel, Studenten, moordenaars en ander 
volk. Kritische kanttekeningen van een officier van justitie (Ede: L.J. Veen, 1979), 81.
86 Jan Fekkes, De God van je tante. Ofwel het Ezel-proces van Gerard Kornelis van het Reve (Amsterdam, 
De Arbeiderspers, 1968), 93.
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Both Van het Reve and the public prosecutor appealed the decision, 
the first because he wanted an acquittal, the second because he was after a 
conviction. Van het Reve had ditched his trial lawyer and defended himself 
during his appeal.87 The appeal was not about new facts, but only about the 
existing facts’ legal qualification.88 In a brief decision, the Court of Appeal 
proclaimed that it could not be proven that Van het Reve’s passages were 
scornfully blasphemous and acquitted him.89 The court reasoned that it “was 
not demonstrated that the defendant had intended to revile or scorn God, or 
in any way to express contempt for God.”90
Finally, the Dutch Supreme Court declared the complaint against the 
appellate court’s judgment inadmissible, thereby making Van het Reve’s 
acquittal final. In its judgment the Supreme Court referred to a notable 
feature of the parliamentary debate of 31 May 1932. During this debate, 
Minister of Justice Donner had said that “the term ‘scornful’ clearly entails a 
subjective element, namely the intention of the scorner to bring down the, 
posited as existent, highest Supreme Being”—de bedoeling van den smalende 
het als reëel gestelde Opperwezen neer te halen.91 The Supreme Court concluded 
from this that “the term ‘scornful’ does not solely describe a certain manner 
of expression that is hurtful to religious feelings.” When applied to Van 
het Reve’s case, the court was of the opinion that in order to violate the 
blasphemy law it was insufficient for an author to express himself in such a 
manner that others were bound to be hurt in their religious feelings.92
87 On 29 September 1967 Van het Reve wrote in a personal letter to his publisher—Geert van 
Oorschot— that he was terribly upset with his lawyer, calling him “incompetent.” He was also 
angry at Van Oorschot for not—partly—paying his legal fees, which amounted to the rather large 
sum of 4.685 Dutch guilders. See Gerard Reve and Geert van Oorschot, Briefwisseling 1951-1987 
(Amsterdam: G.A. van Oorschot, 2005), letter no. 388.
88 Jan Fekkes, De God van je tante. Ofwel het Ezel-proces van Gerard Kornelis van het Reve (Amsterdam, 
De Arbeiderspers, 1968), 114.
89 Ibid., 153–154.
90 Ibid., 154.
91 Parl. Doc., House of Rep., Debate of 31 May 1932, 2632.
92 Jan Fekkes, De God van je tante. Ofwel het Ezel-proces van Gerard Kornelis van het Reve (Amsterdam, 
De Arbeiderspers, 1968), 173. Curiously enough, no party in the discussion advanced the notion 
that the blasphemer’s motivation is irrelevant, because blasphemy is simply a human right. The 
implication of a universal right to freedom of speech and freedom of religion is that this right 
is not only there for the believer to proclaim his respect for the supreme being, but also for the 
communist, atheist, freethinker to air his disrespect. Authors like Lucretius, Holbach, Paine, 
LaMettrie, Marx, Russell, Hitchens, Dawkins and others have made it their mission to warn people 
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the aftermath Of Van het reVe’s trIal
After Van het Reve’s trial the blasphemy law became basically obsolete or a 
“dead letter.”93 The effect of this decision was that it more or less rendered 
the blasphemy law empty in its totality. Not only was the Public Prosecution 
Service reluctant to engage in any kind of action, the public at large felt that 
blasphemy was everyone’s own business and not a matter for the government 
or the law. One man’s orthodox belief is another man’s blasphemy.94 So the 
only feasible attitude in a pluralistic society is tolerance. That means the 
acceptance that people may differ on religious matters.95 The public was 
satisfied that the blasphemy law had not led to a conviction of one of the 
country’s most popular authors. Van het Reve even became somewhat of a 
cult hero.
During the trial, his great talent for irony, pastiche and tricking his 
audience came to the fore. He presented himself as a Catholic, but was he 
really? Was he serious about what he said about his conception of God? 
Nobody could tell; and perhaps not even Van het Reve himself could 
be positively sure about what his stance was. His great competitor and 
critic among the modern novelists, Harry Mulisch (1927–2010), wrote an 
interesting essay about this. He spoke of the “irony of irony.”96
about the deleterious effects of religions belief—see the quotations from “Away with Christmas!” at 
the beginning of this chapter. One may disagree with this, but it would be unfair to give religious 
believers the right to ventilate their ideas while denying this to others or expecting those others, 
infidels, to hide their motives. Their motive is, indeed, to facilitate the creation of a world without 
religious belief, or the transformation of religious beliefs into what John Stuart Mill called “the 
religion of Humanity”: see John Stuart Mill, Three Essays on Religion (Amherst, NY: Prometheus 
Books, 1998 (1874)).
93 See B.A.M. van Stokkom, H.J.B. Sackers and J.-P. Wils, Godslastering, discriminerende uitingen wegens 
godsdienst en haatuitingen (The Hague: Boom Juridische uitgevers, 2007), 106–109.
94 This point of view is well defended by Jeremy Waldron, “Rushdie and Religion,” first published 
under the title “Too important for Tact,” in The Times Literary Supplement, 10 March 1989, 248 and 
260, and reprinted in Jeremy Waldron, Liberal Rights: Collected Papers 1981-1991 (Cambridge/New 
York: Cambridge University Press, 1993, 134–143.
95 See on the history and the concept of tolerance Henri Pena-Ruiz, “Tolérance,” in Henri Pena-Ruiz, 
Dictionnaire amoureux de la laïcité (Paris: Plon, 2014), 853–861.
96 Harry Mulisch, Het ironische van de ironie: Over het geval G.K. van het Reve (Antwerp: Manteau, 
1976), 60. This was not criticism directed at Reve’s blasphemous views, but because of supposed 
racist convictions. Reve was a provocateur pur sang and he also entered the stage with—among 
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Anyhow, Van het Reve had proved to be untouchable. Perhaps the most 
likely comparison with a contemporary author would be the French novelist 
Michel Houellebecq (b. 1956). Houellebecq, one of the most provocative 
contemporary French authors,97 wrote a hilarious novel, Soumission, that 
some commentators dubbed as “racist” or “islamophobic,” but irony makes 
the author impervious to criticism.98 Houellebecq’s protagonist claims, for 
example, that there are some good sides to the submission to radical Islam 
as well. Gradually he becomes convinced of the great prospects for men in a 
polygamous culture, a well-paid position at the Sorbonne—financed by Saudi 
capital—and other accoutrements. This is all very much in the tradition of 
Van het Reve’s irony as well.
Other Dutch authors followed in the footsteps of Van het Reve, and they 
developed a highly critical stance towards traditional Christianity. His own 
brother, Karel van het Reve (1921–1999), was a case in point. Although a 
professor at the University of Leiden, he wrote essays that were at times 
provocative and deliberately jarring, according to some. One of these essays 
was called “The incredible wickedness of the Supreme Being” (1985).99 This 
was an essay in the style of Thomas Paine.100 In The Age of Reason (1794) 
Paine commented on the God of the Old Testament and he made clear that 
this God was a supreme bully. There were many reactions to Van het Reve’s 
essay, and some people complained about the offensive tone of his diatribe. 
Some of those reactions were published, and this gave Van het Reve the 
opportunity for further comments, as always with great humour and manifest 
writing skills. None of this gave rise to a prosecution. As we indicated, the 
others—national-socialist symbols (the swastika) together with a sickle and a hammer to provoke 
his audience.
97 See for his ideas in general Michel Houellebecq and Bernard-Henri Lévy, Ennemis Publics (Grasset: 
Flammarion, 2008), translated into English as Public Enemies (London: Atlantic Books, 2011).
98 Michel Houellebecq, Soumission (Paris: Flammarion, 2015). Houellebecq was also prosecuted on the 
basis of earlier comments, elucidating certain passages from his novel Plateforme. He was acquitted 
of all charges though: Sophie Masson, “The Strange Trial of Michel Houellebecq,” in The Social 
Contract, 14/2, Winter 2003/2004.
99 Karel van het Reve, “De ongelooflijke slechtheid van het opperwezen”, in NRC Handelsblad, 20 July 
1985, also in Karel van het Reve, De ongelooflijke slechtheid van het opperwezen (Amsterdam: Van 
Oorschot, 1987), 7–20.
100 Thomas Paine, The Age of Reason (1794), in Thomas Paine, Collected Writings (New York: The Library 
of America, 1995), 665–885; James H. Smylie, “Clerical Perspectives on Deism: Paine’s The Age of 
Reason in Virginia,” in Eighteenth-Century Studies, 6/2 (Winter, 1972–1973), 203–220.
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times were generally tolerant towards not only religious dissension, but also 
criticism of religion, even criticism with an offensive quality.101
In the fOOtsteps Of Van het reVe: a new generatIOn Of 
pOlemIcIsts
A great admirer of both Gerard Reve and his brother Karel van het Reve is 
the Dutch novelist and journalist Theodor Holman (b. 1953), who is also 
important in the history of Dutch blasphemy. Holman continued the atheist 
and secularist approach of Karel van het Reve, combined with—sometimes—
Gerard’s irony. On 2 July 1994, Holman wrote in the daily Het Parool that 
he still believed that all religions deserved to be severely criticised. And he 
added: “I still believe that every ‘Christian dog’ (christenhond) is a criminal, 
that praying is something childish, and that the church is a masquerade.” 
Holman was prosecuted on the basis of Article 137c of the Dutch Criminal 
Code—the provision that prohibits “group defamation.” Seventy-five readers 
of Het Parool had declared themselves to have been (or felt) “insulted” by 
Holman’s comments.
Asked what the backdrop of his negative comments on Christianity 
and Christians was, Holman declared: “Taken into consideration the way 
the Pope refuses to accept the use of contraceptives in the struggle against 
AIDS, I can also call the Pope a Christian dog.” Holman was acquitted in first 
instance and also in appeal proceedings.
Later his interest shifted to a new religion on European soil: Islam. In a 
column of 27 May 2008, he mocked the Amsterdam police force’s plan to give 
every policeman a Quran. Holman also criticised former Amsterdam mayor 
(2001–2010) Job Cohen who, despite his Jewish background, was a firm 
defender of multiculturalism and somewhat uncritical towards the spread of 
radical Islam in his city. Cohen was often mocked in the Netherlands because 
of his declared intention to go and “have tea” with Islamists. Holman and the 
mayor were often at loggerheads. But this plan to give every police officer 
the holy book of Islam as some sort of gesture of goodwill was, of course, also 
an ideal opportunity for satire. In a caustic commentary, completely in the 
style of Houellebecq, Holman lets one of the servicemen say to the police 
101 See for a portrait of the Netherlands in the 1960s James C. Kennedy, Nieuw Babylon in aanbouw: 
Nederland in de jaren zestig (Amsterdam/Meppel: Tweede druk, Boom, 1997 (1995)); Harry Mulisch, 
Bericht aan de rattenkoning (Amsterdam: De Bezige Bij, 1966).
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chief: “In this Quran there are many beautiful punishments, for instance for 
infidels. Can’t we adopt these punishments? That would be much better for 
this country.” In Holman’s spoof another serviceman had bought the holy 
book for his wife “So that she may learn her position within the family.”102
By that time the most tragic event in Dutch history in the clash between 
secular religious criticism and radical religious terrorism had already taken 
place: the murder of the filmmaker Theo van Gogh by a homegrown jihadist. 
What 9/11 was for the Americans and the execution of the cartoonists of 
Charlie Hebdo for the French, the murder of Theo van Gogh was for the 
Dutch.
the murder Of theO Van gOgh103
Theo van Gogh (1957–2004) was born in The Hague, the Netherlands, but in 
the years before his death he lived in the capital, Amsterdam, where he was 
also killed, on the street, in broad daylight. He was a close friend of Theodor 
Holman’s, and he was perhaps the most outspoken representative of the 
secularist, heterodox, freedom-loving culture for which Amsterdam was 
famous. He was the son of Johan van Gogh (b. 1922), who had worked for 
the Dutch Intelligence Agency. Theo’s uncle (1920–1945), also called Theo, 
was executed as a resistance fighter by the Nazis during the occupation of 
the Netherlands in the Second World War. His great-grandfather, also called 
Theo, was the famous art dealer (1857–1891) and younger brother of the 
world-renowned artist Vincent van Gogh (1853–1891).
Theo van Gogh’s life was full of personal quarrels and vehement intellectual 
clashes with people he deemed to be too politically correct. In the last years 
of his life he was very impressed by the ideas and work of two other notorious 
Dutch opinion makers: Pim Fortuyn (1948–2002) and Ayaan Hirsi Ali (b. 
1969). Fortuyn was a Dutch politician who was murdered by a left-wing 
102 Theodor Holman, “Cadeautje,” in Theodor Holman, Holman liegt: de mooiste, hardste, liefste, 
helderste, gemeenste, slechtste, ontroerendste leugens bijeen (Amsterdam: Nieuw Amsterdam, 2014).
103 Parts of this section and parts of the section entitled “Voltairian Tolerance” have appeared in 
Paul Cliteur, Tom Herrenberg and Bastiaan Rijpkema, “The New Censorship: A Case Study of 
Extrajudicial Restraints on Free Speech,” in Afshin Ellian and Gelijn Molier (eds), Freedom of Speech 
under Attack (The Hague: Eleven International Publishing, 2015), 291–318.
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activist, Volkert van der Graaf (b. 1969).104 Van der Graaf deemed Fortuyn 
to be a “danger” that had to be stopped, that is eliminated. One of Fortuyn’s 
political issues was criticising Islam for its anti-Enlightenment stances, in 
particular with regard to homosexuality—Fortuyn was gay himself. His 
most controversial statements were about the “backward nature” of Islamic 
culture—in Dutch: achterlijke cultuur.105
Hirsi Ali is a Somali-born writer who, after becoming an atheist, criticised 
her former religion, Islam, for its anti-feminist proclivities.106 On this issue 
she made a film together with Van Gogh, which, on 29 August 2004, was 
shown on Dutch television. The title of the film—“Submission”—refers to 
the literal translation of the word “Islam,” but also to the submissive attitude 
the believers exemplify with regard to the central ideas of their belief, which 
makes progress difficult, if not impossible.
There is a third meaning to “Submission” though, and this became very 
important in the work of Theo van Gogh. He severely criticised all public 
intellectuals and politicians who refused to call a spade a spade when it came 
to radical Islam. The leftist multiculturalist intelligentsia adopted such a 
strong non-judgmentalist attitude towards radical Islam that their attitude 
could not be described as anything other than “submissive.”107
104 See on Fortuyn: S.W. Couwenberg, Opstand der burgers: De Fortuyn-revolte en het demasqué van de 
oude politiek (Damon: Budel, 2004); Ron Eyerman, The Cultural Sociology of Political Assassination: 
From MLK and RFK to Fortuyn and van Gogh (London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2011); René Marres, 
Vermoord en verbannen: de aanvallen op Pim Fortuyn en Ayaan Hirsi Ali en hun verdediging van westerse 
waarden (Soesterberg: Aspekt, 2006); Bert Snel, Pim 1: De politieke biografie van Pim Fortuyn als 
socioloog en als politicus 1990-2002 (Amsterdam: Uitgeverij Van Praag, 2012); Bert Snel, Pim 2: Pim 
Fortuyn en zijn partijen, Leefbaar Nederland (Prof. Dr. W.P.S. Fortuyn Stichting 2013).
105 Frank Poorthuis, and Hans Wansink, “De islam is een achterlijke cultuur,” Interview with Pim 
Fortuyn, in De Volkskrant, 9 February 2002.
106 See Ayaan Hirsi Ali, Infidel: My Life (London: The Free Press, 2007); Ayaan Hirsi Ali, Nomad: From 
Islam to America, A Personal Journey through the Clash of Civilizations (London: The Free Press, 2010). 
In her most recent book her focus is less on atheism and secularism as on the need for a reform 
of Islam: Ayaan Hirsi Ali, Heretic: Why Islam Needs a Reformation Now (New York: Harper Collins, 
2015).
107 This is the theme of Bruce Bawer, While Europe Slept: How Radical Islam Is Destroying the West From 
Within (New York/Aukland: Doubleday, 2006); Bruce Bawer, Surrender: Appeasing Islam, Sacrificing 
Freedom (New York: Doubleday, 2009).
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VOltaIrIan tOlerance
In The Friends of Voltaire (1902) Evelyn Beatrice Hall (1868–1956), writing 
under the pseudonym S.G. Tallentyre, introduced one of the most often 
quoted phrases encapsulating the ideal of tolerance: “I disapprove of what 
you say, but I will defend to the death your right to say it.”108 The words are 
not to be found verbatim in Voltaire’s collected works, but they are certainly 
in line with the general tenor of his thinking. We may call this “Voltairian 
tolerance.” The essence of this concept of tolerance is that tolerance means 
condoning what people say or write, even though you disagree with them.
Van Gogh, Hirsi Ali and Fortuyn were vocal advocates of this “Voltairian 
tolerance.” In the case of Pim Fortuyn that meant that, although he himself 
was a practising homosexual, he would not deny the right of orthodox 
Muslims to reject his sexual preference. Orthodox religious believers had the 
right to say “homosexuals are sick,” but he himself would reserve the right to 
say “Islam is a backward religion.”
Now this is basically what “Voltairian tolerance” is all about. You can 
disagree, but you should not aim to silence your discussion partner.109 Only 
on the basis of such an attitude is there hope for consensus in the long run.
This conception of tolerance differs completely from the conception that 
may be dubbed “multiculturalist tolerance.”110 Multiculturalist tolerance 
means that in a multicultural society all parties must try not to offend each 
other by saying something that might hurt others. In that situation orthodox 
imams must be exhorted not to say anything unfriendly about infidels, 
homosexuals and women; and freethinking homosexuals must constrain 
themselves in their attitude towards Islam and orthodox Christians who 
108 S.G. Tallentyre (pseudonym of Evelyn Beatrice Hall), The Friends of Voltaire (London: Smith, Elder & 
Co., 1906), 199.
109 See Pim Fortuyn, “Tegen de islamisering van onze cultuur. Nederlandse identiteit als fundament”, in 
De grote Pim Fortuyn omnibus (Speakers Academy, Van Gennep, 2001), 197–283. Here he expounded 
his views, inviting Muslims to criticise his views.
110 An unexpected advocate of multiculturalist tolerance is the legal philosopher Jeremy Waldron: see 
Jeremy Waldron, The Harm in Hate Speech (Cambridge, Mass./London: Harvard University Press, 
2012). This is unexpected, because Waldron was also one of the most impressive protagonists of 
Voltairian tolerance in his earlier development: see Jeremy Waldron, “Rushdie and Religion,” first 
published under the title “Too important for Tact,” in The Times Literary Supplement, 10 March 
1989, 248 and 260, and reprinted in Jeremy Waldron, Liberal Rights: Collected Papers 1981-1991 
(Cambridge/New York: Cambridge University Press, 1993, 134–143.
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reject their sexual leanings. The ideal of Voltairian tolerance is lively and 
sometimes rough debate, the ideal of multiculturalist tolerance is polite 
silence.
The two conceptions of tolerance have significant consequences for the 
law. From the perspective of Voltairian tolerance the aim is to maximise 
an individual’s right to freedom of speech. From the perspective of 
multiculturalist tolerance, special incitement to hatred laws are advocated, 
if not laws protecting people from blasphemy.
Van Gogh, Fortuyn and Hirsi Ali made criticism of Islam an important 
part of their polemics, especially after the terrorist attacks of 11 September 
2001. Van Gogh’s last film—entitled “06/05”, for the day on which Fortuyn 
was killed—was dedicated to the life and murder of Pim Fortuyn. In 2003, a 
year before his death, Van Gogh wrote a book entitled Allah weet het beter—
“Allah knows best.”111
As we said, in circles of artists and writers Van Gogh was exceptional, 
because he did not subscribe to the fashionable left-wing views of many of 
his colleagues. But he was also hated for this, not only by jihadists, but also 
by the left-wing multiculturalist establishment. 
The irony is that, for many people, his death, and especially the way this 
came about, actually proved what he had not been able to convey during his 
lifetime, namely that radical Islam was a mortal danger to the social cohesion 
of Dutch society—and, frankly, to all democratic and liberal societies.112
On 2 November 2004, Van Gogh was murdered by the homegrown 
jihadist Mohammed Bouyeri (b. 1978). Van Gogh was cycling to work in 
the morning. The killer shot the filmmaker eight times with a handgun and 
subsequently tried to decapitate him with a knife. He also stabbed two knives 
into his victim’s chest, one with a note in which he spelled out his extremist 
message to the world, in particular to Western democracies, to Jews and to 
Ayaan Hirsi Ali. Hirsi Ali proved to be untouchable for the killer, but Van 
Gogh was a soft target.
111 Gogh, Theo van, Allah weet het beter, Xtra Producties, Amsterdam 2003.
112 See for an analysis of the tension between radical and Islam and liberal democracy Caroline Cox 
and John Marks, The West, Islam and Islamism: Is ideological Islam compatible with liberal democracy? 
(London: Civitas, Institute for the Study of Civil Society, 2003); Bassam Tibi, Islamism and Islam 
(New Haven, CT/London: Yale University Press, 2012); Bassam Tibi, Political Islam, World Politics 
and Europe: Democratic Peace and Euro-Islam versus Global Jihad (London/New York: Routledge, 
2008).
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There were two reasons why Van Gogh was so easy to kill. The first 
reason was that he had no police protection, like Hirsi Ali had—Van Gogh 
once joked that he hoped Al Qaeda would “respect the working hours of 
the Amsterdam police.”113 The second reason was that he himself believed 
that he was not a target for terrorist attacks in the same way Hirsi Ali was, 
because she was a Muslim—or rather an apostate Muslim114—and he was a 
Dutch writer with no ties to Islam. So in his case there was no “apostasy.” 
According to his understanding of the Islamist ideology, there would be no 
reason to harm him, let alone kill him. He was after all “the village idiot.” 
But this proved to be a fatal mistake made not only by Van Gogh himself, but 
also by the Amsterdam police and Dutch authorities in general. That you do 
not have to be a Muslim to be killed by a jihadist had also been proven by 
the murder of Rushdie’s Japanese translator Hitoshi Igarashi (1947–1991) on 
12 July 1991 and by the attack on Italian translator Ettore Capriolo (1926–
2013) on 3 July 1991. Rushdie’s Norwegian publisher William Nygaard (b. 
1941) was wounded by gun shots on 11 October 1993. So, in these cases, it 
was not the identity of the victim that counted;115 Khomeini’s fatwa was what 
was important.116
Anyhow, the murder of Van Gogh took most people by surprise. The 
politically correct elite that Van Gogh had so vehemently criticised in 
particular felt embarrassed, although not many people changed their 
attitudes openly. For Dutch society though, the murder proved a watershed 
moment. The anti-Islam party of Dutch parliamentarian Geert Wilders 
achieved huge electoral successes and is at this moment in time—spring 
2016—the biggest party in the opinion polls, with support from between 
113 See “Ditjes & Datjes,” available at: http://www.degezonderoker.nl/metro_42.htm; “Moord is 
slimmer dan paar bommen; als hij in debat had kunnen gaan, zou hij nog leven,” in Het Parool, 9 July 
2005.
114 Generally considered to be a dangerous position: see Ibn Warraq (ed.), Leaving Islam: Apostates 
Speak Out (Amherst, NY: Prometheus Books, 2003); Simon Cottee, The Apostates: When Muslims 
Leave Islam (London: Hurst, 2015).
115 See Ramine Kamrane, La Fatwa contre Rushdie: une interprétation stratégique (Paris: Éditions Kimé, 
1997), 30 who, commenting on the targets mentioned, writes “they were no Muslims.” Only 
Rushdie was. Or rather he was considered to be one.
116 See for the text Daniel Pipes, The Rushdie Affair: The Novel, the Ayatollah, and the West (2nd edn, with 
a postscript by Koenraad Elst, New Brunswick/New York: Transaction Publishers, 2003), 27.
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22 and 27 per cent of voters.117 It is difficult to imagine that this would have 
taken place without the murder of Van Gogh, which proved to inaugurate a 
tremendous change of attitude in the country towards mass immigration, 
and especially the immigration of people with an Islamic background.
The murderer of Van Gogh was apprehended shortly after the murder, 
and he was convicted on 26 July 2005 and given a life sentence without 
the possibility of parole. This severe sentence was a result of the fact that 
the murderer showed no remorse at all. On the contrary, he used the public 
trial to explain the jihadist ideology in a manner that must have been a 
confronting experience for many people who had denied the danger.
After the murder a confusing and heated debate on the “causes” of this 
tragedy erupted, exposing a deep rift in Dutch society. On the one hand 
there were the multicultural and politically correct Dutch elites who pointed 
to Van Gogh’s brutal and outrageous criticism of religion and vulnerable 
minorities in Dutch society. On the other hand, there were the people who 
pointed to the nature of jihadist ideology. The two groups could not agree 
on the causes of the new religious terrorism that seemed to be taking hold.
the IslamIst’s prOfessIOn Of faIth
What made a great impression on Dutch society was the radical profession 
of faith during Bouyeri’s trial. What Bouyeri said both before and during 
his trial was highly relevant for a proper understanding of the Islamist’s 
worldview. As indicated, there was the “Open letter” to Hirsi Ali he left 
on Van Gogh’s corpse.118 This letter contained specific threats to Hirsi Ali, 
but also complaints about the Muslim community, which, according to the 
Dutch jihadist, forsook its primary duty.119 During his trial Bouyeri said: 
“You may send me all your psychologists, psychiatrists and experts, but I 
will tell you, you will never understand this. You can’t. If I am released and 
get the chance to do again what I did on 2 November, wallahi, I would do 
117 “Wilders predicts a ‘revolt’ if PVV is not in next coalition,” available at: www.dutchnews.nl, 
3 February 2016.
118 B., Mohammed, “Open brief aan Hirshi Ali,” in Ermute Klein (trans.), Jihad. Strijders en strijdsters 
voor Allah (Amsterdam: Uitgeverij Byblos, 2005), 27–33; “Open Brief aan Hirshi Ali door 
Mohammed B.”, Parl. Doc, House of Rep., 29 854 (attachment), 2.
119 Ibid., 27–33. See for an analysis of this letter Hans Jansen, “De brief van Mohammed B., bevestigd 
aan het lijk van Theo van Gogh,” in Tijdschrift voor Geschiedenis, 118, nr. 3 (2005) 483–491.
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exactly the same.”120 The murderer had expected a martyr’s death. Found on 
his body was a suicide note that read: “So these are my last words, riddled 
with bullets, baptised in blood, as I had hoped.”121
What can we make of this? As Ron Eyerman writes in The Assasination 
of Theo van Gogh (2008), the killing appears to be staged as a ritual 
assassination.122 But one may also call it a “social performance.”123 Eyerman 
continues:
Three intended victims were identified in Mohammed B.’s letters 
on the Internet: Ayaan Hirsi Ali; Ahmed Aboutaleb, an Amsterdam 
politician born in Morocco, with an opposite view on Muslim 
assimilation; and Geert Wilders, a Dutch politician following in the 
footsteps of Pim Fortuyn.124
That the murder of Van Gogh was meant to send a signal not only to Van 
Gogh and Hirsi Ali but also to the Dutch citizenry in general appears from the 
short conversation that developed after the murderer had killed his victim. 
As Ian Buruma (b. 1951) writes in his account of the events, Mohammed 
Bouyeri made no serious attempt to escape after having killed his victim. 
While he was reloading his gun, a woman passing by said “You can’t do 
that!” Bouyeri answered “Yes, I can. And now you people know what you can 
expect in the future.”125 The ideology of Bouyeri is basically the same as that 
120 In Dutch: U mag al uw psychologen, psychiaters en deskundigen op me af sturen, maar ik zeg u, u zult 
dit nooit begrijpen. Dat kunt u niet. Als ik vrij kom, en ik had de mogelijkheid om nog een keer te doen 
wat ik op 2 november deed, wallahi, ik zou precies hetzelfde hebben gedaan. Our translation, cited in 
Jaco Alberts and Steven Derix, “Strafproces eindigt in wezenloze harmonie: proces Mohammed 
B. Verdachte wil levenslang,” in NRC Handelsblad, 13 July 2005. See the verdict in Rechtbank 
Amsterdam, 26 juli 2005 (Moord op Theo van Gogh). This was the case in which Mohammed 
Bouyeri stood trial for his murder of Theo van Gogh. Later he would also stand trial as a suspected 
member of the Hofstadgroep, a network of Dutch jihadists. The citations about the three reasons 
why Van Gogh deserved death are derived from the Hofstadgroep trial.
121 Ron Eyerman, The Assasination of Theo van Gogh: from Social Drama to Cultural Trauma (Durham, 
NC/London: Duke University Press, 2008), 6.
122 Ibid., 7.
123 Ibid.
124 Ibid., 8.
125 Ian Buruma, Murder in Amsterdam: The Death of Theo van Gogh and the Limits of Tolerance (New 
York: Penguin, 2006), 2; Jutta Chorus and Ahmet Olgun, In Godsnaam: Het jaar van Theo van Gogh 
(Antwerp/Amsterdam: Uitgeverij Contact, 2005), 14.
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of Amedy Coulibaly (1982–2015), who synchronised his attacks on a French 
supermarket with the gunmen in the Charlie Hebdo massacre, Saïd Kouachi 
(1980–2015) and Chérif Kouachi (1982–2015).126 And Bouyeri was willing to 
explain this not only with impressive calmness to a witness at the scene, but 
also during a trial before a Dutch court on 23 January 2008.127 This was four 
years after Van Gogh’s murder. Here the murderer gave some new insight 
into his motives. He declared the following:
The reason for the murder of Van Gogh is that he had offended the 
Prophet. According to the law he deserved the death penalty, and I 
have executed it. … Theo van Gogh considered himself a soldier. He 
fought against Islam. On 2 November 2004, Allah sent a soldier who 
slit his throat … This is Jihad in the most literal sense. Van Gogh saw 
himself as a soldier and he needed to be put down. Van Gogh knew 
exactly what he was doing. He was in the arena.128
126 Coulibaly, who killed four people and a Parisian policewoman in the Parisian kosher grocery 
store, pledged allegiance to the Islamic State in a video published online two days after his death: 
see Julian Borger, “Paris gunman Amedy Coulibaly declared allegiance to Isis,” in The Guardian, 
12 January 2015. In the video he also pledges allegiance to the leader of ISIS, Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi. 
The Kouachis declared themselves to be followers of al-Qaida in the Arabian Peninsula. See on 
the Charlie Hebdo massacre Willy Laes, Een jaar na Charlie Hebdo: een pamflet Antwerp: Houtekiet, 
2015).
127 This was a ruling about the question whether a group of jihadists, the so-called Hofstadgroep, could 
be tried and sentenced collectively for participating in a criminal organisation. This was not the 
case, according to the court. By that time Bouyeri had already been imprisoned for the murder of 
Van Gogh. See on the Hofstadgroep Emerson Vermaat, De Hofdstadgroep: Portret van een radicaal-
islamitisch netwerk (Soesterberg: Aspekt, 2005); Emerson Vermaat, Nederlandse Jihad: het proces 
tegen de Hofstadgroep (Soesterberg: Aspekt, 2006).
128 Gerechsthof Den Haag (The Hague Court of Appeal), 23 januari 2008. In Dutch: Het motief van de 
moord op Van Gogh was gelegen in het feit dat hij de profeet had beledigd. Volgens de wet verdiende hij 
de doodstraf en die heb ik voltrokken … . Theo van Gogh zag zichzelf als een soldaat. Hij streed tegen 
de Islam. Op 2 november 2004 heeft Allah een soldaat gestuurd die hem de strot heeft doorgesneden. 
Allah heeft het woord van Kufr op die dag vernederd. Op die dag heeft Allah het woord van de waarheid 
gevestigd. De Kafir is afgeslacht. Dit is Jihad in de meest letterlijke zin … . Van Gogh zag zichzelf als 
soldaat en hij moest afgemaakt worden. Van Gogh wist precies wat hij deed. Hij bevond zich in de arena. 
See on the murder of Van Gogh: Cliteur, Paul, “Godslastering en zelfcensuur na de moord op 
Theo van Gogh,” in: Nederlands Juristenblad, Afl. 2004/45, 17 December 2004, pp. 2328–2335; 
Cliteur, Paul, “Cast Your Discomfort Aside: In matters of life and death, debate is the only thing 
that counts,” in: The Times Higher Education Supplement, 28 January 2005; Cliteur, Paul, “State and 
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This is an insightful passage that teaches us something about the mindset 
of a violent religious extremist that has some added value to what is to be 
found in the declarations of other jihadists. Dutch society and also Dutch 
scholarship in Middle Eastern Studies was totally overwhelmed by this 
seemingly new phenomenon. Martin Kramer in his groundbreaking Ivory 
Towers on Sand: the Failure of Middle Eastern Studies in America (2001) had 
made clear how American scholarship had failed completely to predict the 
events of 9/11.129 The same could be said of Dutch Islamic studies. Only 
a few of the professionals had foreseen the radicalisation of Islam by the 
jihadists, among them the scholars Hans Jansen (1942–2015)130 and Jan 
Brugman (1923–2004).131 Yet, most scholars in the field were perhaps 
deluded by Edward Said’s criticism of orientalism,132 totally unaware of what 
was going on in the world. The study of radicalised religion was considered 
inappropriate, if not a betrayal of the profession. But let us not respect these 
scholarly taboos and try to understand what the Islamists are trying to tell 
us. What did Bouyeri say?
religion against the backdrop of religious radicalism,” in: International Journal of Constitutional Law, 
vol. 10, no.  1, 2012, pp. 127–152; Jansen, Hans, “De brief van Mohammed B., bevestigd aan het lijk 
van Theo van Gogh,” in: Tijdschrift voor Geschiedenis, 118, nr. 3 (2005), pp. 483–491; Nesser, Petter, 
“The Slaying of the Dutch Filmmaker – Religiously motivated violence or Islamist terrorism in 
the name of global jihad?,” Norwegian Defence Research Establishment, Kjeller, Norway 2005; 
Eyerman, Ron, The Assasination of Theo van Gogh: from Social Drama to Cultural Trauma, Duke 
University Press, Durham and London 2008; Eyerman, Ron, The Cultural Sociology of Political 
Assasination: From MLK and RFK to Fortuyn and van Gogh, Palgrave, Macmillan 2011.
129 Middle Eastern expert James Bill stated in 1996 that “All is not well in the field of Middle East 
political studies in the United States. A review of the history of Middle East scholarship suggests 
we have learned disturbingly little after 50 years of heavy exertion.” Another prominent American 
political scientist, Jerrold Green, argued in 1998 that Middle Eastern Studies “is a field in some 
trouble”. Both are quoted in Martin Kramer, Ivory Towers on Sand: the Failure of Middle Eastern 
Studies in America (Washington, DC: The Washington Institute for Near East Policy, 2001), 1.
130 Johannes J.G. Jansen, The Dual Nature of Islamic Fundamentalism (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University 
Press, 1997; Johannes J.G. Jansen, The Neglected Duty: The Creed of Sadat’s Assasins and Islamic 
Resurgence in the Middle East (London: MacMillan Publishing Company, 1986).
131 J. Brugman, Het raadsel van de multicultuur. Essays over islam en integratie (Amsterdam: Meulenhoff, 
1998).
132 Said was criticised by Hans Jansen, “Edward Said. De luchtfietser van het Midden-Oosten,” in 
Trouw, 11 October 2003; Ibn Warraq, Defending the West: A Critique of Edward Said’s Orientalism 
(Amherst, NY: Prometheus Books, 2007).
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First, that Van Gogh had “offended the Prophet” and “fought against 
Islam.” Second, that on the basis of this indictment he “deserved the death 
penalty.” Third, that he, Bouyeri, had simply executed this lawful punishment. 
Fourth, that part of the justification for this punishment was based on the 
will of God. It was, in fact, Allah himself who had sent “a soldier to cut his 
throat.” Fifth, that the theological doctrine behind- and justification for this 
act lay in the concept of “jihad.”
The assassin seems to present the whole conflict as a fair fight between 
opposing parties. He speaks of “soldiers” who were “in the arena.” He also 
claims to speak for his victim, who “knew what he was doing.”
Ayaan Hirsi Ali, Van Gogh’s co-creator of the film “Submission” which 
deals with the position of women in Islamic culture, was also “in the arena” 
and marched in the “ranks of the soldiers of evil,” Bouyeri stated. He added:
She has offended the Prophet. She is an apostate and she has joined 
the enemy. Three reasons, each in and of themselves sufficient to 
qualify her for the death penalty. … From the moment she went into 
politics and declared her oath in Parliament, she became an apostate. 
… I left the “Open letter to Hirshi Ali” on the corpse of Theo van Gogh 
to make a clear statement. … That statement is: it is war, and if you 
enter the arena you know what will happen.133
the theOterrOrIst’s argument analysed
Here the argument is similar to, but also slightly different from what has 
been said about Van Gogh. There is the common indictment of offending the 
Prophet and its fateful consequences. But then Hirsi Ali’s case differs from 
that of Van Gogh. The following fundamental difference exists.
133 In Dutch: Ze heeft de profeet beledigd, ze is afvallig en ze heeft zich aangesloten bij de vijand. Drie 
redenen, die ieder op zich voldoende zijn om haar voor de doodstraf in aanmerking te doen komen … 
Vanaf het moment dat zij de politiek in ging en haar eed voor het parlement aflegde, is ze afvallig geworden 
… Ik heb de ‘Open brief aan Hirshi Ali’ op het lichaam van Theo van Gogh achtergelaten om een duidelijk 
statement te maken … Het statement is: het is oorlog en als je je in de arena bevindt, weet je wat er 
gebeurt. Gerechtshof Den Haag, 23 January 2008 (Hofstadgroep). See also Paul Berman, The Flight 
of the Intellectuals (New York: Melville House, 2010), 246; Zachary Shore, Breeding Bin Ladens: 
America, Islam, and the Future of Europe (Baltimore, Mld.:The Johns Hopkins University Press, 
2006), 3.
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First, Hirsi Ali is an apostate. An apostate is someone who has relinquished 
his or her religious belief.134 Under modern constitutional law, and on the 
basis of post-Second World War human rights documents, changing or even 
relinquishing your religious belief is an elementary human right.135 But 
whoever is familiar with the stories of, for example, the Hebrew Bible, as 
told in the books of Deuteronomy, Judges, Numbers, and 1 and 2 Kings, will 
immediately recognise that the theme of apostasy is central to the whole 
narrative. The “fateful national consequences of disloyalty to Yahweh” is a 
highly pervasive theme.136 The book of Kings describes the kings of Israel or 
Judah “as either good or bad, depending on how they reigned.”137 We have to 
understand that “good” in this context means loyal to Yahweh. “Bad” means 
disloyal to Yahweh.
Bouyeri killed Van Gogh because the latter wrote things about the prophet 
he, Bouyeri, did not like. All critical commentary on the prophet of Islam is 
to a jihadist an “attack on Islam” to which the true Muslim must respond 
with violence. This came into heavy conflict with the Dutch freethinking 
culture of the 1960s which had ended—or at least thought it had ended—all 
taboos.
134 Paul Marshall and Nina Shea, Silenced: How Apostasy and Blasphemy Codes care Choking Freedom 
Worldwide (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011); Patrick Sookhdeo, Freedom to Believe: 
Challenging Islam’s Apostasy Law (Three Rivers, Mich.: Isaac Publishing, 2009); Samuel M. Zwemer, 
The Law of Apostasy in Islam: Answering the question why there are so few Moslem converts, and giving 
examples of their moral courage and martyrdom) London/Edinburgh/New York: Marshall Brothers, 
1924); Haim H. Cohn, “The Law of Religious Dissidents: A Comparative Historical Survey,” in Israel 
Law Review 34 (2000) 39–100.
135 Matt Cherry and Roy Brown, Speaking Freely about Religion: Religious Freedom, Defamation and 
Blasphemy, International Humanist and Ethical Union Policy Paper (London: International 
Humanist and Ethical Union, 2009), 9; Mirjam van Schaik and Jasper Doomen, “De toekomst van 
godslastering,” in Nederlands Juristenblad, Afl. 30, 12 September 2014, 2110–2116; Tom Herrenberg, 
“Denouncing Divinity: Blasphemy, Human Rights, and the Struggle of Political Leaders to defend 
Freedom of Speech in the Case of Innocence of Muslims,” in Ancilla Iuris 1 (2015) 1-19.
136 Gordon D. Fee and Douglas Stuart, How to Read the Bible Book by Book: A Guided Tour, Mich.: 
Zondervan, 2002), 91; Michael Coogan (ed.), The New Oxford Annotated Bible (Augmented third 
edn, with the Apocryphal /Deuterocanonical Books, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007), 488. 
See also Moshe Halbertal and Avishai Margalit, Idolatry (trans. Naomi Goldblum, Cambridge, 
Mass./London: Harvard University Press, 1992).
137 David Pawson, Unlocking the Bible: A unique overview of the whole Bible (London: Collins, 2007 
(2003)), 292.
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During the 1960s the Netherlands evolved from a rather religious and 
traditional country into a very liberal and secularised one.138 A liberalised, 
anarchistic, iconoclastic frame of mind that we associate with bohemians, 
artists or the “radical chic” had arisen. As we have seen, authors like Gerard 
van het Reve fantasised about having sex with God, who would manifest 
himself in the form of a donkey. His brother Karel van het Reve (1921–1999) 
mocked religious believers in essays that were deemed “blasphemous” by 
many traditional and religious compatriots.139 Youngsters under the name of 
provo’s—“provocateurs”—entered into conflicts with the police.140 Authority 
was pushed off its pedestal.
One of the most important public discussions of that time centred 
around war criminal Adolf Eichmann (1906–1962), a major organiser 
of the Holocaust, whose trial took place in 1962. The Eichmann trial was 
commented on by major political philosophers and public intellectuals like 
Hannah Arendt (1906–1975). According to Arendt, Eichmann exemplified 
the “Banality of Evil.”141 Eichmann was not the monster that most people 
thought he was, but an ordinary individual, very much inclined to follow 
orders.
Psychologist Stanley Milgram (1933–1984) tried to prove Arendt’s thesis 
with psychological experiments that corroborated the view that, under the 
right circumstances, people feel obliged to follow orders, even if it means 
138 See on the cultural development of the Netherlands in the 1960s James C. Kennedy, Nieuw Babylon 
in aanbouw: Nederland in de jaren zestig (Amsterdam/Meppel: Tweede druk, Boom, 1997 (1995)); 
James Kennedy, “The Moral State: How Much do the Americans and the Dutch Differ?,” in Hans 
Krabbendam and Hans-Martien ten Napel (eds), Regulating Morality: A Comparison of the Role of the 
State in Mastering the Mores in the Netherlands and the United States (Antwerp/Apeldoorn: Maklu/
E.M. Meijers Instituut, 2000), 9–23. General accounts of the culture of the Sixties are Arthur 
Marwick, The Sixties: Cultural Revolution in Britain, France, Italy, and the United States, c. 1958-c. 1974 
(Oxford/New York: Oxford University Press, 1998); Jenny Diski, The Sixties (London: Profile Books, 
2009). For a general history of the Netherlands see E.H. Kossmann, The Low Countries: 1780–1940 
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1978).
139 Karel van het Reve, “De ongelooflijke slechtheid van het opperwezen,” in NRC Handelsblad, 
20 July 1985, also included in: Karel van het Reve, De ongelooflijke slechtheid van het opperwezen 
(Amsterdam: Van Oorschot, 1987), 7–20.
140 See on this movement Harry Mulisch’s account in: Harry Mulisch, Bericht aan de rattenkoning 
(Amsterdam: De Bezige Bij, 1966).
141 Hannah Arendt, Eichmann in Jerusalem: A Report on the Banality of Evil (revised and enlarged edn, 
Harmondsworth: Penguin Books, 1992 (1963)).
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committing the most horrendous crimes.142 So basically Eichmann was a 
“bureaucrat.” This had important consequences for the Weberian model of 
bureaucracy, as one might expect.143 Authority, following orders, became 
hugely unpopular with a new generation of youngsters. Dutch novelist 
Harry Mulisch (1927–2010),144 who was also present in Jerusalem during the 
Eichmann trial to comment on the court proceedings for the Dutch magazine 
Elsevier, published his views on the matter in his book De zaak 40/61 (1962).145 
Mulisch, whose views were similar to those of Arendt—though he claimed 
to have developed them earlier and independently of Arendt—summarised 
the new attitude towards politics and culture in his exclamation that, in his 
youth, the only thing he had ever seen was collaboration, reasonableness, 
moderation and hypochondria.146 In 1972 he indicated that he abhorred 
fathers, teachers, policemen and people like that, people who wanted to 
forbid things, take things from you, did not want to listen, thought they knew 
best but in reality were dumb and servile and unjust.147 Mulisch castigated 
the generation of “fathers” who had fought the Germans in the Second World 
142 Stanley Milgram, “The Perils of Obedience,” in Harper’s Magazine, 1974, under the title: “An 
Experiment in Autonomy” also in: Louis P. Pojman (ed.), The Moral Life: An Introductory Reader in 
Ethics and Literature (New York/ Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000), 625–640; Paul Cliteur, 
The Secular Outlook: In Defense of Moral and Political Secularism (Chichester: Wiley-Blackwell, 2010), 
206–208.
143 Meaning, roughly, that civil servants work under the supervision of politicians and have to follow 
orders. See Max Weber, The Profession and Vocation of Politics, in Max Weber, Political Writings (ed. 
Peter Lassman and Ronald Speirs, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1994), 309–370.
144 Harry Mulisch is a famous Dutch novelist. His The Assault (1982) was a worldwide bestseller and 
has been translated into more than thirty languages. In 1986 it was made into a film that won an 
Oscar for best non-English film. Another novel by Mulisch, The Discovery of Heaven (1992), was 
favourably reviewed by The New Yorker’s John Updike (25 November 1996), who compared the 
Dutch author with Homer, James Joyce, Umberto Eco and Thomas Mann.
145 Harry Mulisch, De zaak 40/61: Een reportage (Amsterdam: Uitgeverij De Bezige Bij, 1979 (1962)). 
Although he had a weak spot for authoritarian left-wing regimes like that of Fidel Castro. He wrote 
an opera lauding Castro together with the musician Peter Schat. When Schat later changed his 
opinion on Cuba, Mulish considered his former friend a “traitor”: see Dick Verkijk, Harry Mulisch: 
“Fel anti-nazi” – vanaf wanneer? (Soesterberg: Uitgeverij Aspekt, 2006), 31. Mulisch’s book on 
Eichmann has been translated into English: Harry Mulisch, Criminal Case 40/61: The Trial of Adolf 
Eichmann (trans. Robert Naborn, Foreword Debórah Dwork, Philadelphia, Penn.: University of 
Pennsylvania Press, 2005).
146 Harry Mulisch, De toekomst van gisteren (Amsterdam: De bezige Bij, 1972), 39.
147 Ibid., 37.
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War as not only bourgeois but “fascist” themselves.148 So iconoclasm seemed 
to be the rule rather than the exception in the 1960s.
Theo van Gogh was, in a certain sense, the offspring of that frame of 
mind.149 But now that the Dutch were liberated from all kinds of restraints in 
the field of religious criticism, a new wave of immigrants brought a certain 
amount of traditional puritanism into the country. And, in its radical Islamist 
incarnation, even a violent form of puritanism. Theo van Gogh’s murderer 
was an example of that new mentality.
the end Of the dutch Blasphemy law
Obviously, the murder of Van Gogh confused and shocked Dutch society. 
“The attack on Theo van Gogh strikes at the heart of our national identity…
[freedom of expression] was more or less our national pride, our World 
Trade Center, taken down by a terrorist,” representative Jozias van Aartsen 
(b. 1947) observed during parliamentary debate shortly after the attack.150 
A broad political and social discussion ensued after Van Gogh’s death.151 
What had motivated the killer? Had Dutch intelligence and the security 
services not seen this coming? Within this broader context the inert state 
of the Dutch blasphemy law gained renewed attention. Minister of Justice 
Piet Hein Donner (b. 1948)—the grandson of the minister of justice who 
had proposed the blasphemy law in the 1930s—expressed the intention 
to apply the blasphemy law more strictly.152 The Prime Minister, Jan Peter 
Balkenende (b. 1956), advocated moderation in the public debate. “Everyone 
148 Harry Mulisch, De toekomst van gisteren (Amsterdam: De bezige Bij, 1972).
149 An account of Theo van Gogh’s personality and views can be found in a character sketch by his 
friend Theodor Holman: Theodor Holman, Theo is dood, Met een voorwoord van Gijs van de 
Westelaken (Amsterdam: Mets en Schilt, 2006). Another friend of Van Gogh, Max Pam, presents an 
interesting view on the controversial filmmaker in Max Pam, Het bijenspook: over dier, mens en god 
(Amsterdam: Prometheus, 2009). Dutch novelist Leon de Winter presented a fictionalised account 
of the events around Van Gogh’s death in Leon de Winter, VSV of Daden van onbaatzuchtigheid 
(Amsterdam: De Bezige Bij, 2012).
150 Parl. Doc., House of Rep., 11 November 2004, no. 29854, 1282 (Debat over de moord op de heer Th. 
van Gogh).
151 See on this debate Paul Cliteur, “Godslastering en zelfcensuur na de moord op Theo van Gogh,” in 
Nederlands Juristenblad 2004, no. 45, 2328–2335.
152 “Kabinet verdeeld over godslastering; Verdonk en Donner botsen over aanpak,” in NRC Handelsblad, 
15 November 2004, 1; “Ministers oneens over vervolgen godslastering,” in de Volkskrant, 
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may choose his own words, but it is a good thing if we also take into account 
the ‘recipient’ of these words … Let us realise that our words can wound,” 
Balkenende said.153
Yet at the same time, voices that favoured the abolition of the blasphemy 
law were raised. While a parliamentary motion that pressed the cabinet to 
“reconsider” the blasphemy provisions was rejected a few weeks after Van 
Gogh’s murder, a bill that called for the repeal of the blasphemy provisions 
was proposed in 2009154 and eventually entered into force in 2014. The 
representatives who drafted the proposal underlined the importance of 
diversity of opinion. The proposal relied heavily on the “marketplace of 
ideas” argument: “The collision of arguments and opinions deepens debate 
on important topics, such as philosophical issues and the formation of 
society.”155 Second, the argument of equality was raised: “Provisions that 
grant special protection to (specific) believers do not fit with the idea of 
equal treatment.”156 Third, the representatives adduced that public and 
political debate provided enough opportunity to rebut abusive and insulting 
utterances.157 All parties in the House of Representatives favoured the 
proposal except the Christian parties.158 For example, Mr. Van der Staaij 
(b. 1968) of the orthodox Reformed Protestant Party saw the repeal of the 
blasphemy law as a “great loss” and “the conscious release of a moral anchor 
point.”159 Although he agreed that the provisions were “dead” in strict legal 
terms, Van der Staaij argued that they still had their contemporary value: 
“Freedom is a great good, but don’t use it to unnecessarily and intentionally 
hurt people in their deepest and dearest convictions.”160 Following its 
adoption by the House of Representatives in April 2013, the Senate accepted 
15 November 2004, 2. Donner later retracted his statements. See “Godslastering niet harder 
aangepakt; Donner neemt aankondiging terug,” in NRC Handelsblad, 16 November 2004, 1.
153 “Kabinet verdeeld over godslastering,” in Trouw, 15 November 2004, 1. 
154 Parl. Doc., House of Rep., 2009/10, no. 32203, 2 (Voorstel van Wet van de leden Van der Ham, De Wit 
en Teeven tot wijziging van het Wetboek van Strafrecht in verband met het laten vervallen van het verbod 
op godslastering).
155 Parl. Doc., House of Rep., 2009/10, no. 32203, 3, 1.
156 Ibid.
157 Ibid., 2.
158 See Parl. Doc., House of Rep., 16 April 2013 (Stemmingen initiatiefvoorstel verbod op godslastering).
159 Parl. Doc., House of Rep., Debate of 20 March 2013, 37.
160 Ibid.
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the proposal by 49 votes to 21 in December 2013.161 The Dutch blasphemy 
law—Articles 147, 147a, and 429bis of the Criminal Code—was effectively 
repealed on 1 March 2014.162
cOnclusIOn
In this chapter we have discussed the blasphemy law that was part of the 
Dutch Criminal Code from 1932 to 2014. This law initially consisted of two 
provisions. Article 147 no. 1 prohibited the expression of scornful blasphemy 
in a manner offensive to religious feelings, while Article 429bis prohibited 
the display, in a place visible from a public road, of words or images that, 
as expressions of scornful blasphemy, were hurtful to religious feelings. In 
1934, Article 147a, which made it illegal to distribute blasphemous material, 
was added to the Criminal Code. The blasphemy law was a response to harsh 
criticism directed at and mockery of the Christian religion, primarily from 
on the part of communists. Although prosecutions and convictions did take 
place on the basis of this law—especially in the early years of its existence—
it is fair to say that the blasphemy law never really took root in Dutch legal 
culture. This probably had as much to do with the technicalities of it—in 
order to leave enough “breathing space” for statements on religion, the law 
was only intended to cover a narrow set of blasphemous utterances, namely 
those that were “scornful” and expressed in “a manner offensive to religious 
feelings,” legal terms that proved to be not without complications—as with 
a cultural attitude that tended to be sceptical of governmental interference 
in the area of religious opinion. This culminated in the most famous trial 
based on the blasphemy law, namely the trial of novelist Gerard Kornelis 
van het Reve in the 1960s—a decade in which “rebellion” against all types 
of authority was fashionable and in which the Dutch shifted from a society 
structured along religious lines towards a more secular society. The trial, 
in which Van het Reve was eventually acquitted of charges that he had 
committed “scornful blasphemy” by describing sex acts between himself 
and God in the form of a donkey, weakened the blasphemy provisions to 
161 Parl. Doc., Senate, 3 December 2013 (Stemmingen in verband met het Voorstel van wet van de leden 
Schouw en De Wit tot wijziging van het Wetboek van Strafrecht in verband met het laten vervallen van het 
verbod op godslastering). 
162 Staatsblad, 2014, no. 39 (Wet van 23 januari 2014 tot wijziging van het Wetboek van Strafrecht in verband 
met het laten vervallen van het verbod op godslastering) (Bulletin of Acts and Decrees).
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such an extent that they were largely considered to be a hollow phrase in the 
Criminal Code.
In the decades that followed, instances of blasphemy did not really gain 
much attention in Dutch society at large until polemicist Theo van Gogh was 
murdered by a jihadist in 2004. Van Gogh, a “child” of the liberal mindset of 
the 1960s, was the victim of a puritanical ideology at odds with that liberal 
notion of free thought. Van Gogh’s murder was an extreme example of the 
values of liberal modernity colliding with those of religious puritanism in its 
Islamist form.
Roger Scruton (b. 1944) wrote in 2009: “Everything that happens in 
Holland is now closely watched by other European leaders, anxious to know 
where Europe itself is going.”163 But in a sense Scruton was too optimistic. 
What most European leaders did, in contrast to the European populations,164 
was cultivate the art of the ostrich. The ideology behind the murder of Theo 
van Gogh in 2004 was no different from the ideology of the murderers of 
the French journalists in 2015. So what you had to know to prevent the 2015 
killings at the Charlie Hebdo office could have been known for at least eleven 
years, namely that violent Islamists have declared war on secular freedoms, 
in particular the freedom freely to criticise religion and its historical 
symbols. This makes the subject of blasphemy highly topical for our time. 
The blasphemy ban introduced by Dutch Minister of Justice Donner in the 
1930s resurfaced in the first decennium of the twenty-first century. But with 
a significant difference: the implementation of blasphemy law by puritanical 
Christians did not challenge state sovereignty, the rule of law and the 
rejection of vigilante justice. What the jihadists of the twenty-first century 
re-introduced was the implementation of blasphemy laws by extrajudicial 
execution. Europe is still struggling with the question of how to respond.
With regard to the question of blasphemy laws, there are two general ways 
in which liberal multicultural nations can react to this new phenomenon. 
A state can have a welcoming attitude towards the legal suppression of 
163 Roger Scruton, “Free Speech in Europe,” in The American Spectator (May 2009) 41. See also Zachary 
Shore, Breeding Bin Ladens: America, Islam, and the Future of Europe (Baltimore, Mld.:The Johns 
Hopkins University Press, 2006), 3: “The Dutch case symbolized the social tensions mounting 
across Europe between a burgeoning young, religious Muslim population, on the one hand, and a 
fearful, secular, ethnic European populace, on the other.”
164 See the analyses of Malika Sorel-Sutter, Décomposition française: comment en est-on arrivé là? Paris: 
Fayard, 2015) and Dominique Reynié, Les nouveaux populismes (revised and expanded edn, Paris: 
Librairie Arthème Fayard/Pluriel, 2013 (2011)).
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blasphemy, perhaps as a sign of “multicultural etiquette,” perhaps as a—
futile?—attempt to prevent intercommunal strife, or perhaps—even more 
futile?—as a tool to prevent terrorist attacks. Such suppression of blasphemy 
can be done by enacting straightforward laws that target blasphemous 
utterances or via an extensive interpretation of laws against “incitement 
to hatred on religious grounds” and “defamation of a group of people on 
the basis of their religion.” Although seemingly innocuous, the last type of 
legislation can potentially develop into a resurgence of blasphemy laws. 
Second, a state can move in the opposite direction and revoke provisions 
that protect religion and religious symbols as such. The Dutch decided to do 
so by repealing their crippled blasphemy law in 2014.
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5 Death of a Princess
 Paul Cliteur, Laetitia Houben & Michelle Slimmen*
IntrOductIOn
On 7 January 2015, during a meeting of the editors of the French satirical 
magazine Charlie Hebdo, two theoterrorists, Saïd and Chérif Kouachi, broke 
into the Charlie Hebdo office and killed those who were present: Charb, Cabu, 
Wolinski, Tignous, Honoré, Esla Cayat, Mustapha Qurrad, Bernard Maris, 
Michel Renaud, Frédéric Bousseau, Frack Brinsolaro and Ahmed Merabet.1 
The assault on Charlie Hebdo ignited a worldwide discussion on the meaning 
and significance of free speech, and in particular on the question of whether 
this principle is adequately protected in European nation states.
On 11 January four million protesters raised their voices against the 
atrocities that had befallen Paris. Forty-three heads of state were present 
during the demonstration (which is, as Bernard-Henri Lévy astutely 
remarked, one quarter of the United Nations).2
The attack on Charlie Hebdo was not the first of its kind. The French 
terrorist assault resembles the murder of the Dutch filmmaker Theo van 
Gogh in 2004,3 but it also resembles the terrorist intimidation of the Danish 
*  For preliminary research on this matter we are greatly indebted to Maurits Helmich, Henk Suèr and 
Prof. Mr. E.C.M. Jurgens.
1 Jacques Attali et al., Nous sommes Charlie: 60 Écrivains unis pour la liberté d’expression (Paris: Les 
Livre de Poche, 2015), 9.
2 Bernard-Henri Lévy, “Ce qui restera du janvier”, in ibid., 91–96.
3 Paul Cliteur, “Godslastering en zelfcensuur na de moord op Theo van Gogh”, in Nederlands 
Juristenblad 45 (2004), 17 December 2004, 2328-2335.
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cartoonist Kurt Westergaard4 and the British author Salman Rushdie.5 
It seems that conservative Islamist regimes and movements have great 
difficulty with free speech, especially when it comes to religious satire. 
Islamist terrorist movements do not agree with John Milton’s famous words: 
“let truth and falsehood grapple.”6 They prefer to cut the grappling short by 
terminating the discussion with a Kalashnikov.
In this chapter we want to go back in time and reflect on one of the earliest 
manifestations of this conflict between religious fundamentalism and free 
speech, namely the airing of the film Death of a Princess (1980), a dramatised 
documentary about the execution of a Saudi princess who was accused of 
adultery. This was one of the first large-scale attempts to stifle freedom of 
speech in European nation states on the ground that the contents of the 
film would be offensive to religious believers. But the “religious factor” is 
not all that interests us in this chapter; we will also study the way in which 
theocratic dictatorships try to exert pressure on liberal democracies. In the 
case of Death of a Princess these were not the terrorist techniques that would 
become common in later years (namely, intimidating writers with violence), 
but strategies such as threatening to institute economic boycotts and other 
measures. Nevertheless, the similarities between the pressure exerted in 
Death of a Princess and later events like the Cartoon Affair, the Rushdie 
Affair7 and the assault on Charlie Hebdo are sufficiently striking to justify a 
comparison.
The controversy around the Death of a Princess film raises many questions. 
Do the examples cited show a common pattern? Is it likely that we will see 
more of these confrontations in our time? And if so, how should liberal 
democracies react to this challenge? Are they up to this confrontation? Or is it 
4 Kurt Westergaard, and John Lykkegaard, Kurt Westergaard: The Man behind the Mohammed Cartoon 
(Tilsit: Mine Erindringer, 2012).
5 Salman Rushdie, Joseph Anton: A Memoir (London: Jonathan Cape, 2012); Brian Winston, The 
Rushdie Fatwa and After (Palgrave Macmillan, 2014).
6 “Though all the winds of doctrine were let loose to play upon the earth, so Truth be in the field, 
we do injuriously, by licensing and prohibiting, to misdoubt her strength. Let her and falsehood 
grapple; who ever knew Truth put to the worse in a free and open encounter?”. See John Milton, 
Areopagitica (1644), in: John Milton, Complete Poems and Major Prose (ed. with notes and 
introduction by Merritt Y. Hughes, Indianapolis: Hackett Publishing Company, 2003 (1957)), 746.
7 Paul Cliteur, “Van Rushdie tot Jones: over geweld en uitingsvrijheid”, in Afshin Ellian, Gelijn Molier 
and Tom Zwart (eds), Mag ik dit zeggen? Beschouwingen over de vrijheid van meningsuiting (The 
Hague: Boom Juridische Uitgevers, 2011), 67-89.
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more likely that, in a new world with open borders and unprecedented digital 
opportunities to take messages all over the globe, freedom of expression has 
to be recalibrated? Is there perhaps something to say for whittling down free 
speech out of respect for cultural differences?
Western democracies seem deeply divided on this issue.8 On the one hand 
there are those who proclaim that a lack of solidarity with the cartoonists of 
Charlie Hebdo is a sort of “Munich of the mind” (Munich de la pensée) that 
will only lead us deeper into the quagmire.9 On the other hand there are 
those who think that compromise in this matter is the only thing that can 
help us in this new predicament.10
In Western liberal democracies the idea is often heard that the Saudi 
monarchy will change its ways in the foreseeable future. Is that really what 
we should expect? Or is it more likely that the increasing interdependence 
of nation states will cause Saudi Arabian standards to become more common 
in Europe and in the rest of the Western world than was the case in previous 
decades?
We will also address the moral legitimacy of the sort of criticism the film 
seems to attract. Is it fair to criticise the Saudi government for its handling 
of this cultural conflict? Should we not see the matter more “in context”?11
In this chapter we will highlight the particulars of this largely forgotten 
story of the Saudi princess and assess the relevance of that event for the 
contemporary debate about the threat that terrorism poses to the culture of 
freedom, and in particular to one of its most remarkable manifestations: the 
principle of freedom of expression. 
8 See, e.g., Kevin Barrett (ed.), We are not Charlie Hebdo! Free thinkers question the French 9/11, (Lone 
Rock: Sifting and Winnowing Books, 2015), comprising a series of articles all critical about the 
French attitude towards civil liberties and religious criticism. For a splendid defence of Charlie 
Hebdo see Caroline Fourest, Eloge du blasphème (Paris: Bernard Grasset, 2015); Philippe Val, Malaise 
dans l’inculture (Paris: Bernard Grasset, 2015).
9 Philippe Claudel, “Je suis Charlie mais un peu tard”, in Jacques Attali et al., Nous sommes Charlie: 60 
Écrivains unis pour la liberté d’expression (Paris: Les Livre de Poche, 2015), 32–35.
10 This is, e.g., the position of the Dutch–American journalist Ian Buruma: see Ian Buruma, “Charlie 
and Theo”, in Project Syndicate: the World’s Opinion Page, 15 January 2015.
11 This was one of the most trenchant critiques by the famous literary scholar Edward Said: see 
Edward W. Said, Covering Islam: How the Media and the Experts determine how we see the Rest of the 
World (London: Vintage, 1997). 
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what the fIlm was aBOut
Death of a Princess is a documentary based on the true story of Princess 
Masha’il Bint Fahd Al Saud (1958–1977), a 19-year-old Saudi Princess who 
was, together with her lover, publicly executed for adultery, which was (and 
is) a capital offence in Saudi Arabia. She was the granddaughter of Prince 
Mohammed bin Abdulaziz (1910–1988), an elder brother of the Saudi king 
Khalid bin Abdulaziz Al Saud (1913–1982). She was executed, together with 
her boyfriend, at the instigation of her own grandfather. Since it is unclear 
whether there was a fair trial (by Saudi standards),12 her death may also be 
construed as an “honour killing,” one that took place in the most prestigious 
of circles.
The film is based on interviews by Antony Thomas (b. 1940). Initially, 
Thomas wanted to make a documentary, but he soon realised that this 
was impossible due to the fact that most interviewees required to remain 
anonymous. So he decided to make a fictionalised version, or rather a “film 
on the film” he had wanted to make. The characters in the film are played 
by actors, not by the real people who provided input and information for the 
original film.
Thomas himself is played by the actor Paul Freeman (b. 1943), who in 
the film goes under the name of Christopher Ryder. Another important 
character in the film is Elsa Gruber (played by Judy Parfitt), whose character 
is based on Rosemarie Buschow, a German teacher who worked for the royal 
family and who wrote a book about her experiences.13
Not only do the characters in the film remain anonymous, but the name 
of the princess, whose death is the focus of the whole drama, is also not 
mentioned. There is only one photograph of the princess, allegedly taken a 
day before her execution. Little is known about her. She has been more or 
less filtered out of history, like Stalin did with Trotsky.
What interests us here is primarily the discussion that ignited when the 
film was launched, or rather the lack of a serious moral analysis of what had 
12 Thomas White and Gladys Ganley, “The ‘Death of a Princess’ Controversy”, Program on Information 
Resources Policy (Cambridge, Mass.: Center for Information Research, Harvard University, 1983), 
9. In Saudi Arabia, someone can be convicted of adultery after accusations from four different 
witnesses or when he/she confesses four times. See Jeffrey K. Walker, “The Rights of the Accused 
in Saudi Criminal Procedure”, in Loyola of Los Angeles International and Comparative Law Journal 15 
(1992–1993) 863, at 876–877. 
13 Rosemarie Buschow, The Prince & I (London: Futura Publications Limited, 1979).
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happened: the execution of a young couple for no other reason than that 
they loved each other. The film was aired in England on 9 January 1980; in 
the Netherlands on 16 April 1980; in the United States on 12 June 1980; 
and in Israel on 12 June 1980. When the film was aired in England, much 
discussion arose immediately.14 The same pattern occurred in the United 
States. Major Anglo-American oil company Mobil Oil tried to exert pressure 
in order to oppose further distribution “in the light of what is in the best 
interest of the United States,”15 and the Secretary of State seemed to voice 
concern about whether PBS (Public Broadcasting Service, an American non-
commercial broadcaster) was to broadcast the film. It seems that commercial 
interests are more important than criticising practices that are opposed to 
fundamental values.
a preVIew Of cOntempOrary deBates
Many of the debates on the role of religious fundamentalism, so familiar to 
us since 9/11 2001, the murder of Theo van Gogh on 2 November 2004 and 
the attack on Charlie Hebdo on 7 January 2015, are foreshadowed in Death 
of a Princess. The film provides an excellent introduction to the discussion 
on this topic. In the film, Samira says about the Saudi ruling class: “These 
people pervert Islam. They use Islam. They scare people to death with 
their barbarous, illegal punishments.” We quote this passage because this 
is basically what we also hear from President Obama and former Prime 
Minister David Cameron nowadays in similar discussions. Those statements 
are based on the presumption that religion, in its most basic nature, is good. 
And if there is something bad seemingly connected with religion, this is 
apparently not religious.16 Based on this concept of religion, Samira can say 
about Saudi Arabia: “This isn’t a Muslim country.”
14 See on this Aart Brouwer and Margreet Fogteloo, “Het imago van Nederland geschaad?”, in De 
Groene Amsterdammer, 24 March 2010.
15 See Mobil’s advertisement in the New York Times: “A new fairy tale”, in New York Times, 8 May 
1980, A35. In the advertisement Mobil expresses the “hope that the management of the Public 
Broadcasting Service will review its decision to run this film.”
16 See for a more elaborate explanation of this view Paul Cliteur, “Is Humanism Too Optimistic? An 
Analysis of Religion as Religion”, in Andrew Copson and A.C. Grayling (eds), The Wiley Blackwell 
Handbook of Humanism (Chichester: Wiley Blackwell, 2015), 374–403.
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In other words, the execution of the princess has nothing to do with 
Islam, according to Samira. But she goes further. She also asserts that the 
people who killed the princess are “no Muslims,” at least that seems to be 
implied in Samira’s statement that Saudi Arabia is not a Muslim country.
In the film we also see how Antony Thomas is first introduced to the story. 
There was a British guest worker who was hired to perform some construction 
work.17 He was brought in because the Saudis are so tremendously rich that 
hardly anyone has to work there. The construction worker, “Steven Jackson,” 
was informed that there was an execution pending. So he mixed with the 
locals and followed the stream. Subsequently, he witnessed the execution of 
someone who later turned out to be the princess and comments: “It’s funny, 
isn’t it, straight out of church and off to see a bloke get chopped.” Jackson also 
gives some sober cultural relativist commentary. In their eyes, he explains, 
what the Saudi princess has done is just as serious as murder. “It’s against 
their laws, you know. They’re dead set in their ways.”
centurIes BehInd
Ryder gets a similar comment from Elsa Gruber (the character based on the 
“real” nanny Buschow),18 who says: “Why do you keep picking on those 
people? Their only crime is that they are living centuries behind us. They 
have different things, and we have different things.”
17 This is still common practice, as appears in a recent row about this topic. The Dutch politician 
Geert Wilders criticised Saudi Arabia for its human rights record. Subsequently the Dutch 
government glossed over the situation and called upon Wilders to remain calm, once again because 
of economic interests. Someone teaching “international relations” at the King Fahd University in 
Dhahran in Saudi Arabia, Tiest Sondaal, criticised the politician because of his critical statements 
on the Saudi Kingdom: see Tiest Sondaal, “Wilders zet mijn werkvisum in Saoedi-Arabië op het 
spel”, in De Volkskrant, 20 May 2014. Sondaal knows that Saudi Arabia is not a democracy “in our 
eyes,” but he does mention efforts made to reform the country. He also speaks of “a dialogue” that 
is being held on this topic. Due to the criticism of Saudi Arabia he could possibly lose his “work 
visa,” Sondaal complains, and this could be awkward for an exporting country like the Netherlands. 
Minister Timmermans and Deputy Prime Minister Asscher firmly rejected Wilders’s criticism of 
Saudi Arabia (see “Kabinet hekelt anti-islamactie”, NOS, 19 December 2013). So even without the 
cabinet taking any position on the matter, Saudi Arabia threatened to boycott Dutch companies. 
(“Saoedische boycot van Nederlandse bedrijven valt mee”, ANP, 25 July 2014).
18 See on her Emily Hahn, “A Nanny in Arabia”, in the New York Times, 8 February 1981.
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What makes this argument intriguing is the curious combination of 
cultural relativism and universalism.19 On the one hand, Gruber rejects 
Ryder’s moralistic comment on the execution of the Princess and her lover. 
On the other hand, she makes the observation that Saudi Arabia is “behind 
us.” That last judgement presupposes a standard, a yardstick to measure 
progress. In other words, Gruber cannot be a consistent relativist. The 
dominant tenor, though, seems to be relativistic: “When in Rome, do as the 
Romans do.” 
According to the cultural relativist, there are no universal values, such as 
the United Nations proclaimed to have found and enshrined in the Universal 
Declaration of Human Rights (1948).20 Who are we to criticise their values? 
The only valid yardstick we can use to judge values is a measure derived 
from the culture itself, never an external yardstick.21After all, Saudi Arabia 
promised to guarantee human rights and fundamental freedoms as a United 
Nations member.22 It is clear that it based those promises on different 
standards and values from Western countries. If you want to criticise 
beheading as a punishment for blasphemy, you do not refer to the amendment 
to the American constitution that prohibits “cruel and unusual punishment,” 
but you consult the Quran and see if you find anything there about “mercy” 
and “justice.”23 This approach was already perfectly internalised by the 
mother of Israeli-American journalist Steven Sotloff (1983–2014). Sotloff 
was beheaded by IS around 2 September 2014 in the Syrian desert. On 
27 August 2014, Sotloff’s mother issued a video message begging the 
19 Universalism is the view “that moral rules apply to everyone, regardless of time and space.” See Dan 
Greenberg, and Thomas H. Tobiason, “The New Legal Puritanism of Catharine MacKinnon”, in Ohio 
State Law Journal, 54 (1993) 1275, at 1421.
20 Michael Freeman, “Universality, Diversity and Difference: Culture and Human Rights”, in Michael 
Freeman, Human Rights: An Interdisciplinary Approach (Cambridge: Polity, 2003), 101–131; P.R. 
Baehr, “Hoe universeel zijn mensenrechten”, in Civis Mundi, Universaliteit van mensenrechten, 32 
(1993) 47.
21 Martin Gardner, “Beyond Cultural Relativism”, in Martin Gardner, The Night is Large. Collected 
Essays 1938–1995 (London: Penguin Books, 1996), 149–161.
22 Mary Carter Duncan, “Playing by their Rules: the Death Penalty and Foreigners in Saudi Arabia”, in 
Georgia Journal of International & Comparative Law 27 (1998–1999) 231, at 240.
23 As Brian Whitaker writes: “For the vast majority of Muslims worldwide – not only extremists or 
conservatives, but also those who consider themselves moderate or progressive – determining 
whether a particular practice is acceptable hinges on deciding whether or not it is legitimately 
‘islamic’”: see Brian Whitaker, “Mutual Friends: Secularism and Islam”, in The Guardian, 14 April 
2009.
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“caliph” to spare her son. The mother refers to the Islamic tradition and to 
the Quran. Apparently she realises that appealing to common decency will 
not impress the new ruler. Now this is what may be called “cultural relativist 
discourse.” In this discourse it is often expected that Western countries are 
tolerant towards non-Western traditions. What is not expected is reciprocity. 
In the case of Death of a Princess, instead of disapproving and rejecting the 
execution of the princess in accordance with Saudi law, the discussion that 
ignited in Western countries was about whether or not the film should be 
screened, all for the sake of economic relations. Instead of proclaiming that 
Saudi Arabia should respect several universal rights (freedom of speech, 
but also the right to life), Western governments detracted from their own 
principles and fundamental human rights. They did so in the first place by 
neglecting to uphold the right to freedom of speech and in the second place 
by not condemning what had happened to the princess, which ought to be 
considered a violation of human rights. 
Gruber does the same. But her cultural relativist discourse is contradictorily 
followed by her statement that “they are centuries behind,” using exactly the 
kind of external yardstick mentioned above. Does this explain why we do 
not expect mutual tolerance from non-Western traditions? How could you 
possibly expect a culture to be tolerant towards other cultures when the first 
is considered to be “centuries behind”? 
tOugh laws haVe theIr adVantages
Although the film was presented in the Arab world as insultingly negative 
about Arab culture, there are many characters in the film who defend 
Arab culture instead. That is the case with Ms. Quataajy, a lady who runs 
a beauty parlour. She combines some traditionalistic ideas with modernist 
convictions. She also thinks the princess had brought it all on herself. Should 
she not have known what would befall her? 
This is an argument we have heard time and again about Rushdie, 
Westergaard, the Parisian cartoonists, Lars Vilks and many others who 
incurred the wrath of the Islamic theoterrorists.24 We also heard it after 
24 As Roald Dahl said about Rushdie: “He knew exactly what he was doing and cannot plead 
otherwise.” Quoted in Ibn Warraq, Virgins? What Virgins? And Other Essays (Amherst, NY: 
Prometheus Books, 2010), 32.
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the killing of Theo van Gogh. He knew what he was doing, did he not?25 
Note that there is a distinction between those cases and the death of the 
Saudi princess. She knew the penalty that was imposed for adultery, so she 
indeed literally knew what would befall her, whereas the acts of Rushdie, 
Westergaard and Vilks are completely legal in their countries of residence. 
However, the fact that the princess knew the consequences of her deed does 
not justify the inhumanly severe penalty that she and her lover suffered for 
the simple fact of loving each other.
This blaming the victim vision is, in fact, similar to the argument Mobil 
Oil used in trying to persuade the American Public Broadcasting Service to 
cancel the airing of Death of a Princess: “We all know that in the U.S., our 
Constitution guarantees a free and unfettered press. However, implicit in 
that guarantee is the obligation on the part of the press to be responsible.”26 
Responsible, yes. But what is “irresponsible” about highlighting the cruel 
death of a young woman who did nothing but choose to live her own life? Is 
it not a moral imperative for all of us, including Mobil Oil, to voice protest 
against the atrocious acts that are portrayed in Death of a Princess? There 
is, of course, the commercial liberty to trade with countries that are not 
democracies, countries that do not subscribe to exactly the same principles 
as Western liberal nation-states. But that does not mean that Mobil Oil does 
not have any “responsibility” to call a spade a spade when it comes to gross 
violations of human rights and the infringement of the principles for which 
countless generations of political philosophers27 and social activists have 
fought.28
25 See for an analysis of this Theodor Holman, Theo is dood (foreword by Gijs van de Westelaken, 
Amsterdam: Mets en Schilt, 2006); Max Pam, Het bijenspook: over dier, mens en god (Amsterdam: 
Prometheus, 2009). Exponents of the claim that Van Gogh had brought the violence on himself 
(comparable to the insinuations by Brandpunt on Vilks) are Geert Mak in his Gedoemd tot 
kwetsbaarheid (Amsterdam/Antwerp: Uitgeverij Atlas, 2005) and Ian Buruma in Murder in 
Amsterdam: The Death of Theo van Gogh and the Limits of Tolerance (New York: Penguin, 2006).
26 Mobil’s advertisement in the New York Times: “A new fairy tale”, in New York Times, 8 May 1980, A35.
27 Spinoza, Locke, Voltaire, Diderot, Mill, Clifford, Russell and others.
28 Such as the feminist scholar Susan Moller Okin (1946–2003): see Susan Moller Okin, “Feminism 
and Multiculturalism: Some Tensions”, in Ethics, July 1998 (108), 661; Susan Moller Okin, Is 
Multiculturalism Bad for Women?, ed. Joshua Cohen, Matthew Howard and Martha Nussbaum, 
Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1999); Susan Moller Okin, Women in Western Political 
Thought (introduction by Debra Satz, Princeton, NJ/Oxford: Princeton University Press, 1979).
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One of the mysteries of this topic is that not only the representatives of 
corporations but also journalists are pestering actual or potential victims of 
theoterrorist violence with the question whether they did not bring all this 
on themselves.
A case in point was an episode of the Dutch TV programme Brandpunt 
(“focal point”) about the Swedish artist Lars Vilks, broadcast on 10 March 
2015. The title that was chosen for the episode was Een bewegend doelwit 
(“a moving target”).29 But sometimes the network adopts a different title 
for it: De verantwoordelijkheid van Lars Vilks (“The responsibility of Lars 
Vilks”). Both the Dutch programme’s titles give us some information about 
its content.
The “moving target” refers to the fact that the Swedish artist Lars Vilks, 
ever since he was chosen as a target by Al Qaida in 2007, has to constantly 
“be on the move.” As the artist explains in the documentary, a “moving 
target” is difficult to hit, so from a security perspective moving around is very 
effective. From a human perspective, though, this implies that he has hardly 
any life left. He cannot use his studio, for instance. This is an enormous 
nuisance for the artist.
The second title refers to the opinion not of the artist himself but of the 
interviewer, Frenk van der Linden. It speaks of the “responsibility” of the 
artist. The idea is—and Van der Linden had the nerve to ask this openly—
whether the artist was not personally responsible for this predicament. He 
asked if it was worth it, apparently referring to the precarious situation the 
artist found himself in.
Another insinuating but totally vacuous question by the interviewer was 
whether Vilks’s cartoons “had made the world safer.” The implication was, 
apparently, that art had to make the world safer.
Vilks answered all the questions diligently and without losing his temper. 
Nevertheless, the end of the “interview” was hugely embarrassing. Vilks left 
in his car for an unknown destination with people from the security service, 
and Van der Linden went back to his own country, the Netherlands, after 
having asked his questions of a man marked for death by theoterrorists, 
desperately trying to uphold the artistic freedom to create the kind of art 
he wants to create, even if that displeases theoterrorist murderers. Would 
Van der Linden also have dared to ask the victims in the Parisian Jewish 
29 Available at: http://www.npo.nl/brandpunt/10-03-2015/KN_1667660/WO_KRO_809058 (accessed 
at 24 August 2016).
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supermarket whether “being Jewish” was not a “provocation” for the 
terrorists?30
But let us return to Death of a Princess. Ms. Quataajy combines her 
comment with some nationalistic remarks about Saudi Arabia. “We are strict 
here, not like your country, where burglars can come into your home and kill 
you and rob you and get the lightest punishment, where you can’t walk in the 
street for fear of rape. We’re safe here.”
It is an interesting point. It may be a fallacy, but it is still interesting. Ms. 
Quataajy wants us to believe that if you act ruthlessly against burglars and 
rapists this will have a positive effect on the crime rate. And she makes it 
seem as if accepting execution for adultery is a necessity for an adequate 
policy to discourage burglary and rape. But, we may reply, the execution of 
the princess was about love and had nothing to do with burglary or rape. The 
“sins” of the princess were only that she loved another man and planned to 
decide what to do with her life. The film does not criticise Saudi Arabia in 
general, or the penal sanctions on burglary and rape in relation to Western 
standards. What the film comments on is:
- Cruel and unusual punishment
- Punishing a person for something that may be considered a basic human 
right (namely free choice of your partner)
- Forced marriage
- The rights of women in general
One of the most astonishing features of the whole discussion about the 
film is that hardly anyone addressed the issues mentioned above. It may be 
strange, if not unbelievable, to say this, but the discussion about the film 
did not reflect the issues addressed in the film. When Sheik Mohammed Al 
Zamel (as he was called in the film) was asked to express his view on the 
execution, he answered: “That’s our law. We don’t turn a blind eye to certain 
excesses of our royal family, as others do, but we are nevertheless human. 
Can you imagine the prince’s distress? Not only the death of his favourite 
granddaughter, but the vilest publicity.”
Many claims are made in this short commentary. First he offers the 
argument that this is their law. As a point of factual comment, this cannot be 
30 Amedy Coulibaly (1982–2015) was the hostage-taker and gunman in the Porte Vincennes hostage 
crisis in the Jewish supermarket in which he killed four hostages. He was a close friend of Saïd and 
Chérif Kouachi, the gunmen in the Charlie Hebdo shooting. He synchronised his attacks with the 
Kouachi brothers. 
122 THE FALL AND RISE OF BLASPHEMY LAW
denied. But laws can be evil laws, can they not? The sheik further elaborates 
on this with the contention that they do not turn a blind eye to their royal 
family’s excesses. Apparently, the message he tries to get across is that even 
the royal family can be criticised, which is certainly not true (at least not in 
the sense that one can do this unpunished). And instead of debunking the 
harmful honour code of the patriarchal Saudi society, he solicits some sort 
of pity we are supposed to feel for the prince. It is not the princess, who was 
beheaded, who deserves our concern, but the prince whose pride was hurt. 
Or the royal family because of the “vilest publicity” they were subjected to.
There even seems to be a hint of equal protection before the law in the 
quotation, because he seems to insinuate that even princesses are punished 
if they violate the law (like ordinary humans). Apparently even in Saudi 
Arabia they have a rule of law and not of men.31 The truth is that the Al-Saud 
family is so powerful that it decides whether to apply or disregard the law.32
there Is nO lInk wIth Islam
One of the most precarious questions is, of course: “What does this have 
to do with Islam?” Is the execution of the princess and her lover somehow 
mandated by Islam?33
This is the central question scholars, politicians and believers themselves 
have been struggling with from the moment radical manifestations of 
religion presented themselves on the world scene. 
31 One tends to forget that the “rule of law” has importance only when the “law” has a moral quality. 
See on this Lon L. Fuller, The Morality of Law (revised edn, New Haven, CT/London: Yale University 
Press, 1978 (1964)). So it is dubious whether the execution of the princess can ever be based on 
“law” in the sense Fuller delineates that concept.
32 An extremely critical view of Saudi Arabia is Laurent Murawiec, Princes of Darkness: The Saudi 
Assault on the West (trans. George Holoch from the French, Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield 
Publishers, 2005). Less critical (but with much information) is Karen Elliott House, On Saudi 
Arabia: Its People, Past, Religion, Fault Lines – and Future (New York: Vintage Books, Random House, 
2013).
33 A more general debate on religion and violence is Rudyard Griffiths (ed.), Hitchens vs. Blair: Be it 
resolved Religion is a Force for Good in the World, The Munk Debate on Religion, 26 November 2010 
(Toronto: Anansi, 2011). Whether Islam is a religion of peace or not is discussed in John Donvan 
(moderator), “Islam is a religion of peace”, A debate between Zeba Khan and Maajid Nawaz against 
Ayaan Hirsi Ali and Douglas Murray, in Intelligence Squared U.S., 6 October, 2010.
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But at the same time, it is one of the great taboos, and not many scholars 
dare to discuss this topic freely, at least not with the contention that indeed 
there is a connection between religion and violence. There are two basic 
stances we can take here.
Stance I: theoterrorism has nothing to do with Islam as a religion. Stance 
II: it has everything to do with Islam.34
When we compare Death of a Princess with other recent controversial films 
about Islamic tenets, like Submission (2004),35 An interview with Mohammed 
(2008),36 Fitna (2008),37 and Innocence of Muslims (2012),38 there is a 
remarkable difference in the sense that nowhere in Death of a Princess is 
Islam somehow held responsible for the execution. It is mainly Arab culture, 
or Arab culture as interpreted by those in power, that is held responsible. 
34 This is what Islam scholar Robert Spencer has argued for in Robert Spencer, The Politically Incorrect 
Guide to Islam and the Crusades (Washington, DC: Regnery Publishing, Inc., 2005). See for a similar 
point of view Anne-Marie Delcambre, L’Islam des Interdits (Paris: Desclée de Brouwer, 2003); Anne-
Marie Delcambre, L’Islam (Paris: La Découverte, 2004); Anne-Marie Delcambre, La Schizophrénie 
de l’Islam (Paris: Desclée de Brouwer, 2006); Anne-Marie Delcambre, Mahomet: La parole d’Allah 
(Paris: Éditions Gallimard, 2009).
35 A film by Theo van Gogh († 2004) and Ayaan Hirsi Ali. In almost all accounts of the death of Van 
Gogh, this film is identified as the reason Mohammed Bouyeri decided to kill him. The murderer 
himself has always denied this. See on the film Ayaan Hirsi Ali, Submission. “Zomergasten” 
programme of 29 August 2004; Betsy Udink (Amsterdam: Uitgeverij Augustus, 2004).
36 Ehsan Jami is the author of Het recht om ex-moslim te zijn (Amsterdam: Ten Have, 2007), but he 
also made a film: “An Interview With Muhammed,” posted on the internet on 9 December 2008. 
The Ministry of Foreign Affairs issued a declaration on this film: “Verklaring van de Nederlandse 
regering inzake de film van Jami”, Ministerie van Buitenlandse Zaken, 9 December 2008, www.
minbuza.nl.
37 Film by Geert Wilders from 2008. Many people argued prior to the screening of the film that this 
had to be prohibited by the government. See Theo Koelé, “Kabinet moet Fitna verbieden”, in De 
Volkskrant, 26 March 2008. European heads of state took up positions on the film without having 
seen it: Petra de Koning, “Eu-landen wijzen ‘fitna’ af”, in NRC Handelsblad, 29 March 2008. The 
term “fitna” means disorder: see Gilles Kepel, Fitna: Guerre au coeur de l’islam (Paris: Gallimard, 
2004).
38 This is only a fragment of a film posted on the internet. It caused great turmoil and was, allegedly, 
the cause of the death of the American ambassador in Libya, Chris Stevens. See Tom Herrenberg, 
“Politici, de vrijheid van meningsuiting en Innocence of Muslims”, in Nederlands Juristenblad, 
24 September 2013, 2255–2259. See also Tom Herrenberg, “Denouncing Divinity: Blasphemy, 
Human Rights, and the Struggle of Political Leaders to defend Freedom of Speech in the Case of 
Innocence of Muslims”, in Ancilla Iuris (2015), 1-19.
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There is a figure in the film, Samira, who even says: “This isn’t a Muslim 
country. These people pervert Islam. They use Islam. They scare people to 
death with their barbarous illegal punishments. That is not the way with 
Islam. A woman is nobody’s property in Islam. There is no veil in Islam.”
That brings us to the question, of course, what is Islam? How do you 
establish what belongs to a religion and what does not? Do we have to look 
in the Quran to find the prescribed punishment for adultery? Do we have to 
listen to the ulema and how they interpret these verses? Do we have to look 
at the stories about the Prophet? Or do we have to consult sharia law?39
The most central question, perhaps, is: “Is there room for interpretation?”40 
Is it perhaps—partly or wholly—“up to us” what we want to see as the 
essence of Islam? Can you say, if you do not like a certain practice, “This has 
nothing to do with Islam”?41
This is what Samira does in the film. She is quite insistent on this. She 
says: “The way they applied the law in that girl’s case has nothing to do with 
Islam.” If you take this comment seriously it may be possible to say that the 
Saudi government is not an Islamic government. And this is, indeed, the 
conclusion Samira draws. She says: “This autocratic regime has nothing to 
do with Islamic thought, feeling or ideology. Islam is democratic. There are 
no kings in Islam. The Quran says that the leaders must be elected by the 
people and that the people have the right to criticise them.” Samira speaks of 
a movement that ought to bring Saudi society back to Islam. She speculates 
that the murdered princess could be part of a movement because many 
believe she was caught on purpose. She fled disguised as a man instead of 
39 Nuh Ha Mim Keller, Reliance of the Traveller (rev. edn, The Classic Manual of Islamic Sacred 
Law ‘Umdat al-Salik by Ahmad ibn Naqib al-Misri (d. 769–1368) in Arabic with Facing English 
Text, Commentary, and Appendices (ed. and trans. Nuh Ha Mim Keller, Beltsville, Mld.: Amana 
Publications, 1994 (1991)). See on sharia also Bassam Tibi, Political Islam, World Politics and Europe: 
Democratic Peace and Euro-Islam versus Global Jihad (London/New York: Routledge, 2008).
40 According to some authors there is much leeway for interpretation. See, e.g., Abdullahi An-Na’im, 
Islam and the Secular State: Negotiating the Future of Shari’a (Cambridge, Mass./London: Harvard 
University Press, 2008); Irshad Manji, The Trouble with Islam: A Muslim’s Call for Reform in Her Faith 
(New York: St. Martin’s Press, 2003).
41 See on this A.C. Grayling, Against all Gods: Six Polemics on Religion and an Essay on Kindness (London: 
Oberon Books, 2007); A.C. Grayling, To Set Prometheus Free: Essays on Religion, Reason and Humanity 
(London: Oberon Masters, 2009); A.C. Grayling, The God Argument: The Case against Religion and for 
Humanism (London: Bloomsbury, 2013).
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wearing a fully covering veil, which would have made her unrecognisable, so 
that she probably would have been able to escape successfully.
This statement (namely that certain deplorable practices, such as 
terrorist attacks, have nothing to do with Islam) has often been made by 
Western governments. Terrorism and extremism have nothing to do with 
Islam, according to Obama or Cameron.42 It is a puzzling contention. Would 
it not come closer to the truth to say that it does not have everything to do 
with Islam but that at the same time it is also difficult to maintain that 
Islamism (as a politico-religious ideology)43 has nothing to do with Islam (as a 
religion)?44 It cannot be denied, in any case, that certain practices are based 
on Islamic writings, so it certainly has something to do with Islam. What kind 
of Islam, is perhaps more difficult to determine. The fact that it concerns an 
interpretation of Islam that is denied by a large number of other Muslims 
should be clear, just as that it is only a small number that have hijacked the 
religion.45 But it remains a troubling factor that certain passages from the 
Quran are cited time and again. And not texts that advocate human rights, 
but the so-called sword verses.46 Nevertheless, after the attack on Charlie 
Hebdo, Muslims worldwide expressed their disapproval.47 This assault 
might not be due to Islam, but to a fundamentalist view of Islam. In the 
case of Death of a Princess, the execution was based on a violation of the 
Saudi government’s interpretation of Islamic law, based on the Quran and 
the traditions of the Prophet.
42 “Het zijn geen moslims, maar monsters. Britse premier zegt dat IS moet worden vernietigd, 
Arabische landen willen VS helpen bombarderen,” in De Volkskrant 15 September 2014.
43 See for the distinction between Islam and Islamism: Bassam Tibi, Islamism and Islam (New Haven, 
CT/London: Yale University Press, 2012); Bassam Tibi, Political Islam, World Politics and Europe: 
Democratic Peace and Euro-Islam versus Global Jihad (London/New York: Routledge, 2008).
44 There is a recent criticism of Islam that holds that it is not a “religion” but should be considered 
a political ideology. See for this Geert Wilders, “Defending the West from Cultural Relativism 
and Jihad”, Annual Lecture of the Magna Carta Foundation in Rome, 25 March 2011, in American 
Thinker, 26 March 2011; Geert Wilders, Marked for Death: Islam’s War Against the West and Me 
(Washington, DC: Regnery Publishing, Inc., 2012).
45 Paul Cliteur, “Vrijheid van Expressie na Charlie”, in Nederlands Juristenblad, afl. 5, 6 February 2015.
46 This point is well made by Bahis Sedq, The Quran Speaks (Indianapolis, Ind.: Dog Ear Publishing, 
2013); Sam Harris, The End of Faith: Religion, Terror, and the Future of Reason (London: The Free 
Press, 2005 (2004)); Graeme Wood, “What is the Islamic State?”, in The Atlantic, March 2015, 79-
94; Graeme Wood, “What ISIS Really Wants: The Response”, in The Atlantic, 24 February 2015.
47 “Muslims Around The World Condemn Charlie Hebdo Attack”, in The Huffington Post, 7 January 
2015.
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twenty-fIVe years later
In 2005, twenty-five years after the first broadcast, the maker of the film, 
Antony Thomas, looked back. His idea was that the film was still topical. 
Small wonder, one might say; he was the maker. But he indicated that others 
also subscribed to this point of view. Ali Al-Samed, a Saudi activist, indicated 
that the position of women had not significantly changed since 1980, when 
the film was first aired. Then, women were veiled, as they are now. Then, 
women lived segregated from men, as they do now. Then, women were not 
allowed to drive cars; they are still not allowed to do so now. Then, women 
did not have the right to vote; and they cannot vote now. Then, women 
did not have a free choice in marriage; and they do not have it now. Then, 
people were beheaded for blasphemy, adultery, apostasy and similar penal 
offences, as they are now.48 Beheadings are noted and discussed today in 
Western media, but this is not because they are new, but because now it is 
also Americans and British that are beheaded.49 But what is the difference 
between beheading a princess in 1980 and doing the same with James Foley 
in 2014?
The bases on which these atrocities take place (the basis in worldview, 
ideology, legal code) are more similar than they may seem. In all these cases 
it is about blasphemy, apostasy, adultery, insubordination. In a political 
order where state and religion are intricately interwoven, every criticism of 
the political leadership is at the same time a form of blasphemy, with all the 
consequences connected to that status.50 Our case of the Saudi princess is 
also a form of blasphemy because adultery is against Islamic law. Committing 
it is thus a criticism of the political leadership.
The most recent case of Saudi suppression of free speech is the 
incarceration of the Saudi blogger Raif Badawi (b. 1984).51 In a series of blogs 
48 See on this Michiel Hegener, Vrijheid van godsdienst (Amsterdam/Antwerp: Uitgeverij Contact, 
2005); M. Hegener, “Vrijheid van godsdienst: afschaffen of beschermen?”, in H.M.A.E. van Ooijen, 
L.F. van Egmond, Q.A.M. Eijkman, F. Olujic, O.P.G. Vos. (eds)., Godsdienstvrijheid: afschaffen of 
beschermen? (Leiden: Stichting NJCM-Boekerij, Nr. 46, 2008), 109–119.
49 Some change in that process occurred after the murder of Lee Rigby in London. See Tony Blair, 
“The ideology behind Lee Rigby’s murder is profound and dangerous. We must take on this 
extremism”, in Mail on Sunday, 2 June 2013.
50 This is documented in Paul Marshall and Nina Shea, Silenced: How Apostasy and Blasphemy Codes are 
Choking Freedom Worldwide (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011).
51 “Lash and jail for Saudi web activist Raef Badawi”, in BBC News Middle East, 30 July 2013.
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he criticised theocracy and lack of freedom of thought in his home country, 
while advocating freethought, liberalism and secularism. After 2012 he was 
incarcerated by the regime and sentenced to 1,000 public whippings. On 
9 January 2015, he received the first fifty of these lashes, but at the moment 
of writing a worldwide campaign is being conducted to effect his release. A 
selection of his blogs has been translated into German.52
attempts tO Ban “death Of a prIncess” In the unIted kIngdOm 
and the unIted states
Now let us go back to the film, and more specifically the way it was 
received in Western countries. One might expect those countries to protect 
fundamental rights and confront Saudi Arabia with the violations of human 
rights addressed in the film. But did this happen?
On 9 April 1980, Death of a Princess was shown in Great Britain by 
ATV (Associated Television).53 Only two days later, on 11 April, the Saudi 
Embassy in London released a statement declaring the film an attack on 
the religion of Islam and on the way of life of Saudi Arabia.54 During the 
weeks following the broadcasting of the film, Saudi Arabia continuously 
put pressure on the British government.55 Although initially no steps were 
undertaken to smooth over the tensions between the two countries, Lord 
Carrington, the foreign secretary, eventually apologised publicly for the 
“deeply offensive” film and said he “wished it had never been shown.”56 
In the United States there seemed to be little commotion about the 
screening of the film at first. The Public Broadcasting Service stated on 
52 Badawi, Raif, 1000 Peitschenhiebe weil ich sage, was ich denke, Aus dem Arabischen von Sandra Hetzl, 
(Berlin: Ullstein, 2015).
53 R.D. Hershey Jr., “Film about Executed Princess Upsets British-Saudi Relations”, in New York Times, 
11 April 1980.
54 “‘Death of a Princess’, Drama-Documentary on Saudi Execution Which Provoked an International 
Incident, to Air on Public Television’s ‘World’ May 12”, Press Release, Public Broadcasting Service, 
11 April 1980.
55 “Regret Voiced for Saudi Film,” Facts on File World News Digest, 30 May 1980, 407 A3; “Concorde: 
Fast and Beautiful – But Costing a Bundle,” in The Christian Science Monitor, 21 May 1980, 5. 
56 “Regret Voiced for Saudi Film,” Facts on File World News Digest, 30 May 1980, 407 A3.
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11 April that the film would be shown in the United States.57 However, 
four days before the film was about to be broadcast, Mobil Oil Company 
protested against it. On 8 May 1980, it placed an advertisement in the 
New York Times, questioning Thomas’s artistic integrity. The advertisement 
suggested that freedom of speech was being abused for fiction presented as 
reality. As part of an oil producing partnership, Mobil Oil had a substantial 
interest in preserving a good relationship with Saudi Arabia.58 But Mobil 
Oil was also important to PBS for another reason: it was a financier of other 
kinds of programming. On 9 May the American Secretary of State sent a 
letter to the PBS president Lawrence Gosman, expressing his concerns about 
the possible consequences of the screening of the film.59 He emphasised 
that the government was not trying to exercise any type of censorship, but 
was simply expressing its concerns about the situation. He stressed the 
government’s trust in the organisation to make an appropriate decision on 
whether to broadcast the film or not. He also included a letter he had received 
from the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia in which it opposed the film’s broadcast. 
One could ask if this is not an implicit form of censorship, due to the fact 
that the Secretary of State acknowledged the objections of the Saudis and 
subsequently stressed PBS’s responsibility to make an appropriate decision. 
Ultimately PBS decided to broadcast the film, in spite of the letter and public 
protests.60 However, not all stations resisted the pressure, and expressions 
of concern were also heard. A substantial number of PBS stations delayed or 
cancelled the broadcast.
In the Netherlands there was also a commotion about the film. In 1980, 
at the moment the film was launched, the Netherlands were governed by the 
first Van Agt Cabinet (from 19 December 1977 to 11 September 1981). Dries 
van Agt was the Prime Minister, and Hans Wiegel, who was also Minister 
of Internal Affairs, was the Deputy Prime Minister. Two other important 
players were Neelie Smit-Kroes, Secretary of State for Transport, Public 
Works and Water Management and Til Gardeniers-Berendsen, Minister for 
57 “‘Death of a Princess’, Drama-Documentary on Saudi Execution Which Provoked an International 
Incident, to Air on Public Television’s ‘World’ May 12”, Press Release, Public Broadcasting Service, 
11 April 1980.
58 C. Gerald Fraser, “Mobil Asks PBS to Reconsider Showing Film About Saudi Princess”, in New York 
Times, 9 May 1980, A 10. 
59 “Text of Letters on Disputed Film”, in New York Times, 9 May 1980, A 10. 
60 William A. Henry III., “Apologies PBS Style,” in The New Republic, 24 May 1980, 6. 
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Culture, Recreation and Social Work (Cultuur, Recreatie en Maatschappelijk 
Werk).
Bert van den Braak, from the Parliamentary Documentation Centre 
of Leiden University, writes that Minister Gardeniers and Deputy Prime 
Minister Wiegel stressed the negative consequences, both political and 
economic, connected to the airing of the film, and therefore advised against 
broadcasting it. There was also some pressure from the private sector.
The Dutch Broadcasting Foundation (NOS) did not succumb to this 
pressure, as we will see in the following paragraphs, and the film was aired 
on 16 April 1980. State Secretary Kroes tried to explain the attitude of the 
Dutch approach in Riyadh.61
the dutch cOntrOVersy
Did Ministers Wiegel and Gardeniers indeed try to stop the film from 
being broadcast while it was their moral duty not to interfere? According to 
Reinier de Winter, Erik Jurgens, the chairman of the NOS, did not yield to 
the pressure exerted by the Dutch cabinet.62
The Dutch Christian newspaper Reformatorisch Dagblad quoted State 
Secretary Kroes, sharing her own view of what had happened. According 
to her own testimony she was not a proponent of censuring the film, but 
at the same time she did not present herself as a hell-raising defender of 
human rights either. She said: “It was a happy coincidence that I happened 
to be in Saudi Arabia, because that made it possible for me to do some 
damage control.”63 Although she does not spell out what “damage” she has 
in mind, it is clear from the context that it is only commercial interests she 
is thinking of. By “damage,” she does not mean the damage that occurs when 
leading politicians fail to uphold the principles upon which the post-war 
international legal and political order is built. Nor does she use “damage” to 
61 See also Reinier de Winter, “Globalisering: de ‘margin of appreciation’ in spiegelbeeld? Vrijheid 
van meningsuiting versus vrijheid van godsdienst in de Deense cartoonaffaire”, in T. Barkhuysen, 
M.L. van Emmerik and J.P. Loof (eds), Geschakeld recht: verdere studies over Europese grondrechten ter 
gelegenheid van de 70ste verjaardag van prof. Mr. E.A. Alkema (Deventer: Kluwer, 2009), 551–565.
62 Ibid., 563.
63 “Smit-Kroes zet zichzelf pluim op hoed”, in Reformatorisch Dagblad, 24 April 1980: “Het is voor 
Nederland bijzonder gelukkig geweest, dat ik toevallig in Saoedi-Arabië zat, want daardoor kon ik de 
schade ter plaatse zoveel mogelijk beperken”.
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refer to the impression that arises when leading politicians do not address 
the moral quandary of ignoring the execution of a young woman for no 
other reason than her love for someone of her age. The problem is that if 
you do think these principles are important, the intervention by the State 
Secretary for Traffic and Water Management did not “control” anything. On 
the contrary, her interventions must have reinforced the impression that 
European politicians in a liberal nation-state do not believe in their own 
professed principles. In her rendering of the situation, the State Secretary 
insinuates that the Dutch people should be very grateful that she was in 
the right place at the right time to cool the situation. But would it not have 
been better if State Secretary Kroes had, from the first moment, made it 
crystal clear that the Dutch government would under no circumstances be 
willing to negotiate on the principle of freedom of the press and would never 
consider government censorship?
The Secretary of State also stressed that she had not acted on her own behalf 
in Saudi Arabia. She had had contact with Deputy Prime Minister Wiegel. 
“I even once contacted him at his mother-in-law’s house.”64 According to 
Kroes, the Saudis were particularly annoyed because the “religious feelings 
of the royal house were offended.”
This is a somewhat strange commentary that does not address the problem 
the whole controversy was about: the death of a young woman, brutally 
murdered because she did not comply with the wishes of the patriarchic class 
around her. It was not the atrocious execution, but the feelings of the royal 
family, their “religious feelings” in particular, that were apparently the subject 
of the conversation between the State Secretary and the Saudi government. 
The fact that the Saudi royal family wanted to frame this event as something 
that had to do with honour and religious feelings is quite understandable, 
but what is more difficult to understand is that the Dutch State Secretary did 
not address the issue of killing a young woman for an “offence” that, under 
normal circumstances, cannot be characterised as anything other than the 
exertion of an elementary human right. In her report of the talks she had 
with the Saudis she never mentions even coming close to addressing this 
issue. She only said to the Saudis that she could not forbid the airing of the 
film. When Kroes arrived in the Netherlands, she was unpleasantly struck by 
64 “Die heb ik zelfs eenmaal thuis bij zijn schoonmoeder gebeld”.
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the fact that the media reported that she had frustrated freedom of speech. 
This was not the case, Kroes said.65
According to her own view of the situation, Kroes had (1) limited the 
damage; and (2) not said or done anything that violated free speech. If that 
had been the case, it would have been no small accomplishment. But is it 
likely?
The airing of the film was also briefly discussed in the Senate, but 
much later (4 June 1980) and, more relevantly, a discussion ensued 
about the improper pressure that had allegedly been exerted by the Dutch 
Government to prevent the Dutch Broadcasting Foundation from screening 
the film.66 Those who took the governmental point of view stressed that the 
government had done nothing more than notify the NOS about the possible 
consequences broadcasting the film could have.
A similar occurrence several years later is interesting in this context. On 
23 February 1987, then Acting Minister of Foreign Affairs Hans van den 
Broek (b. 1936), made a phone call to the NOS that was aired on live TV. 
Van den Broek called the Dutch anchorman Paul Witteman (b. 1946) just 
before a controversial item about the religious leader of Iran at the time, 
Ayatollah Khomeini, was to be broadcast. The clip, a spoof about Khomeini, 
was originally created in Germany (and had been broadcast on German 
television eight days earlier) by show master and comedian Rudi Carrell 
(1934–2006), and there it had caused a lot of commotion.67 In his own 
words, the Dutch minister had “imposed nothing” during his call, but had 
simply indicated the possible consequences of the airing of the segment. He 
left the decision on whether or not to broadcast it to the journalist (or the 
broadcast corporation).68 In both cases (Death of a Princess and the showing 
of this Khomeini spoof) the government, as well as the minister involved, 
neglected to acknowledge the influence they had by pronouncing such 
things in their capacity as ministers. When the government proclaimed its 
65 “En dan kom je terug en dan wekt men hier de indruk, dat je met de vrijheid van meningsuiting de 
vloer aanveegt. Dat is niet gebeurd”.
66 Parl. Doc., Senate., 4 June 1980, 875.
67 See on this Paul Cliteur, Tom Herrenberg and Bastiaan Rijpkema, “The New Censorship: A Case 
Study of Extrajudicial Restraints on Free Speech”, in Afshin Ellian and Gelijn Molier (eds), Freedom 
of Speech under Attack (The Hague: Eleven, International Publishing, 2015), 291–318; Paul Cliteur, 
“The Rudi Carrell Affair and its Significance for the Tension between Theoterrorism and Religious 
Satire”, in Ancilla Iuris 15 (2013) 15–41, full text available at: http://www.anci.ch/paul_cliteur.
68 Parl. Doc., House of Rep. 1986/1987, 19 700, ch. V, nr. 79, 1–3.
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opinions on the broadcasting of Death of a Princess (that is, not to broadcast 
it), pointing out the possible dangers and threats the film might provoke, 
it no longer seemed like a mere notification; it looked more like a pressing 
request, which could be interpreted as a form of censorship. It is rather 
hypocritical or, to put it more mildly, naïve to pretend that when a member 
of the government makes a live phone call to a television station, this can be 
seen as merely a contribution to an ongoing discussion in the same way that 
ordinary citizens participate in a public debate.
In 1980, the Cabinet Van Agt I, and subsequently Minister Van den Broek 
in 1987, did set some dangerous precedents for affairs that would arise later. 
It is a somewhat disquieting idea that dictatorships like Saudi Arabia and 
Iran managed to ride the moral high ground while leading Dutch politicians 
grovelled in the dirt and failed to address the human rights issues that were 
so evident in these cases.
QuestIOns By mp rOethOf
Although there was no official debate in the Lower Chamber of Parliament 
on Death of a Princess, the Labour MP Hein Roethof (1921–1996) formulated 
some questions, trying to assess whether the government had tried to 
influence the broadcast corporation in its decision to air the film or cancel 
it.69
Is it true, Roethof wanted to know, that on 12 April 1980, when she was 
in Saudi Arabia, the State Secretary for Transport and Water Management 
(Staatssecretaris van Verkeer en Waterstaat) had tried to take steps to cancel 
the documentary?70 The government did not deny that it had tried to seek 
a cancellation of the film, but “only on the basis of conviction.” Members of 
the Cabinet had also been in contact with Erik Jurgens, the chair of the NOS, 
but only to discuss the possible consequences of the film’s broadcast. It was 
clear to the government that the final decision to air or cancel the film was 
up to the broadcasting corporation and not the government. But it was the 
responsibility of the government to inform the broadcasting corporation of 
69 H. Roethof, “Vragen van het lid Roethof over uitzending van een film door de NOS over Saoedi-
Arabië”, Ingezonden 14 April 1980, in Parl. Doc., House of Rep. 1979/1980, Attachment.
70 Ibid., 1917.
DEATH OF A PRINCESS 133
the possible consequences for Dutch/Saudi relations and the impact on the 
Dutch economy, the government argued.71
Roethof also commented: “If the Saudi government has legitimate 
complaints about the film, complaints that I do not have any information 
about, I would like to know them.”
This was a smart move, of course, because for a government in a democracy 
it is somewhat embarrassing to have to concede that the members of the 
Cabinet seriously considered frustrating the airing of a film on a violation of 
human rights as atrocious as the execution of the princess and her lover. No 
decent government will do this gladly. What they tried to do instead (and this 
was also the course of action the American Secretary of State chose, as we 
saw in the preceding paragraphs) is insinuate that cancelling the film might 
not be such a bad idea, while at the same time emphasising that the final 
decision on this delicate matter was the “responsibility” of the broadcasting 
corporation. And of course they hoped for a minimum of publicity, to avoid 
a moral outcry from the public. This strategy, though, did not work.
Roethof also formulated some ideas about what was and was not legitimate 
in cases such as the one then under scrutiny. He said that the role of the 
government could indeed be to provide factual information to the NOS, but 
that if the government were to try to exert force or pressure, it would be on 
the wrong track.72
It is an interesting suggestion. We may question, though, whether a 
government can ever perform the task of presenting information about 
foreign pressure, but in the capacity of a neutral bystander. Is that realistic? 
If the government were to share knowledge of foreign sources of pressure 
(as the Minister of Foreign Affairs did explicitly in 1987 and the members 
of Cabinet Van Agt I did more implicitly), it would be natural for the 
broadcasting corporation to become suspicious (as would every other private 
actor) about the vital question of whether it could rely on the support of 
its national government in times of crisis. This is essential, especially when 
there is also a security risk involved (as there was in the Iranian case, as the 
minister suggested in his conversation with the journalist).
So both 1980 (Death of a Princess) and 1987 (the Rudi Carrell Affair) set 
some dangerous precedents of giving in to undue influence on the part of 
dubious governments.
71 Ibid.
72 Roethof quoted in: Algemeen Dagblad, 14 April 1980.
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An unusually straightforward condemnation of the Saudi attempt to stifle 
free speech came from another socialist: André Kloos (1922–1989). Kloos 
was the chairman of the VARA (a socialist broadcasting corporation) who 
said that we, the Dutch, should ask for more understanding from the Saudis 
for “the system we all defend.” He also pointed out what the long-term 
consequences would be if the Dutch complied with the Saudis’ demands. 
Would the consequence not be that we could only make films about countries 
with which we had no commercial ties?73 
what tO dO wIth freedOm Of speech In a multIcultural 
InfOrmatIOn sOcIety?
Commercial interests played an important part in the Dutch discussion, not 
least because this is a classic issue in the division between left and right. We 
should not forget that the Cabinet Van Agt I was a right-wing government 
and the socialists were in opposition. So this was a discussion not only about 
moral matters, but about party politics as well. Also, the left could afford 
to be on the “immaterial side” of the discussion, while the right had to 
defend business interests. At least that is what they thought they had to do. 
Nevertheless, this is always a difficult matter to be honest about.
Two MPs from the liberal party VVD, De Korte and Blaauw, who supported 
the government in its lack of enthusiasm for airing Death of a Princess on 
Dutch television, tried to explain their motives in the Dutch daily newspaper 
Trouw.74 It was a prejudice against their party, Blaauw complained, that 
liberals were always motivated by commercial considerations. This was not 
the case. What had motivated him, said Blaauw, was the idea that the film 
might be seen as offensive to the feelings of Muslims. He had gathered from 
the reactions to the film in England that this was indeed the case. Blaauw 
also claimed to have had long conversations with representatives of Muslim 
groups in the Netherlands.
This did not make much of an impression on the journalists from Trouw. 
De Korte and Blaauw were mocked in Trouw because, so the journalists 
contended, this was the first time the VVD seemed to be receptive to 
73 Kloos quoted in Trouw, 17 April 1980.
74 “NOS wil film toch uitzenden”, in Trouw, 16 April 1980; Theo Koelé, “Dood van een handelsreiziger”, 
in Trouw, 15 April 1980.
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complaints from ethnic and religious minorities. Were they absolutely sure 
that it was not the oil that explained their interest in the film?
Whatever may be the answer to that last question one thing is clear, 
namely the matter that the liberal MPs Blaauw and De Korte introduced 
to the discussion would play a huge role in all the great discussions that, in 
1980, were still ahead of us. In all the later discussions (the Rushdie Affair,75 
the Cartoon Affair,76 the Rudi Carrell Affair,77 Charlie Hebdo Affair,78 etc.), 
time and again it was argued that freedom of speech is fine, but that we have 
to protect vulnerable minorities from offensive views that are common in 
Western societies.79
Should not freedom of speech be recalibrated in a world dominated by 
a continuous flow of information, ideas and opinions? In a world where 
cultural differences perhaps cannot be bridged, is there something to be said 
for more respect for these differences, which would consequently require 
further limitations on the right to freedom of speech?
Characteristic of our modern societies is a continuous digitalisation and 
the development of a visual world in which words and images are universally 
distributed in a fraction of a second. If people always agreed with one 
another, there would be no legal codes or conflicts. Obviously, this is not 
the case. People have different opinions, and all these opinions and ideas 
unceasingly clash and, in the worst case, clash with the use of violence as a 
consequence. On the one hand, there may be something to say for taking a 
step back. Perhaps one should take the feelings of others into account more 
and be more careful when expressing criticism. On the other hand, it is the 
expression of criticism that keeps a democracy alive.
Critical reflection is essential for a democracy. It is therefore troubling 
that this, although recognised in the founding documents of Europe and the 
case law of the European Court of Human Rights, is forgotten by European 
75 Paul Cliteur, “Van Rushdie tot Jones: over geweld en uitingsvrijheid”, in Afshin Ellian, Gelijn Molier 
and Tom Zwart (eds), Mag ik dit zeggen? Beschouwingen over de vrijheid van meningsuiting (The 
Hague: Boom Juridische Uitgevers, 2011), 67-89.
76 Oring, Elliott, “The Muhammad cartoon affair”, in Humor, 21–1 (2008) 21–26.
77 Paul Cliteur, “The Rudi Carrell Affair and its Significance for the Tension between Theoterrorism 
and Religious Satire”, in Ancilla Iuris 15 (2013) 15–41, full text available at: http://www.anci.ch/
paul_cliteur.
78 Charb, Lettre aux escrocs de l’islamophobie qui font le jeu des racistes (Paris: Les Échappés, 2015). 
79 This is a central topic in Charb, Lettre aux escrocs de l’islamophobie qui font le jeu des racistes (Paris: 
Les Échappés, 2015). See also chapter 9 in this volume, on free speech and multiculturalism. 
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governments in the cases analysed in this chapter. Living in a democracy 
means living with the pain you suffer from other people’s opinions.80 There 
will always be someone who feels offended by, or disagrees with, other 
opinions. Therefore, limiting freedom of speech on this ground is pointless. 
On the contrary, it might even be better to reinforce this freedom. It is 
important to realise that when a government questions the broadcasting of 
a film and stresses the possible extraterritorial consequences (without even 
paying attention to the content of the film), it is exposed as being susceptible 
to foreign threats (in this case from Saudi Arabia, but it could also be from 
North Korea, or any other country, as is inherent in the criticism of André 
Kloos, quoted above). Instead of upholding and defending the values 
European governments have enshrined in their human rights treaties and 
constitutions, they give in to the unreasonable demands of dictatorships. In 
the long run this attitude may prove suicidal, and democratic governments 
should perhaps do some soul searching on how to uphold democratic values 
in the future. Despite all the uncertainties in this world we may say that, 
although Death of a Princess may have been one of the first instances of a 
certain type of moral and political conflict, it was certainly not the last. And 
governments may have much to gain from carefully studying these conflicts, 
in both a historical and a transnational perspective. 
80 “Vrijheid is er ook voor Wilders,” in De Volkskrant, 31 January 2015.
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6 Rushdie’s Critics
 Paul Cliteur & Tom Herrenberg
IntrOductIOn
On 14 February 1989, the Supreme Leader of Iran, Ayatollah Khomeini 
(1902–1989), issued a declaration that called for the death of British novelist 
Salman Rushdie (b. 1947). It reads as follows:
I inform all zealous Muslims of the world that the author of the book 
entitled The Satanic Verses—which has been compiled, printed, and 
published in opposition to Islam, the Prophet, and the Koran—and all 
those involved in the publication who were aware of its contents are 
sentenced to death.
I call upon all zealous Muslims to execute them quickly, wherever 
they may be found, so that no one else will dare to insult the Muslim 
sanctities. God willing, whoever is killed on this path is a martyr.
In addition, anyone who has access to the author of this book but does 
not possess the power to execute him should report him to the people 
so that he may be punished for his actions.1
The aim of this chapter is to analyse some of the criticism that has been levelled 
against Salman Rushdie for having published his novel The Satanic Verses 
(1988). Since Khomeini’s “fatwa,” clashes between free speech and religious 
extremism have not dwindled, but have instead grown in significance. It is 
not only novels that have proved to give rise to controversy, but also cartoons 
and video clips. The latest of these controversies, the massacre of the Charlie 
1 Quoted in Daniel Pipes, “Two Decades of the Rushdie Rules: How an edict that once outraged the 
world became the new normal,” in Commentary Magazine, October 2010, 31.
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Hebdo cartoonists in Paris on 7 January 2015 underscores a deep division 
between a culture of civil liberties and theocratic extremism. Although 
Rushdie received considerable support from many sides,2 he also faced 
strong criticism for writing his novel. Indeed, Rushdie was targeted not 
only by terrorists who wanted to punish him for his blasphemous novel, but 
also by public intellectuals who considered his stance too provocative, if not 
downright insulting, to the religious views of many people. In this chapter 
we will discuss positions taken by some of Rushdie’s critics and look at their 
significance in the light of the killings of the Charlie Hebdo journalists and 
cartoonists.
waylay hIm In a dark street
An early reaction to the Rushdie affair came from the famous historian Hugh 
Trevor-Roper (1914–2003), who stated:
I wonder how Salman Rushdie is faring these days under the 
benevolent protection of British law and British police, about whom 
he has been so rude. Not too comfortably I hope… I would not shed 
a tear if some British Muslims, deploring his manners, should waylay 
him in a dark street and seek to improve them. If that should cause 
him thereafter to control his pen, society would benefit and literature 
would not suffer.3
Perhaps this is—apart from Khomeini’s fatwa itself—one of the most 
extreme reactions to the publication of the novel. What makes this reaction 
interesting is that Trevor-Roper so openly shows understanding for the 
threat of physical violence—if not advocating it—against the writer of the 
controversial novel. The reaction was also stunning since it came from an 
academic who, due to the nature of his own profession, can only work under 
conditions of academic freedom—conditions that are more or less naturally 
opposed to “controlling the pen.”
2 See, e.g., “Writers rally to Rushdie as publishers rethink,” in The Guardian, 16 February 1989; 
“Writers Defend Rushdie,” in the New York Times, 21 February 1989.
3 Quoted in: Salman Rushdie, Joseph Anton: A Memoir (London: Jonathan Cape, 2012), 260; Paul 
Weller, A Mirror for our Times: “The Rushdie Affair” and the Future of Multiculturalism (London/New 
York: Continuum, 2009), 21.
RUSHDIE’S CRITICS 139
Furthermore, Trevor-Roper is a historian. He is the author of an extensive 
oeuvre, including books such as The Last Days of Hitler (1947),4 The Invention 
of Scotland (1994),5 History and the Enlightenment (2010),6 and many other 
works. He certainly must have been aware of the history of censorship, 
intimidation and violence against writers and scholars in the past.7
The vehemence of Trevor-Roper’s reaction was perhaps partly because 
he felt Rushdie had to have known in advance what type of reaction his 
novel would unleash. Trevor-Roper argued that Rushdie was “well versed 
in Islamic ideas” and that he “knew what he was doing and could foresee 
the consequences.”8 This point was also made by former United States 
President Jimmy Carter (b. 1924). Carter referred to something that came up 
time and again in the discussion on Rushdie’s book, namely that as a Muslim, 
former Muslim, or at least someone cognizant of the mores in the Muslim 
world, Rushdie should have known better. Carter wrote: “The author, a well-
versed analyst of Moslem beliefs, must have anticipated a horrified reaction 
throughout the Islamic world.”9
Just like Trevor-Roper, Carter also took Rushdie to task for knowing what 
he, Rushdie, was doing. This was also explicitly voiced by Rushdie’s fellow 
writer Roald Dahl (1916–1990). “[Rushdie] must have been totally aware of 
the deep and violent feelings his book would stir up among devout Muslims. 
In other words, he knew exactly what he was doing and cannot plead 
otherwise,” Dahl argued.10 To this accusation Rushdie once humorously 
responded by saying that “It would be really strange ... to spend five years 
writing a novel and not know what you are doing.”11
4 Hugh Trevor-Roper, The Last Days of Hitler (London: Pan, 2012 (1947)).
5 Hugh Trevor-Roper, The Invention of Scotland: Myth and History (New Haven, CT: Yale University 
Press, 1994).
6 Hugh Trevor-Roper, History and the Enlightenment (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 2010).
7 See, e.g., Hugh Trevor-Roper, The Crisis of the Seventeenth Century: Religion, the Reformation & Social 
Change (Indianapolis, Ind.: Liberty Fund, 1967).
8 Paul Weller, A Mirror for our Times: “The Rushdie Affair” and the Future of Multiculturalism (London/
New York: Continuum, 2009), 21.
9 Jimmy Carter, “Rushdie’s book is an insult,” in the New York Times, 5 March 1989, also in Lisa 
Appignanesi and Sara Maitland (eds), The Rushdie File (Syracuse, NY: Syracuse University Press, 
1990), 236–237.
10 Quoted in: Ibn Warraq, Why the West is Best: A Muslim Apostate’s Defense of Liberal Democracy 
(London: Encounter Books, 2010), 32.
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the IllegItImacy Of crItIcIsIng relIgIOn
What clearly appeared from Carter’s reaction was that criticising religion 
was not very welcome. This opinion was shared by many, but not always 
for explicitly religious reasons. Sometimes there was also an element of 
resignation in the commentary of some participants. Religious criticism 
is not wise, because we cannot control the turmoil that follows it. In an 
interview on the Rushdie affair in May 1989, Novelist John le Carré (b. 1931) 
commented in the same vein when—while stating that it was “outrageous 
that ... Salman Rushdie had been condemned to death by the Iranian 
Government”—he said: “I don’t think it is given to any of us to be impertinent 
to great religions with impunity.”12
This reference to “impunity” seems to be an allusion to what was made 
much more explicit by Trevor-Roper: you cannot complain when violence 
is exerted against you as a result of your criticism of religion. So the word 
“impunity” has a sinister undertone. 
Another point was made by another famous detractor of Rushdie, the art 
critic John Berger (b. 1926). Berger’s point was that it would simply not be 
possible to control the violence. In The Guardian he wrote in February 1989:
I suspect Salman Rushdie, if he is not caught in a chain of events 
of which he has completely lost control, might by now be ready to 
consider asking his world publishers to stop producing more or new 
editions of The Satanic Verses. Not because of the threat to his own 
life, but because of the threat to the lives of those who are innocent 
of either writing or reading the book. This achieved, Islamic leaders 
and statesmen across the world might well be ready to condemn the 
practice of the Ayatollah issuing terrorist death warrants. Otherwise a 
unique twentieth century Holy War, with its terrifying righteousness 
on both sides, may be on the point of breaking out sporadically but 
repeatedly—in airports, shopping streets, suburbs, city centers, 
wherever the unprotected live.13
Berger introduces the notion of “innocence” with regard to not only writing, 
but also reading a book. It seems he is suggesting that when you read a book 
12 “Russians Warm to le Carré,” in the New York Times, 22 May 1989.
13 Quoted in William J. Weatherby, Salman Rushdie: Sentenced to Death (New York: Carrol & Graf, 
1990), 168.
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that theoterrorists object to14 you run the risk of forfeiting your “innocence.” 
Berger sought the solution to the turmoil over the novel in halting the 
production and distribution of The Satanic Verses. Roald Dahl, too, was 
of the opinion that, given the outrage over the book, the best thing to do 
was to halt its distribution: “If the lives of the author and the senior editor 
in New York are at stake, then it is better to give in on a moral question 
when you are dealing with fanatics. If I were Rushdie, then for the sake of 
everybody threatened I would agree to throw the bloody thing away. It would 
save lives.”15 Here, Dahl and Berger shared common ground with Iran’s 
parliament speaker at the time, Hashemi Rafsanjani (b. 1934), who “said the 
solution to the strangest and rarest crisis in history is to issue a strict order 
to seize all copies in the entire world and burn them.”16
BrItIsh pOlItIcIans respOnd
On 15 February 1989, Britain’s foreign secretary, Sir Geoffrey Howe (1926–
2015), gave a rather tame reaction to the death sentence, telling the BBC that 
Khomeini’s declaration was something of “very grave concern” and that the 
British government was “looking into the background of it very carefully.”17 
He also argued that Iran’s actions illustrated “the extreme difficulty of 
establishing the right kind of relationship with a manifestly revolutionary 
regime with ideas that are very much its own.”18 A day later Howe’s attitude 
was more forthright, and he declared that “Nobody has the right to incite 
people to violence on British soil or against British citizens. Ayatollah 
Khomeini’s statement is totally unacceptable.”19 On the same day the British 
government put out a statement that read: “The British Government’s view 
is that it would not be possible to establish a normal relationship with Iran 
while the Iranian Government failed to respect fully international standards 
14 The word “theoterrorists” is used here for those who exert violence on the basis of a conception 
of God’s wishes. Needless to say, whether they give the right interpretation to God’s wishes is 
irrelevant from a social science perspective.
15 “Pulp book to save lives, says Dahl,” in The Times, 17 February 1989.
16 “Iranian Says All Copies Must Be Burned,” in The Associated Press, 10 March 1989.
17 “Iranians Protest over Banned Book,” in the New York Times, 16 February 1989.
18 Ibid.
19 “Britain Protests Khomeini’s ‘Death Sentence’ Against Author Rushdie,” in Schenectady Gazette, 
17 February 1989.
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of behaviour.”20 In late February Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher (1925–
2013) stated that freedom of speech “is subject only to the laws of this land ... 
and will remain subject to the rule of law. It is absolutely fundamental to 
everything in which we believe and cannot be interfered with by any outside 
force.’”21
Both Howe’s second statement and Thatcher’s comment seem to address 
the central issue, namely the fact that Khomeini has appropriated the right 
to exercise control over an individual not belonging to his jurisdiction. This 
point was aptly made by novelist Anthony Burgess (1917–1993). Burgess, 
commenting on the fatwa, argued:
The Ayatollah Khomeini is probably within his self-elected rights in 
calling for the assassination of Salman Rushdie, or anyone else for 
that matter, on his own holy ground. To order outraged sons of the 
prophet to kill him and the directors of Penguin Books on British soil 
is tantamount to a jihad. It is a declaration of war on citizens of a free 
country and as such it is a political act. It has to be countered by an 
equally forthright, if less murderous, declaration of defiance.22
Burgess’ reaction proved prescient because, amid all the confusion, he 
highlights the really relevant issues here: assassination, national sovereignty, 
jihad and the need to resist. Burgess also rightly stresses that there is a conflict 
of visions. Khomeini is indeed right within his own religious paradigm. It is 
also remarkable that Burgess does not shy away from calling this “jihad,” 
meaning a “declaration of war” on citizens of another country. Burgess 
further stresses the element of territoriality (“British soil”).
While the British government unequivocally condemned Khomeini’s 
threat in the first days and weeks after 14 February 1989, attention shifted to 
the content of The Satanic Verses when Sir Geoffrey Howe gave an interview 
to the BBC in early March. In this interview—which was “relayed by the 
Persian service ... in Iran”23—Howe was quite critical of the book, saying 
that:
20 “Britain puts ties with Iran on hold,” in the New York Times, 17 February 1989.
21 “Iran Tells Britain to Condemn Book,” in Washington Post, 1 March 1989. 
22 “The sins of a holy terror. Once it would do intellectual battle but Islam now prefers to draw blood,” 
in The Globe and Mail, 17 February 1989.
23 “Terrorists add Hurd, Howe to book death list,” in The Times, 3 March 1989.
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[There is] a huge distance between ourselves and the book. The British 
government, the British people, do not have any affection for the book. 
The book is extremely critical, rude about us. It compares Britain with 
Hitler’s Germany. We do not like that any more than the people of the 
Muslim faith like the attacks on their faith contained in the book. So 
we are not sponsoring the book. What we are sponsoring is the right 
of people to speak freely, to publish freely.24
The Times noted that Howe’s remark about the “huge distance between 
ourselves and the book” was “apparently aimed at appeasing Muslim outrage 
and making the first tentative move towards a settlement with Iran.”25 The 
paper opined that the comments of Howe—who was also put on the death 
list of a pro-Iranian terrorist group—went “some way towards fulfilling an 
Iranian demand earlier this week for Britain not to adopt improper gestures 
towards the Islamic world.”26 At the same time, Margaret Thatcher had 
seemingly also developed an understanding of the offence the book had 
caused. Relating to her own religious beliefs, she said that “We’ve known in 
our own religion people doing things which are deeply offensive to some of 
us, deeply offensive, and we felt it very much. And that is what has happened 
in Islam. I think that these great religions are strong enough and deep enough 
to withstand these kind of events.”27 
These comments were much to Rushdie’s dismay. As reported by the 
Washington Post, Rushdie felt that “the government is beginning to play 
both sides in the middle in its efforts to defend the rights of free expression 
and avoid a threatened break in formal diplomatic relations with Iran.”28 
Rushdie “feared the Government was weakening in its support for him as 
part of an attempt to resolve the UK-Iran crisis.”29
Howe was also criticised in the newspapers. The Guardian wrote in a 
commentary on Howe’s interview:
It was presumably someone else at the Foreign Office who went through 
The Satanic Verses, picking out the naughty bits which led Sir Geoffrey 
24 Ibid. 
25 Ibid.
26 Ibid.
27 “Rushdie fears backdown by Government,” in The Times, 4 March 1989.
28 “Statement Worries Rushdie,” in Washington Post, 4 March 1989.
29 “Rushdie fears backdown by Government,” in The Times, 4 March 1989.
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Howe to conclude on Thursday that the book was “extremely rude” 
about Britain. The result was not a great succes, either as an exercise 
in literary criticism or as a covert signal to the moderates in Iran. 
… 
Aren’t we supposed to be against governments saying that they 
disapprove of books—let alone making up other people’s minds for 
them? It was also a somewhat philistine judgment. Not only was the 
book “rude” but, said Sir Geoffrey, it “compares Britain with Hitler’s 
Germany.” It does nothing of the kind. It does portray, as our reviewer 
Angela Carter wrote before the great row began, “the mean streets of 
a marvellously evoked eighties London.”30
The newspaper concluded by stating that Rushdie “seems to have broken his 
silence ... to express concern about Sir Geoffrey’s statement; and, regrettably, 
one can see why.”31
In the Financial Times, Ian Davidson wrote a commentary on Howe’s 
interview. Davidson touched on a number of interesting points:
Mealy-mouthed expressions of distaste for The Satanic Verses merely 
served to make the Government look obsequious and cringing. 
When Sir Geoffrey Howe said on the radio: “We understand that the 
book itself has been found deeply offensive by people of the Moslem 
faith,” he was making an observation which was entirely otiose. He 
made matters much worse when he went on to say: “The British 
Government, the British people, don’t have any affection for the book, 
which is extremely critical, rude about us. It compares Britain with 
Hitler’s Germany. We don’t like that any more than people of the 
Moslem faith like the attacks on their faith contained in the book.”
The implications of these words are unmistakable and alarming: 
in the hope of avoiding a break in diplomatic relations, the British 
Government was fully prepared to adopt the posture of an equally 
injured party, even if it meant endorsing (in modifed terms) the 
Ayatollah’s attack on The Satanic Verses. If Mr Rushdie felt he was in 
30 “Rude, as in rudimentary,” in The Guardian, 4 March 1989.
31 Ibid.
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danger of being dumped by the British Government, he may have had 
good reason. 32
Davidson also made some interesting points about the expertise and 
competence of the government to comment on matters of literary 
interpretation.
Whether Sir Geoffrey or Mrs. Thatcher thinks The Satanic Verses is 
a nice book or a nasty book, whether they believe it is offensive to 
Moslems, or whether they consider it unfair to the British people, are 
entirely irrelevant questions. In any case, they are wholly unqualified, 
in their capacity as elected politicians, to have a useful opinion on any 
of these subordinate issues.33
Davidson also spelled out what were to him the relevant questions in this 
case: “Under the Iranian gun, the only questions which are immediately 
relevant are whether Mr. Rushdie was legally entitled under British law to 
write and publish his book, and whether Ayatollah Khomeini is entitled to 
incite the murder of Mr. Rushdie.”34
Davidson did something only few people commenting on the Rushdie 
affair did. He first asked us: what are the relevant questions in this controversy?
You can, of course, comment on everything: on whether you liked the book, 
on whether Rushdie could have foreseen the consequences, on whether you 
like religious criticism in general, or on whether you have an understanding 
for offended feelings of religious believers. But what Davidson drew our 
attention to was the relevance of those questions. What should, for instance, 
a politician or “the state” ask when judging the situation? And Davidson 
claims only two questions are relevant: was Rushdie legally entitled to write 
the book, and was Khomeini entitled to incite murder?
These two questions are, indeed, the relevant questions for a politician 
to ask. But, as we saw, not all politicians focused on those questions—some 
took on the role of literary critic and commented on the matter as if they 
were ordinary citizens. Not to their credit, because what the state has to 
do is protect its citizens against the internal and external enemies of the 
32 “Why British Diplomacy Cuts A Poor Figure In Iran’s Holy War: It is Britain which should have 
severed diplomatic relations rather than attempt conciliation,” in Financial Times, 9 March 1989.
33 Ibid.
34 Ibid.
146 THE FALL AND RISE OF BLASPHEMY LAW
peace. And in the light of that question, Davidson’s two perspectives should 
be guiding.
Other eurOpean pOlItIcal leaders
Other European government representatives backed the British in the 
struggle with religious terrorism. One of the first diplomatic responses 
came from the Netherlands. Shortly after Khomeini threatened Rushdie, the 
Dutch Minister of Foreign Affairs, Hans van den Broek (b. 1936), cancelled a 
trip to Teheran. He gave the reason for his decision by saying about the death 
threat that “This is totally unacceptable, a call for international terrorism.”35 
German Chancellor Helmut Kohl (b. 1930) “called on the ‘entire civilised 
world’ to take action against Iran’s threat to kill Rushdie.”36 President 
Mitterrand (1916–1996) of France said: “All dogmatism which through 
violence undermines freedom of thought and the right to free expression 
is, in my view, absolute evil. The moral and spiritual progress of humanity is 
linked to the recoil of all fanaticisms.”37 Mitterrand was certainly right on 
this. The freedom to criticise freely is a fundamental institution of liberal 
democracies. That freedom is not absolute though, and there are good 
reasons to accept limits to the freedom of speech, for example in case of 
incitement to violence. Khomeini’s fatwa itself, for instance, can never find 
protection under a liberal principle of freedom of speech.38 The problem 
is, though, that accepting limits to freedom of speech does not imply that 
we can leave this task of establishing the nature of these limits to world 
religions, clerical leaders and religious zealots.
French Prime Minister Michel Rocard (b. 1930) stated that “any 
demonstrations urging violence against Rushdie would result in criminal 
35 “Britain puts ties with Iran on hold,” in the New York Times, 16 February 1989.
36 “Bonn and Paris back stand against Iran,” in the Guardian, 23 February 1989.
37 Ibid.
38 That incitement to physical violence should be accepted as a limit to free speech was also 
proclaimed—although not literally—by John Stuart Mill in his important essay On Liberty (1859). 
See also David M. Rabban, “Clear and Present Danger Test,” in Kermit L. Hall (ed.), The Oxford 
Companion to The Supreme Court of the United States (New York/Oxford: Oxford University Press, 
2005), 183–184. And in general see Mick Hume, Trigger Warning: Is the Fear of Being Offensive Killing 
Free Speech? (London: Willam Collins, 2015).
RUSHDIE’S CRITICS 147
charges.”39 The mayor of Paris, Jacques Chirac (b. 1932), commented along 
the same lines:
I am not confusing Muslims with fanatics, but I cannot imagine that 
in Paris we will accept desperadoes who call for murder. If they are 
French they need to be pursued; if they are foreigners, they should 
be expelled. Foreigners, once they are on our soil, must respect our 
laws, and we cannot tolerate calls for murder in the capital of human 
rights.40
A week after Khomeini’s edict, the Ministers of Foreign Affairs of the 12 
member states of the European Community issued a statement that 
condemned “this incitement to murder as an unacceptable violation of the 
most elementary principles and obligations that govern relations among 
sovereign states.” The ministers also expressed “their continuing interest 
in developing normal constructive relations with the Islamic Republic of 
Iran” but added that “if Iran shares this desire, it has to declare its respect 
for international obligations and renounce the use or threatened use of 
violence.”41
Other relIgIOus leaders
As might be expected, Iran was also seeking allies both in the West and 
among Muslim nations for its stance in the Rushdie affair. One of its allies in 
the struggle against the blaspheming Rushdie, it hoped, was the Pope. The 
Iranian embassy in Vatican City demanded that the Pope join actions against 
Rushdie. A senior Vatican official commented on this request, saying that he 
doubted whether the Holy Father would take any action. As the spokesman 
said: “After all, he is not a defender of the Moslem faith. In fact this move 
by the Iranian diplomats is rather out of place.”42 The Vatican spokesman 
further explained: “It’s their problem, not ours, we have enough of our own, 
39 “Bomb Kills One, Wounds Seven in Kashmir Protest,” in The Associated Press, 27 February 1989.
40 Quoted in Lisa Appignanesi and Sara Maitland (eds), The Rushdie File (Syracuse, NY: Syracuse 
University Press, 1990), 133.
41 “Text of European Statement,” in the New York Times, 21 February 1989.
42 Quoted in Lisa Appignanesi and Sara Maitland (eds), The Rushdie File (Syracuse, NY: Syracuse 
University Press, 1990), 81.
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especially with all the books and films which cast doubts on Jesus Christ 
himself. We have never asked for Moslem help in curbing their sale.”43
Apparently, the Vatican spokesman did not consider this an opportunity 
to make clear where the Vatican stood in matters of freedom of conscience 
and freedom of speech. He was only concerned with the fact that the Iranians 
had sought the wrong partner for their protest. Should we conclude from 
this that if Muslims had been more helpful in protesting against criticism 
of Jesus Christ, the Church would have joined the actions of the Iranians 
against Rushdie?
More understanding for the Iranian point of view came from Anglican 
Church. The Archbishop of Canterbury, Dr. Robert Runcie (1921–2000), 
called for a strengthening of the law against blasphemy to cover religions 
other than Christianity. About the offended Muslims Runcie said: “I 
understand their feelings and I firmly believe that offence to the religious 
belief of the followers of Islam or any other faith is quite as wrong as offence 
to the religious beliefs of Christians.”44
Rabbi Avraham Ravitz (1934–2009), the leader of the Orthodox Degel 
Hatorah Party, said that Salman Rushdie needed to be condemned.45 The 
Chief Rabbi of the United Hebrew Congregations of the Commonwealth, 
Immanuel Jakobovits (1921–1999), was critical as well and called for 
legislation that would prohibit “the publication of anything likely to inflame, 
through obscene defamation, the feelings or beliefs of any section of 
society.”46
Now we have to be careful, of course, not to equate the reactions of 
religious leaders with the reactions of the religion they represent as such or, 
even less so, with individual believers’ opinions. Nonetheless, it seems fair 
to say that an unequivocal defence of Rushdie and his right to freedom of 
expression was rare for religious leaders. A case in point was what Cardinal 
Albert Decourtray (1923–1994), Archbishop of Lyons, said on the matter. He 
was the president of the French bishops’ conference. Decourtray issued a 
declaration that contained two important points. First, that he had not read 
Rushdie’s novel. Second, that he was offended by the book. “Once again the 
faith of believers is insulted,” the bishop declared.47 He continued: “Yesterday 
43 Ibid.
44 Quoted in ibid., 101.
45 Ibid., 109.
46 “British Now Lie Low With Rushdie,” in the New York Times, 9 March 1989.
47 “Priest: ‘Satanic Verses’ not like ‘Last Temptation,’” in The Bulletin, 26 February 1989.
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it was the Christians who were offended by a film which disfigured the face 
of Christ. Today it is the Muslims by this book about the Prophet.”48
tryIng tO understand rushdIe’s crItIcs
Those religious leaders who condemned Rushdie and proposed legislation 
that would outlaw blasphemous material seemed to declare that strong 
criticism or satire of religious symbols should be off limits. They espoused 
more or less the same idea as the aforementioned author John le Carré, who 
stated “I don’t think it is given to any of us to be impertinent to great religions 
with impunity.” But, we can ask ourselves, what does “impertinent” mean in 
this context? Is all criticism of a great religion by definition impertinent? Or 
does Le Carré want to distinguish between modest and legitimate criticism 
on the one hand and impertinent criticism on the other? And where should 
one draw the demarcation line? Was Nietzsche (1844–1900) “impertinent” 
when he declared God dead?49 And what about Freud (1856–1939) when 
he wrote about religious belief as an illusion?50 Was Spinoza (1632–1677) 
impertinent in equating God with nature?51 In short: would John le Carré 
extend his criticism to the whole literature of criticism of religion as it has 
been developed by Voltaire, Holbach, Kant, Freud, Hegel, Spinoza, Meslier, 
Paine and countless others? But why not give critics of religion some more 
credit? It seems reasonable to argue that contemporary public atheists such as 
Richard Dawkins52 (b. 1941) and Christopher Hitchens53 (1949–2011), but 
also those who complained about Rushdie’s satire, such as Hugh Trevor-Roper 
48 Ibid.
49 In Friedrich Nietzsche, Die fröhliche Wissenschaft, in: Sämtliche Werke, 1882, Band 3, Kritische 
Studienausgabe herausgegeben von Giorgio Colli und Mazzino Montinari, Deutscher Taschenbuch 
Verlag (Munich: De Gruyter, 1999), 343–653.
50 Sigmund Freud, Die Zukunft einer Illusion, 1927, in Sigmund Freud, Studienausgabe, Band IX, Fragen 
der Gesellschaft, Ursprünge der Religion (S. Fischer Verlag), 135–191.
51 Thereby giving a decisive impetus to the Enlightenment, according to the British historian Jonathan 
Israel in, inter alia, Jonathan I. Israel, Radical Enlightenment: Philosophy and the Making of Modernity 
1650–1750 (Oxford/New York: Oxford University Press, 2001) and Jonathan Israel, “Enlightenment! 
Which Enlightenment?”, in Journal of the History of Ideas 67/3 (July 2006) 523.
52 Richard Dawkins, The God Delusion (Paperback edn, London: Black Swan, Transworld Publishers, 
2006).
53 Christopher Hitchens, God is Not Great: How Religion Poisons Everything (New York/Boston, Mass.: 
Twelve, 2007).
150 THE FALL AND RISE OF BLASPHEMY LAW
and John Berger, can write what they write because religious critics helped 
pave the way. And would it not be unwise to let this cultural heritage erode? 
To let it slip through our fingers because we mistakenly assume that freedoms 
once won are our birthright forever? The paradox seems to be that there is a 
tendency to be hurt and offended over the writings of a contemporary critic, 
for instance Richard Dawkins, who regards religious belief as delusional,54 
while Freud’s (1856–1939) characterisation of religious belief as an “illusion” 
does not elicit any comments.55 At least not any more. This is somewhat 
strange. The diatribes against Christianity or religious belief in general by 
Nietzsche (1844–1900) or Holbach (1723–1789) are considered to be part 
of the European tradition of liberty, our cultural heritage, while the less 
confronting criticisms of Christopher Hitchens, Richard Dawkins and Michel 
Onfray (b. 1959)56 are regarded as “outrageous,” “unnecessarily provocative,” 
“deliberately offensive,” or in words of that kind. Historical iconoclasts are 
lauded, their contemporary equivalents are despised. As Jeremy Treglown 
(b. 1946), literary historian and editor of The Times Literary Supplement in 
the 1980s, wrote shortly after the Rushdie controversy erupted: “Milton’s 
pamphlets and Dryden’s and Pope’s satires, which caused deep and violent 
feeling in those they attacked, should obviously have been toned down. 
Many readers have been made uncomfortable by the moral insights of Jane 
Austen and Dickens—clear cases for sensitive editing. Wouldn’t we be easier 
in our minds if there were no books at all?”57 We see that same phenomenon 
with religious satire. Voltaire and Jonathan Swift are not criticised for their 
“tone,” so why do this with Rushdie?58
Rushdie’s critics also leave us with many questions about the interpretation 
of their views. Le Carré, for instance: what does he mean by “great religions”? 
Should we take his words to mean that he is not opposed to criticising smaller 
54 Richard Dawkins, The God Delusion (Paperback edn, London: Black Swan, Transworld Publishers, 
2006).
55 Sigmund Freud, Die Zukunft einer Illusion, 1927, in Sigmund Freud, Studienausgabe, Band IX, Fragen 
der Gesellschaft, Ursprünge der Religion (S. Fischer Verlag), 135–191.
56 Michel Onfray, Traité d’athéologie: Physique de la métaphysique (Paris: Grasset, 2005).
57 “Second Thoughts and Gritted Teeth on ‘The Satanic Verses,’” in The Associated Press, 5 March 1989.
58 Although this, we admit, is not entirely true, because Voltaire’s Le Fanatisme ou Mahomet Le 
Prophète, Tragédie (Postface by Jérôme Vérain, Paris: Éditions Mille et une Nuits, 2006 (1753)) also 
proved to be controversial. See on this Philippe Val, Malaise dans l’inculture (Paris: Bernard Grasset, 
2015); Philippe Val, Reviens Voltaire, Ils sont devenus fous (Paris: Bernard Grasset, 2008).
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religions or sects, but that he is against criticising the larger religions?59 If 
so, what is the reason for the “big is beautiful” approach? And where should 
one draw the line? Should we also consider it impertinent to comment 
unfavourably on Joseph Smith (1805–1844), the founder of Mormonism,60 
and Ron L. Hubbard (1911–1986), the founder of the Church of Scientology? 
Or are Mormonism and Scientology not “big enough” to attain the status of 
exemption from criticism which Le Carré demands for the “great religions”? 
And is the size of a religion, the number of its adherents, a good criterion for 
placing a religion beyond criticism? 
One may have serious doubts about that. It would imply that Christianity 
could be the object of serious criticism in its infancy, but once it had gained 
the status it later acquired it was exempt from criticism. Why not the reverse? 
Why not say that a religion in its infancy should be handled gently but once it 
acquires a certain official status, the status of a state religion for instance, it 
should be criticised rigorously, because “power tends to corrupt, and absolute 
power corrupts absolutely,” as Lord Acton (1834–1902) wrote?61 Or was Le 
Carré talking about a religion’s quality? But if so, how do we distinguish 
between the religions of great quality and those of lesser quality?
These are important questions, and by posing them we did not even 
comment on the exact meaning of Le Carré’s words “with impunity.” Le Carré 
said that we could not (or should not?) be “impertinent to great religions 
with impunity.” What does that word “impunity” mean? “Impunity” is often 
used in a criminal context and associated with unjustifiably getting away with 
something serious. Is Le Carré also alluding to punitive measures against the 
novelist, as Trevor-Roper did more openly when he said he would not shed a 
tear if aggressors were to waylay Rushdie in a dark street? Unfortunately, we 
59 See on sects and alternative religions Stephen J. Hunt, Alternative Religions: A Sociological 
Introduction (Aldershot: Ashgate, 2003), 33–61; Stephen J. Stein, Alternative American Religions) 
Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000).
60 See on this Amos N. Guiora, “Protecting the Unprotected: Religious Extremism and Child 
Endangerment,” in Journal of Law & Family Studies 12 (2010) 391–407.
61 “Power tends to corrupt, and absolute power corrupts absolutely. Great men are almost always 
bad men, even when they exercise influence and not authority, still more when you superadd the 
tendency or the certainty of corruption by authority. There is no worse heresy than that the office 
sanctifies the holder of it.”, Quoted in Lord Acton (John Emerich Edward Dalberg-Acton), “Letter to 
Bishop Creighton” (5 April 1887), in J.N. Figgis and R.V. Laurence (eds), Historical Essays and Studies 
(London: Macmillan 1907), 504.
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do not know for sure,62 and the matter is important, because what happened 
in the Rushdie affair was that a cleric called for vigilante justice. That is a 
serious affair. The merits and demerits of blasphemy laws can of course be 
debated,63 and to condemn Rushdie is one thing, but what Trevor-Roper, and 
perhaps Le Carré, advocated went further. Trevor-Roper at least implicitly 
approved of physical violence against Rushdie in order to “improve him.”
JOhn le carré reVIsIted and BOOk BurnIng
In William J. Weatherby’s (1930–1992) Salman Rushdie: Sentenced to Death 
(1990) Le Carré is quoted elaborating on his earlier comments on the 
Rushdie affair, saying, just as Berger had done, that Rushdie should have 
withdrawn his book “until a calmer time has come.”64 Apparently, Le Carré 
saw the Rushdie controversy as something that was exceptional, and that if 
things were not stirred up something of a normal situation (“a calmer time”) 
would return. Now, writing twenty-five years later, we know that a calmer 
time has not come. And the central question is, of course, what can bring 
this about? Is the “calmer time” likely to return as a result of giving in to 
the theoterrorist demands, or will this, in fact, only draw us further into the 
quagmire?
Perhaps one may formulate it thus: do the Islamist ideas Khomeini 
conveyed not demand the removal of all material with a similar content to 
Rushdie’s book from the world? Legend has it that this was the position of 
the third Caliph, Uthman (c. 580–656), who ordered the destruction of 
the Library at Alexandria on the grounds that either the books agreed with 
the Quran, in which case they were redundant, or they disagreed with it, 
in which case they were worthless or evil. As John Grant writes: “In an act 
that has rightly been vilified throughout the centuries since, the Library’s 
62 Although Le Carré wrote a personal letter to Rushdie’s biographer Wheatherby explaining his stance 
towards The Satanic Verses. This is, however, not a retraction of his former dismissal of Rushdie’s 
book, nor does it make Le Carré’s views any clearer: see William J. Weatherby, Salman Rushdie: 
Sentenced to Death (New York: Carrol & Graf, 1990), in particular 170–171.
63 See, e.g., Richard Webster, A Brief History of Blasphemy: Liberalism, Censorship and The Satanic Verses 
(Oxford: The Orwell Press, 1990). Webster criticises Rushdie and tries to foster understanding for 
blasphemy laws.
64 William J. Weatherby, Salman Rushdie: Sentenced to Death (New York: Carrol & Graf, 1990), 171.
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books were used as fuel to heat Alexandria’s public baths. There were so 
many books that the burning took six months.”65
Grant may be right that this act has been vilified throughout the centuries, 
but it is not completely inconsistent with the worldview it aims to support. 
If you really believe that all that there is to say about morals, science, life and 
human destiny is included in one single book, why read all the others?
When St. Paul entered Ephesus “a number of those who practised magic 
collected their books and burned them publicly” (Acts 19:19). The French 
painter Eustache Le Sueur (1616–1655) made a magnificent painting about 
this early book burning: La Prédication de saint Paul à Ephèse (1649). We 
see the majestic figure of St. Paul presiding over a meeting, engaged in the 
noble art of burning blasphemous, heterodox, dissident or, from a certain 
perspective, “unnecessary” books.66
If we relate this to Rushdie’s book, we may ask ourselves whether it is 
not somewhat naïve to presume that condoning the censorship of one book 
will not lead to the censorship of other books—that Western intellectuals 
condemning Rushdie, or showing an understanding for physical violence 
after offence was taken, are complicit in the radical narrative that seeks 
to censor all types of material deemed “blasphemous”? John le Carré and 
John Berger perhaps thought that the fundamentalist mindset affected 
only Rushdie’s book and not theirs. But is that not too sanguine? And would 
Berger, Trevor-Roper, Dahl and Le Carré also be prepared to compromise 
if their own books were at stake?67 Would they be prepared to remove their 
own writings from the list of books to be published in the Western world if 
“horrified reactions” were to be the result of their products in other parts of 
the world?68 And should we give in only when books displease Iranian piety 
65 John Grant, Corrupted Science: Fraud, Ideology and Science (AAPPL Artists’ and Photographers’ Press, 
2007), 177.
66 See on this Frederick H. Cramer, “Bookburning and Censorship in Ancient Rome: A Chapter from 
the History of Ideas of Speech”, in Journal of the History of Ideas 6/2 (April, 1945) 157; Matthew 
Fishburn, Burning Books (Palgrave MacMillan, 2008).
67 Orhan Pamuk wrote that the attack on the freedom of one writer concerns all writers: see 
Orhan Pamuk, “Pour Rushdie,” in Anouar Abdallah et al., Pour Rushdie: Cent intellectuels arabes 
et musulmans pour la liberté d’expression (Paris: La Decouverte, Carréfour des littératures, Colibri, 
1993), 244–245.
68 Roald Dahl conceded that he would, when he said that “If I were Rushdie, then for the sake of 
everybody threatened I would agree to throw the bloody thing away. It would save lives.” See “Pulp 
book to save lives, says Dahl,” in The Times, 17 February 1989. Le Carré stated: “I am mystified that 
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or should we also give in to possible demands of other Islamists and dictators 
of a more secular type? If we show understanding for the Supreme Leader 
of the Islamic Revolution in Iran vowing to retaliate over a book he does 
not like, should we not show the same understanding for objections by the 
Supreme Leader of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea, or the House 
of Saud, over publications they despise?
Perhaps one would reject these musings as “speculative” and “not to the 
point.” But are they? If secular dictators or non-Islamist religious leaders see 
that threats of violence are a good device to stop the publication of critical 
books, then why should they not copycat Khomeini’s strategy?69
wIthdraw the BOOk untIl a calmer tIme has cOme
What many of Rushdie’s early commentators have in common is that they 
presumed the controversy over The Satanic Verses was exceptional and 
probably unique—not a precedent but an incident. This is even the case in 
Weller’s book (2009), which speaks about the Rushdie affair as something 
that has to do with the author Salman Rushdie. It was his personal liberty 
that was at stake, Weller tells us in the introduction to his monograph. 
Today we know that after the Charlie Hebdo attacks (2015), the riots over the 
Innocence of Muslims video70 (2012) and the Danish cartoons (2005/2006), 
the “calmer time” Le Carré hoped for has not come. And that requires us to 
assess how we want to counter the violence that terrorists have in store for 
us if we wish to continue exercising our civil liberties.
he hasn’t said: ‘It’s all a mess. My book has been wildly misunderstood, but as long as human lives 
are being wasted on account of it, I propose to withdraw it.’ I have to say that would be my position.” 
See Rachel Donadio, “Fighting Words on Sir Salman,” in the New York Times (online), July 15, 2007; 
William J. Weatherby, Salman Rushdie: Sentenced to Death (New York: Carrol & Graf, 1990), 170.
69 Which actually was the case with the satire comedy The Interview, which was about North Korea’s 
leader Kim Jong-un. In December 2014, North Korea promised 9/11-type attacks in American 
cinemas if The Interview were scheduled. In this conflict President Obama was unyielding: “We 
cannot have a society in which some dictator someplace can start imposing censorship here in 
the United States” (Remarks by the President in Year-End Press Conference, 19 December 2014). 
See also Bastiaan Rijpkema, Weerbare democratie: de grenzen van democratische tolerantie (Leiden: 
Dissertatie Leiden, 2015), 251.
70 See Tom Herrenberg, “Denouncing Divinity: Blasphemy, Human Rights, and the Struggle of 
Political Leaders to defend Freedom of Speech in the Case of Innocence of Muslims,” in Ancilla Iuris 
(2015) 1-19.
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In an interview broadcast on 14 February 1989, the same day the fatwa 
was issued, Rushdie was asked: “What you’ve written has been called 
insulting to Islam and a provocation to all Muslims. Did you take delight 
in provocation?” Rushdie did not comment on the word “delight,” but he 
picked up the word “provocation” and answered:
It depends what you mean by provocation. Any writer wishes to 
provoke the imagination. You want to make people think about what 
you’re writing. One of the reasons for writing, I believe, is to increase 
the sum of what it’s possible to think, to say “Let’s look at it a different 
way.” If it works, then people are provoked, and maybe they don’t like 
it.71
But this idea (and ideal) of “provocation” was not shared among all prominent 
novelists of his generation. Few commentators seemed to understand or 
even suspect that this might not be about one specific author of one specific 
book, but about a whole way of living. Since Khomeini’s edict calling for 
Rushdie’s death was a symptom of a phenomenon—religious extremism 
targeting free speech in the West—quite unfamiliar to post-Second World 
War Europe, we should make note of the fact that we have something those 
commentators did not, namely the luxury of hindsight. And in hindsight we 
can argue that the Rushdie controversy proved to be at least as much about 
national sovereignty and a culture of freedom as it has developed in some 
parts of the world72 (and not others), as it was about one particular and 
controversial book.
cOnclusIOn: censOrshIp By terrOrIsm prOVed here tO stay
An early response to the controversy over The Satanic Verses from Rushdie’s 
publisher Viking Penguin addressed the core of the problem Khomeini’s 
declaration created. This response by a spokesman of Viking Penguin was 
as follows: 
71 See Lisa Appignanesi and Sara Maitland (eds), The Rushdie File (Syracuse, NY: Syracuse University 
Press, 1990), 23.
72 In Europe, according to Henri Mendras, L’Europe des Européens: Sociologie de l’Europe occidentale 
(Paris: Gallimard, 1997), 52.
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It is inconceivable to most of us in the West that a writer, and a 
distinguished writer at that, should not be able to express his ideas, and 
that publishers should not be permitted to publish them, booksellers 
not permitted to sell them, and that readers should be excluded from 
the marketplace of ideas. If the present tendency continues, the 
Ayatollah will have prevailed. This is not censorship with respect to the 
First Amendment, this is censorship by terrorism and intimidation.73
Indeed, the Rushdie affair can be regarded as the locus classicus of a social 
phenomenon new to modern Western societies: severe extrajudicial 
punishment for utterances deemed “unacceptable” to the most radical 
elements of a religion, as interpreted by the most radical leaders of that 
religion. As such, the controversy over The Satanic Verses was, in a way, 
compared to what happened at the Charlie Hebdo office, a haunting preview 
of things to come.
We started this chapter with Hugh Trevor-Roper’s remark that he would 
not shed a tear if some British Muslims waylaid Salman Rushdie in a dark 
street to seek to improve his manners. The famous British historian hoped 
that after this, Rushdie would “control his pen” and he thought that “society 
would benefit” from this and literature “would not suffer.” Fast-forward to 
today’s state of affairs; it is impossible to say whether Trevor-Roper, had he 
still been alive, would have justified the murder of the French cartoonists in 
2015 in the same fashion. This is clearly something of much greater impact 
than having a writer beaten up in a dark street. One may argue that Rushdie 
“controlled his pen” in the sense that he never again wrote a book like The 
Satanic Verses. But others took over the torch of liberty—and some paid a 
heavy price for it. When four million people demonstrated in the streets 
of Paris after the Charlie Hebdo attacks, and more than forty heads of state 
joined the procession in favour of free speech and the necessity of defying the 
religious militants, this was a sign of hope. Yet, notwithstanding this sign of 
support for the liberty to write and speak, the last twenty-five years have also 
proven that “censorship by terrorism and intimidation” has become more 
familiar to Western societies than one might have thought in the 1980s—
and remains a problem that is as hard to solve now as it was then.
73 “Rushdie’s Publisher Assails ‘Censorship by Terrorism,’” in the New York Times, 19 February 1989.
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7  John Stuart Mill’s “If All Mankind Minus One”  
Tested in a Modern Blasphemy Case
 Paul Cliteur, Tom Herrenberg & Bastiaan Rijpkema
IntrOductIOn: mIll and the tyranny Of the preVaIlIng OpInIOn
If all mankind minus one, were of one opinion, and only one person 
were of the contrary opinion, mankind would be no more justified 
in silencing that one person, than he, if he had the power, would be 
justified in silencing mankind.1
Thus wrote John Stuart Mill (1806–1873), one of the champions of individual 
liberty and freedom of speech, in his seminal work On Liberty (1859). The latter 
part of the quotation—one person is not justified in silencing mankind—is 
a truism: we would call a person who has the ambition to silence mankind 
a “dictator” or a “tyrant.” But what makes this quotation interesting is the 
first part: neither does mankind have the right to silence the individual—not 
even when this person’s ideas or opinions are shared by no one else. Mill was 
worried not only about the restrictions on liberty imposed by a single tyrant, 
but also by restrictions imposed on individual members of society by the 
majority. In the first chapter of On Liberty, Mill argues that
Protection ... against the tyranny of the magistrate is not enough: there 
needs protection also against the tyranny of the prevailing opinion 
and feeling; against the tendency of society to impose, by other means 
than civil penalties, its own ideas and practices as rules of conduct 
on those who dissent from them; to fetter the development, and, if 
possible, prevent the formation, of any individuality not in harmony 
1 John Stuart Mill, On Liberty (London: Longman Green and Co., 1865 (1859)), 10.
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with its ways, and compel all characters to fashion themselves upon 
the model of its own.2
The intriguing power of Mill’s argument begins to manifest itself when we 
realise that what was sheer speculation in the nineteenth century attains 
a new dimension in our time. In Mill’s time a speaker’s audience was 
relatively local; it would have been difficult to establish what idea or opinion 
was rejected by the overwhelming majority of the people or by “mankind.” 
We could have speculated about this, but we would have had no means of 
verifying our speculations. It would have remained a thought experiment. 
This is no longer the case due to modern technology. Modern technology has 
also fundamentally changed ease of communication. News and opinions can 
reach most places in the world not in a week or a day, but in a second. Most of 
“mankind” is only a keystroke away. This unprecedented interconnectedness 
on two levels—the ability to receive extraordinary numbers of opinions and 
the ability to share one’s own opinions with virtually the whole world—has 
consequences for free speech.
In this chapter we will discuss one particularly controversial opinion 
that indeed gained worldwide attention, namely the burning of the Islamic 
holy book, the Quran, by the American Pastor Terry Jones.3 Pastor Jones—
head of the Florida-based church the Dove World Outreach Center—was 
in the media spotlight for several months in 2010. His actions gave rise 
to considerable and uncomfortable dilemmas concerning free speech and 
religious extremism, dilemmas that make it worthwhile to analyse this affair 
in more detail. Of all the unpopular, controversial or contested opinions 
regarding religion that recent decades have produced—such as Rushdie’s 
The Satanic Verses,4 the mockery of Ayatollah Khomeini by the television 
2 Ibid., 3.
3 The discussion of the Terry Jones affair in this chapter is in part a reworked and updated translation 
of an article that appeared in Dutch as Bastiaan Rijpkema, “Vrijheid van meningsuiting in de val 
tussen religieus extremisme en utilitarisme”, Nederlands Juristenblad 44/45 (2012) 3106–3111; parts 
of that article were also used in Paul Cliteur, Tom Herrenberg and Bastiaan Rijpkema, “The New 
Censorship: A Case Study of the Extrajudicial Restraints on Free Speech”, in Afshin Ellian and Gelijn 
Molier (eds), Freedom of Speech under Attack (The Hague: Eleven Publishing 2015), 291 at 305-315.
4 See Paul Cliteur, “Van Rushdie tot Jones: over geweld en uitingsvrijheid”, in Afshin Ellian, Gelijn 
Molier and Tom Zwart (eds), Mag ik dit zeggen? Beschouwingen over de vrijheid van meningsuiting 
(The Hague: Boom Juridische Uitgevers (2011), 67–89 and Paul Cliteur, Tom Herrenberg and 
Bastiaan Rijpkema, “The New Censorship: A Case Study of Extrajudicial Restraints on Free Speech,” 
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host and comedian Rudi Carrell,5 and the Danish cartoons6—Pastor 
Jones’ idea was by far the most unpopular of all. After all, in the case of 
Rushdie there was at least a considerable part of mankind that liked reading 
his novel. There was “artistic value” to it. In the case of Carrell, at least a 
considerable part of Germany’s television audience liked what he did. And 
in the case of the Danish cartoons there were at least some people who liked 
some of the cartoons. But not with Jones. When, in the summer of 2010, 
Jones announced that he intended to burn a Quran, there were almost no 
members of “mankind” who favoured his approach.7 So, here we have it: 
the situation Mill spoke of in 1859. A man using his legal right to free speech 
in a way that almost everybody objected to. Virtually the whole of mankind 
minus one agrees—and so do we—on not burning the Quran, and holy books 
in general; the question is, however: should this affect his legal right to do 
so?
By analysing this affair in detail we hope to contribute to the understanding 
of a complex contemporary social phenomenon: legally protected, yet for 
some offensive, speech that for some radical believers is reason to resort 
to violent means. It is also part of a larger research effort to come to grips 
with what could be seen as a new, subtle form of censorship: emerging 
extrajudicial (non-legal) restraints on free speech, resulting from threats and 
actual violence against people who use their legal free speech rights.
The chapter can be read in two ways: as a chronological reconstruction of 
a thought experiment that becomes reality, and as a thematic discussion of 
the real-life political and moral dilemmas a “mankind minus one” situation 
confronts us with. 
There is also a way in which the chapter explicitly should not be read: 
as a defense of the “morality” or “acceptability” of burning a Quran or any 
other (sacred) book—this is emphatically not such a defense. We, like many 
in Afshin Ellian and Gelijn Molier (eds), Freedom of Speech under Attack (The Hague: Eleven 
International Publishing, 2015), 291-318 (on Rushdie 296-299).
5 See Paul Cliteur, “The Rudi Carrell Affair and its Significance for the Tension between 
Theoterrorism and Religious Satire,” in Ancilla Iuris (2013) 15-42.
6 Paul Cliteur, Tom Herrenberg and Bastiaan Rijpkema, “The New Censorship: A Case Study of 
Extrajudicial Restraints on Free Speech,” in Afshin Ellian and Gelijn Molier (eds), Freedom of Speech 
under Attack (The Hague: Eleven International Publishing, 2015), 291–318 (on the Danish Cartoons: 
302–304).
7 “Florida Church Plans Koran Burning on 9/11 anniversary”, Agence France Presse, 31 July 2010, see 
also ‘‘Who is Terry Jones? Pastor behind ‘Burn a Koran-day,” ABC News, 7 September 2010.
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others, think burning a holy book, and books in general, is distasteful and 
objectionable. Our aim here is to explore the free speech controversies and 
dilemmas a real-life “mankind minus one” situation gives rise to—and there 
is no better example than the Terry Jones affair. In the following paragraphs 
we will first present the background of Terry Jones’s ideas and his plan to 
burn a Quran. 
terry JOnes and hIs dOVe wOrld Outreach center
The Dove World Outreach Center in Gainesville, Florida, was founded in 1986. 
Ten years after its founding, Terry Jones and his wife obtained leadership of 
the church.8 Jones’s church has long been known for its vociferous protests. 
The church thinks Christians should be more assertive in public debates, 
and this includes “strong protests against sins.’’ Thus, the church organised 
several protests against homosexuality and abortion that drew a lot of media 
attention.9 For instance, during a recent mayoral election campaign in 
Gainesville, the church posted a sign saying “No Homo Mayor” outside 
its building in a protest against the Democratic mayoral candidate, Craig 
Lowe.10 In addition to its protests, the Dove World Outreach Center also 
operates an online shop that sells a book written by Jones called Islam Is of 
the Devil as well as a number of hats, T-shirts and mugs with the same text.11 
In 2009, the church caused some commotion when several church 
members sent their children to public schools with “Islam is of the Devil” 
T-shirts. In reaction, the school forbade the children to wear the T-shirts to 
school, since it could “disrupt the learning process” and “offend or distract” 
other students.12
8 “Profile: Dove World Outreach Centre”, BBC US & Canada, 1 April 2011.
9 Michael Tomasky, “Church will burn Koran on 9–11”, Guardian, 27 July 2010.
10 “City tries to shake off ‘embarrassment’ of Koran-burning church”, BBC US & Canada, 9 September 
2010.
11 “Florida Church Plans Koran Burning on 9/11 anniversary”, Agence France Presse, 31 July 2010. 
12 Michael Tomasky, “Church will burn Koran on 9-11”, Guardian, 27 July 2010; Christopher Curry, 
“Devil shirts send kids home”, Gainesville.com/The Gainesville Sun, 26 August 2010.
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July 2010: new realItIes
The biggest controversy started in July 2010, when Jones used Facebook to 
announce an “International Burn a Koran Day,” to be held at his church on 
11 September 2010, in “honour” of the victims of the terrorist attacks on 
the World Trade Center in New York, then exactly nine years previously.13 
Jones’s idea was eccentric, but not entirely new. On 14 January 1989, in the 
town of Bradford in northern England another book burning was organised: 
Salman Rushdie’s The Satanic Verses. As Kenan Malik (b. 1960) writes in 
From Fatwa to Jihad: The Rushdie Affair and its Legacy (2009), the novel was 
tied to a stake before being set alight in front of the police station. “It was 
an act calculated to shock and offend,” Malik writes.14 And it did more than 
that. “The burning book became an icon of the rage of Islam.”15 After Terry 
Jones had announced his plans, Assistant Pastor Wayne Sapp uploaded 
a video to YouTube in which the church’s intentions were explained, 
and—to add weight to the announcement—he included some images of a 
burning Quran.16 On 21 July 2010, the Religious News Service re-aired the 
announcement,17 and in the following days the news spread to, among other 
countries, England,18 the Netherlands19 and France.20 A few days later, on 
31 July 2010, the first terrorist threat was made: members of the “Al Falluja 
jihadist forum” threatened to “spill rivers of your (American) blood.”21 
13 “Florida Church Plans Koran Burning on 9/11 anniversary”, Agence France Presse, 31 July 2010; see 
also ‘‘Who is Terry Jones? Pastor behind ‘Burn a Koran-day’’, ABC News, 7 September 2010.
14 Kenan Malik, From Fatwa to Jihad: The Rushdie Affair and Its Legacy (London: Atlantic Books, 2009),  
ix.; Dominique Thomas, Le Londonistan: Le djihad au Coeur de l’Europe (Éditions Michalon, 2005), 
34.
15 Kenan Malik, From Fatwa to Jihad: The Rushdie Affair and Its Legacy (London: Atlantic Books, 2009), 
p. ix.; Paul Weller, A Mirror for our Times: “The Rushdie Affair” and the Future of Multiculturalism 
(London/New York: Continuum, 2009), 2.
16 ‘How Koran burning story grew from obscurity’, BBC, 10 September 2010.
17 Ibid.
18 “Church will burn Koran on 9-11”, Guardian, 27 July 2010.
19 “Kerk roept op tot Koranverbranding”, Reformatorisch Dagblad, 28 July 2010.
20 “Une église de Floride propose de bruler le Coran le 11 septembre”, Agence France Presse, 31 July 
2010.
21 “Florida Church Plans Koran Burning on 9/11 anniversary”, Agence France Presse, 31 July 2010. 
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So, when the leader of a small church of about fifty members22 in the 
fairly small town of Gainesville23 announces that he intends to burn a 
Quran, this announcement apparently reaches the Netherlands—in this 
case, the small Christian “Reformed Daily” (Reformatorisch Dagblad)—
within the same month.24 Modern means of communication make the 
world community more closely knit. We live in a “Global Village,” as 
Marshall McLuhan (1911–1980) said in 1962.25 In times of ongoing terrorist 
threats, however, our stay in the “Global Village” is becoming increasingly 
less pleasant than the idea of a “village” might suggest. The reality of our 
time is that what happens in one country is most likely to have effects in 
other countries.26 Contemporary terrorism is transnational by its nature and 
recognises no international boundaries.27 In his 2006 inaugural lecture at 
the University of Leiden, the Netherlands, legal philosopher Afshin Ellian 
(b. 1966) underlined the significance of this development, specifically in 
relation to religious extremism:
Young Muslims predominantly radicalise on Internet fora. 
Globalisation, media technology and high-speed communications 
have changed our world permanently. The hallmark of this 
established glob ality is, according to Peter Sloterdijk, a state of 
forced neighbourhood with innumerable accidentally coexisting 
persons, where terrorism, as the romance of pure attack, is a 
disinhibition of the dense world. Maybe Sloterdijk is right in his 
22 Estimations vary. According to the local newspaper the Gainesville Sun, the church has 50 members, 
see: “Petraeus: Dove World’s Quran burning may have global impact”, Gainesville Sun, 7 September 
2010, available at: http://www.gainesville.com/article/20100907/ARTICLES/100909663.
23 Gainesville has approximately 128,460 inhabitants (2014), see: http://www.census.gov/quickfacts/
table/PST045215/1225175,00.
24 “Kerk roept op tot Koranverbranding”, Reformatorisch Dagblad, 28 July 2010, available at: http://
www.refdag.nl/kerkplein/kerknieuws/kerk_vs_roept_op_tot_koranverbranding_1_493456.
25 See M. McLuhan, The Gutenberg Galaxy: the making of typographic man (Toronto: The University of 
Toronto Press, 1962), inter alia, 21 and 31. Globalisation as such, of course, began much earlier. See, 
e.g., J.M. Roberts, The Penguin History of Europe (London: Penguin Books, 1996), 340–341.
26 See Paul Cliteur, Het Monotheïstisch Dilemma (Amsterdam: De Arbeiderspers, 2010), 78 and also 
Peter Singer, One World: The Ethics of Globalization (New Haven, CT/London: Yale University Press 
2004), 7.
27 See also Paul Cliteur and Machteld Zee, “Staat, religie en terreur: niets nieuws,” in Claudia 
Bouteligier and Afshin Ellian (eds), Fundamentele verhalen: over recht, literatuur en film (The Hague: 
Boom Juridische Uitgevers, 2014), 56-57.
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assertion that telecommunication is the practical consummation of 
the Enlightenment: a deliberating open world with all its attendant 
consequences. Half-truths, uncontrolled facts and selective 
interpretations are everyday practice on the Internet. People express 
their abhorrence of Abu Ghraib without reporting the number of 
American soldiers who were prosecuted and convicted of assault. They 
rile each other up and encourage hatred of dissenters, the democratic 
order and its institutions. The Internet is a thriving bazaar of hate-
trade.28
The “deliberating open world”—the “consummation of the Enlightenment”—
is not without consequences. It affects, for instance, counterterrorism: 
intelligence services are pushed online to try to hinder the recruitment 
of extremists that happens there.29 The Terry Jones affair shows another 
consequence of this interconnected world: free speech and its limits can no 
longer be studied in the isolation of a single legal order.
septemBer 2010: when Is a “reQuest” nO lOnger a reQuest?
In September 2010, just before the planned burning, the media attention 
started to gather momentum. The responses to Jones’s plans intensified 
accordingly. After protests broke out in Indonesia30 and Afghanistan,31 
government officials from Pakistan,32 Egypt 33 and Iraq,34 among others, also 
condemned the proposed burning.35 Iran blamed Israel.36
28 Afshin Ellian, ‘Sociale cohesie en islamitisch terrorisme (Social cohesion and Islamic terrorism)’ 
(Leiden: Inaugural lecture Leiden University, 2006), 20 (translation by the authors), full text, 
available at: https://openaccess.leidenuniv.nl/bitstream/handle/1887/12992/Oratie%20Ellian.
pdf?sequence=1.
29 Ibid., 24–25.
30 “Protest rallies against ‘Burn a Quran day’ continue,” Asia-Pacific News Agencies, 5 September 2010.
31 “Qu’ran burning: Protester ‘shot dead’ as NATO troops open fire on demonstrators”, Guardian, 
10 September 2010.
32 “Worldwide outrage at planned Quran burning”, Al Arabiya, 9 September 2010.
33 Ibid.
34 Ibid.
35 For an overview of countries that condemned the burning see http://www.csmonitor.com/World/
Global-Issues/2010/0909/11-countries-speaking-out-against-Koran-burning-in-Florida.
36 According to Iranian Foreign Minister Manouchehr Mottaki the burning was “orchestrated by 
the Zionist regime after being defeated in its efforts against Muslims and the Islamic world”: see 
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In the meantime David Petraeus (b. 1952), at that time the International 
Security Assistance Force (ISAF) commander in Afghanistan, also 
condemned the proposed burning and warned of possible consequences: “It 
could endanger troops and it could endanger the overall effort. It is precisely 
the kind of action the Taliban uses and could cause significant problems. 
Not just here, but everywhere in the world we are engaged with the Islamic 
community.”37
Following Petraeus, the burning was condemned by a diverse parade of 
celebrities and government officials, from actress Angelina Jolie (b. 1975)38 
and the Veterans of Foreign Wars of the United States,39 to the U.S. embassy 
in Kabul,40 the lieutenant general of the UN training mission in Afghanistan, 
William Caldwell (b. 1954),41 Secretary of State Hillary Clinton (b. 1947)42 
and NATO Secretary General Rasmussen (b. 1953).43 
Amid all the commotion, on 7 September a White House spokesman 
declared that the White House subscribed to Petraeus’s warning.44 Then 
things accelerated. Two days after the White House statement, U.S. President 
Obama (b. 1961) appeared on “Good Morning America,” where he explicitly 
called on Jones to refrain from the Quran burning. The President said the 
following:  
What he’s proposing to do is completely contrary to our values as 
Americans; that this country has been built on the notions of religious 
freedom and religious tolerance. And as a very practical matter, as 
commander-in-chief of the armed forces of the United States, I just 
want him to understand that this stunt that he is talking about pulling 
could greatly endanger our young men and women in uniform who are 
“Worldwide outrage at planned Quran burning”, Al Arabiya, 9 September 2010.
37 “In quotes: Koran-burning threat”, BBC US & Canada, 10 September 2010.
38 “Angelina Jolie condemns planned Quran burning by Florida church”, CBS News, 9 September 2010.
39 “Major US veterans group condemns planned Koran burning”, Agence France Presse, 7 September 
2010.
40 “Petraeus: Koran burning plan will endanger US troops”, BBC South Asia, 7 September 2010.
41 “U.S. Afghanistan commanders condemn Koran-burning plan”, Reuters, 6 September 2010.
42 “Clinton condemns Quran-burning plan”, CNN U.S., 8 September 2010.
43 “Pressure mounts in U.S. against Koran-burning plan”, Reuters, 7 September 2010.
44 “Quran burning plan a ‘concern’: White House”, CBC News, 8 September 2010.
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in Iraq, who are in Afghanistan. We’re already seeing protests against 
Americans just by the mere threat that he is making.45
When asked what he was worried about, Obama replied: “Well, look, this is 
a recruitment bonanza for al-Qaida.”46
That same day Jones declared—despite the pressure from the White 
House—that he was still determined to burn a Quran on 11 September.47 
A few hours after Obama’s appearance on “Good Morning America,” Jones 
received a direct phone call from U.S. Secretary of Defense Robert Gates (b. 
1943). During a brief conversation, Gates pointed to the potential dangers 
to American forces and urged Jones to cancel his plans.48 After a period of 
uncertainty it was reported that Jones had decided not to burn a Quran on 
11 September.
So, quite extraordinarily, Jones seemed to give in at the very last moment, 
but the commotion that preceded it is more interesting: several government 
officials, including President Obama, indirectly called on Jones not to proceed 
with his plans, until finally even the U.S. Secretary of Defense personally 
urged Jones to cancel the burning.
Was the reason that Obama did not call Jones himself that somehow 
he felt this was not something an American president is supposed to do? 
General Petraeus’s advice to Jones was widely seen as sensible. Or should 
it be explained as an admission of failure: what is the purpose of bringing 
freedom to Iraq and Afghanistan while simultaneously suppressing freedom 
at home?
Acknowledging that there are no easy answers to these questions, should 
it not be admitted that they are the right questions to pose? Were these not 
the problems and dilemmas that should have been addressed? 
The fact that this discussion did not take place may be seen as a trifle—
and some will undoubtedly experience it as such. But was it really? Is this 
not one of the most fundamental discussions we can engage in in political 
philosophy? A discussion about what the proper functions of the state are 
and whether the state, indeed, acts as a state should?
45 For a transcript of the interview see “Opinion Roundup: Burning the Quran”, National Public Radio, 
9 September 2010.
46 Ibid.
47 “Florida Pastor Determined to Carry Out Quran Burning”, AOL News, 8 September 2010.
48 “Obama’s Pentagon Chief calls Florida Pastor”, USA Today, 10 September 2010.
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We should also seriously ask ourselves what was the status of freedom of 
speech after Obama and other high-level politicians—even in a direct phone 
call—had made their appeals to Jones? It seems fair to say that the mob-like 
terrorist threats resulted in a great deal of equivocation from many of the 
American political and media elites on the issue of free speech. Has trying to 
find different ways to discourage Jones from exercising his First Amendment 
rights made Americans safer? Is it likely that religious extremists are satisfied 
with the President’s efforts? So satisfied that they will now leave Americans 
and their free speech rights alone? Or is it likely that those extremists will 
threaten Americans again the next time something they do not like is to 
be published—a book, or a film, or a musical, or a cartoon? Those are the 
questions “mankind minus one” confronts us with.
Not all American politicians took the same stance as Obama. New York 
City Mayor Michael Bloomberg (b. 1942) did not join the others in asking 
Jones to cancels his plans; he defended Jones’s constitutional right to burn 
the Quran: “The First Amendment protects everybody, and you can’t say 
that we’re going to apply the First Amendment to only those cases where 
we are in agreement.”49 Indeed, the First Amendment protection of free 
speech would be meaningless if it applied only to speech the government or 
the majority of the population approved of—the modern American tradition 
of free speech is “Millian” in the sense that it protects those who hold 
conventional opinions (“all mankind”) as much as it protects eccentrics (“all 
mankind minus one”). In the words of Justice Holmes (1841–1935): 
If there is any principle of the Constitution that more imperatively 
calls for attachment than any other it is the principle of free thought—
not free thought for those who agree with us but freedom for the 
thought that we hate.50
In the Terry Jones affair, it seems that not the U.S. president but the New 
York mayor was the “Millian” or “Holmesian”: defending shocking and 
uncomfortable but legally protected speech. Interestingly enough, more 
recently we did see a quite strident “Millian” Obama. In 2014, Sony Pictures 
released a big Hollywood film called The Interview, a satirical film about 
North Korea. Towards the end of the film the current leader’s head is blown 
49 “Bloomberg Defends Florida Pastor’s Right to Hold Quran Burning Rally”, CBS News, 8 September 
2010.
50 United States v. Schwimmer, 279 U.S. 644 (1929).
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up—in graphic special effects.51 Defending free speech after severe threats 
against Sony Pictures and movie theatres, Obama said the following:
We cannot have a society in which some dictator someplace can start 
imposing censorship here in the United States. Because if somebody 
is able to intimidate folks out of releasing a satirical movie, imagine 
what they start doing when they see a documentary that they don’t 
like, or news reports that they don’t like. Or even worse, imagine if 
producers and distributors and others start engaging in self-censorship 
because they don’t want to offend the sensibilities of somebody whose 
sensibilities probably need to be offended. So that’s not who we 
are. That’s not what America is about.52
This is a very different Obama—only compare this statement to the one he 
made in the Terry Jones affair. 
Opinions, instructions, and requests of government officials are most likely 
to impact on free speech. Using your freedom of speech after a telephone 
call from the U.S. Secretary of Defense is not exactly the same as doing 
so without having received such a call. This presents us with a serious 
political philosophical dilemma that deserves thorough discussion. Should 
government officials—in function—give unsolicited and proactive “advice” 
to citizens on the use of their free speech? In the end, such government 
interventions could very well legitimise and strengthen the extrajudicial 
restraints terrorists and extremists try to impose on free speech. In other 
words, protecting free speech forces us to make up our minds, choosing 
between the intervening Obama in the Terry Jones affair, and the Millian 
Obama we saw during the controversy over The Interview.
aprIl 2011: the mOral respOnsIBIlIty fOr speech acts
After Jones had announced that he would not burn a Quran on 11 September, 
things remained quiet for a long time. Worth mentioning, however, are the 
51 “Sony cancels The Interview release amid threats”, BBC, 18 December 2014.
52 “Remarks by the President in Year-End Press Conference”, The White House, Office of the Press 
Secretary, 19 December 2014, available at: https://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2014/12/19/
remarks-president-year-end-press-conference. 
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$180,000 bill Jones received for police deployment during the controversy53 
and the fact that he was forbidden to enter the United Kingdom.54 However, 
in early 2011, Jones announced on the church’s website that on 20 March 
2011 an “International Judge the Koran Day” would be held.55 This time the 
event actually did take place, and at the end of the trial the Quran was found 
“guilty” and sentenced to death which, for a book, turned out to be burning.56
The burning produced a new storm of protest. There were protests 
throughout Afghanistan, and in Pakistan extremists placed a $2.4 million 
bounty on Jones’s head.57 Hezbollah declared that it held the U.S. government 
responsible for the burning, and Iran spoke of “crimes that contribute to 
the American hegemonic conspiracy.”58 A low point was reached on 1 April 
2011, when multiple United Nations staff members were killed in the Afghan 
city Mazar-e-Sharif when “demonstrators poured out of mosques in the 
city in the early afternoon, shortly after Friday prayers where worshippers 
had been angered by reports that a Florida pastor had burned a copy of the 
Quran.”59
Although the responses to the violent murders varied, and some firmly 
rejected attributing responsibility for the murders to Jones,60 there were 
also other opinions. The British newspaper The Guardian set up an opinion 
poll shortly after the killings in Afghanistan, in which it asked its readers to 
respond to the following question: 
Is the Florida pastor who burnt the Quran morally responsible for the 
deaths of UN staff in protests in Afghanistan?
53 “Pastor who threatened to burn Korans told to pay police bill”, Telegraph, 20 September 2010.
54 “Pastor Terry Jones banned from UK after 9/11 Quran burning threat”, Guardian, 20 January 2010. 
55 “Florida pastor Terry Jones’s Koran burning has far-reaching effects”, Washington Post, 2 April 2011.
56 Ibid.
57 “This Week”, ABC News, 27 March 2011, transcript available at: http://abcnews.go.com/ThisWeek/
week-transcript-gen-jim-jones-ret/story?id=13285705#.UHPzFXbgAVc, and “Florida pastor Terry 
Jones’s Koran burning has far-reaching effects”, Washington Post, 2 April 2011.
58 “Hezbollah blames U.S. for Florida Quran burning”, The Star, 23 March 2011.
59 See “UN staff killed in Afghanistan amid protests over Qur’an burning”, Guardian, 1 April 2011.
60 See, e.g., Brendan O’Neill, “Pastor Terry Jones is no more to blame for the Afghan violence than 
Martin Scorsese was for the shooting of Ronald Reagan”, Guardian, 1 April 2011.
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The readers could choose from two options: 
“Yes, it is a provocative blasphemy against others’ beliefs,” 
or: 
“No, it should be considered a legitimate free speech act.” 
The results: 45 per cent of the readers held Jones morally accountable for the 
deaths of the UN workers in Afghanistan.61
The “reasons” that The Guardian attached to the options “Yes” and “No” 
might sound somewhat peculiar. If you choose the option “Yes, morally 
responsible,” it is because the burning is a “provocative blasphemy against 
others’ beliefs.” So, one might wonder, are we to accept that—apparently—
the murder of innocents is an “understandable” response to provocative 
statements? If people are that “insulting”—hence the “provocative 
blasphemy”—you cannot expect them to refrain from violence. From an 
ethical perspective we believe we can be brief on this: even if you are prepared 
to consider the burning of a, for some, sacred book to be a “crime,”62 this 
could never constitute a (moral) justification for murder. Any ethical theory 
should satisfy such a basic requirement of proportionality.
However, we can speculate whether those who do see Jones as morally 
responsible could substantiate their position in a more sophisticated way 
than the “standard answer” The Guardian opinion poll suggests. The ethical 
theory of utilitarianism offers such a possibility.
Utilitarianism assesses the moral worth of an act entirely on the basis 
of its consequences.63 Therefore a judgment on how the burning of a Quran 
compares to murder—which has little validity—is not needed here. A 
utilitarian uses the “principle of the greatest happiness (or utility) for the 
greatest number.”64 Acts are thus good when they promote the general 
61 For the results, see: http://www.guardian.co.uk/commentisfree/cifamerica/poll/2011/apr/01/
christianity-islam.
62 This is what the “Yes” response suggests, given the wording “provocative blasphemy.”
63 See in general: Rachels, Stuart, The Elements of Moral Philosophy, New York: McGraw-Hill, 2007, 
pp. 89–91, 100–116; Kenny, Anthony, A New History of Western Philosophy (Vol. iv): Philosophy in the 
Modern World, Oxford: Oxford University Press 2008, 220–228.
64 John Stuart Mill explains this principle in his “Utilitarianism”, see Mill, John Stuart, On Liberty 
and Utilitarianism, London: David Campbell Publishers 1992, see: Rachels, Stuart, The Elements of 
Moral Philosophy, New York: McGraw-Hill, 2007, 89 and 100–101; Kenny, Anthony, A New History of 
Western Philosophy (Vol. iv): Philosophy in the Modern World, Oxford: Oxford University Press 2008, 
226.
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happiness and bad when they reduce the general happiness.65 In our case 
a utilitarian argument could look like this: the benefits of burning the book 
must be weighed against the benefits of not burning the book. On the basis 
of a utilitarian calculation, the utilitarian would likely conclude that the 
utility of not burning the book will be higher than the possible benefits of 
Jones actually burning the book (no riots and numerous deaths versus the 
comparatively lesser utility of drawing temporary attention to the Islam-
criticism of a small American congregation). Therefore it follows that 
burning the Quran is not morally justified. 
Problematic in such a utilitarian argument is that the moral agent (in this 
case, Jones) is held to be responsible for all—deliberate or non-deliberate—
consequences of his actions. This makes the person himself disappear in one 
large utilitarian calculation, making him lose his personal integrity, or, in 
other words, the relationship between his actions and his goals is broken. 
Philosopher Bernard Williams (1929–2003) convincingly formulates this 
criticism in his article “A Critique of Utilitarianism.”66 Williams gives two 
examples to illustrate this defect. We will discuss his most striking example 
at some length. This example is known as the story of Jim and Pedro.67
the stOry Of JIm and pedrO
On a botanical expedition in South America, Jim, by chance, finds himself in 
the central square of a small town. Against a wall in the square twenty Indians 
are tied up, held at gunpoint by armed men. Pedro, the leader of the armed 
men, explains that he is about to execute this randomly selected group of 
Indians in retaliation for earlier held protests against the government, so that 
potential future protesters will remember the benefits of “not protesting.” 
But since Jim is a “special guest” from another country who has met them by 
chance, Pedro is happy to award Jim a privilege: Jim is allowed to kill one of 
the Indians. If Jim does so, Pedro will let the other Indians go, to add “extra 
65 This was already formulated by Jeremy Bentham; it should also be noted that, for a utilitarian, 
everyone’s happiness weighs equally, see: Rachels, Stuart, The Elements of Moral Philosophy, New 
York: McGraw-Hill, 2007, 90 and 100.
66 See Williams, Bernard, “A Critique of Utilitarianism”, in Smart, J.J.C. & Williams, B. (eds.), 
Utilitarianism: for and against, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1973, 77–150. 
67 Ibid., 98–99.
JOHN STUART MILL’S “IF ALL MANKIND MINUS ONE” 171
luster to the special occasion.” If Jim refuses, there is, of course, no special 
occasion, so Pedro will still have to kill all the Indians.
For a moment, Jim considers if he can seize one of the guns and keep 
the would-be murderers at gunpoint, but it is quite clear that—given the 
situation—this is impossible. The Indians understand this too and beg Jim to 
do what Pedro asks. What should Jim do?
For a utilitarian, the answer is clear: Jim should kill one Indian, thereby 
“saving” the other Indians.68 The morally right action in this case, on the 
basis of a utilitarian calculation (one dead Indian or twenty dead Indians), 
should therefore be: killing one Indian. And, as a consequence, not killing one 
Indian would make him responsible for the killing of twenty Indians—after 
all, he was in a position to prevent those deaths. Just as Jones is considered 
to be responsible for the actions of protesters in Mazar-e-Sharif, Jim is held 
responsible for the consequences someone else (in this case, Pedro) attaches 
to his actions.
This is a point of vital importance: in utilitarianism intentions play no 
role, so persons can (also) be held accountable for consequences, unsolicited 
and unwanted, others connect to their actions. In doing so, utilitarianism 
contradicts our most fundamental intuitions about responsibility and justice, 
namely: people are only responsible for their own actions. Otherwise people 
lose their personal integrity: if “everyone is responsible for everything,” it is 
no longer important what people themselves wanted. However distasteful the 
burning of a “sacred book” might be—again, we agree it is very distasteful—
the consequences that protesters on the other side of the world attach to this 
burning can never be morally attributed to Jones. Moreover, to do so would 
also disregard the “moral agency” of the murderers.
cOnclusIOn: gOVernments and the lure Of utIlItarIanIsm
The Terry Jones affair is a striking example of a new reality when it comes 
to constitutional freedoms: in an interconnected world, free speech cannot 
be studied in the isolation of a single legal order. Terrorists and extremists 
on the other side of the globe force restrictions on the use of free speech by 
a U.S. citizen, and coerce the U.S. government to intervene. Extremists even 
68 See ibid., 99.
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tie grave, violent consequences (terrorist attacks, murder) to speech that is 
legally protected in a different legal order, almost 12,000 kilometers away.69 
This new reality gives rise to serious moral dilemmas and political 
quandaries. The moral question was addressed above: utilitarianism 
seems to suggest (we believe: unconvincingly) that a person bears moral 
responsibility for the unwanted and unsolicited consequences others tie 
to their speech acts. To conclude our discussion, let us now return to the 
political dimension of our new reality, zooming in on Obama’s response to 
the Terry Jones affair one last time. When it comes to explaining government 
reactions to extremists’ demands regarding constitutional freedoms, the 
theory of utilitarianism again seems illuminating. 
Changing our perspective to that of government officials means asking 
a different question: should we not limit certain freedoms, such as the 
freedom of expression, a bit, so that less provocation occurs and the terrorist 
threat also decreases? A utilitarian answer could be: “Yes, why not? In the 
end, what does curtailing the freedom of those few authors and publicists 
really matter?” 
The utilitarian government official could reason as follows: Certain 
expressions of authors, publicists, and other public figures are perceived to 
be provocative. Although these provocative expressions fall within the legal 
limits to freedom of speech, they nonetheless motivate some extremists to 
engage in terrorism—recall Obama: “a recruitment bonanza for al-Qaida.” 
The suffering terrorism causes is enormous: social disruption, fear, and, 
above all, the loss of human lives. What to do? A utilitarian, guided by the 
happiness principle, would suggest limiting freedom of speech. After all, 
what is—on the whole—the importance of those few authors and publicists 
we thereby restrict in their freedom? 
Of course we should note that there are more philosophically sophisticated 
forms of utilitarianism. One could think of “rule-utilitarianism,” for instance, 
which is more long-term orientated and looks for the consequences of rules, 
instead of single acts.70 Yet it is the “act-utilitarianism,” or, to put it a bit 
69 According to the “Distance Calculator,” when flying, see http://www.distancecalculator.net/. 
70 For “rule” utilitarianism this may be different. “Rule” utilitarianism looks for rules (instead of acts) 
that tend to promote the greatest happiness for the greatest number. A “rule” utilitarian could say 
that—despite possible negative short-term effects—one should stick to the rule, because in the 
long term this guarantees more happiness. See, for instance, Smart, J.J.C., “An outline of a system 
of utilitarian ethics”, p. 9–10, in Smart, J.J.C. & Williams, B. (eds.), Utilitarianism: for and against, 
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1973.
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more impolitely, a kind of “layman’s utilitarianism,” that has a particularly 
strong appeal for government officials. We might even speak of a “utilitarian 
lure,” based on a vaguely articulated notion of utilitarianism. That specific 
utilitarian lure comes in two variants, a “soft” and a more drastic one.
An example of the “soft” variant can be seen in the telephone conversation 
between the U.S. secretary of defense and Terry Jones. The gist of this “soft” 
variant goes something like this: “Very well, legal intervention—that is, 
changing the laws—is perhaps not feasible, or we might consider it to be too 
drastic, but instead of legal interference, why can we not just ask a person 
not to do or say something; just make a ‘request’ and point out their own 
responsibility in the matter?” This could establish de facto or extrajudicial 
limits on free speech.
The second variant is perhaps more worrying than the “soft” version. 
Based on a utilitarian consideration one can also come to the conclusion that 
it might be wise to sharpen the legal limits to freedom of expression, so that 
certain expressions are not possible at all—period. Or at least: not without 
persecution. An attempt at such a “utilitarian concession” to terrorists 
seemed to occur after the terrorist assassination of writer and filmmaker 
Theo van Gogh in the Netherlands. On 2 November 2004, Van Gogh was 
murdered, and in that same month the then minister of justice, Piet Hein 
Donner (b. 1948), made a plea to bring life to the derelict criminal offense of 
blasphemy.71 In the end, Donner, after some controversy had arisen, seemed 
to revoke his words, or at least restate them, and it never became exactly 
clear what he meant by “reviving” blasphemy laws.72 However, this, to put 
it mildly, unfortunate “timing,”—after van Gogh’s murder—did raise  the 
suggestion that maybe we should indeed try to take some of the wind out of 
the terrorists’ sails by legally pandering to them.
Both utilitarian responses are questionable. By way of internal criticism 
(so, within utilitarianism), one could first ask whether the government 
officials’ utilitarian calculation is, in fact, correct. Are they not far too 
quick in assuming that you can mollify terrorists with concessions? On the 
contrary, would terrorists not be empowered by these concessions (“they are 
71 Louis Cornelisse, “Minister wil rust in de tent brengen”, Trouw, 16 November 2004. See also 
chapter 4 in this volume on the Dutch blasphemy law. 
72 “Godslastering niet harder aangepakt (gerectificeerd)’, NRC Handelsblad, 16 November 2004, 2004.
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giving in; you see, it works”), so that terrorism will only increase?73 If so, the 
utilitarian calculation seems to yield very different results.
Moreover, one could call into question the consequentialist focus of 
utilitarianism. Is the supposed certainty about consequences, on a more 
abstract level, not highly unrealistic? Our reality is made up of a particularly 
complex set of causes and effects. Utilitarianism seems to function very 
well in thought experiments or situations that approach complete certainty, 
but it appears to be far less usable in complex issues, such as contemporary 
international terrorism.74
A more fundamental problem with utilitarian reasoning is that it places 
the cards in the hands of those who threaten to use violence—thereby taking 
the constitutional right to free speech hostage. The crux of this problem was 
well put by Ronald Dworkin (1931–2013):
When we compromise on freedom because we think our immediate 
goals more important, we are likely to find that the power to exploit 
the compromise is not in our own hands after all, but in those of 
fanatical priests armed with fatwas and fanatical moralists with their 
own brand of hate.75
The main argument against “layman’s utilitarianism” therefore lies elsewhere. 
It lies in the core values  that we are not to change if we want to preserve our 
free and democratic societies. When these freedoms are lost, there is not that 
much left to defend in the first place. The fact that utilitarianism passes this 
over seems to make it unsuitable as a useful advisor in the struggle against 
terrorism. 
73 Robert Pape suggests that terrorists indeed seem to “learn” from concessions. In an empirical study 
of 188 suicide attacks between 1980 and 2001, he formulates it as follows: “This pattern of making 
concessions to suicide terrorist organizations over the past two decades has probably encouraged 
terrorist groups to pursue even more ambitious suicide campaigns.” And, further on: “Advocates 
of concessions should also recognize that, even if they are successful in undermining the terrorist 
leaders’ base of support, almost any concession at all will tend to encourage the terrorist leaders 
further about their own coercive effectiveness.” See Pape, Robert, “The Strategic Logic of Suicide 
Terrorism,” American Political Science Review 2003, vol. 97 nr. 3, 343–361, see here: 344 and 356.
74 Rachels is more optimistic on our ability to judge consequences, see Rachels, Stuart, The Elements of 
Moral Philosophy, New York: McGraw-Hill, 2007, 125.
75 Dworkin, Ronald “A New Map of Censorship”, Index on Censorship, 2006, vol. 35 no.  1, 132–133.
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The lure of utilitarianism for governments is strong; it holds the promise 
of short-term victories—exactly what those in office need. We believe, 
however, that both the “soft” (for instance: Obama in the Terry Jones 
affair) and the more “rigorous” (such as reviving a defunct blasphemy law) 
utilitarian options are unwise, practically and principally. Governments 
should defend fundamental principles such as free speech and not water 
them down when deemed inconvenient. It is not convenient speech that 
needs protection.76 The litmus test for such a stance is the way we deal with 
the most unpopular, appalling, or shocking of expressions—Mill’s “mankind 
minus one.” What Terry Jones was planning to do, and eventually did, had 
it all: it was unpopular, appalling, and shocking; Mill’s thought experiment 
brought to life. The Terry Jones affair starkly shows the dire predicament for 
governments in real-life “mankind minus one” situations—in such cases it is 
not easy to resist the siren call of “layman’s utilitarianism.”
76 See also Kustaw Bessems, “De vrijheid om weerzin te wekken”, pp. 19–28, in: Ellian, Afshin & 
Molier, Gelijn, eds., Mag ik dit zeggen? Beschouwingen over de vrijheid van meningsuiting, The Hague: 
Boom Juridische Uitgevers 2011.
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8  Religious Freedom and Blasphemy Law in a 
Global Context:  
The Concept of Religious Defamation
 Mirjam van Schaik
IntrOductIOn
Religious liberty is a general concept used by politicians and academics. As 
a right, freedom of religion or belief is incorporated in the constitutions of 
many Western states. It is also a classical human right, and has been adopted 
in international conventions. In general, universal human rights have been 
discussed and agreed upon by the international community, accepted as an 
international norm, and defined as fundamental and authoritative.
This chapter, about the freedom of religion and belief (freedom of religion) 
and its universal status, addresses matters of great contemporary concern. 
There are various places in the world where strict measures to restrict this 
fundamental right have been taken. A special status is granted to a particular 
religion, apostasy is outlawed under the criminal code, as is blasphemy for 
causing offence to religious feelings.
Freedom of religion has continuously been interpreted in various ways. 
Additionally, polemics have become an incentive for the establishment of 
this right, but not always in a positive way. Several of the interpretations and 
applications in recent decades have demonstrated an inclination towards 
derogating from its very status as a fundamental human right by implicitly or 
explicitly subverting its non-distinctive application, content and universality 
as allocated in the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights 
(ICCPR). 
To substantiate this claim I will address a severe abuse in the field of 
freedom of religion. I will discuss examples where religious freedom is 
amalgamated with political strategies or policies of protecting the reputation 
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of religions against defamation. I have defined this as a political derogation, 
which results in severe consequences for the normative framework of this 
right. To demonstrate this, I will analyse resolutions and international 
documents drafted by the Organisation of Islamic Cooperation (OIC), 
which has for almost twenty years tabled resolutions on the issues of 
“combating defamation of religions” and “combatting religious intolerance” 
in the Commission on Human Rights, in its successor the Human Rights 
Council, and in the General Assembly. Their founding documents will also 
be examined. I will furthermore discuss some reports of the United Nations 
Special Rapporteurs. These reports reveal information about the various 
violations of religious freedom perpetrated or condoned by member states of 
the OIC. In addition, some views within academia will be addressed.
For normative references I will rely on article 18 ICCPR, which states that 
everyone has the right to freedom of thought, conscience and religion. And 
although not binding, article 18 of the United Nations Universal Declaration 
of Human Rights (UNUDHR) is also relevant, for it has influenced many 
constitutions globally, and has functioned as a foundation for several national 
and international legal documents. 
the OrganIsatIOn Of IslamIc cOOperatIOn
The OIC, formerly known as the Organisation of the Islamic Conference 
(1974–2011), was founded after the so-called ‘criminal arson of the Al-Aqsa 
Mosque in occupied Jerusalem’ on 21 August, 1969. This occurrence was 
followed by a conference of 24 Islamic heads of state in September in 1969 
in Rabat—as well as various Islamic Conferences of Foreign Ministers—to 
found an Islamic organisation that would represent the Islamic people. The 
OIC was subsequently formally established in May 1971, and adopted its 
charter in 1972. It is based in Jeddah, Saudi Arabia, and claims to represent 
the universal Ummah, a community of more than 1.5 billion Muslims. The 
OIC considers itself to be “the collective voice of the Muslim world”, and 
takes it upon itself “to safeguard and protect their interests ... in the spirit 
of promoting international peace and harmony among various people of the 
world”.1 
1 Website of the OIC, available at: http://www.oic-oci.org/oicv2/page/?p_id=52&p_ref=26&lan=en. It 
is important to note that this chapter does not examine to what extent the OIC is legally authorised 
to speak on behalf of all Muslims, or even Islam. 
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After the United Nations (UN), the OIC is currently the largest 
intergovernmental organisation, with 57 members. Except for the Palestinian 
authority, all states are members of the UN. The supreme body of the OIC 
is the Islamic Summit, consisting of kings and heads of state. It assembles 
every three years to discuss and set out policy, offer advice on all issues for 
the realisation of the objectives of the OIC and additional important issues 
for the member states and the Ummah in general. There is also the Council 
of Foreign Ministers, which gathers every year and is responsible for the 
implementation of the general policy. Furthermore, there is an executive 
body, known as the General Secretariat. Over the years the OIC has created 
subsidiary committees to coordinate and realise their actions in various areas, 
including political, economic, cultural, social, scientific, financial, sports, 
technological, educational, media, social, humanitarian and religious.2 In 
2011 the OIC created an advisory body, the Independent Permanent Human 
Rights Commission (IPHRC), which has the legal authority to oversee 
human rights in OIC member states. Since June 2013 the OIC has had 
an official representative office for the European Union (EU) in Brussels, 
Belgium, inter alia to contribute to the dialogue between the two parties.3
The OIC has a unique position, being a religious intergovernmental 
organisation with permanent observer status at the UN.4 This entails that 
the OIC has free access to most of the UN meetings, a standing invitation 
to participate as an observer in the sessions of the General Assembly and 
maintains a permanent office at the UN headquarters in New York. With 
this permanent observer status the OIC has a dominant role, or at least a 
prominent one, when the human rights agenda is addressed. 
dIsputIng unIVersalIty
For several decennia the OIC has disputed the universality of the Universal 
Declaration and its subsequent human rights framework. In 1981 the Islamic 
Republic of Iran was one of the first states that opposed its universality 
2 Ibid. 
3 “President Barroso meets the Secretary General of the Organisation of Islamic Cooperation (OIC), 
Mr Ekmeleddin İhsanoğlu,” 25 June 2013, available at: http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_MEMO-
13-609_en.htm (accessed 26 April 2015).
4 There are no other religious intergovernmental organisations with this status. However, as a non-
member state, the Holy See, has the status of permanent observer.
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during a meeting of the General Assembly (UNGA).5 The representative 
stated that Iran appreciated “the true meaning of human rights through 
an understanding of the genuinely emancipating teachings of Islam and 
through their implementation.”6 He stated that “all rules regarding human 
rights must be founded exclusively on principles of divine ethics, and justice 
must be defined in terms of eternal moral principles.”7
This indicates the core of the OIC’s view: human rights are not founded 
on universal secular principles but on divine ethics. This led to the drafting 
of several Islamic human rights documents, such as the Universal Islamic 
Declaration of Human Rights8 and the Arab Charter on Human Rights.9 
However, these documents did not have the same impact or prevalence as 
the Cairo Declaration on Human Rights in Islam (CDHRI), adopted in 1990. 
This agreement was drafted during the Cairo Islamic Conference of Foreign 
Ministers of the OIC.10 The preamble to the CDHRI declares that the OIC is 
[b]elieving that fundamental rights and universal freedoms in Islam 
are an integral part of the Islamic religion and that no one as a matter 
of principle has the right to suspend them in whole or in part or violate 
or ignore them in as much as they are binding divine commandments, 
which are contained in the Revealed Books of God and were sent 
through the last of His Prophets to complete the preceding divine 
messages thereby making their observance an act of worship and their 
neglect or violation an abominable sin, and accordingly every person 
5 David. G. Littman, “Universal Human Rights and “Human Rights in Islam,” Midstream, February/
March 1999, 5–6.
6 See A/C.3/37/SR. 56, paras 50–51.
7 Iran voted in favour of the UNUDHR, but changed its stance after its revolution in 1979. What is 
interesting to note is that Saudi Arabia was one of the few states that abstained from voting for the 
UNHRD. The reason for this was, inter alia, article 18 of the Declaration, which also states that 
everyone has the right to change his religion or belief. 
8 In accordance with the Muslim World League, this document was drafted by the Islamic Council, 
and ratified in 1981 and presented to UNESCO.
9 The Arab Charter on Human Rights was adopted by the Council of the League of Arab States on 
22 May 2004.
10 Res. 49/19-P. The Cairo Declaration on Human Rights in Islam. The Nineteenth Islamic Conference 
of Foreign Ministers (Session of Peace, Interdependence and Development), held in Cairo, Arab 
Republic of Egypt, 31 July–5 August 1990.
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is individually responsible - and the Ummah collectively responsible - 
for their safeguard.11
With the Cairo Declaration the OIC laid down distinctive Islamic principles 
that conflicted with UN human rights law, thereby not only restricting 
fundamental human rights, but subjecting all to superseding Islamic norms. 
The CDHRI is—in pursuance of the Iranian statement—generally seen as 
a reaction to the UNUDHR, resulting in the supremacy of religious law over 
universal human rights; derogating from their universal status.12 As a result, 
instead of the UNUDHR, the CDHRI would from now on function as a 
guiding document in the application of human rights for the OIC members. 
The Cairo Declaration declares that in the member states of the OIC 
all human rights must be addressed from an Islamic perspective, and, 
according to articles 24 and 25, all rights and freedoms are subject to Islamic 
law (Sharia). No right to freedom of religion is included, since article 10 
forbids the practice of- or conversion to any religion other than Islam. 
The Declaration states that “Islam is the religion of true unspoiled nature. 
It is prohibited to exercise any form of pressure on man or to exploit his 
poverty or ignorance in order to force him to change his religion to another 
religion or to atheism.” There is a so-called freedom of expression, but it is 
restricted by Islamic law, and infringement will result in severe punishment 
in accordance with Sharia: see articles 19 and 22 CDHRI.
the ten-year prOgramme Of actIOn: a new fOcus On human 
rIghts?
In 2005, during the Mecca Islamic Summit Conference, the OIC prepared 
a ten-year action programme for “the Muslim Ummah to achieve its 
renaissance, and in order to take practical steps towards strengthening 
the bonds of Islamic solidarity, achieve unity of ranks, and project the true 
11 Preamble, Res. 49/19-P. The Cairo Declaration on Human Rights in Islam. 
12 See for more Raj Bhala, Understanding Islamic Law (LexisNexis Mattew Bender & Company, 2011), 
ch. 46, in particular paras 46.05–46.06; David.G. Littman, “Universal Human Rights and “Human 
Rights in Islam,” Midstream, February/March 1999; Audrey Guichon, “Some Arguments on the 
Universality of Human Rights in Islam”, in Javaid Rehman and Susan C. Brean (eds), Religion, 
Human Rights and International Law: A Critical Examination of Islamic State Practices (Leiden/Boston, 
Mass.: Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 2007), 185–186.
182 THE FALL AND RISE OF BLASPHEMY LAW
image and noble values of Islam and its civilisational approaches.”13 This 
programme was intended to help the OIC to review “the most prominent 
challenges facing the Muslim world.”14 
Several scholars described the adoption of this action programme as a 
positive change of course in the OIC’s human rights policy, inter alia by the 
desire expressed in it to establish an independent body to promote human 
rights, the Independent Permanent Human Rights Commission (IPHRC). As 
associate professor of international relations at the University of Washington 
Tacoma, Turan Kayaoglu, points out: “With the adoption of a ten-year 
‘program of action’ in 2005, human rights gained greater prominence on 
the OIC agenda.”15 Also according to Kayaoglu, “[T]he IPHRC signals a 
newfound commitment to human rights issues within the OIC. It represents 
a shift away from the organisation’s past cynicism on human rights.”16 
Kayaoglu, however, seems to overlook the fact that according to section VIII 
paragraph 2 of the action programme, the establishment of the IPHRC had 
to be in accordance with the principles of the Cairo Declaration. One must 
ask to what extent there is a positive change in human rights policy, since the 
Cairo Declaration does not even recognise the fundamental human right of 
freedom of religion or belief, and certain other freedoms merely when they 
are in accordance with Islamic law. The term ‘human rights’ in the title of 
the commission does therefore seem to be rather misleading. 
The analysis made by Saied Reza Ameli, Professor of Communications at 
the University of Tehran, is even more flawed, as he uses incorrect arguments 
to argue that there is a shift towards UN human rights discourse within OIC 
policy and that “… the Ten-Year Programme of Action puts more emphasis 
on human rights ...”.17 He claims that the founding OIC documents are 
more focussed on an Islamic perspective on human rights, as opposed to a 
13 OIC/3EX-SUM/05/PA/FINAL, programme of action to meet the challenges facing the Muslim 
Ummah in the 21st century. Third extraordinary session of the Islamic summit conference, Mecca, 
Saudi- Arabia, 7–8 December 2005, available at: http://www.oic-oci.org/oicv2/upload/pages/typoa/
en/poa_en_rev1.pdf. 
14 Ibid.
15 Turan Kayaoglu, “A Rights Agenda for the Muslim World? The Organization of Islamic Cooperation’s 
evolving Human Rights Framework,” Brookings Doha Center, 6 January 2013, 12. 
16 Ibid., 13. 
17 Saied Reza Ameli, “The Organisation of Islamic Conference: accountability and civil society,” in 
Jan Aart Scholte (ed.), Building Global Democracy?: Civil Society and Accountable Global Governance 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2011), 152. 
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universal one, than the ten-year action programme is.18 One can agree that 
in the founding charter from 1972 human rights were indeed addressed from 
an Islamic perspective, however explicit references were made to the concept 
of fundamental human rights that are universal. In the Ten-Year Programme 
of Action which currently applies, there are references in paragraph VIII to 
human rights, but thus only when they comply with Islamic law. In addition, 
not a single reference is made in the action programme to either the UN 
Charter or other UN documents. To further substantiate his claim, Reza 
Ameli refers to the drafting of other international Islam-oriented documents 
during the following years, such as the Islamic Charter for Human Rights 
and the Universal Islamic Declaration of Human Rights. 
This argument is unconvincing for three reasons. First of all, it is true 
that these documents were strongly inspired by Islam, but that does not 
mean that the current one, the action programme, is not. Secondly, the 
mentioned documents were not drafted by the OIC but by other Islamic 
institutions. And, thirdly, they did not have as much influence within the 
Islamic world as the Cairo Declaration did in 1990. The Declaration is still 
of great significance, especially for the OIC’s Ten-Year Programme of Action 
on the topic of human rights, which is extended to the year 2025 according 
to their website.
the 2008 charter
In addition to the Ten-Year Programme of Action, the OIC implemented 
its current charter three years later. It was adopted by the Eleventh Islamic 
Summit in March 2008, and aims to affirm the unity and solidarity among its 
members, to preserve Islamic values, to revitalise Islam’s role in the world, 
to enhance and strengthen the bond of unity and solidarity among Muslims, 
and to contribute to international peace and security.19 
The charter gives the impression that regarding its stance on universal 
human rights it is an improvement, since it no longer refers to the Cairo 
Declaration and its notion of sharia law, as was the case in the Ten-Year 
Programme of Action. In the objectives and principles of the new charter it is 
18 Ibid., 152–153.
19 Eleventh Islamic Summit held in Dakar on 13–14 March 2008, website of OIC under ‘About OIC’, 
available at: http://www.oic-oci.org/oicv2/page/?p_id=52&p_ref=26&lan=en (accessed 26 April 
2015). 
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furthermore included that the OIC members are determined “to adhere ... 
[to their] commitment to the principles of the United Nations Charter, the 
present Charter and International Law”, and “to promote human rights 
and fundamental freedoms, good governance, rule of law, democracy and 
accountability in Member States.”
At first glance this appears to be progress. However, the same 
paragraph states that these commitments need to be in accordance with 
the constitutional and legal systems of the particular member state. In 
general, the OIC member states have a strong state religion, where Islam 
is constitutionally entrenched. Some are even theocracies and suppress all 
religious diversity. This creates religious legitimacy for the OIC members to 
escape their UN human rights obligations, even though most of them are 
signatories to the international human rights treaties and are legally bound 
by them. 
Also relevant is the fact that the preamble to the previous charter, the one 
from 1972, explicitly stated that the OIC “reaffirm[s] their commitment to 
the United Nations Charter and fundamental Human Rights, the purposes 
and principles of which provide the basis for fruitful cooperation among all 
people.” This explicit reference to the term fundamental is nowhere to be 
found in the current charter or in the action programme. If this gap is read 
in conjunction with the passage that commitments to the aforementioned 
ideals need to be in accordance with the legal systems of the member states, 
it is no surprise that there is a lack of reference to universal human rights, 
since it would conflict with their national norms.20
In addition it is relevant to mention that article 1 of the new charter 
contains a paragraph that states the OIC’s objective “to protect and defend 
the true image of Islam”, and “to combat defamation of Islam.”21 With this 
addition the OIC members formally enshrined these concepts in their 
charter, and created the legitimacy for the course they have been sailing over 
the years, a course which has dominated the Human Rights Council and 
General Assembly since 1999.22 However, before this grasp is discussed, the 
interesting question that needs to be answered, the question that is often 
neglected when this topic is discussed within academia is: why did the OIC 
20 See for more Ann Elizabeth Mayer, “The OIC’s Human Rights Policies in the UN. A Problem of 
Coherence”, Matters of Concern. Human Rights Research papers, The Danish Institute for Human 
Rights, 2015, 10–11. 
21 It was also added in the 2005 Ten-Year Programme of Action.
22 There was never any reference to the concepts in their founding document from 1972.
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in 1999 introduce the concept of defamation of Islam in the UNHRC? Or, in 
other words, what were the reasons for the OIC to start this UN policy? The 
next paragraphs will further elucidate this point. 
the OIc’s mOtIVatIOns
To get a clear understanding of what caused, or, better said, contributed to 
this launch, it is relevant that the background and motives of the OIC and 
its member states are considered. To provide this context it is necessary to 
take a look at OIC declarations, resolutions and policy documents. Overall, 
at least three developments can be distinguished that have contributed to 
the cause. In line with the view of Lorenz Langer, a lecturer at the University 
of Zurich, in the first place it is all about upholding the appearance of Islam, 
that is, the image of Islam in general. Secondly, the reprimands several of the 
individual member states of the OIC received in various UN forums, which 
led to aggravation within the OIC countries.23 And in addition to Langer’s 
view, the third development involves the consequences of the fatwa that 
Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini issued against Salman Rushdie for writing The 
Satanic Verses. The next section will further elucidate these points. 
The first development, the defence of the image of Islam, made its first 
appearance at the third Islamic Summit Conference in Mecca in 1981. 
During this Summit the members of the OIC agreed to “develop ... mass-
media and information institutions, guided in this effort by the precepts 
and teachings of Islam, in order to ensure that these media and institutions 
will have an effective role in reforming society, in a manner that helps in 
the establishment of an international information order characterized by 
justice, impartiality and morality, so that our nation may be able to show 
to the world its true qualities, and refute the systematic media campaigns 
aimed at isolating, misleading, slandering and defaming our nation.”24 In 
this quotation some aspects need to be emphasised. In the first place, the 
term ‘nation’ has to be understood as Islam in general. In addition, it is not 
solely about the image of Islam for Muslims, or within the OIC countries, but 
23 Lorenz Langer, Religious Offence and Human Rights, The implications of Defamation of Religions 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2014), 165–169. Lorenz Langer is a lecturer at the 
University of Zurich.
24 Mecca Declaration, Third Islamic Summit Conference OIC (Palestine and Al Quds Session), Mecca, 
25–28 January, 1981, Final Communiqué, para. 6. 
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more specifically about the perception of Islam by non-Muslims worldwide. 
It concerns what and why information about Islam is made public and how 
it is done.
During the following years the OIC pursued the same course, until 
Salman Rushdie’s The Satanic Verses was published. In 1989 Rushdie’s work 
was “strongly condemned” by the OIC, and he was regarded as an apostate 
and his work a blasphemous publication.25 The OIC called for action, and 
issued “a Declaration on Joint Islamic Action to combat blasphemy against 
Islam in which it expressed the resolve of all Islamic States to coordinate 
their efforts, based on Sharia, to effectively combat blasphemy against Islam 
and abuse of Islamic personalities.”26 They furthermore declared that “all 
Islamic countries should make more effective efforts to ensure respect for 
Islam and its noble values. ... [B]lasphemy could not be justified on the basis 
of freedom of thought or expression. ... It appealed to all members of the 
international community to ban the book and take necessary measures to 
protect the religious beliefs of others.”27 It was a clear message, with strong 
demands. It was no longer merely about creating institutions to “inform 
people about Islam”, but it was time to “take action”, that is, set norms to 
protect their religion. 
In this regard, the Dakar Islamic Summit, held two years later in 1991, 
is important. The OIC stated in the resulting Dakar Declaration that it 
was determined to “counter individually and collectively, any campaign of 
vilification and denigration waged against Islam and its sacred values as 
well as the desecration of the Islamic places of worship.”28 And it stated it 
would “inform the whole world of the essence of Islamic civilization, culture 
and thought so as to provide the best possible reflection of the true image 
of Islam and to participate in the enrichment of universal civilisation.”29 
So again there is a clear emphasis on the provision of information and on 
concrete actions—individually as a state, and the OIC as a collective—for 
the defence of the image of Islam. However, this time the OIC went a step 
further. It drafted a resolution entitled “On adopting a unified stand on the 
25 Eighteenth Islamic Conference of Foreign Ministers (Sessions of Islamic fraternity and solidarity), 
Final Communiquè, 13–16 March 1989, para. 46.
26 Ibid.
27 Ibid. 
28 Dakar Declaration, Sixth Islamic Summit Conference, Dakar, Senegal, 9–11 December, 1991, under 
III Cooperation in the social, cultural and information fields, iv–v.
29 Ibid.
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attack of Islamic sanctities and values [emphasis mine]” and in it requested 
the Secretary-General “to take the necessary measures for the drafting of 
an international convention [emphasis mine] to ensure respect for sanctities 
and values, and to submit a progress report thereon to the next Islamic 
Conference of Foreign Ministers,”30 with the result that in the conference of 
foreign ministers in 1993 they recalled the adoption of “a unified stand” and 
focused on the adoption of “a joint stand on the debasing of Islamic Sanctities 
and Values.”31 They appealed to the Secretary-General “to prepare and 
submit [at] the next International Conference of Foreign Ministers a study 
on the conclusion of an international legal instrument [emphasis mine].”32 In 
addition to the intention to create an international legal instrument the OIC 
continued to express its resentment at “the persistence of some quarters in 
publishing further editions and new issues of the book ‘Satanic Verses’ and 
publicising its author in many places, particularly in Europe.”33 
Over the years, the development of the OIC’s objectives, from wanting 
to positively inform about Islam to the appeal for an international legal 
instrument to protect their religion, was thus inter alia influenced by 
Rushdie’s work. It is remarkable to see what a novel can lead to. 
In subsequent years several resolutions with similar actions followed. 
During the 1994 summit, the members extensively discussed the “image of 
Islam outside the Islamic World”, and they were determined to “project the 
correct image of Islam”, because the Western states continued to discredited 
it.34 At the Islamic Summit in 1997 in Teheran, the OIC expressed that it 
wanted a “Group of Experts on the Image of Islam” to prepare a policy that 
would contribute to their eventual project.35 
In relation to what has been argued about the influence of Rushdie’s 
novel, more can be said about the OIC’s actions after its publication, which 
constitutes a second development that contributed to the launch of the 
30 Ibid., Res. NO. 3/6-C(IS), “On adopting a Unified Stand on the Attack on Islamic Sanctities and 
Values”.
31 Conference of the Foreign Ministers, Karachi, Islamic Republic of Pakistan, 25–29 April, 1993, Res. 
no.  17/21-C “A Unified Stand on the Belittling of Islamic Sanctities and Values”.
32 Ibid.
33 Ibid. 
34 Seventh Islamic Summit Conference, Casablanca, Morocco, 13–15 December, 1994, final 
communiquè, para. 22. E/CN.4/1997/71, para. 27, section 3. 
35 Eighth Islamic Summit Conference Tehran, Islamic republic of Iran, 9–11 December, 1997, final 
communiquè, paras 16, 110 and 112. 
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defamation of religion resolution in 1999 in the UN. The call for action by 
the OIC in 1989 was not entirely unexpected, for it was in the same period 
that Khomeini, the religious leader of Iran, one of the prominent states 
of the OIC, had issued a fatwa on Rushdie for writing and publishing the 
aforementioned book. Although the OIC members did not actually comment 
on the fatwa, they did consider Rushdie to be an apostate, condemned his 
blasphemous actions, and called for action.36 However, they, like Khomeini, 
never had the legal authority to combat blasphemous crimes internationally. 
In contrast though to Khomeini, the OIC did have a seat at the UN table, and 
could therefore initiate and politically influence a debate on this topic. The 
report in which Rushdie was pronounced an apostate was also presented to 
the UN and circulated in the General Assembly.37 This was the first time the 
OIC had condemned blasphemy within UN contours, a stance that they, as 
the next paragraph will describe, developed and expanded in the next ten 
years. 
The third development that contributed to the start of the defamation 
resolutions in 1999 consists in the reprimands of the individual OIC 
member states in various UN forums.38 In particular the reports of the UN 
special rapporteurs on Religious Intolerance and its successor Freedom 
of Religion or Belief were critical. For instance, in 1994 the annual report 
of the Special Rapporteur of Religious Intolerance, Abdelfattah Amor, 
addressed occurrences and state actions in several member states of the 
OIC that were inconsistent with the Declaration on the Elimination of All 
Forms of Intolerance and Discrimination Based on Religion or Belief. The 
report mentioned that in Saudi Arabia “the legal system ... allows flogging, 
amputation and beheading for the punishment of, inter alia, comments 
on religion” and it described several other cases where people arrested on 
charges of blasphemy faced possible execution.39 Saudi Arabia’s response was 
36 Although not relevant for this chapter, a lot can be said about what it actually meant to declare 
Rushdie to be an apostate. See for more on this topic Paul B. Cliteur, Professor of Jurisprudence 
at Leiden University, who has extensively published on this topic: see, e.g.,The Secular Outlook: In 
Defense of Moral and Political Secularism (Chichester: Wiley-Blackwell, 2010), Paul B. Cliteur, Tom 
Herrenberg and Bastiaan R. Rijpkema, “The New Censorship,” in Afshin Ellian and G. Moliet (eds), 
Freedom of Speech under Attack (The Hague: Eleven International Publishing, 2015), 291–319.
37 A/44/235/20600, 20 April 1989. 
38 Lorenz Langer, Religious Offence and Human Rights, The implications of Defamation of Religions 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2014), 165–169.
39 E/CN.4/1994/79, paras 31–33.
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fierce: according to it the report was filled with “false interpretations of the 
Islamic religion and Islamic practices.” They also stated that the rapporteur 
was not qualified “to assess the Islamic religion” and that “his summation 
based on ‘allegations’ is deplorable.” Saudi Arabia even questioned whether 
this “disturbing disinformation on Islam and the Islamic people” was “a sort 
of a new ‘crusade’ which is so familiar in international politicking under the 
banner of the ‘white men’s burden?’”.40 They made it clear that they had had 
enough of this conduct. In the same report Amor mentioned that Sudan was 
also seriously infringing the right to freedom of religion. Cases are described 
in which several people were arrested and detained for practising a religion 
that was not Islam. Sudan’s reaction was equivalent to that of Saudi Arabia; 
the allegations were “false” and “absurd”.41 The country visit to Pakistan 
in 1996 also led to a very critical report, one in which the discriminatory 
legislation regarding religious minorities and the blasphemy laws with their 
severe penalties were especially criticised.42 
In the following years, different OIC members were criticised for 
discriminatory regulations concerning freedom of religion and belief, for 
instance Iran, Egypt, United Arab Emirates, Brunei and the Maldives.43 
These reprimands continued to pile up, causing resentment against the UN 
by the OIC members, which eventually contributed to the IOC taking the 
matter into its own hands: the international introduction of combatting 
defamation of religions.
the IntrOductIOn Of defamatIOn Of relIgIOn In the un
The OIC presented the concept of religious defamation to the UN on 20 April 
1999, when Pakistan, on behalf of the OIC, introduced the draft resolution 
“Defamation of Islam” under agenda item Racism, racial discrimination, 
xenophobia and all forms of discrimination in the Commission on Human 
Rights (UNCHR).44 In the resolution the focus is on negative stereotyping 
40 Ibid.
41 E/CN.4/1994/79, paras 75–77.
42 E/CN.4/1996/95/Add.1. In the annual report of 1995 the Special Rapporteur already addressed 
several cases concerning these issues regarding Pakistan see E/CN.4/1995/91.
43 This list is not exhaustive. E/CN.4/1997/91, paras 10–16, 19, E/CN.4/1999/58, paras 31–33, 50–52, 
66–68, 73–74, 85, 96. 
44 E/CN.4/1999/L.40, 20 April 1999. 
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and intolerance towards Islam, and states are urged to “take all necessary 
measures to combat hatred, discrimination, intolerance and acts of violence, 
intimidation and coercion motivated by religious intolerance, including 
attacks on religious places, and to encourage understanding, tolerance and 
respect in matters relating to freedom of religion and belief.”45 The delegate 
from Pakistan declared that the reason for the introduction of this draft was 
that “in the past few years, there had been new manifestations of intolerance 
and misunderstanding, not to say hatred, of Islam and Muslims in various 
parts of the world.’46 Also, “[t]here was a tendency in some countries and 
in the international media to portray Islam as a religion hostile to human 
rights, threatening to the Western world and associated with terrorism and 
violence, whereas, with the Quran, Islam had given the world its first human 
rights charter. No other religion received such constant negative media 
coverage.”47 The motivation as portrayed by the OIC for the defamation 
resolution was clear: it was to protect Islam. 
The representative of Germany responded on behalf of the states of the 
European Union, and underlined that “the European Union was attached to 
the principles of tolerance and freedom of conscience, thought and religion 
for all,” but was of the opinion that the general structure of the proposal 
was not in balance, since it mentioned only the negative stereotyping of 
Islam. Germany therefore introduced amendments to broaden the scope of 
negative stereotyping to all religions and change the title of the resolution to 
“Defamation of Religions”.48 These changes were submitted “to deal equally 
with all religions”.49 The Pakistani representative was not pleased with the 
proposed amendments, and stated that “the problem faced by Islam was of a 
very special nature and its manifestations took many forms. Some people did 
not hesitate, for example, to refer to an ‘Islamic bomb’, but no one would ever 
think of making such an association with another religion. Islam was being 
portrayed as a threat to the international system, with many negative images, 
which incited people to hatred of Muslims. That phenomenon endangered 
world stability and was contrary to the principle of the universality of human 
rights.”50 He continued by stating that “[t]he amendments submitted by 
45 Ibid.
46 E/CN.4/1999/SR.61, para. 1.
47 Ibid. 
48 E/CN.4/1999/L.90. 
49 Ibid. 
50 E/CN.4/1999/SR.61, para. 7.
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Germany were designed to remove most of the specific references to Islam 
contained in the draft resolution, but that would defeat the purpose of the 
text, which was to bring a problem relating specifically to that religion to 
the attention of the international community.”51 Thus the OIC requested 
that the amendments be withdrawn and that the commission accept sub-
amendments in which there was a specific focus on Islam again.52 Germany, 
however, declined and asked the EU members to hold to their positions.53 
The Pakistani representative asked for further negotiations so the “two 
parties”—already explicitly dividing East (OIC) and West (Europe) within 
the international community—could attempt to find common ground.54
The next day the two parties reached consensus and drafted a resolution 
with a general title that included all religions. It resulted in the adoption 
of Resolution 1999/82, “Defamation of religions”.55 The resolution inter alia 
urges: 
all States, within their national legal framework, in conformity 
with international human rights instruments to take all appropriate 
measures to combat hatred, discrimination, intolerance and acts 
of violence, intimidation and coercion motivated by religious 
intolerance, including attacks on religious places, and to encourage 
understanding, tolerance and respect in matters relating to freedom 
of religion or belief.56
In the Resolution no definition is given of religious defamation. Only the 
title contains a reference to the concept.
The Pakistani representative stated that “the OIC countries had shown 
considerable flexibility by agreeing to adopt a nonexclusive approach to 
the issue.”57 And they “looked forward to cooperating with all countries in 
51 Ibid., para. 8.
52 E/CN.4/1999/L.104.
53 E/CN.4/1999/SR.61, para. 9.
54 Ibid., para.11.
55 E/CN.4/1999/L.40/Rev.1. There was also one amendment made orally. However, the content of this 
amendment is not relevant for this analysis. 
56 60th meeting, 28 April 1999, Res. 1999/82. E/CN.4/1999/82. Commission on Human Rights Report 
on the Fifty-fifth session (22 March–30 April 1999), 280–281. E/1999/23, E/CN.4/1999/167. 
57 E/CN.4/1999/L.40/Rev.1 and E/CN.4/1999/SR.62, paras 1–2.
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promoting a better understanding of Islam ...”58 The German representative 
stated that although “an agreement [was] reached [it] should not ... hide 
the fact that a high degree of uncertainty remained as to the expediency of 
the Commission’s continuing to deal with the issue in that way and in that 
context. ... While joining the consensus on the draft, [they] wished to make 
it clear that they did not attach any legal meaning to the term ‘defamation’ 
as used in the title.”59
From the German remark it is clear that the EU member states realised 
that the adoption of the religious defamation resolution would have 
consequences for the normative contours of the human rights framework. 
Instead of dismissing the OIC’s whole line of reasoning, they assumed an 
accommodating stance, in particular by merely remarking that the general 
structure of the resolution was imbalanced, and that it had to be broadened 
so that all religions would be dealt with equally. It gave the OIC room to 
manoeuvre and introduce the concept of religious defamation in the UN. 
Unfortunately, they did not foresee what kind of impact their accommodating 
attitude would have in the next decade. 
frOm cOnsensus tO maJOrIty VOte
In the following year, Pakistan, again on behalf of the OIC, introduced a 
resolution with a similar title and content. After a few amendments it was 
adopted by consensus in the UNCHR.60 What is relevant to mention is that 
the representative of Portugal, on behalf of the EU, emphasised that the 
subject of defamation of religion should not be discussed in the UNCHR as 
it would divert attention from its duty to promote freedom of all religions 
and beliefs. They were worried that the draft could be interpreted as being 
focused on one specific religion,61 which was in fact the case. 
In 2001 Pakistan stepped up its efforts and introduced the resolution 
“Combating defamation of religions as a means to promote human rights, 
58 Ibid. 
59 E/CN.4/1999/SR.62, para. 9 and E/CN.4/1999/L.40/Rev.1.
60 See amendments: E/CN.4/2000/L.6, E/CN.4/2000/L.18, 7th meeting 26 April 2000, Res. 
2000/84. Defamation of religions. Commission on Human Rights Report on the fifty-sixth Session 
(20 March–28 April), 336–338. E/2000/23, E/CN.4/2000/167.
61 E/CN.4/2000/SR.67, paras 72–77.
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social harmony and religious and cultural diversity”.62 This time the EU took 
a different stance. On behalf of the EU the representative from Belgium 
stated that the
… l’Union européenne appuie le dialogue entre les civilisations, 
mais considère que l’on ne saurait confondre religion et civilisation. 
En outre, la liberté d’expression est la condition sine qua non d’un 
dialogue réel entre les civilisations. La liberté d’expression et la liberté 
de religion sont la manifestation fondamentale de la tolérance au sein 
des sociétés. Tous ces arguments ont été exposés lors des consultations 
sur le projet de résolution mais ils n’ont pas été pris en compte par les 
auteurs. C’est pourquoi, les États membres de l’Union européenne ont 
demandé qu’il soit procédé au vote sur ce projet de résolution. Quant 
à eux, ils voteront contre ce texte.63
By emphasising the freedoms of expression and religion, stating that they 
are a fundamental manifestation of tolerance in society, and stressing that 
the freedom of expression is the condition sine qua non of civil dialogue, 
the EU member states tried to persuade the OIC. They argued that it was 
incorrect that the focus was on the protection of religions rather than on the 
human rights of the individual adherents to these religions.64 In addition, 
they announced that they would ask for a vote, with notice that they would 
vote against,65 but to no avail. The members of the OIC did not take any of 
the EU’s arguments into account. The draft resolution was taken to a vote 
and was adopted by 28 votes in favour to 15 against, with 9 abstentions.66 
62 E/CN.4/2001/L.7/Rev.1.
63 E/CN.4/2001/L.7/Rev.1, E/CN.4/2001/SR.61, 4 December 2001 paras 6, 3. “The European Union 
supports the dialogue between civilisations, but considers that religion and civilisation cannot 
be confused. Furthermore, freedom of expression is the sine qua non of a real dialogue among 
civilisations. Freedom of expression and freedom of religion are fundamental manifestations of 
tolerance within societies. All these arguments were exposed during consultations on the draft 
resolution, but they were not taken into account by the authors. Therefore, the Member States of 
the European Union asked for a vote on this draft resolution. As for them, they will vote against it.” 
[my translation]
64 Ibid., paras 11, 3. 
65 Ibid.
66 Commission on Human Rights Report on the fifty-seventh Session (19 March–27 April 2001), 
47–49, 372. E/2001/23, E/CN.4/2001/167. Germany, Belgium, Canada, Spain, The United States, 
France, Italy, Japan, Latvia, Norway, Poland, Portugal, Czech Republic, Romania, United Kingdom 
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With the E/2001/4 resolution the UNCHR “encourages States, within their 
respective constitutional systems, to provide adequate protection against all 
human rights violations resulting from defamation of religions and to take 
all possible measures to promote tolerance and respect for all religions.”67
This course of events would repeat itself in the subsequent years (2002–
2005).68 Resolutions with similar and more extensive content and effect 
were adopted by a majority vote, largely consisting of OIC member states. 
For example, in the next year a resolution with the same encouragement as 
cited above was adopted, but the words “and their value system” were added 
to the last sentence.69 Only a few words but, as previously described, of great 
significance. 
the expansIOn tO the general assemBly
In the aftermath of the Danish cartoon crisis in 2005, the concept of 
religious defamation expanded to another, larger UN platform. The Yemeni 
delegate, on behalf of the OIC, introduced the draft resolution “Combatting 
defamation of religions” in the UNGA.70 The Egyptian representative argued 
that the “the draft resolution was not directed against any one country ... Its 
sole purpose was to emphasize the importance of respect for the religions 
and beliefs of others, which were an integral part of the vision and way of 
of Great Britain and Northern Ireland voted against. “Combating defamation of religions as a means 
to promote human rights, social harmony and religious and cultural diversity”: 28 votes in favour, 15 
against, and 9 abstentions. Res. E/2001/4.
67 E/CN.4/Res. E/2001/4.
68 In 2002 Res. 2002/9, E/CN.4/Res/2002/9 (15 April 2002), Draft resolution by Pakistan, on behalf 
of the OIC E/CN.4/2002/L.9, E/CN.4/2002/SR.39, paras 28–42, pp. 6–8, “Combating defamation 
of religion”: 30 votes in favour, 15 against, and 8 abstentions. In 2003 Res 2003/4, E/CN.4/
Res/2003/4 (14 April 2003), Draft resolution by Pakistan, on behalf of the OIC E/CN.4/2003/L.16, 
E/CN.4/2003/SR.47, paras 95–109, “Combating defamation of religions”: 32 votes in favour, 
14 against, and 7 abstentions. In 2004 Res 2004/6, E/CN.4/Res./2004/6 (8 April 2004), Draft 
resolution by Pakistan, on behalf of the OIC E/CN.4/2004/L.5, E/CN.4/2004/SR.45, paras 73–84, 
“Combating defamation of religions”: 29 votes in favour, 16 against, and 7 abstentions. In 2005 Res. 
2005/3, E/CN.4/Res/2005/3 (12 April 2005), Draft resolution by Pakistan, on behalf of the OIC E/
CN.4/2005/L.12, E/CN.4/2005/SR.44, paras 2–17, “Combating defamation of religions”: 31 votes in 
favour, 16 against, 5 abstentions.
69 E/CN.4/Res./2002/9.
70 A/C.3/60/L.29. 
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life of many peoples.”71 The member states of the EU made it clear that they 
would not be on board, for similar reasons as the ones they had given in 
previous years in the UNCHR.72 But to no avail: religious defamation became 
a fact in the international community when draft resolution A/C.3/60/L.29 
was adopted with 88 votes in favour, 52 against, and 23 abstentions.73 The 
UNGA inter alia 
urges States to provide, within their respective legal and constitutional 
systems, adequate protection against acts of hatred, discrimination, 
intimidation and coercion resulting from defamation of religions, to 
take all possible measures to promote tolerance and respect for all 
religions and their value systems and to complement legal systems 
with intellectual and moral strategies to combat religious hatred and 
intolerance.74
In the following years the OIC continued to achieve its agenda in various 
UN fora, and after the disbandment of the UNCHR in 2006, the OIC passed 
resolutions regarding religious defamation in its successor, the United 
Nations Human Rights Council (UNHRC).75 That same year the UNHRC 
asked Asma Jahangir, Special Rapporteur on freedom of religion or belief, 
and Doudou Diène, Special Rapporteur on contemporary forms of racism, 
racial discrimination, xenophobia and related intolerance, to draft a report 
on the subject of defamation of religion, in particular its implications for 
article 20, paragraph 2, of the ICCPR. The reason for this was the “… deep 
concern over the increasing trend of defamation of religions and incitement 
to religious hatred and its recent manifestation.”76 
71 A/C.3/60/SR.45, para. 36, 5. 
72 A/C.3/60/SR.45, para. 37, 5.
73 A/RES/60/150 (20 January 2006), A/60/509/Add.2 (Part II). For statements in explanation of the 
vote see A/C.3/60/SR.45, paras 34–45. 
74 A/RES/60/150.
75 The UNHRC was created by the UNGA on 15 March 2006 after it adopted resolution A/RES/60/251. 
In 2006, A/RES/60/150 (20 January 2006), A/HRC/DEC/1/107 (30 June 2006); in 2007, A/
RES/61/164 (21 February 2007), A/HRC/RES/4/9 (30 March 2007); in 2008 A/RES/62/154 (6 March 
2008), A/HRC/RES/7/19 (27 March 2008); in 2009 A/RES/63/171 (24 March 2009), A/HRC/
RES/10/22 (26 March 2009); in 2010: A/RES/64/156 (8 March 2010), A/HRC/RES/13/16 (15 April 
2010), A/RES/65/224 (11 April 2011).
76 A/HRC/2/3 (20 September 2006). This was the Implementation of A/RES/60/251.
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The report’s conclusions were clear. It affirmed, among other things, 
that “the right to freedom of religion or belief, as enshrined in relevant 
international legal standards, does not include the right to have a religion 
or belief that is free from criticism or ridicule.”77 It furthermore concluded 
that, “[i]n maintaining a pluralist, diverse and tolerant society, Member 
States should avoid stubbornly clinging to free speech in defiance of the 
sensitivities existing in a society with absolute disregard for religious feelings, 
nor suffocating criticism of a religion by making it punishable by law ...”78
Given the actions that would follow, it can be safely said that the UNHRC 
ignored the conclusions of the report.79 In subsequent years it would usually 
refer to previous reports, where other rapporteurs had been more supportive 
of the religious defamation concept.80 
the pOlItIcal derOgatIOn
The concept of defamation of religion took up a highly visible position within 
the UN. The number of references to the concept increased considerably, 
and, in contrast to its former preambular position, it became part of the 
substantive paragraphs of the resolutions.81 In addition, the operative 
sections of the resolution were expanding. 
In its observatory report on islamophobia in 2009 the OIC felt that it had 
enough authority to state that the
OIC’s position with regard to the important issue of defamation of 
religions has not only been used to create ripples in the Western mind 
77 Ibid., paras 60, 10.
78 Ibid., paras 66, 15.
79 In contrast to Jahangir, Diène was much more supportive of the concept in previous years, 
especially right after the publication of the Danish cartoons in the Jillands-Posten. See for more 
Langer, Lorenz Langer, Religious Offence and Human Rights, The implications of Defamation of Religions 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2014), 233–235. 
80 For example, to Abdelfattah Amor’s reports. He was Jahangir’s predecessor and, with some 
comments, he approved the concept. The OIC also referred to Diène’s previous reports. See for 
more Lorenz Langer, Religious Offence and Human Rights, The implications of Defamation of Religions 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2014), 233–236.
81 Robert C. Blitt, “Defamation of Religion: Rumors of its Death are Greatly Exaggerated,” Case 
Western Reserve Law Review 62 (2011) 353–354.
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and media but also confused with the existing normative framework on 
the freedom of expression. It needs to be appreciated that this position 
has over the past decade repeatedly been observed to command support 
by a majority of the UN member states – a support that transcended 
the confines of the OIC Member States. The succession of UNGA 
and UNHRC resolutions on the defamation of religions makes it a 
standalone concept with international legitimacy.82 
With this remark, the OIC seems to claim that there is some sort of opinio 
juris. Its stance is that the succession of majority resolutions created a 
basis for an international norm for criminalising religious defamation. 
To evaluate whether or not this stance is legitimate one must ask to what 
extent ‘succession’ can be seen as a foundation for legally recognising an 
international punitive standard? This can be concisely answered: within 
international legal theory succession is not a justification for adopting an 
international (criminal) standard.
Central in the resolutions is, among other things, “… the enactment 
or strengthening of domestic frameworks and legislation to prevent the 
defamation of religions”,83 “stressing ... the need to effectively combat 
defamation of all religions ...”84 and the notion that “… the right to freedom 
of expression ... may be subject to limitations as provided by law and 
necessary for ... respect for religions and beliefs”.85 It is remarkable that in 
none of the resolutions is a definition of religious defamation given, for it is 
not in line with the legal definitions of defamation, slander and libel. 
From an examination of the resolutions, it can be deduced that they 
include the call for states to take strict measures to legitimately restrict 
the freedom of expression. It is not only a call for censorship, but also to 
develop legislation that criminalises blasphemy or take other actions that 
82 OIC-CS-2ndOBS-REP-FINAL-10 May 2009, 4. See also Robert C. Blitt, “Defamation of Religion: 
Rumors of its Death are Greatly Exaggerated,” Case Western Reserve Law Review 62 (2011), 
353–354. See for a detailed overview Appendix 1: Reports Generated By UN Resolutions Related 
to Defamation of Religions, by Reporting Mandate, in Robert C. Blitt, “The Bottom up Journey of 
‘Defamation of Religion’ from Muslim States to the United Nations: A Case Study of the Migration 
of Anti-Constitutional Ideas,” Studies in Law, Politics, and Society 56 (2011). Much can also be said 
about the concept of Islamophobia. 
83 A/RES/64/156.
84 A/HRC/RES/10/22.
85 A/RES/61/164. 
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have a threatening or discriminatory effect on critics and dissenters. Most 
importantly, it is seen as an international call to criminalise blasphemy.86 
It must also be questioned whether the concept of defamation of religion 
is sustainable at all. After all, is not every religion by its nature the defamation 
of other religions? The representative of Pakistan has to understand that 
when he states that Muhammad is the Seal of the Prophets, he is defaming 
the faith of the Bahai, for they recognise later prophets. And when Christ 
is seen as the son of God, this is blasphemous from a Jewish perspective.87
In addition, the emphasis in the defamation resolutions is on the protection 
of religions. While it is clear that this is to protect one religion, Islam, it is not 
clear whom this protection benefits in practice. Is it the state religion, the 
religious ruler, or perhaps the majority of the believers? Apart from that, the 
protection of the rights of religious minorities is central to the mandate on 
freedom of religion. And the idea of  protecting religions is evidently at odds 
with the freedom of religion, and with the human rights acquis in general, in 
which the individual and his freedoms are protected.88
Accordingly, it seems safe to conclude that religious defamation is an 
ambiguous concept. It is vague and has a scope wide enough to encompass 
different kinds of chilling effects on the freedoms of religion and expression. 
With the defamation resolutions, the OIC amalgamates freedom of religion 
with political policies and diminishes its original intent and scope. And by 
implicitly undermining its content, and explicitly undermining its non-
distinctive application, the OIC politically derogates from its very status as a 
fundamental, universal human right, leading to severe consequences for its 
normative framework. 
resOlutIOn 16/18 cOmBattIng relIgIOus IntOlerance
In 2009 there was a noticeable change in support for the religious defamation 
concept. A joint petition was presented and signed by more than 200 civil 
organisations, including monotheistic, humanist and atheist organisations, 
86 See for more Heiner Bielefeldt, “Misperceptions of Freedom of Religion or Belief,” Human Rights 
Quarterly 35 (2013) 41–42; L. Bennett Graham, “Defamation of Religions. The End of Pluralism?,” 
Emory International Law Review 23 (2009) 69; Robert C. Blitt, “Defamation of Religion: Rumors of 
its Death are Greatly Exaggerated,” Case Western Reserve Law Review 62 (2011).
87 Paul Cliteur, “Taylor and Dummett on the Rushdie Affair,” Journal of Religion & Society 18 (2016) 15.
88 Ibid.
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urging member states of the UNHRC to reject the 2009 defamation 
resolution.89 In addition, the combined abstentions and votes against the 
defamation resolutions reached a higher number than the votes in favour.90 
The same occurred in the UNGA, and there was an even further decline in 
support in 2010.91 
In 2011 there was what was considered to be a turnround, or even a 
breakthrough. The OIC introduced into the UNHRC resolution 16/18 on 
“Combating intolerance, negative stereotyping and stigmatization of, and 
discrimination, incitement to violence and violence against persons based 
on religion or belief”.92 The resolution was adopted with consensus on 
24 March 2011, and has since then functioned as a guiding document for 
discussion within the UN.93 
In the general comments and explanations before the vote the United 
States stated that it was “pleased” that consensus had been reached, and 
hoped that it “become[s] a blueprint for constructive, meaningful actions 
that the international community will take to promote respect for religious 
differences.”94 The Algerian representative stated that 
le consensus atteint autour du projet de résolution L.38 sur la lutte 
contre l’intolérance et la haine basées sur l’affiliation religieuse, 
89 Human Rights Council Resolution “Combating Defamation of Religion”, The International 
Humanist and Ethical Union, 26 March 2009, available at: http://iheu.org/human-rights-council-
resolution-combating-defamation-religion (accessed 9 June 2015). 
90 A/HRC/RES/10/22.
91 In 2009 A/RES/64/156 Combatting defamation of religions, A/64/439/Add.2 (Part II), 9–11, there 
were 81 votes in favour, 55 votes against, and 43 abstentions. In 2010 A/RES/65/224, A/65/456/Add.2 
(Part II), 73–74, A/C.3/65/L.46/Rev.1, there were 76 in favour, 64 against, and 42 abstentions.
92 A/HRC/RES/16/18 (24 March 2011). It is salient that a few months before the resolution was 
adopted in the UNHRC, a resolution regarding combatting defamation of religions was adopted in 
the UNGA. A/RES/65/224 (21 December 2010). 
93 Heiner Bielefeldt, “Misperceptions of Freedom of Religion or Belief,” Human Rights Quarterly 35 
(2013), 41–43. In the following years resolution 16/18 was reaffirmed in the UNHRC: on 23 March 
2012 resolution 19/25, A/HRC/RES/19/25, on 22 March 2013 resolution, 22/31, A/HRC/RES/22/31, 
on 28 March 2014 resolution 25/34, A/HRC/RES/25/34, on 27 March 2015 resolution 28/29, A/
HRC/28/RES/29. And in the UNGA: on 19 December, 2011 resolution 66/167, A/RES/66/167, on 
20 December 2012, resolution 67/178, A/RES/67/178, on 18 December 2013 resolution 68/169, A/
RES/68/169, on 18 December 2014 resolution 69/174, A/RES/69/174.
94 46th Meeting, HRC Extranet, Sixteenth Session, Draft resolutions, decisions & President’s 
statements, A/HRC/16/L.38.
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constitue une avancée significative. C’est vraiment pour ma délégation 
la traduction contemporaine du “I have a dream” de Martin Luther 
King. Merci a tous pour avoir jeté des ponts plutôt que d’avoir jeté 
l’éponge.95
For Algeria, a member of the OIC, it was certainly more than a blueprint, 
considering that she compared it to a watershed moment in American civil 
rights history, Martin Luther King’s historic speech on 28 August 1963. A 
rather exaggerated and slightly inappropriate comparison. Nonetheless, it 
can be safely concluded that both the OIC and the Western states stated that 
they were decisive in focusing on combatting religious intolerance.
What stands out when resolution 16/18 is analysed is that there is no 
longer an explicit reference to the concept of defamation of religion. It refers 
to persons, so it seems that the aim is to protect the individual rather than 
religions, which is more in line with the human rights acquis. However, 
there is still an implicit emphasis on one religion in particular, as a speech 
of Ekmeleddin İhsanoğlu, the Secretary-General of the OIC, is explicitely 
addressed in the resolution.96 It is furthermore relevant that other and 
even more concepts are included in the resolution, which have more or 
less the same ambiguity as defamation of religions, for example “derogatory 
stereotyping”, “negative profiling”, and “stigmatisation”.97 In general, these 
vague concepts lack both definition and criteria, and risk being subject to 
various interpretation.
95 48th Meeting, Final general remarks on 16th session UNHRC, HRC Extranet, Sixteenth Session, 
Oral statements, 25 March 2011. “The consensus around draft resolution L.38 on the fight against 
intolerance and hatred based on religious affiliation, is a significant step. It is for my delegation 
really the contemporary translation of the ‘I have a dream of Martin Luther King’. Thank you all for 
having built bridges instead of throwing in the towel” [my translation].
96 The resolution codified eight points of action that İhsanoğlu addressed in his speech during this 
meeting. For example, “Speaking out against intolerance, including advocacy of religious hatred that 
constitutes incitement to discrimination, hostility or violence.” “Adopting measures to criminalize 
incitement to imminent violence based on religion or belief.” “Understanding the need to combat 
denigration and negative religious stereotyping of persons, as well as incitement to religious hatred, 
by strategizing and harmonizing actions at the local, national, regional and international levels 
through, inter alia, education and awareness-building.” 
97 A/HRC/RES/16/18.
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the reactIOns after resOlutIOn 16/18
The reactions to the new course from academics and human rights groups 
were diverse. For example, Evelyn Aswad, Professor of Law at the University 
of Oklahoma College of Law, was optimistic and wrote that “the 16/18 
approach to combating religious intolerance, including offensive speech, 
reflects the appropriate, effective, and wide-ranging toolbox available to 
governments in reacting to such speech without resorting to broad bans on 
speech.”98 Ted Stahnke, from the organisation Human Rights First, was also 
positive. He stated that it was a “decisive break from the polarizing focus in 
the past on defamation of religions” and stated that “the U.N.’s new approach 
reflects what is needed to combat the intolerance we continue to see around 
the world ...”99 
The reaction of the Special Rapporteur on freedom of religion or 
belief, Heiner Bielefeldt, who is also Professor of Human Rights at the 
University of Erlangen-Nuremberg, was moderately positive. He wrote that 
“whether the UNHRC resolution 16/18 in the long run marks a turning 
point in the international debate remains to be seen. For the time being, 
it creates opportunities to address, in a more open inter-group atmosphere 
important political issues, such as stereotypes, prejudices, and concomitant 
manifestations of extreme hatred. This certainly is a positive development.”100 
Brett Scharffs, Professor of Law and Associate Director of the International 
Centre for Law and Rreligion at Brigham Young University, took a similar 
stance. He found it hard to predict an outcome, but stated that “the idea 
seems to have currency”.101 Although few in number, there were sceptical 
reactions, for example from Robert Blitt, associate Professor of Law at the 
University of Tennessee. He argued that “the new compromise approach 
98 M. Aswad Evelyn, “To Ban or Not to Ban Blasphemous Videos”, Georgetown Journal of International 
Law 44 (2013) 1325–1326.
99 “U.N. General Assembly Abandons Dangerous “Defamation of Religion” Concept” press release, 
19 December 2011, available at: http://www.humanrightsfirst.org/press-release/un-general-
assembly-abandons-dangerous-%E2%80%9Cdefamation-religion%E2%80%9D-concept.
100 Heiner Bielefeldt, “Misperceptions of Freedom of Religion or Belief,” Human Rights Quarterly 35 
(2013), 43.
101 Brett Scharffs, “International Law and the Defamation of Religion Conundrum,” The Review of Faith 
& International Affairs 11/1 (2013) 69.
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risks being exploited”.102 Jonathan Turley, professor of law at The George 
Washington University Law School, was also very sceptical. Although he 
misquoted paragraphs from the resolution in his article, he stated that “… 
the latest resolution does not repeat the defamation language, the purpose 
remains unchanged and the dangers for free speech are obvious.”103 
the aftermath dIscussIOns: the IstanBul prOcess
To facilitate the implementation of Resolution 16/18, the Istanbul Process, 
a series of high-level meetings, was called into being in July 2011. The first 
meeting was hosted by the OIC, and co-chaired by its Secretary-General 
and former US secretary of state, Hillary Clinton. More than twenty 
representatives from different states were there.104 In their joint statement 
the representatives
… called upon all relevant stakeholders throughout the world to take 
seriously the call for action set forth in Resolution 16/18 ... Participants, 
resolved to go beyond mere rhetoric, and to reaffirm their commitment 
to freedom of religion or belief and freedom of expression by urging 
States to take effective measures, as set forth in Resolution 16/18, 
consistent with their obligations under international human rights 
law ...105 
102 Robert C. Blitt, “Defamation of Religion: Rumors of its Death are Greatly Exaggerated,” Case 
Western Reserve Law Review 62 (2011), 347.
103 Johnatan Turley, “Criminalizing Intolerance: Obama Administration Moves Forward On United 
Nations Resolution Targeting Anti-Religious Speech,” 13 December 2011, available at: http://
jonathanturley.org/2011/12/13/criminalizing-intolerance-obama-administration-moves-forward-on-
united-nations-resolution-targeting-anti-religious-speech/.
104 The Secretary of State of the United States, the secretary-general of the OIC, the EU 
high representative for foreign affairs, and foreign ministers and officials from Australia, Belgium, 
Canada, Denmark, Egypt, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, Jordan, Lebanon, Morocco, Pakistan, 
Poland, Romania, Senegal, Sudan, Turkey, United Kingdom, the Vatican (Holy See), UN OHCHR, 
Arab League, African Union were present.
105 Joint Statement on Combating Intolerance, Discrimination, and Violence Based on Religion or 
Belief, 15 July 2011, available at: http://www.oicun.org/oicus/oicusprojects/20110719041927244.
html (accessed 12 June 2015. Clinton, representing the Western states, furthermore stated that “this 
resolution marks a step forward in creating a safe global environment for practicing and expressing 
one’s beliefs.” In “Remarks at the Organization of the Islamic Conference (OIC) High-Level Meeting 
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From their statement it appears that they were making efforts to realise the 
objectives as set in the 16/18 resolution. 
This meeting was followed by a meeting behind closed doors in 
Washington in December 2011, again co-chaired with the OIC. There were 
representatives from 26 states and several international organisations. This 
time Clinton had a more prominent role and said that “religious freedom 
and freedom of expression are among our highest values”106 and “together 
[with the OIC] we have begun to overcome the false divide that pits religious 
sensitivities against freedom of expression ...”107
The following session in London, hosted by the United Kingdom and 
Canada, was in December 2012, and topics similar to those talked about 
during the previous meetings were discussed. The next conference, organised 
solely by the OIC and held in Geneva in June 2013, provided the opportunity 
to discuss parts of their initial stance.108 Besides the annual topics, like the 
importance of an intercultural dialogue and speaking out against intolerance, 
the criminalisation of hate speech was put on the agenda. It led to familiar 
heated debates on the line between freedom of expression and hate speech.109 
on Combating Religious Intolerance,” available at: http://www.state.gov/secretary/20092013clinton/
rm/2011/07/168636.htm (accessed 12 June 2015.); K. Eckstrom, “Clinton Applauds U.N.’s Religious 
Freedom Resolution,” The Huffington Post, 25 March 2011.
106 Report of the United States on the First Meeting of Experts to Promote Implementation of United 
Nations Human Rights Council Resolution 16/18: 32, December 2011, available at: http://www.
universal-rights.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/02/1st-Meeting-Conference-Report.pdf
107 Ibid.
108 “OIC to hold the next event of the ‘Istanbul Process’ on combating intolerance in 
Geneva,” 20 February 2013, available at: http://www.oic-oci.org/oicv2/topic/?t_
id=7758&ref=3157&lan=en&x_key=istanbul process. “OIC Secretary General traveling today to 
Geneva for meeting on combating religious intolerance,” 18 June 2013, available at: http://www.oic-
oci.org/oicv2/topic/?t_id=8187&ref=3305&lan=en&x_key=istanbul process.
109 In his opening statement, İhsanoğlu, said that “… An open and constructive debate of ideas is 
indeed useful. It must be upheld as a matter of freedom of opinion and expression. It, however, 
transforms into a case of incitement to discrimination, hostility or violence when the freedom is 
abused to denigrate symbols and personalities sacred to one or the other religion. It needs to be 
understood as a matter of identity. It needs to be acknowledged that people in some parts of the 
world tend to identify themselves more with a particular religion than elsewhere. It is, therefore, 
essential to draw a line between free speech and hate speech …” in “Statement by His Excellency 
the Secretary General at the 3rd Istanbul Process Meeting on the follow-up of Implementation 
of HRC Resolution 16/18,” 20 June 2010, available at: http://www.oic-oci.org/oicv2/topic/?t_
id=8196&ref=3308&lan=en&x_key=istanbul process.
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The dividing lines between the West and the OIC reappeared and cracks in 
the new alliance resulted.110 The same occurred during the fourth meeting in 
Doha in March 2014,111 and during its recently held fifth session in Jeddah, 
Saudi Arabia, in June 2015.112 
Accordingly, after a few years the efforts to, in Clinton’s words “overcome 
the false divide”, were no longer the primary focus for the OIC within UN 
contours.113
a dIfferent stance Or a new strategy?
It is important to note that there was a difference between how the OIC 
originally handled and implemented the newly set course with regard to 
resolution 16/18 in UN contours, for example with the Istanbul Processes, 
and how they treated it inside their own organisations. This follows from 
contradictory statements from OIC officials and OIC documents. For 
example, the Islamic Educational, Scientific, and Cultural Organisation, 
which was established by the OIC, announced only a year after the adoption 
of resolution 16/18 that the International Federation of Journalists “should 
respect Islamic religious symbols and halt desecration of them. In this regard, 
it underlined that defaming Islamic religious symbols provokes the feelings 
110 See for more Turan Kayaoglu and Marie Juul Petersen, “Will Istanbul Process Relieve the Tension 
Between the Muslim World and the West?,” The Washington Review of Turkish & Eurasian Affairs, 
October 2013.
111 Report for Doha Meeting for Advancing Religious Freedom Through Interfaith Collaboration. 
Istanbul Process 16/18 for Combating Intolerance and Discrimination based on Religion or Belief, 
24–25 March 2014, available at: http://www.universal-rights.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/02/
Doha-Meeting-final.pdf. See for more by Marc Limon, Nazila Ghanea and Hilary Power, “The Policy 
Report, Combatting Global Religious Intolerance. The implementation of Human Rights Council”.
112 See for the official statements https://www.fidh.org/IMG/pdf/fidh_written_submission_-_5th_
session_of_the_istanbul_process-2.pdf; Hilary Power and Marie Juul Petersen, Informal Report Of 
the 5th meeting of the Istanbull Process. “From Resolution to Realisation – how to promote effective 
implementation of Human Rights Council resolution 16/18”, Jeddah, 3–4 June 2015, available at: 
http://www.humanrights.dk/files/media/researchpublications/downloads/urg-dihr-report-on-the-
5th-meeting-of-the-istanbul-process-jeddah-20152.pdf. 
113 Chile will host the 2016 Istanbul meeting. This will be the first time that a meeting has not been 
organised by one of the OIC or the Western states. It will be interesting to see what the outcomes of 
the discussions will be.
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of Muslims, and goes against the international media law and media ethics 
and the UN Resolution 65/224 on combating defamation of religions ...”114 
What is even more disconcerting is that only a few months after the 
adoption of resolution 16/18, the OIC’s Council of Foreign Minsters adopted 
a new resolution on the topic of combatting defamation of religions. In it the 
OIC decided “to continue to support the resolution en bloc in favor of the 
resolution at the Human Rights Council.”115 The OIC furthermore said in it 
that it was “exploring [an] alternative approach ...”116 and that its members 
“continue to explore options with regard to broadening support for the 
resolution on defamation of religions ...”117 It “decide[d] to remain seized 
of the matter as a top priority item on the agenda of all OIC Summits and 
Council of Foreign Ministers.”118
These statements not only demonstrate that the OIC members derived 
other content or means of implementation of the 16/18 resolution than was 
assumed, but it indicates more: it was not the turnround the West thought it 
would be. The Western states were under the impression that they had left 
the notion of religious defamation behind, and had thus corrected the error 
they had made in 1999. So one may wonder, why did the OIC initiate this 
ostensible change of direction? After all, it was Pakistan, at the initiative of 
the OIC, that introduced the draft resolution. What was the reason for this 
change of direction? 
When placed in context it looks like a mere change of tactics, that is, a 
strategic move. There are some arguments for this assumption. First of all, 
the OIC became aware that its continual rhetoric of arguments, in which it 
stated that the Western states violated the freedom of expression by failing to 
114 ISESCO calls upon IFJ to activate UN Resolution on combating defamation of religions, 
21 September 2012. via: http://www.isesco.org.ma/index.php?option=com_k2&amp;view=ite
m&amp;id=7626:isesco-calls-upon-ifj-to-activate-un-resolution-on-combating-defamation-of-
religions&amp;lang=en Resolution 65/224, combatting defamation of religions. A/RES/65/224.
115 Res. 35/38 OIC (28-30 June 2011), On Combating Defamation of Religions, Res35/38-POL, in OIC/
CFM-38/2011/POL/FINAL, 79–82.
116 Ibid.
117 Ibid.
118 Ibid. See for more Robert C. Blitt, “Defamation of Religion: Rumors of its Death are Greatly 
Exaggerated,” Case Western Reserve Law Review 62 (2011), 361–365; Javaid Rehman and Stephanie E. 
Berry, “Is ‘defamation of religions’ passé? The United Nations, Organisation of Islamic Cooperation, 
and Islamic State Practices. Lessons from Pakistan,” The George Washington International Law Review 
44 (2012) 451.
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ban insults to religion, or criminalise defamation of religion, was no longer 
working. Or, as İhsanoğlu said: “We could not convince them” and “[t]he 
European countries don’t vote with us, the United States doesn’t vote with 
us.”119 Secondly, the OIC was aware that there was a decline in support, and 
more states abstained from voting, in contrast to the position of the West, 
which remained firm. And the last argument, which is perhaps the most 
interesting one, is that it realised that the hijacking of different UN fora was 
only damaging its own reputation of being the world’s representative of the 
Umma, and, a fortiori, it would no longer be taken seriously by the Western 
states as an equal debating partner when discussing human rights in the 
future. 
These considerations probably made the OIC rethink its strategy and 
shift to a different approach, namely to combatting religious intolerance. 
Subsequently, the OIC shifted its primary focus in the 16/18 resolution to the 
freedom of religion, instead of expression, and by changing the semantics it 
reopened the debate and broadened its scope. The OIC is using the freedom 
of religion as the basis for its battle against, inter alia, the newly introduced 
ambiguous concepts of negative profiling, derogatory stereotyping and 
stigmatisation of persons based on religion (with an implicit focus on 
Islam). However, this shift and semantic adjustment have not changed the 
OIC’s original stance. It still has the same objectives, only now it is trying 
to realise them from a different, more disguised angle. Accordingly, by 
using this approach, the OIC can continue to politically derogate from the 
universality, status and content of the right to religious freedom, which will 
have consequences for the normative framework. 
Of course it is possible that attributing this level of strategic planning 
to the OIC is giving it too much credit. Nonetheless, the fact remains that 
it explicitly continues to strive for an international norm on criminalising 
defamation of religion within OIC contours, and implicitly within the 
different UN forums. 
119 “National Secular Society, Islamic bloc abandons plans for global blasphemy law at UN,” 16 October 
2012, available at: http://www.secularism.org.uk/news/2012/10/islamic-bloc-abandons-plans-for-
global-blasphemy-law-at-un (accessed 11 June 2015); Tom Henghan, “West’s free speech stand bars 
blasphemy ban: OIC,” Reuters, 15 October 2012. 
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cOnclusIOn
In this chapter about the freedom of religion and its universal status, I have 
addressed an issue of great contemporary concern: the political derogation 
of the freedom of religion perpetrated by the OIC, resulting in severe 
consequences for the normative framework.
I have discussed examples of the OIC amalgamating the right to freedom 
of religion with political strategies and policies of protecting the reputation 
of religions against defamation. To demonstrate this, I have analysed its 
various resolutions and founding documents, and discussed some reports of 
the UN Special Rapporteurs. These reports revealed information about the 
numerous violations of the freedom of religion perpetrated or condoned by 
member states of the OIC.
Close analyses have demonstrated that since its establishment the OIC’s 
actions have consisted of incoherent and even self-contradictory statements 
and documents on human rights law. There is a continuous back-and-forth 
movement between so-called recognition and endorsement of human rights 
in general, and the supremacy of Islamic law over universal human rights. 
While the OIC has given the impression that international law and human 
rights have over the years obtained a more prominent place on the agenda, 
closer analysis revealed otherwise. By referring to the Cairo Declaration in its 
Ten-Year Programme of Action and the lack of reference to UN fundamental 
human rights in its later 2008 charter, the OIC continues to approach human 
rights from an Islamic perspective.
From 1999 to 2011 the OIC had a firm grasp on the UNHRC and the 
UNGA with the adoption of the defamation of religion resolutions. In these 
resolutions it gave different interpretations of the right to freedom of religion, 
undermined its non-distinctive application, and argued clamorously against 
its universality. It considered the freedom of expression also to be subject to 
limitations. With the shift in 2011 to combatting religious intolerance, the 
OIC made it appear as if it had turned the tide with the adoption of this new 
compromise resolution. However, there are indications that it was more a 
strategic move than an actual reconsideration of its stance. At this time, the 
OIC is still defending this stance within UN contours.
And despite the fact that the resolutions are non-binding, and the OIC 
cannot enforce any legal actions with them, they do express the political will 
of the member states of the UN, and are therefore of significant influence, an 
influence that is unfortunately dominated by an organisation that continues 
to derogate from the universal human right of freedom of religion.
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9  Blasphemy, Multiculturalism and 
Free Speech in Modern Britain
 Rumy Hasan*
Blasphemy BefOre multIculturalIsm: “lIfe Of BrIan” and “the 
message” In the 1970s
In 1949, in the optimistic environment of post-war reconstruction and a 
peaceful future, a senior law lord, Lord Denning, succinctly gave the reason 
for the law on blasphemy, and why it was no longer relevant:
The reason for the law [on blasphemy] was because it was thought that 
a denial of Christianity was liable to shake the fabric of society, which 
was itself founded upon Christian religion. There is no such danger to 
society now and the offence of blasphemy is a dead letter.1
In this chapter we explore whether Denning was correct or not, and proceed 
to argue that the issue has taken a turn which could not have been foreseen 
by judges and politicians some 70 years ago, as the ethnic and religious 
make-up of Britain has undergone enormous change, which would have a 
profound effect on views regarding blasphemy.
In retrospect, the attempts by some Christians to suppress the showing 
of Monty Python’s Life of Brian in the late 1970s was a key marker in the 
fall of the blasphemy law in England and Wales, a law that was eventually 
repealed in 2008. Critics of the film argued that it was blasphemous as the 
main character, Brian, was apparently based on Jesus Christ. Accordingly, 
it was a breach of the law on blasphemy and so the film should be banned 
*  My thanks to Paul Cliteur and Tom Herrenberg for several helpful comments and corrections, 
including alerting me to the protests in London in 1938 by Muslims against H.G. Wells and to the 
Handyside case.
1 Cited in R. Webster, A Brief History of Blasphemy (Southwold: The Orwell Press, 1990), 24.
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from being shown in cinemas and other public venues. In Britain, just as 
in other Western countries, the raison d’être of the law on blasphemy was 
to protect Christianity for reasons set out by Lord Denning. At least since 
the Enlightenment, a concerted effort had been made to push religion out 
of state institutions, and to a considerable extent this succeeded as religion 
largely became a private affair. Though the United Kingdom has never had an 
avowedly secular constitution in the manner of France, the role of religion 
has nevertheless declined sharply since the Second World War.
So even though Christianity—and the organised church—became a 
shadow of its former self, it was still shielded by the law, meaning that while 
one could renounce the faith, one could not lampoon, ridicule or satirise 
it. This contradictory position in an increasingly secular society inevitably 
gave rise to tensions, tensions which began to rise in the 1960s when Britain 
became a more prosperous society, so that there were many other channels 
to invest time and money in. Concomitant with rising living standards 
were attitudinal changes—in particular non-conformity, so that a challenge 
to orthodoxy and the establishment took hold among large swathes of the 
population, helped by the burgeoning mass media, especially television. 
Politicians, the monarchy, religion, the clergy, the military—pillars of the 
establishment—were subject to challenge and satire.
In this new libertarian climate, there was an unwritten understanding 
between religious leaders and civil society that a “low level” form of satire of 
Christianity was permissible and would not be curtailed through recourse to 
the blasphemy law. If, however, there was egregious or “high level” disrespect 
for Christianity and its prophet, then the threshold of tolerance would be 
breached and the wrath of the churches, backed by the law, would fall upon 
the perpetrators, or, more precisely, the blasphemers.
Monty Python’s Life of Brian was a significant case of the threshold being 
breached. But, as Richard Webster, author of A Brief History of Blasphemy 
points out, it was rather a mild instance of blasphemy.2 Indeed, after some 
cuts were made at the behest of the British Board of Film Classification 
(BBFC) the film received a certificate for general release. In other words, the 
film authority with de facto censorial powers did not deem it to have breached 
the law of blasphemy and so, on 8 November 1979, it was duly released in 
the UK. Despite this clearance, the film encountered resistance. Worried by 
its causing offence to Christians, many town and city councils banned local 
cinemas from screening it. It was also banned in other countries—in Ireland 
2 Ibid., 27.
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for 8 years and for one year in Norway.3 The BBC and ITV resorted to self-
censorship by refusing to show it.
Nevertheless, despite these bans, Life of Brian was distributed widely, and 
became the fourth highest grossing film of that year in the UK4—by this 
success the reactionary blasphemy law was robustly challenged. Though 
protests and pickets against the film by Christian groups took place in many 
venues where it was screened, the important point to note is that all forms 
of opposition to the film were entirely peaceful. While some Christians—
perhaps the majority—would be offended by Life of Brian, there was no 
serious invocation of a right not to be offended.
This is not to say that the blasphemy law was a dead letter at the time. In 
1977, two years before the controversy surrounding Life of Brian, a blasphemy 
case was filed against the magazine Gay News and proved the first successful 
prosecution on such grounds in England since 1922. The magazine’s offence 
stemmed from its publication of a poem that portrayed Jesus Christ as 
the object of homosexual love. In Monty Python: The Case Against, Robert 
Hewison summarises the presiding judge’s judgment:
In earlier centuries, it was regarded as blasphemous simply to 
deny the existence of God, but this restriction on free thinking was 
gradually relaxed, provided that the denial was made in a decent and 
sober manner. “But what was still regarded as blasphemy…and is still 
regarded today…was an element of irreverence, scurrility, profanity, 
vilification or licentious abuse coupled with the Christian religion, or 
any sacred person, or any sacred object.”5
An appeal was launched by the magazine, but the House of Lords upheld 
the guilty verdict. In his judgment, Lord Scarman argued that there is a case 
for the law on blasphemy to be extended “to protect the religious beliefs 
and feelings of non-Christians. The offence belongs in a group of criminal 
offences designed to safeguard the internal tranquillity of the kingdom…
[There] is a duty on all of us to refrain from insulting or outraging the 
religious feelings of others.”6 Indeed, precisely these arguments were to 
3 Channel 4, The Secret Life of Brian, 1 January 2007.
4 R. Sellers, “Welase Bwian”, The Guardian, 28 March 2003, available at: http://www.theguardian.com/
culture/2003/mar/28/artsfeatures1.
5 Cited in R. Hewson, Monty Python: The Case Against (London: Methuen, 1990 [1981]), 61.
6 Ibid., 66.
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be made by ethnic minorities with respect to their religions in decades to 
come. Prima facie, this is logical: on the grounds of fairness and equality, if 
Christianity is protected by the law then so should other religions, especially 
considering that many non-Christians had settled in Britain. This presaged 
the reasoning of defenders of multiculturalism and multifaithism. Be that as 
it may, had parliament adhered to Scarman’s recommendation, it would have 
been a severe blow to freedom of expression and a fillip to religious censors.
The case and guilty verdict attracted much opposition, especially from 
the arts world, and demands began to be made for the law on blasphemy to 
be repealed. This seemed to have helped to create a rather more favourable 
political climate for Life of Brian and perhaps contributed to the film being 
passed by the BBFC without major changes and to the Pythons not being 
sued.
Three years before Life of Brian, in 1976, the film The Message was released. 
This chronicled the life and times of Islam’s prophet, Mohammed, and his 
followers. Even at a time when the Muslim population in the West was a 
small fraction of what it is today, there were hints concerning reactions to 
this film which foretold what would become the norm decades later. It was 
produced and directed by the Syrian-American Moustapha Al Akkad, who 
consulted Islamic clerics so as to demonstrate that he was being true to the 
faith. Accordingly, the film complied with orthodox Islamic views that the 
face of Mohammed should not be shown on screen, nor his voice heard. But 
while he received approval from Al Azhar University in Cairo, the film was 
opposed by the World Muslim League in Mecca. The film’s original title was 
Mohammed, Messenger of God but, days before the film’s opening in London, 
threatening telephone calls to the cinema forced Akkad to change the title 
to The Message, as it was thought by some Muslims that the prophet was 
portrayed in the film.7
Forty years ago, the relatively small Muslim population in Britain was not 
politically active in regard to Islam. Thus, notwithstanding the fact that the 
film was not widely distributed, there were no further protests or pickets 
against The Message, and filmgoers managed to see it like any other film. But 
problems encountered in the USA were on a different scale altogether, as 
Meena Jang of the Hollywood Reporter explains:
In 1977, a group of twelve radical Hanafi Muslim terrorists orchestrated 
a raid in Washington D.C., taking over three separate buildings – the 
7 “Muhamad film title changed after threats”, The Times, 27 July 1976, 4.
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B’nai B’rith National Headquarters, National Islamic Center and D.C. 
City Hall. They held roughly 150 people hostage over a two-day period 
from March 9-11. The uprising was planned in part as retaliation against 
the release of Filmco International Productions’ film Mohammad, 
Messenger of God (later retitled The Message: The Story of Islam). [The] 
leader Hamaas Abdul Khaalis, publicly denounced the film and called 
for it to be destroyed, claiming it to be sacrilegious and “a fairytale 
about Mohammad”. All claims were made under the false impression 
that Quinn played the role of Mohammad himself, which went against 
Muslim belief that any kind of representation of the Prophet should 
be condemned ... [T]he Khaalis-led dissident group staged an uprising 
at three locations in Washington, killing 24-year-old WHUR radio 
reporter Maurice Williams and D.C. police officer Mack Cantrell 
(who died in the hospital days later after being shot on the scene) and 
injuring eleven hostages. The raid lasted for 39 hours with the terrorist 
group demanding that Mohammad be removed from theaters across the 
country, in addition to the government handing over a group of men 
responsible for the deaths of leader Hamaas Abdul Khaalis’ relatives. 
The movie’s distributor, Irwin Yablans Co., complied with the threats 
by cancelling Mohammad’s release. Akkad, convinced that the Black 
Muslims were unaware that the film had been made in abidance with 
their religious laws, even went as far as to offer “to destroy the film’s 
negative if the gunmen viewed the film and objected to it,” as reported 
by The Hollywood Reporter at the time. 
Though only temporarily, the film was ultimately pulled from nine 
theaters in New York and Los Angeles in the wake of the attack for the 
safety of over 100 hostages, with no response from the Muslim group 
regarding Akkad’s offer. The weekend following the two-day siege, the 
director made the decision to bring Mohammad, Messenger of God back 
to theaters, disregarding the Hanafi Muslims’ previous demands. The 
$18 million budget film sold over 100 advance tickets from March 9-11 
and grossed $53,605 in its premiere weekend in four major theaters 
in New York and Los Angeles (though a few theaters stood by their 
decision to not screen the film at all).
“Our plans to release Mohammad have not changed,” Akkad told THR 
in 1977 upon choosing to resume the film’s postponed run. “We cannot 
run our lives and businesses according to the wishes of terrorists.” He 
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further emphasized: “I am sure the terrorists never saw the picture 
they were protesting. The sensitive spot was the title and Anthony 
Quinn’s role. They were very misinformed on what the picture is all 
about.”8
These Black Muslim terrorists were an early incarnation of jihadist 
behaviour that would become so prevalent in the twenty-first century. What 
is revealing is the nature of their outrage, on the grounds of blasphemy: that 
a film caused offence by its title and the belief that the prophet was portrayed 
by an actor. The contrast between the protests concerning Life of Brian and 
The Message were astonishingly stark.
But we can aver that a hostile, violent response on the part of Muslims in 
the West to their religion or prophet being blasphemed against has been the 
norm. This is attested by a little known event that took place in London as far 
back as 1938, as reported upon by The Manchester Guardian:
Mr H. G. Wells’s “Short History of the World” was ceremoniously 
committed to the flames by a party of Indian Mohammedans today 
in the East End [of London] ... It is expected that about a thousand of 
them will go to the India Office next Thursday [The march duly took 
place on 18 August 1938]9, and there is a further proposal that they 
should also go to Mr Wells’s house. The complaint is that in his text Mr 
Wells says of Mohammed: “He seems to have been a man compounded 
of…considerable vanity, greed, cunning, and self-deception, and 
quite sincere religious passion” The book also says that the Koran is 
certainly unworthy of its alleged divine authority.10
8 M. Jang, ‘“The Interview” isn’t the first film pulled because of terror threats’, Hollywood Reporter, 
20 December 2014, available at: http://www.hollywoodreporter.com/news/interview-isnt-first-film-
pulled-759701.
9 Science and Society Picture Library, ‘Muslims marching through London’, Image no.  10432407, 
available at: http://www.scienceandsociety.co.uk/results.asp?image=10432407.
10 “Mr Wells and Mohammed”, Manchester Guardian, 13 August 1938, ProQuest Historical Newspapers, 
The Guardian Observer, 10.
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Blasphemy In the era Of multIculturalIsm
During the 1980s, as immigrants from the former colonies largely became 
accepted as legitimate British citizens, there was an increasing sense that 
multiculturalism had taken root in Britain. The culmination of this thinking 
was the publication of The Parekh Report in 2000, whose foundational 
recommendation was that the government formally declare the United 
Kingdom to be a “multicultural society.”11 This was not, however, an 
epithet that was universally shared, and myriad events and facts regarding 
the demands made under this rubric would generate great concern. Here 
we discuss such concerns regarding the tension between blasphemy and 
freedom of expression in a supposedly multicultural society.
It was not a film but a book that was published some ten years after Life of 
Brian came out that, in Britain, saw a decisive shift in the manner of protest 
against a work that offended religious, specifically Muslim, sensibilities. 
The book in question was Salman Rushdie’s The Satanic Verses, and events 
surrounding it would prove to be of world historic significance.12 Soon 
after it was published in September 1988, threats against Rushdie and the 
publishers, Penguin Press, were made. By the beginning of 1989, Muslims in 
Bradford expressed such outrage that they organised a public burning of the 
book, like their co-religionists had done in 1938. In his autobiography, Joseph 
Anton, Rushdie quotes Heinrich Heine: “Where they burn books they will in 
the end burn people too.”13
The protests went global and included attacks against bookshops—two in 
London were firebombed—publishers, and translators. Muslims who took 
offence, together with their supporters and sympathisers, wanted the book 
to be pulled on the grounds of blasphemy. Rushdie strongly disagreed with 
this and argued the need to explore religion as a form of political repression 
and as international terrorism—furthermore, that one should follow in the 
footsteps of the French Enlightenment thinkers who advocated blasphemy 
as a weapon, refusing to accept the power of the church to set limiting points 
on thought, and that religion is in fact the enemy of the intellect.14
11 B. Parekh (Chair), The Future of Multi-Ethnic Britain (The Parekh Report), Report of the Commission 
on the Future of Multi-Ethnic Britain, The Runnymede Trust (London: Profile Books, 2000), 313.
12 See also ch. 6 of this volume.
13 S. Rushdie, Joseph Anton: A Memoir (London: Jonathan Cape, 2012), 129.
14 Ibid., 177.
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14 February 1989 was the date of the infamous fatwa by the Iranian 
leader Ayatollah Khomeini, calling for the death of Rushdie and his 
publishers, which turbo-charged the protests. Though Khomeini was a Shia, 
the sectarian rivalry with Sunnis was largely forgotten as very few in the 
Islamic world and among Muslims in the West challenged his order for 
the assassination of a writer from another country. In Britain, there was a 
clarion call for the extension of the law on blasphemy to include Islam—
and many politicians and other public figures buckled under the pressure of 
Muslim outrage that was backed up by violence and threats of violence, so 
agreed with this curtailment of freedom of expression. As a life-long man of 
the left and supporter of the Labour Party, Rushdie felt betrayed by Labour 
parliamentarians joining the ranks of these Muslims—and poignantly notes 
that “the true conservatives of Britain are now in the Labour Party, while the 
radicals are all in blue.”15 Rushdie wrote a letter to the left wing black Labour 
MP Bernie Grant to highlight the regressive stance that he and other leading 
lights of the left had taken:
Dear Bernie Grant MP,
“Burning books” you said in the House of Commons exactly one 
day after the fatwa, “is not a big issue for blacks.” The objection to 
such practices, you claimed, were proof that “the whites wanted to 
impose their values on the world.” I recall that many black leaders—
Dr Martin Luther King, for example—were murdered for their ideas. 
To call forth the murder of a man for his ideas would therefore appear 
to the bewildered outsider to be a thing which a black Member of 
Parliament might find horrifying. Yet you do not object. You represent, 
sir, the unacceptable face of multiculturalism, its deformation into 
an ideology of cultural relativism. Cultural relativism is the death of 
ethical thought, supporting the right of tyrannical priests to tyrannise, 
of despotic parents to mutilate their daughters, of bigoted individuals 
to hate homosexuals, and Jews, because it is part of their “culture” to 
do so.16
Rushdie is prescient in attacking Grant on the basis of his support for 
multiculturalism and, ipso facto, abandonment of universal principles. 
15 Ibid., 131.
16 Ibid., 187.
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As large numbers of immigrants settled in Britain after the Second World 
War—overwhelmingly ethnic minorities from the former colonies—there 
was a gradual conflation of race/ethnicity with culture and religion. Just as 
it became unacceptable to espouse openly racist views, so this also became 
the case with respect to the culture and religion of the new settlers; in other 
words, culture and religion became subsumed within the discourse of race 
and ethnicity. The corollary to this was, in line with legislation that outlawed 
racist practices, as under the Race Relations Acts, so must legislation also 
outlaw insults and offence to the cultural and religious beliefs and practices 
of ethnic minorities. Respect for and recognition of the culture and religion 
of ethnic minorities is central to the multicultural doctrine;17 causing 
offence therefore causes misrecognition and is unambiguously tantamount 
to inflicting harm. It was this reasoning that was adopted and internalised 
by so many in regard to The Satanic Verses, and it was the slippery road to the 
extension of blasphemy laws. Paul Cliteur provides an incisive analysis of the 
failings of two leading, avowedly liberal philosophers in this regard: Charles 
Taylor and Michael Dummett.18
In the clash between freedom of expression and ethnic minority 
sensibilities, the former tended to give way to the latter. Whereas the 
response of “progressives” in the 1970s was to support Monty Python’s right to 
artistic expression, sending the message that it decisively trumped Christian 
sensibilities, for perhaps the majority within this grouping precisely the 
reverse was the case with regard to Rushdie and Muslims.
Even prior to the Satanic Verses affair, in accordance with the multicultural 
principle of not causing offence and misrecognition, there was little by 
way of satire or criticism of ethnic minorities. But the affair indubitably 
proceeded to have an extremely chilling effect on freedom of expression 
when it concerned Islam and Muslims. Whilst television programmes such 
as Channel 4’s Spitting Image continued mercilessly to lampoon the Pope 
and Archbishop of Canterbury, in stark contrast, even the merest hint of 
satirising Islam became a taboo after the fatwa. In fairness, given the violent, 
menacing opposition that would inevitably follow those brave (some might 
say, foolish) enough to lampoon or criticise Islam and Muslims, it was 
hardly surprising that no one raised their head above the parapet. Hence, 
in regard to Islam, Britain had acquired, through extra-parliamentary and 
extra-judicial means, a de facto blasphemy law as self-censorship became 
17 See R. Hasan, Multiculturalism: Some Inconvenient Truths (London: Politicos, 2010), ch. 1.
18 P. Cliteur, ‘Taylor and Dummett on the Rushdie Affair’, Journal of Religion and Society 18 (2016) 1-25.
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the default position in the media, the arts and academia. This has largely 
remained the case until the present day—The Guardian, for example, in 
January 2016 decided to curb comments on certain pieces as was elaborated 
upon by the website Islam Surveyed:
Certain subjects—race, immigration and Islam in particular—attract 
an unacceptable level of toxic commentary, believes Mary Hamilton, 
our executive editor, audience. “The overwhelming majority of these 
comments tend towards racism, abuse of vulnerable subjects, author 
abuse and trolling, and the resulting conversations below the line 
bring very little value but cause consternation and concern among 
both our readers and our journalists,” she said last week. As a result, it 
had been decided that comments would not be opened on pieces on 
those three topics unless the moderators knew they had the capacity 
to support the conversation and that they believed a positive debate 
was possible.19
These are nothing short of feeble excuses for blatant suppression of free 
speech—ironic given that the Guardian describes its comment section as 
“Comment is Free”; indeed, their censorial stance could be based on the 
grounds of the offence of blasphemy.
cOntrastIng respOnses tO twO “BlasphemOus” plays: “BehztI” and 
“Jerry sprInger: the Opera”
It was not only Muslims who stamped out any slight to their religion. In 
December 2004, sections of the British Sikh community resorted to precisely 
the same means as Muslims had become accustomed to doing. The focus of 
Sikh rage was a play, Behzti (“dishonour” in Punjabi) written by a British 
Sikh playwright by the name of Gurpreet Kaur Bhatti and set in a gurdwara 
(Sikh temple). On the opening night of the performance, on 18 December, 
hundreds of Sikh protestors attacked the Birmingham Repertory Theatre and 
“800 people were evacuated, security guards were attacked, a foyer door was 
destroyed, windows were broken in a restaurant and demonstrators entered 
back stage and smashed equipment.” Mohan Singh, a local Sikh community 
19 Islam Surveyed, ‘Reader’s don’t matter – at The Guardian’, February 2016., available at: https://
islamsurveyed.files.wordpress.com/2016/02/readersdontmatter-attheguardian.pdf.
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leader, pithily provided the rationale for this mayhem: “When they’re doing 
a play about a Sikh priest raping somebody inside a gurdwara, would any 
religion take it?”20 In other words, Mr Singh was suggesting that the violent 
conduct of the protestors was entirely justified and, moreover, would be 
the sort of action adherents to other religions under similar circumstances 
would also resort to.
The Roman Catholic Archbishop of Birmingham, the Most Reverend 
Vincent Nichols, offered support to the Sikh community at large on the 
basis of a classic reason for the law on blasphemy: “Such a deliberate, even 
if fictional, violation of the sacred place of the Sikh religion demeans the 
sacred places of every religion.”21 The theatre’s management stated that 
short of “blatant censorship” and cancelling the production, it could not 
have done more to appease the Sikh community.22 But, after discussions 
with members of the Sikh community—who demanded that the play not 
be set in a gurdwara—and the Commission for Racial Equality, the theatre 
management, fearful of more mob violence, pulled the play after 3 nights, 
and Bhatti went into hiding after receiving death threats.
This was nothing short of censorship by acts of violence on the grounds 
of blasphemy, and it outraged many of the leading lights of the British arts 
community, some 700 of whom wrote an open letter stating that: 
It is a legitimate function of art to provoke debate and sometimes to 
express controversial ideas…Those who use violent means to silence 
it must be vigorously opposed and challenged. We all have the right 
to protest peacefully if a work of art offends us. We do not have the 
right to use violence and intimidation to prevent that work of art from 
being seen by others. To verbally and physically threaten a writer, 
audience members, performers and theatre staff is unacceptable. To 
attempt to censor a play because some incidents in it would thereby 
be rendered less offensive to some people if they were set elsewhere 
20 BBC News, ‘Theatre stormed in Sikh protest’, 19 December 2004, available at: http://news.bbc.
co.uk/1/hi/england/west_midlands/4107437.stm.
21 Ibid.
22 BBC News, “Theatre attacks Sikh play protest”, 19 December 2004, available at: http://news.bbc.
co.uk/1/hi/england/west_midlands/4109315.stm.
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is unacceptable. To stop the production of a work of art by means of 
force and continued threats of force is unacceptable.23 
Sikhs in Britain had demonstrated the same intolerance of any slight to 
their faith as Muslims, and the unmistakeable reality was that the offence of 
blasphemy became a de facto crime against the religions of ethnic minorities, 
enforced by threats and acts of violence. This was a sobering reality whose 
effect was to act as a disincentive to any aspiring writer or artist who dared 
to satirise the culture and religion of ethnic minorities. Interestingly, many 
of those who had attacked Rushdie over The Satanic Verses kept quiet, but 
this may not have been because of principle. Whereas Rushdie’s novel had 
a global impact, with the head of another state issuing a licence to kill, the 
Behzti affair was much more local in scope and of much shorter duration. 
There are relatively few Sikhs compared to the number of Muslims and 
no Sikh leader or priest issued a fatwa from India calling for the murder of 
Bhatti, and nor were there large protests anywhere else.
In the month after Behzti was pulled, another play aroused great 
controversy: Jerry Springer: The Opera, a satire on the American talk host’s 
long-running programme. It was broadcast by the BBC in January 2005 and 
elicited a record number of complaints—55,000—and the evangelical group 
Christian Voice led protests against the screening outside 9 BBC offices. The 
Christian Institute attempted to bring a private prosecution, but this was 
rejected by the Magistrates’ Court, a decision upheld by the High Court of 
Justice. During the play’s tour around the UK, there were regular protests 
outside theatres at which it was performed, including the singing of hymns 
and handing out of leaflets.24
Many Christians thought the play was blasphemous. Christian Voice 
attempted to prosecute the BBC’s Director General on the ground that the 
show was “an offensive, spiteful, systematic mockery and wilful denigration 
of Christian belief” and argued that the show “clearly crossed the blasphemy 
threshold.” This was unsuccessful, as two High Court judges ruled that the 
programme could not be considered as blasphemous “in context.” “As a 
whole [it] was not and could not reasonably be regarded as aimed at, or an 
23 Cited in T. Branigan, “Stars sign letter in support of playwright in hiding”, Guardian, 23 December 
2004, available at: http://www.theguardian.com/uk/2004/dec/23/arts.religion.
24 BBC News, ‘Springer tour faces new protests’, 26 January 2006, available at: http://news.bbc.
co.uk/1/hi/entertainment/4640588.stm.
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attack on Christianity or what Christians held sacred,” the judges said in 
their ruling.25
Two important conclusions can be drawn. First, all the protests against 
Jerry Springer: The Opera were entirely peaceful—there were no recorded 
instances of threats or acts of violence against those involved with the play. The 
playwrights, Richard Thomas and Stewart Lee, did not receive death threats 
and go into hiding; no theatre was smashed up by violent demonstrators 
determined to stop it from being performed. Second, neither the BBC nor 
any theatre designated to show the play bowed to the protestors: all took the 
principled stance that freedom of expression trumps that of offence taken by 
groups of people believing their religions to have been blasphemed against 
by fictional works of art. By so doing, attempts at censorship failed and 
freedom of expression was assured. The contrast with protests against Behzti 
was striking and profound. It is, however, revealing that Behzti was never 
commissioned by the BBC or any other broadcaster for either television or 
radio—clearly a double standard was at play. Such a double standard was 
best explained by former Director General of the BBC, Mark Thompson, 
when he argued: “Without question, ‘I complain in the strongest possible 
terms’, is different from, ‘I complain in the strongest possible terms and I am 
loading my AK47 as I write.’”26
The compelling conclusion is the profoundly contrasting approaches 
to perceived blasphemy by Muslims and Sikhs on the one hand, and by 
Christians on the other. The former have been intolerant, fanatical and 
violent, the latter peaceful, tolerant and educative in approach. What 
explains this? The roots of this sharp distinction, we can argue, lie in the 
pre-Enlightenment societies from which ethnic minority immigrants hail, 
contrasted with a society which is at its core a product of the Enlightenment, 
one in which religion has largely been confined to the private sphere. From 
this understanding, the manner of protests by Muslims and Sikhs in Britain 
is entirely in keeping with how it is conducted in Pakistan, India and 
Bangladesh.
25 C. Tryhorn, ‘Springer opera not blasphemous, court rules’, The Guardian, 5 December 2007, 
available at: http://www.theguardian.com/media/2007/dec/05/independentproductioncompanies.
bbc.
26 “Mark Thompson: BBC director general admits Christianity gets tougher treatment’, 27 February 
2012, available at: http://www.telegraph.co.uk/culture/tvandradio/bbc/9107689/Mark-Thompson-
BBC-director-general-admits-Christianity-gets-tougher-treatment.html.
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Importantly, however, in the multicultural discourse, migrants were not 
asked to conform to the norms and mores of their host society, but rather, 
the indigenous white society was required to show tolerance and respect for 
their (the migrants’) cultures and religions. Hence, exceptions to such norms 
and mores became the new norm—otherwise this would be demonstrable 
disrespect and misrecognition and necessarily a grievous harm to their very 
being; akin to racism, which had long been outlawed.
There was the recognition that for ethnic minorities, religion and religious 
identity was of far greater significance than for the largely and increasingly 
irreligious white British society, hence the view that tolerance by the latter to 
the former necessitated refraining from criticising or satirising their culture 
and religion and attendant beliefs and practices. This resulted in tolerance 
on the part of the white host society for ethnic minority immigrants and 
intolerance on the part of ethnic minorities for anything that slighted their 
identity. This blatant breach of universalism was to be a crucial factor in the 
increasing alienation of indigenous whites to the intolerant views of settlers, 
as evidenced in The Satanic Verses and Behzti affairs.
law On IncItement Of relIgIOus hatred and the repeal Of the 
law On Blasphemy
During the 1990s, pressure had been mounting on the government to tackle 
the demands from ethnic minorities to protect their religions from satire and 
ridicule. After 9/11, the Labour government was concerned about a possible 
backlash against Muslims; contemporaneously, Muslim groups began 
campaigning to extend the blasphemy law to cover Islam in order to curb 
perceived “Islamophobia.” Proponents of this demand used the outcome of a 
case against the leader of the far right British National Party, Nick Griffin, to 
intensify their efforts. Griffin had been arrested in 2004 for describing Islam 
as a “wicked, vicious faith,” but was cleared of inciting racial hatred on the 
defence of freedom of expression and for the fact that Islam is not a race or 
ethnicity. Following the acquittal, former Chancellor Gordon Brown stated
I think any preaching of religious or racial hatred will offend mainstream 
opinion in this country and I think we’ve got to do whatever we can 
BLASPHEMY, MULTICULTURALISM AND FREE SPEECH IN MODERN BRITAIN 223
to root it out from whatever quarter it comes. And if that means we’ve 
got to look at the laws again I think we will have to do so.27
Such new legislation would be politically expedient to Labour given that it 
invariably receives the bulk of the Muslim vote.28 Indeed, Labour has come 
to rely on a de facto “Muslim bloc vote” to win these constituencies.
The options for the Labour government were either to extend the law on 
blasphemy to cover other religions or to introduce amendments to existing 
legislation that would act as de facto blasphemy provisions. However, given 
the decades long pressure to rescind the blasphemy law, the former remedy 
was felt to be politically unfeasible in the context of the sharply declining role 
of religion in mainstream society. Accordingly, in its 2005 general election 
manifesto, the Labour Party promised to introduce a Bill designed to outlaw 
“incitement to religious hatred”:
It remains our firm intention to give people of all faiths the same 
protection against incitement to hatred on the basis of their religion. 
We will legislate to outlaw it and will continue the dialogue we started 
with faith groups from all backgrounds about how best to balance 
protection, tolerance and free speech.29
The reference to “people of all faiths” is a clear statement of Labour’s view 
that Britain is not only a multicultural society but has been transformed into 
a “multifaith” society. Accordingly, the role of religion was given—without 
serious consideration, let alone debate—a decisive importance in the makeup 
of national identity. Furthermore, euphemistic language is used: dialogue 
with faith groups and taking account of “protection” and “tolerance” (of 
religious beliefs) necessarily implies curbing freedom of speech. This is what 
came to pass after Labour won the 2005 election and drafted the promised 
Bill, which was duly passed by Parliament. The result was the Racial and 
Religious Hatred Act 2006 which came into force on 1 October 2007. It 
27 BBC News, ‘BNP leader cleared of race hate’, 10 November 2006, available at: http://news.bbc.
co.uk/1/hi/england/bradford/6135060.stm.
28 Voting data on the basis of religion is not collated but this is an accurate statement given that 
Labour has, for decades, won elections in constituencies with a high percentage of Bangladeshis and 
Pakistanis, who are overwhelmingly Muslim.
29 Labour Party Manifesto, Britain Forward Not Back, 2005, available at: http://ucrel.lancs.ac.uk/
wmatrix/tutorial/labour%20manifesto%202005.pdf, 111–112.
224 THE FALL AND RISE OF BLASPHEMY LAW
creates an offence in England and Wales of inciting hatred against a person 
on the grounds of their religion.
The Act defines religious hatred as “hatred against a group of persons 
defined by reference to religious belief or lack of religious belief.” “[A]cts 
intended to stir up religious hatred” include “use of words or behaviour 
or display of written material.” The key section of the Act is 29B (1): “A 
person who uses threatening words or behaviour, or displays any written 
material which is threatening, is guilty of an offence if he intends thereby 
to stir up religious hatred” [italics added by RH]. The insertion of “intends” 
arose because of protests against the Bill, especially by some of the leading 
figures in the arts community, who argued that the law would severely 
curtail freedom of expression. Defenders of the legislation countered this by 
asserting that this would not be the case, given that the threshold at which 
religious offence became incitement would be high. They also pointed to 
section 29J, which provides protection for freedom of expression:
Nothing in this Part shall be read or given effect in a way which 
prohibits or restricts discussion, criticism or expressions of antipathy, 
dislike, ridicule, insult or abuse of particular religions or the beliefs or 
practices of their adherents, or of any other belief system or the beliefs 
or practices of its adherents, or proselytising or urging adherents of a 
different religion or belief system to cease practising their religion or 
belief system.
To a significant extent, sections 29B (1) and 29J are in conflict. Certainly, 
“ridicule, insult, and abuse” of a religion has long been deemed by advocates 
of blasphemy legislation to be tantamount to hatred—and indeed ethnic 
minorities, with a history of displaying intolerance to any slight to their 
religions will view it as such. To my mind, legislators were aware of this fact 
but nevertheless pushed ahead with the Bill as the fulfilment of a manifesto 
commitment and the appeasement, above all, of the Muslim community. 
The Act is, in fact, the extension of “race” to include “religion,” which 
explains why it is termed the Racial and Religious Hatred Act—a product of 
the mindset that had become embedded under multiculturalism.
Contrary to what critics of the Act might have expected, there have been 
few instances of recourse to this Act since it came into force, and when it 
has been invoked claims under it have not been successful. A well known 
case is that of the Christian hoteliers. A devout Christian couple, Ben and 
Sharon Vogelenzang, were charged with insulting a Muslim guest because 
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of her religion. The victim, Mrs Tazi, “claimed the couple became enraged 
when she wore a hijab on her last day and accused Mr Vogelenzang, 53, of 
asking her if she was a murderer and a terrorist. She also told the court Mr 
Vogelenzang called the Prophet Muhammad a murderer and a warlord and 
likened him to Saddam Hussein and Hitler.” Though the couple denied this 
version of events, “Mr Vogelenzang admitted that his wife may have referred 
to the hijab as a form of bondage.” Although the Crown Prosecution Service 
(CPS) was satisfied there had been sufficient evidence for a successful 
prosecution, the judge dismissed the case on the grounds that the evidence 
against the hoteliers was “inconsistent.”30
The case did, however, send the signal that the CPS was willing to invoke 
the Racial and Religious Hatred Act, and so despite its failure to achieve a 
conviction, a cautionary approach is likely to have been taken in society at 
large, not least in the arts and political communities.
A similar case to that of the hoteliers arose in Northern Ireland (where 
the Act does not apply), but with a much clearer outcome. An evangelical 
preacher, James McConnell, was charged with calling Islam “satanic” and 
“heathen” and a “doctrine spawned in hell” in a sermon he gave in August 
2015. But the case failed as “the judge hearing the case, said it was ‘not the 
task of the criminal law to censor offensive utterances…The courts need 
to be very careful not to criticise speech which, however contemptible, is 
no more than offensive…Accordingly, I find Pastor McConnell not guilty 
of both charges.’ The right to freedom of expression ‘includes the right to 
say things or express opinions that offend, shock or disturb the state or any 
section of the population,’ he said.”31
The interesting point about the McConnell case is that the judge’s defence 
of freedom of expression stems directly from Resolution 1510 passed in 2006 
by the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe (PACE), whose 
article 1 stipulates:32
30 BBC News, ‘Christian hoteliers cleared in Muslim woman abuse row’, 9 December 2009, available 
at: http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/england/merseyside/8404212.stm.
31 H. Sherwood, ‘Pastor who said Islam was “doctrine spawned in hell” is cleared by court’, 5 January 
2016, available at: http://www.theguardian.com/world/2016/jan/05/pastor-who-said-islam-was-
doctrine-spawned-in-hell-is-cleared-by-court.
32 This resolution was, itself, derived from the Handyside case. See European Court of Human Rights, 
Handyside v. The United Kingdom, 7 December 1976.
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The Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe reaffirms that 
there cannot be a democratic society without the fundamental right to 
freedom of expression. The progress of society and the development of 
every individual depend on the possibility of receiving and imparting 
information and ideas. This freedom is not only applicable to 
expressions that are favourably received or regarded as inoffensive but 
also to those that may shock, offend or disturb the state or any sector 
of the population, in accordance with Article 10 of the European 
Convention on Human Rights.33
A further point of note regarding this case is whether the claim would have 
reached the threshold of the Racial and Religious Hatred Act; if so, then the 
Act is in obvious breach of the above resolution. A surprising aspect of the 
case is that an imam from London, Muhammad Al Hussaini, defended the 
verdict, arguing that the judiciary should not criminalise speech, “however 
distressing it might be,” unless it provokes violence, and that it is now 
“time for reflection on the kind of language that would be appropriate for 
ministers of religion like myself - Muslim, Jewish and Christian ministers.”34 
This is a very rare instance of a Muslim leader who, rather than calling for 
the protection of Islam against blasphemy and invoking the multiculturalist 
defence of misrecognition and harm, instead defends freedom of expression. 
But his stance is not likely to be welcomed by imams at large, or other Muslim 
leaders in Britain. An example of this is the Muslim Action Forum (MAF) 
which is attempting to bring about a new blasphemy law, as was made clear 
in a press release on 8 February 2015:
Muslim Action Forum (MAF) has devised a legal strategy to prevent 
the continuous insulting and derogatory publications depicting 
and abusing the personality of our Holy Prophet Muhammad peace 
be upon Him. This strategy and campaign will have taken its first 
historical step by presenting a petition supported by over 100 000 
signatures of Muslims promoting the concept of Global Civility and 
33 Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe [PACE] (2006) ‘Resolution 1510: Freedom of 
expression and respect for religious beliefs’, available at: http://assembly.coe.int/nw/xml/XRef/Xref-
XML2HTML-en.asp?fileid=17457&lang=en.
34 BBC News, ‘Pastor James McConnell: Imam welcomes court ruling’, 6 January 2016, available at: 
http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-northern-ireland-35241555.
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condemning the continuous publication of these insulting cartoons in 
France and other parts of the world.
MAF intends to launch a series of legal challenges in the English Court 
system to establish that such depictions of our Holy Prophet peace be 
upon Him is the worst kind of ‘Hate Crime’ that can be perpetrated on 
the 3 million Muslims in the UK and 1.7 billion Muslims worldwide. 
We shall support this strategy through amendment of some existing 
legislation and the presentation of a Private Members Bill that 
promotes this idea of Global Civility.35
The defence of “global civility” adds to the lexicon of reasons for curbing 
freedom of expression in a multifaith society in which the minimum 
requirement is not to give offence to adherents to religions.
In 2008, MPs voted to support the abolition of the law on blasphemy in 
an amendment to the Criminal Justice and Immigration Bill. Maria Eagle, 
the junior justice minister, made the reasons clear in the debate: “These 
offences have now largely fallen into disuse and therefore run the risk of 
bringing the law into disrepute. Given that these laws protect only the tenets 
of the Christian Churches, they would appear to be plainly discriminatory.”36 
Recognising this to be true, the Churches did not voice opposition, so the bill 
passed without any rancour—now making all religions equal before the law 
and confining the offence of blasphemy to the history books.
Also, in Northern Ireland, a play satirising the Bible by The Reduced 
Shakespeare Company entitled The Bible: The Complete Word of God (Abridged) 
was banned by a council because it was deemed to be blasphemous. But after 
a campaign against the ban by other councillors, local artists, comedians, 
writers and Amnesty International, the council, rather than seeking recourse 
to legal action, reversed its decision.37 
35 Muslim Action Forum, Press Release, 8 February 2015, available at: http://www.
muslimactionforum.com/Press_Release_8thFeb.pdf.
36 M. Beckford, “Blasphemy laws are lifted’” The Telegraph, 10 May 2008, available at: http://www.
telegraph.co.uk/news/1942668/Blasphemy-laws-are-lifted.html.
37 H. McDonald, ‘The Bible – the show goes on in Belfast’, The Guardian, 29 January 2014, available at: 
http://www.theguardian.com/uk-news/2014/jan/29/the-bible-reduced-shakespeare-company-belfast.
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unIVersItIes, “safe spaces,” and censOrshIp
In recent years in Britain, universities have adopted the principle of “safe 
spaces” on campuses, an idea and practice taken from American universities 
where it was applied initially to protect lesbian, gay, bisexual and transgender 
(LGBT) students from harassment and violence—and then applied to all 
students. In Britain, safe spaces are designed to provide a safe, protective 
campus environment to vulnerable students in particular, in the main, 
ethnic-religious minorities and LGBT students. It is policed by the students’ 
unions and entails “no-platforming” of speakers who are deemed a threat to 
such supposedly vulnerable students. The origins of the no-platform policy 
lie in preventing known fascists from speaking on campus; but the bans 
have spread to various other categories of speakers, and this has aroused 
increasing disquiet and controversy. A recent case is that of the well-known 
academic and feminist Germaine Greer, who was prevented from speaking 
at Cardiff University in the autumn of 2015 on the grounds that she is hostile 
to transsexuals.38
In regard to religion, students’ unions, led by the National Union of 
Students, operate a policy of preventing what they consider to be offensive 
and disturbing—in effect, blasphemous—to the religions of ethnic minority 
students. As in the wider society, this particularly applies to Islam. Three 
examples illustrate the policy at work. The first occurred in October 2013, 
at the LSE Freshers’ Fair, at which the Students’ Union, supported by a 
representative of LSE’s legal and compliance team and its head of security, 
forced two members of the LSE Atheist, Secularist and Humanist Society to 
remove their “Jesus and Mo” T-shirts (which depict, in cartoon form, Jesus 
Christ and the prophet Mohammed) on the ground that this created “an 
offensive atmosphere” and could constitute “harassment” of Muslim (but 
not Christian) students.39 This reasoning implied that such “harassment” 
was deemed to be “Islamophobic” but, interestingly, not “Christophobic.” 
After vigorous campaigning and threat of legal action, the Director of the 
38 A. Andrew, “Is free speech in British universities under threat?”, Observer, 24 January 2016, available 
at: http://www.theguardian.com/world/2016/jan/24/safe-spaces-universities-no-platform-free-
speech-rhodes.
39 T. Mendelsohn, ‘Sanctimonious little prigs’: Richard Dawkins wades into row as LSE atheist society 
‘banned from wearing satirical Jesus and Prophet Mohamed T-shirts’, The Independent, 7 October 
2013, available at: http://www.independent.co.uk/student/news/sanctimonious-little-prigs-richard-
dawkins-wades-into-row-as-lse-atheist-society-banned-from-wearing-8864618.html.
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LSE, who had supported the action by the Students’ Union, apologised to the 
two students; but the Students’ Union refused to do so.40
The second example concerns the attempts to silence the ex-Muslim 
campaigner Maryam Namazie from speaking at Warwick University in 
September 2015. The Students’ Union initially barred her from speaking at 
an event organised by the Warwick Atheist Secularist and Humanist Society 
due to fears that her speech would “incite hatred” against Muslim students. 
The Union’s reasons for censorship were the familiar ones found in the safe 
space, multiculturalist discourse: “after researching both [Ms Namazie] 
and her organisation, a number of flags have been raised. We have a duty of 
care to conduct a risk assessment for each speaker who wishes to come to 
campus.” According to the Union, the articles written by Ms Namazie showed 
that she was “highly inflammatory” and “could incite hatred on campus.”41 
But, after public pressure, Warwick’s Students’ Union rescinded the ban and 
allowed Namazie to speak and, unlike the LSE’s Students’ Union, offered a 
full apology for its censorial action, basing it on a procedural breakdown.42
The third example again concerns Maryam Namazie. She was invited to 
speak at Goldsmiths College, London, in December 2015, by the college’s 
Atheist Secular and Humanist Society (ASH). Whilst giving her talk on 
Islam and apostasy, members of the Goldsmiths Islamic Society (ISoc) 
who attended the event resorted to heckling, abuse and interruptions. As 
Namazie explains: “After my talk began, ISOC ‘brothers’ started coming into 
the room, repeatedly banging the door, falling on the floor, heckling me, 
playing on their phones, shouting out, and creating a climate of intimidation 
in order to try and prevent me from speaking.”
ISoc claimed that they had asked Goldsmiths ASH Society not to invite 
Namazie on the grounds that she was “a notorious Islamophobe” and that 
“the university should be a safe space for all our students. Islamophobic 
40 National Secular Society, “NSS welcomes LSE apology over Jesus & Mo debacle’, 19 December 2013, 
available at: http://www.secularism.org.uk/news/2013/12/victory-for-free-expression-as-lse-issue-
public-apology-over-jesus-and-mo-controversy.
41 S. Sandhu, “Maryam Namazie: Secular activist barred from speaking at a student union event due 
to fears her speech would “incite hatred” against Muslim students’, Independent, 25 September 2015, 
available at: http://www.independent.co.uk/news/uk/home-news/maryam-namazie-secular-activist-
barred-from-speaking-at-warwick-university-over-fears-of-inciting-10517296.html-0.
42 S. Gilbert, ‘Ex-Muslim speaker’s Warwick University ban overturned following public pressure’, 
Coventry Telegraph, 27 September 2015, available at: http://www.coventrytelegraph.net/news/
coventry-news/ex-muslim-speakers-warwick-university-10145068.
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views like those propagated by Namazie create a climate of hatred and 
bigotry towards Muslim students.”43
What is curious and somewhat disturbing about the Goldsmiths case is 
that the college’s Feminist and LGBQT Societies, rather than supporting 
Namazie—a defender of women’s and gay rights—condemned her and 
expressed solidarity with the misogynistic and homophobic Islamic Society. 
The former issued the following statement: “Goldsmiths Feminist Society 
stands in solidarity with Goldsmiths Islamic Society. We support them in 
condemning the actions of the Atheist, Secularist and Humanist Society and 
agree that hosting known Islamophobes at our university creates a climate of 
hatred.”44 This astonishing position by two self-styled “progressive” societies 
is likely to be typical of that obtaining in British universities in general. 
Hence, under the umbrella of “safe spaces,” Islamic Societies are aggressively 
demanding censorship of speakers who are critical of Islam, and are being 
assisted in this regressive stance by societies who should be championing 
freedom of expression and freedom from oppression. It is indubitably the 
case that the hold of multicultural thinking has fully permeated the ranks 
of institutions that should be at the forefront of critical thinking and debate. 
Joana Williams forcefully argues that this conformist approach is contrary to 
the aims of evaluating existing knowledge, and of proposing new knowledge, 
and so is harmful to learning.45
The unholy alliance between Islamists, students’ unions, and feminist and 
gay rights groups to suppress free speech in universities is, in effect, similar 
to the effort by the 57-nation Organisation of Islamic Countries (OIC) to pass 
a non-binding resolution at the UN against the defamation of religion.46 The 
43 A. Ali, ‘Muslim students from Goldsmiths University’s Islamic Society ‘heckle and aggressively 
interrupt’ Maryam Namazie talk’, The Independent, 4 December 2015, available at: http://www.
independent.co.uk/student/news/muslim-students-from-goldsmiths-university-s-islamic-society-
heckle-and-aggressively-interrupt-a6760306.html.
44 A. Andrew, “Is free speech in British universities under threat?”, Observer, 24 January 2016, available 
at: http://www.theguardian.com/world/2016/jan/24/safe-spaces-universities-no-platform-free-
speech-rhodes.
45 See J. Williams, Academic Freedom in an Age of Conformity: Confronting the Fear of Knowledge 
(Houndmills, Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2016).
46 See for a discussion R. Hasan, ‘Muslim identity, psychic detachment, and universal rights’, in A. 
Carling A (ed.), The Social Equality of Religion or Belief: A New View of Religion’s Place in Society 
(Houndmills, Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2016), 137-149. 
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OIC opposes two articles (18 and 19) of the Universal Declaration of Human 
Rights which directly conflict with Sharia law in all its variants:
Article 18: Everyone has the right to freedom of thought, conscience 
and religion; this right includes freedom to change his religion or 
belief, and freedom, either alone or in community with others and 
in public or private, to manifest his religion or belief in teaching, 
practice, worship and observance;
Article 19: Everyone has the right to freedom of opinion and expression; 
this right includes freedom to hold opinions without interference and 
to seek, receive and impart information and ideas through any media 
and regardless of frontiers.47
A further point worth highlighting is that in contrast to Amnesty 
International’s principled opposition to the banning of the play The Bible: The 
Complete Word of God (Abridged), Amnesty has never publicly offered support 
to those satirising or critiquing Islam as in the above three instances, nor has 
it provided an explanation for this double standard. One surmises that this 
is because of its multicultural sensitivities whereby offence caused to ethnic 
minorities always trumps offence caused to the majority white population.
the medIa and selectIVe self-censOrshIp
The situation is little better in the media, where there is a long history of 
selective self-censorship. The most graphic example of this was the refusal 
by any mainstream media outlet to publish or show the Danish cartoons 
when the controversy exploded in 2005. Similarly, most did not show the 
front page of the special issue of Charlie Hebdo after the murderous attacks 
on its staff and offices in Paris in January 2015 (with a sorrowful Mohammad 
holding a banner “Je Suis Charie”). The same applies to the Jesus and Mo 
cartoons: whilst “Jesus” is happily shown, “Mo” is not. Muslims argue that 
Islam does not permit any representation of the prophet Mohammad, an 
injunction with which much of the media meekly complies so as not to cause 
offence. To paraphrase Samuel Johnson, “taking offence is now the first 
47 Universal Declaration of Human Rights (1948), available at: http://www.ohchr.org/EN/UDHR/
Documents/UDHR_Translations/eng.pdf.
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refuge of the censor”—but the offence taken by some, especially Muslims 
and ethnic minority adherents to other religions, is clearly given more 
serious consideration than offence taken by white Christians. 
cOncludIng remarks
Despite the law on blasphemy being repealed, and actions under the Racial 
and Religious Hatred Act having largely failed, the threat of censorship on 
the grounds of blasphemy remains. Where such censorship does take place, 
as in the examples above, it is only through campaigning in combination 
with publicity that banning orders are reversed. This is indicative of the fact 
that the authorities and other important organisations concerned—that 
is, national and local governments, as well as the mainstream media and 
university bodies—have not taken a principled stand in defence of freedom 
of expression. Rather, the reflex position is to censor works that are thought 
to blaspheme the religions of ethnic minorities. In this, they not only fail 
robustly to comply with the PACE Resolution 1510 cited above, but they 
dismiss timeless principles set out long ago by Voltaire and John Stuart Mill. 
In a famous remark attributed to him by his biographer, Evelyn Beatrice 
Hall, Voltaire set the true test for freedom of expression: “I disapprove of 
what you say, but I will defend to the death your right to say it.” In On Liberty 
Mill firmly rebukes opponents of “free discussion” and lays down a clear 
principle that free societies should adopt:
Strange it is that men should admit the argument for free discussion, 
but object to their being ‘pushed to an extreme’; not seeing that unless 
the reasons are good for an extreme case, they are not good for any 
case. Strange that they should imagine that they are not assuming 
infallibility, when they acknowledge that there should be free 
discussion on all subjects which can possibly be doubtful, but think 
that some particular principle or doctrine should be forbidden to be 
questioned because it so certain, that is, because they are certain that 
it is certain.48
Given the present reality, it is not unduly surprising to find that at the end of 
2013, writer and Python Michael Palin lamented on BBC Radio 4: “religion 
48 J.S. Mill, On Liberty and Other Essays (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008 (1859)), 29.
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is more difficult to talk about. I don’t think we could do Life of Brian any 
more. A parody of Islam would be even harder.”49 In other words, to all 
intents and purposes, the offence of blasphemy still exists. To return to the 
situation of four decades ago, that is, before society adopted the suffocating 
strictures of multiculturalism, will require courage and determination on 
the part of the artistic community, with support from politicians—and the 
mainstream media and the academy will need to join in this supremely 
important endeavour.
49 A. Glennie, ‘You can’t parody Islam, says Palin: Monty Python star believes religious sensitivities 
have increased so much it would be impossible to make Life of Brian today’, The Daily Mail, 
30 December 2013, available at: http://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-2530920/You-parody-
Islam-says-Palin-Monty-Python-star-believes-religious-sensitivities-increased-impossible-make-Life-
Brian-today.html#ixzz42LoV41fU.
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